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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Functions of Theory in Our Times 
 
 
 
 
 
The act of self-reflection that ‘changes a life’ is a movement of emancipation (Habermas 
1987: 212). 
 
One of the Jürgen Habermas’s early, key concerns was to demonstrate that 
human interests precede knowledge (‘knowledge-constitutive interests’) (e.g. 
1987: 69, 189, 198, 211, 289). As Peter Dews puts it, ‘Habermas’s strategy in this 
book [Knowledge and Human Interests (1968)] is to show that the basic conceptual 
structures of human knowledge are determined by interests which are deeply 
anchored in the social existence of human beings as such’ (1999: 7). This means 
precisely that Habermas aimed to uphold social theory based on the ‘eman- 
cipatory cognitive interest’ by differentiating it from positivism, pragmatism, 
historicism and hermeneutics based on the ‘technical and practical cognitive 
interests’ (1987: e.g. 198), taking over the core intellectual tradition of Critical 
Theory. In fact, this implies that Habermas declared that he inherited Max 
Horkheimer’s early position represented by ‘Traditional and Critical Theory’ 
(1937), which had contended that ‘the self-knowledge of present-day man is not 
a mathematical knowledge of nature which claims to be the eternal Logos, but a 
critical theory of society as it is, a theory dominated at every turn by a concern 
for reasonable conditions of life’ (2002b: 198-9). 
    It is important to note, however, that Horkheimer did not completely reject 
the raison d’être of traditional theories, while the intention of his above article 
was to criticise their theoretical tendency as harmful to our ‘mind’ (2002b: 223). 
On this view, rather, what he stresses is as follows: 
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Today . . . in the transition from the present form of society to a future one mankind will for 
the first time be a conscious subject and actively determine its own way of life. There is still 
need of a conscious reconstruction of economic relationships. Indiscriminate hostility to 
theory, therefore, is a hindrance today. Unless there is continued theoretical effort, in the 
interest of a rationally organized future society, to shed critical light on present-day society 
and to interpret it in the light of traditional theories elaborated in the special sciences, the 
ground is taken from under the hope of radically improving human existence (2002b: 233). 
 
Horkheimer is a direct heir of Hegel in the sense that he attempts to lead theory 
to perform its functions in the way of ‘seek[ing] autonomy or man’s control 
over his own life no less than over nature’ for ‘recogniz[ing] this same tendency 
as a force operative in history’ (2002b: 223). In this respect, he is in favour of 
dialectic, taking the view that theory undergoes not only a ‘logical process’ but 
also a ‘concrete historical one’ (2002b: 211). In Horkheimer’s view, ‘both the 
subject and the role of thought are changed’ by enabling theory to fulfil the 
theoretical function of dialectic (2002b: 211). Only Critical Theory distinguished 
from every traditional theory, he highlights, can undertake these theoretical and 
historical tasks. 
    What, then, did Habermas primarily intend by introducing psychoanalysis in 
his early work? As Dews says, it was to defend a ‘“transcendental deduction” of 
the emancipatory interest’, showing that psychoanalytic therapy aims at 
patients’ ‘self-reflection’ and ‘emancipation’ by distinguishing psychoanalysis 
from ‘causal-explanatory and hermeneutic (interpretive) knowledge’ (1999: 8-9). 
Dews, referring to Karl-Otto Apel, defines the two significations of ‘self-
reflection’ in Habermas’s sense, which had first been suggested by Apel, and 
which was later accepted by Habermas: first, it ‘involves the explanation of the 
universal conditions of forms of knowledge and practice in general – for example, the 
identification of the cognitive interests’; second, it ‘takes the form of a breaking 
down of the specific constraints and barriers to self-knowledge which have marred an 
individual life history (as in psychoanalysis), or possibly a collective history (as 
in the critique of ideology)’ (1999: 10; emphases added). With regard to this cru- 
cial point, Dews reminds us of Habermas’s two distinct forms of self-reflection, 
which were clarified in ‘A Postscript to Knowledge and Human Interests’ (1971): 
‘critique’ (Kritik) and ‘reconstruction’ (Nachkonstruktion) (1999: 11). On this view, 
Habermas defended the former by comparing it with the latter, dividing them 
up into three meanings: first, critique is ‘brought to bear on objects of expe- 
rience whose pseudo-objectivity is to be revealed, whereas reconstructions are 
based on “objective” data such as sentences, actions, cognitive insights, etc.’; 
second, critique ‘is brought to bear on something particular – concretely spea- 
king, on the particular self-formative process of an ego, or group, identity – 
whereas reconstructions try to understand anonymous systems of rules’; and 
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third, critique ‘is characterized by its ability to make unconscious elements 
conscious in a way which has practical consequences’, and it ‘changes the 
determinants of false consciousness, whereas reconstructions explicate correct 
knowhow . . . without involving practical consequences’ (1987: 378).1 From the 
perspective of his sense of critique, it is evident that Habermas’s social theory is 
based on the above second form of self-reflection. That is to say, it is not causal-
explanation-oriented nor interpretation-oriented but emancipation-oriented the- 
ory. In other words, his social theory aims to reveal ‘pseudo-objectivity’, to 
clarify the ‘particular self-formative process of identity’, and to bring an uncon- 
scious state to consciousness for altering the ‘determinants of false conscious- 
ness’; these tasks are the exact functions of critique. If Habermas’s early position 
is still relevant, then I have a strong reason to adhere to the tradition of Critical 
Theory which has concerned itself with the realisation of self-reflection and 
emancipation by way of critique, that is with the achievement of Mündigkeit.2 
 
Main research topics 
My research re-introduces two social and political thinkers, Erich Fromm (1900-
80) and Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003). It would seem that there is no need to go into 
any detail about the former. He has been generally regarded as a German-
American social psychologist who integrated Marx’s historical materialism with 
Freud’s instinct theory by way of Weberian sociology. The latter is most com- 
monly regarded as a Japanese political thinker who focused on the study of the 
Tennō system (Tennōsei) as a Japanese system of government. As we shall see 
later, it appears that Fromm and Fujita share no link, in the sense of different 
disciplines and historical backgrounds. Despite these clear differences, however, 
their academic works have much in common in some respects. First, they both 
concern themselves with psychoanalytic theory with a focus on the concept of 
‘narcissism’ in the social range. Second, they are both in favour of some imp- 
ortant theoretical tools and components of philosophy, such as ‘dialectic’ and 
‘immanent critique’. Third, they warn against the contemporary tendency and 
attitude to be indifferent to others and things that do not concern oneself and to 
exploit others to one’s own advantage in terms of one’s unconscious narcissistic 
state of mind. Perhaps the first and third common viewpoints are profoundly 
associated with their contemporaneousness, as both lived chiefly in the twen- 
tieth century. In other words, their standpoints are concerned with contempo- 
rary phenomena widely seen in many industrialised societies, and it is therefore 
quite natural that both theorists should lay stress on these two perspectives, 
particularly taking account of their academic foundations. Apart from these two 
examples of common grounds, it should be noted that the second common 
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point of view is also related to their similar academic backgrounds. Roughly 
speaking, both Fromm and Fujita absorbed their intellectual knowledge pri- 
marily from Hegel, Marx and Freud. From this perspective, it is not surprising 
that they have similar theoretical ingredients. In this respect, it is even possible 
to believe that they are exact heirs of traditional Critical Theory in favour of the 
task of achieving Mündigkeit, even though many scholars are opposed to this 
view of their works despite Fromm’s early contributions to the Institute for 
Social Research and Fujita’s theoretical components capturing the essence of 
critique. 
    Having said that, my research shines a light not only on their positive 
theoretical conventions but also on the common negative ingredients in their 
theories of narcissism. Both their standpoints regard narcissism as a major 
hindrance to social life. For this reason, we have considerable difficulty in 
dealing with the problem and therefore in curing the disease by applying their 
social and political theories due to the fact that narcissism is one of the most 
fundamental human needs.3 For the purpose of surmounting this theoretical 
aporia, I introduce Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which is in favour of 
and accepts the desire and existence of narcissism concerning human nature. 
On the basis of his stance on narcissism, as we shall see below, my research 
examines how we perceive and experience our democratic life. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1 Although Shapiro’s translation employs the term ‘criticism’, for this word I follow Dews’s 
interpretation of the German Kritik (1999: 11). 
  2 This term can be translated with the English ‘maturity’. According to Dews, it ‘is often 
translated as “autonomy” and “responsibility”’ (1999: 9). 
  3 My research regards narcissism not simply as man’s personality traits or attributes but rather 
as man’s need. 
Part I 
 
Methodology
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Political Theory in Our Times 
 
 
 
 
 
The future of humanity depends on the existence today of the critical attitude, which of 
course contains within it elements from traditional theories and from our declining culture 
generally (Horkheimer 2002b: 242). 
 
In the first part, primarily I will critically reflect on the methodology of political 
theory. The necessity of carrying out this task is explained by the fact that laying 
the foundations of the discipline are one of the primary aims of my research, in 
addition to an exploration of the two political thoughts and the introduction of 
the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism, as mentioned before, and it would 
seem that, for that purpose, it is necessary to tackle to a certain extent some 
important methodological issues of political theory, and to identify some pos- 
sible functions of the discipline. In this part, most importantly, I want to clarify 
what contemporary society expects of ‘theory’ through the above investigations. 
For performing this task, I will first consider methods my research applies and 
relies on, next conduct a brief survey of methodological issues of political theory, 
and finally identify the relevance of the discipline. With respect to some pri- 
mary methodological issues of the discipline, I have given a detailed description 
of what political theory needs for its own disciplinary development, apart from 
the main subject of my research (Appendix 1: ‘Political Theory as an Academic 
Discipline’). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 
 
How to Conduct Research 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The Theme of Narcissism: 
Between Political Theory and Psychoanalysis 
 
As we shall see later, issues connecting politics with psychology or psycho- 
analysis have been raised primarily in the field of political psychology – they 
have provided the standpoint that tries to see political phenomena by applying 
psychological or psychoanalytic theories, and this task has been undertaken by 
psychologists (see Ch. 3, s. 2). The theme of narcissism, however, has rather 
been tackled almost exclusively in the field of psychoanalysis. Presumably, this 
is because, despite the fact that the concept is derived from the Greek myth, 
‘Narcissus story’, and that it began with the description of man’s sexual 
condition, since Sigmund Freud first gave a systematic psychoanalytic account 
of the notion in his ‘On Narcissism’ (1914), primarily his followers have deve- 
loped it into a more psychoanalytically rigid concept meaning a personality 
trait and a personality disorder (see App. 2). 
 
Narcissism in the social sciences 
Having said that, as we will see later, the subject has also been introduced to 
social studies and addressed by major scholars in the humanities and social 
sciences, amongst them Erich Fromm, Theodor W. Adorno, Charles Taylor and 
Richard Sennett. On the whole, their common intention of adopting the term 
narcissism to their research is to tackle social problems containing pathological 
phenomena which have come into existence specifically in contemporary soci- 
ety. In particular, Fromm as a social theorist and a psychoanalyst raised the 
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significant issue of ‘social narcissism’ (or ‘group narcissism’) particularly in 
terms of extreme forms of politics such as fascism by elaborating the concept 
which had been regarded merely as an individual phenomenon (1964: ch. 4; 
also see Ch. 4, s. 1 and Ch. 6, s. 3).1 The Japanese political thinker Shōzō Fujita 
also tackled a similar issue to Fromm’s, specifically in terms of the ‘society of 
the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei shakai) and ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi), as we can 
see his discussion of the topic particularly in his writings ‘Narushizumu kara no 
dakkyaku’ (To Break Free from Narcissism) (1983) and ‘Anraku e no 
zentaishugi’ (Totalitarianism to Unruffled Ease) (1985) (e.g. 1997e; also see Ch. 5, 
ss. 1-5 below). Seemingly, however, no one has so far tried to largely address 
the theme of so-called ‘social narcissism’ with the exception of the above two 
theorists. 
 
Political theory and psychoanalysis 
Themes connecting political theory with psychoanalysis have been undertaken 
primarily by Cornelius Castoriadis, Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Žižek, Axel Honneth, 
James M. Glass, C. Fred Alford, José Brunner and Joel Whitebook, in addition to 
the theorists noted above.2 It would seem that, while their works draw ins- 
piration primarily from the leading figures of the Frankfurt School, such as 
Horkheimer, Adorno and Herbert Marcuse, Castoriadis, Žižek and Laclau are 
under the strong influence of Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis in particular. 
Amongst others, Glass’s Psychosis and Power: Threats to Democracy in the Self and 
the Group (1995) and Brunner’s Freud and the Politics of Psychoanalysis (2001) can 
be regarded as representative works in this subject which deal with the sign- 
ificant issue of applying Freud’s psychoanalysis directly to topics of political 
theory. Recently, Lene Auestad’s Psychoanalysis and Politics: Exclusion and the 
Politics of Representation (ed., 2012), for example, reconsiders social hatred from 
the perspective of Freud’s theory of narcissism, and also addresses a variety of 
political issues such as Islamism and xenophobia, racism and Nazism, and 
colonialism, postcolonialism and hospitality, from some other psychoanalytic 
perspectives. Also, Yannis Sravrakakis’s The Lacanian Left: Psychoanalysis, Theory, 
and Politics (2007) significantly argues how Lacanian psychoanalysis functions 
in political theory in relation to democracy. 
    It seems to me, however, that the theme linking political theory and psy- 
choanalysis is still underdeveloped in the sense that seemingly there are not 
any systematic and structured analytic devices specific to its subject, while cer- 
tain psychoanalytic methods and approaches, such as Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theories, respectively separately exist. In this respect, it should 
be noted that it is necessary to come up with some specific approaches for tack- 
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ling issues lying between both academic fields, and for enabling us to approach 
them from both sides at the same time. 
 
Narcissism in political theory 
To what extent, then, should my research be involved in research into the 
psychoanalytic topic of narcissism in respect of the disciplinary framework? No 
doubt, it particularly concerns the theory of recognition and also some other 
important theoretical schemes, such as identity, toleration, morality and ethics, 
lying between political theory and social theory. Moreover, it concerns some 
existential forms of social norms, especially how they are directly associated 
with individual personality and psychology, and vice versa, and how they inv- 
olve laying individual psychological foundations, and vice versa. The theore- 
tical framework of a social and political theory of narcissism my research puts 
forward will contribute to finding new ways of understanding and dealing with 
issues particularly concerning the contemporary form of society and individ- 
uals. 
    As noted above, although certain scholars in the realm of political theory 
have tackled psychoanalytic, political issues, the many have nevertheless been 
careless about the topic of narcissism in general in the academic field and in 
some relevant fields after the two theorists dealt to a large extent with it – thus, 
they have resulted in disrespecting Fromm’s and Fujita’s theories of narcissism, 
needless to say. In fact, no one has been intensely interested in narcissism in a 
social range thereafter, as far as my survey is concerned. Not surprisingly, this 
means that those theories have not yet been developed, as opposed to their 
other theories. In this respect, it is worthwhile to re-introduce both theorists, 
who share the same perspective of ‘social narcissism’, focusing on their theories 
of narcissism and referencing psychoanalysis.3 
 
 
2.  Research Methods 
 
Methods 
Next, I want to clarify how to conduct research. First of all, it is important to 
make it clear that my research is essentially based on the methodological 
standpoint that political theory is ‘the theoretical activity that is concerned about 
politics, that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in politics, and that 
actually changes politics’, as we shall see in the next chapter (see Ch. 2, p. 20 
  How to Conduct Research 11 
below). In my view, political theory does devote itself not only to understan- 
ding and providing a new way of understanding a thinker’s text but also to 
being concerned with and theoretically and actually participating in politics; 
that is, my research is not satisfied only with dealing with some issues of a 
thinker and his work, but rather it aims to see them in order to consider and 
tackle actual political issues – from this perspective, it is expected that the 
vocation of political theory is to try to affect actual politics in a direct fashion. 
Through my research, I take this position and want to be an ‘epic theorist’ who 
tries to be involved in politics on the basis of his public concern, and a ‘political 
actor’ who regards himself as one essentially involved in politics, as much as 
possible (see Ch. 2, s. 2). 
    On the basis of the above stance, second, I want to suggest that the focus 
throughout will be on the philosophical and psychoanalytic concepts of ‘self’ 
and ‘other’. Actually, as we shall see later, the notion of narcissism means an 
essential need of human beings, on the one hand, and it means a psychological 
distance between the self and others, on the other. From the perspective of the 
concept, one’s relationship with others and its quality are determined speci- 
fically in accordance with a degree of the distance. To put it differently, it gives 
some significant criteria for seeing them. This method, then, will lead me to 
provide those criteria and a new way of seeing politics in terms of the idea, and 
moreover, to prepare to find and tackle its problems from some different pers- 
pectives, particularly through critically examining two political theories caring 
about the concept of narcissism. 
    And third, my research refers to Heinz Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which 
is expected to contribute to giving a new way of understanding politics. His 
psychology focuses on the self, and devotes itself to seeing that psychological 
structure – in this respect, it tries to grasp human beings in terms of the self, and 
thus, it is called ‘self psychology’. I am sure that his psychoanalysis will shed 
new light on some difficulties in contemporary politics on the grounds that it 
has great possibilities for helping to find some solutions to a theoretical impasse 
both Fromm and Fujita reached. 
 
Research framework and structure 
The first part discusses some methodological issues of political theory. Chapter 
2 attempts to define some possible tasks and functions of political theory. It 
identifies what the discipline deals with, focusing on the meanings of ‘political’ 
and ‘theory’; from this perspective, I seek what theory ought to be. Here I can 
discover what political theory is, and how and why it exists. This part shows, 
most importantly, identifies the functions of political theory. 
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    The second part lays the philosophical-anthropological foundation for my 
research, applying Kohut’s self psychology, which stresses the raison d’être of 
the ‘self’. In his psychoanalytic theory, all individuals come into being as nar- 
cissistic selves whose needs must be satisfied by others. Their selves are ext- 
remely vulnerable to psychological damage, and are therefore required to care 
about each other. This view of the individual explains why we are by nature 
oriented towards establishing intersubjective interpersonal relationships; other- 
wise, we lose the raison d’être of both the self and the other. Chapter 3 develops 
the methodological device of the ‘psychoanalytic self-other relationship’, in 
which individuals are not affected by power nor sui generis social facts; that is, 
they can break free from any social frameworks. The individual who has 
become the self can thereby freely communicate with others in his respective 
interpersonal relationships with them. Chapter 4 shows how narcissism is asso- 
ciated with politics, shining a light on Fromm’s and Kohut’s theories of nar- 
cissism. 
    The third part, regarded as the main part in my research, concerns some 
social and political issues regarding the discipline of political theory. It raises 
two thinkers, Fromm and Fujita, both of whom are potentially regarded as 
political theorists. In fact, their theories have great possibilities for gaining clues 
necessary to find solutions to the core contemporary social and political pro- 
blems that cause a mental disease of society. According to their view, our 
society is the world in which we have lost experience (Fujita 1997d: 17, 188-91; 
1997e: 15), that is to say, the ‘other’ (tasha) is dead, and in which ‘man is dead’ 
(Fromm 1956: 74, 360). In this place, the other comes into being as a simple 
means of fulfilling the needs of the self. The sole remedy for this disease, found 
throughout contemporary society, which both theorists provide, is to overcome 
narcissism by facing our respective narcissistic needs as a major hindrance to 
healthy politics. In this way, basically, they reject the intrinsic human need of 
narcissism, and both their theories thereby fall into moral and ethical theories. 
To be sure, it seems that we have lost all cures to the disease that can be 
obtained from their political theories. I emphasise, however, that it is not 
beyond the realm of possibility to treat ‘social narcissism’, as Fromm calls it 
(1964: ch. 4). A possible effective way of achieving this objective is to apply 
Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, which tries to respond to the demands of the 
narcissistic self as a matter of first priority. From this perspective, the raison 
d’être of politics is to help the self to escape suffering. From Kohut’s psycho- 
analytic viewpoint, however, it is understood that narcissism is the state of the self 
who has not yet glued himself to others. This view, most importantly, enables us to 
see that narcissism is by no means an obstacle to both the self and politics, and 
that the task of politics is exactly to glue the self onto the other. 
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    I arrive at the provocative conclusion that the primary functions of political 
theory are to prevent the unconscious violence, which is hidden beneath the 
injured self, from leading itself to repress and depress the self and the other and 
to establish intersubjective relationships. 
    Every chapter is designed to be to a certain extent independent of the others, 
and it is therefore possible to read them individually. Readers are expected to 
begin reading in accordance with their respective concerns. It is more useful, 
however, to read in front-to-back order. My research is directed towards the 
self-reflection of knowledge and politics in the precise early Habermas’s sense. 
What we can do in current disciplinary and social conditions is definitely not to 
draw attention to epidemic theories and topics, but to reflect upon our society 
and existence, and to try to find an effective solution for overcoming the current 
difficult situation through disciplinary endeavour. In this respect, it must be 
stressed that whether it is of value to raise an obsolete and forgotten theory 
from the ashes depends heavily upon one’s capacity for imagination. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1 It should be noted that he used and gave a systematic account of the term narcissism to his 
social studies at the latest in his work Man for himself: An Inquiry into the Psychology of 
Ethics (1947). 
  2 In this subject, e.g. the Journals Psychoanalysis, Culture & Society and The Journal of Psycho-
Social Studies can serve as a useful reference for understanding and developing the topic. 
  3 With regard to research on the respective theorists, I will refer to preceding works on them in 
Chapters 5 and 6. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
The Contemporary Relevance of Political Theory 
 
 
 
 
 
You must take responsibility to bring explosion-affected persons (hibakusha) happiness and 
meaning (Ernest J. Sternglass).1 
 
 
1.  Problems 
 
Political theorists are often silent on questions of method and approach. While scholars in 
other branches of political and social sciences expend great energy debating the right way 
to conduct research . . . political theorists generally spend little time addressing questions 
of ‘how’ and ‘why’ in their work. Instead, they dive straight into their analysis, turning 
immediately to the task at hand . . . (Leopold and Stears 2008b: 1).2 
 
The above statement clearly denotes a lack of methodological reflection in the 
academic discipline of political theory.3 This view seems appropriate in the 
sense that other political theorists also highlight the fact, offering solid evidence 
of it.4 As David Leopold and Marc Stears put it, ‘the study of methods and 
approaches . . . might reveal crucial insights into the nature, point, and purpose 
of the discipline itself’ (2008b: 3). In this sense, it is no doubt particularly 
important for every academic discipline to tackle their respective methodolo- 
gical issues and to try to develop their own methods and approaches. From this 
perspective, it might seem necessary that, similarly, political theory should deal 
with the issues of how and why. However, it is not simple to address them in the 
discipline: first, because of its disciplinary characteristics – e.g. ‘interdisciplinary’ 
and ‘cross-disciplinary’ characters (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 6, 34); second, because 
we can presume that political theory still remains underdeveloped – e.g. the exp- 
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ression of ‘unapologetically mongrel sub-discipline’ describes the fact (Dryzek et 
al. 2006b: 5; emphases added). 
  How should we consider these troublesome problems besetting political 
theory? It seems to me that Daniel McDermott’s methodological view of poli- 
tical theory is relevant to a better understanding of these issues: ‘Analytical 
political philosophy is a complement to social science’ (2008: 11). In addition, 
John S. Dryzek et al. illuminate the importance of the methodological role of 
political theory in terms of the ‘philosophy of social science’ as follows: ‘political 
theorists are in an especially good position to mediate between the philosophy 
of social science on the one hand, and particular methods on the other’ (2006b: 
28). From these perspectives, political theory is intrinsically required to fulfil a 
sub-disciplinary role of the social sciences, and it can be validly argued that 
political theory itself is an approach to the social sciences. In short, taking acc- 
ount of the complementary and sub-disciplinary functions of political theory, it 
may rather be expected to play a predominantly methodological role. 
  Most importantly, the purpose of this part is to specify the role of political 
theory for finding core clues as to how to address issues of political theory. The 
aim of this survey is rather to dive into an exploration of what methods and 
approaches are more relevant to contemporary political theory. This examina- 
tion therefore aims primarily to contribute to laying the foundations of the 
methodology of political theory. 
 
 
2.  What Is Political Theory? 
 
As is well known, the explicit awareness of the phenomenon of politics began 
with the polis in ancient Greece, and politics, in this sense, originally meant the 
matters of the polis and the polis itself: ta politika (e.g. Heyking 2008: 319; Patzelt 
2007: 20; Schultze 2010: 746; Vincent 1997: 6). Thereafter, however, the concept 
of politics has been provided in a variety of ways – e.g. as can be seen from 
Elizabeth Frazer’s discussion (Frazer 2008). While nowadays we can see the 
plurality of the notion, in this respect, as seen from the political view of ‘social 
action’ the definition of politics relies heavily upon what component of politics 
one lays stress on (on this concept, see, e.g. Druwe 1987).5 
On the other hand, politics as an academic discipline has its origin in politikē 
epistēmē, rigorous knowledge concerning ta politika (e.g. Berg-Schlosser and 
Stammen 2003: 6-7; Patzelt 2007: 20). In addition, politics (hē politikē) in the polis, 
which is characteristically seen in Aristotle, was identical to philosophia politikē 
(political philosophy); the latter term equivalent to the former is in fact emp- 
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loyed by Aristotle himself in his Politics (Aristotle 1988: III. 12, 1282b23). In this 
sense, it can be validly argued that politics began with political philosophy. 
However, it is noted that the discipline of politics has transformed its own char- 
acteristics as a result of aspirations for natural science-based systematic scientific 
research especially since the twentieth century: from politics to political science – 
in this respect, the radical transformation of politics is a relatively recent event 
(e.g. Barrow 2008). Interestingly, despite the fact that this radical shift away to 
scientific studies had come to its climax with David Easton in the 1950s, the 
direction was later completely rejected by Easton himself. The academic disci- 
pline has to a large extent modified its own style thereafter as exemplified by 
the appearance of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971): the perceptible change 
in the disciplinary value that politics should be involved in value judgements. In 
this respect, it can be argued that Rawls’s work responds largely to Easton’s 
demands that political science should contribute to society, that it ought to 
include value judgements, and that political scientists must take responsibility 
for their behaviour. 
 
What kind of theoretical activity is political theory? 
What can we find out with respect to the activity of engaging in political theory 
from these perspectives? As far as the Japanese scholar of politics Masao 
Maruyama’s discussion is concerned, for example, the disciplinary activity of 
political theory is also a ‘political action’ (seijiteki jissen) (1969c: 238; [1995c: 149]) 
– on him, see App. 1, s. 4.6 According to him, in the ‘political world’ (seijiteki 
sekai) even ‘strict neutrality’ (gensei chūritsu) denotes a political stance (1969c: 
238; [1995c: 149]). For Maruyama, in this sense, even the task of carrying out an 
academic study is coloured by politics – in my view, nonetheless, everything is 
not completely eroded by politics in the place, and non-political space some- 
what remains.7 In these respects, scholars also become political actors through 
their academic works. From this perspective, the task of political theory must 
turn into one which is somewhat different from something we know. 
 
Political theory 
I hypothesise that it will be much better to rely upon the term ‘theory’ of the 
discipline’s name of political theory for identifying some functions and roles of 
the discipline. In my view, the term theory has a revolutionary sense in compa- 
rison with the term philosophy (see App. 1, pp. 211-3). According to Sheldon 
Wolin, the former arose not as an intellectual activity but as a response to real 
problems which resulted in classic theory (1968a: 320). He provides an account 
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of its meaning with another expression as follows: ‘Many of the great theories 
of the past arose in response to a crisis in the world, not in the community of 
theorists’ (1968b: 147; emphases added). In addition, Wolin points up the imp- 
lications of theory as follows: 
 
Throughout the history of Western political theory we find that most of the major theories 
have been produced during times of crisis, rarely during periods of normalcy. This phe- 
nomenon suggests that the major theories resemble ‘extraordinary science’: they are pro- 
duced when the operative political paradigm is encountering, not puzzles, but profound 
anomalies. Further, the major theories exhibit the same feature of extraordinary science: 
they seek to discredit the existing operative paradigm (1968b: 151; emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, he adds that the difference between ‘behavioural theory’ and 
‘traditional theory’ is equivalent to the distinction between ‘normal science’ 
and ’extraordinary science’, and therefore that the latter theory has much int- 
erest in ‘possible world’ and ‘jeopardises’ the existing paradigm (1968b: 152). 
Wolin lays stress on ‘traditional theory’ performing the function of changing the 
status quo. 
 
(a) Two intentions of studying political theory 
At this point I want to identify some possible functions of political theory. Here 
my enquiry is what we are doing and intending by engaging in political theory. In 
order to make this issue easier, I want to raise the following question: What is 
one doing when carrying out research on Rawls’s political theory? To put it 
another way, my question is whether (a) he is thereby intending to theoretically take 
part in actual politics by putting forward his political theory on the basis of Rawls’s 
theory, or whether (b) he is thereby merely studying Rawls’s political theory. What 
does it mean when his action is identified as the latter? Here we should con- 
sider the possible difference between political theory and the history of political 
thought (see App. 1, pp. 213-20). There is a handy tip for considering this issue; 
to examine what the ends of his action are. 
  For Quentin Skinner, for example, the aim of his studies is to gain an accurate 
understanding of the history of an idea, that is to identify the meaning of an 
utterance and a thinker’s text (see, e.g. 1988a). My stance is that, while this 
action signifies the study of the history of political thought, it does by no means 
signify the study of political theory so long as it is the intention of his studies as 
noted above, because the latter discipline draws attention to our politics, and its 
end is therefore not to give a precise description of history but to see and take 
part in actual politics from a disciplinary perspective, despite the fact that the 
study of political theory often employs the method of history. In short, answer 
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(b) noted above is provided with the possible view that, when one intends to 
either gain a full understanding of Rawls’s theory or offer a new way of under- 
standing it, ironically he does not take part in the activity of studying political 
theory even if he intends to conduct research into Rawls’s political theory; in 
this case, his intention is rather to study Rawls’s political theory in the sense that 
his action of studying does not aim at engaging in politics but at understanding 
Rawls’s texts written in the past. While I highlight the difference between inte- 
rest in the present and past, it is of course impossible to completely distinguish 
between their intentions so long as Rawls’s texts raise actual political issues; 
they therefore involve one dealing with real political topics regardless of 
whether or not he is aware of this fact. Rather, it seems that in the case of 
answer (b) one mostly aims solely at understanding a text. On this view, the 
following luminous description of the meanings of answers (a) and (b) sheds 
light on my enquiry here: 
 
Articles like ‘Constitutionalism in Habermas’, for example, or ‘Locke on Constitutional 
Government’, clarify problems of constitutionalism in only the most remote and mediated 
way, typically devoting most of their energy to a critique of the existing exegetical literature, 
presenting some textual commentary of their own, and offering little direct insight into 
substantive political concerns. While there is surely nothing wrong with such inquiries, they 
need to be linked to the project of understanding constitutionalism, not simply the project of 
understanding Habermas and/or Locke (Isaac 1995: 646; emphases added). 
 
While this famous statement concerning the meanings of the two answers might 
seem to provide nothing new for us, we are nonetheless still not familiar with a 
way of understanding the activity of engaging in political theory as seen from 
answer (a), but instead, in answer (b) we can see our familiar political theory 
that pays attention only to ‘a critique of the existing exegetical literature, pre- 
senting some textual commentary of their own, and offering little direct insight 
into substantive political concern’, which Jeffrey C. Isaac problematically high- 
lights – on this view, he says that political theorists are ‘strangely silent’. From 
his perspective, studying political theory can mean the definitely conscious theo- 
retical action that we devote our attention to tackling issues of actual politics in 
favour of answer (a), as opposed to a way of studying in favour of answer (b), 
although he approves of the significance of absorbing existing political theories; 
political theory requires the definite consciousness that theoretically participates in 
politics. From Maruyama’s perspective, this is explained by saying that we are 
required to be ‘political actors’ by means of such a theoretical action. 
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(b) Epic theorist 
 
We now turn to Wolin’s discussion concerning theory. In Wolin’s view, as we 
saw above, theory fulfils a function in changing the status quo. In this respect, it 
should be noted that his stance on theory is basically linked to his famous 
concept of ‘epic theorist’ who has particular interest in establishing a new poli- 
tical theory as his vocation (1969: 1078). Here I strongly wish to quote enor- 
mously important sentences which present the theoretical essence of the mag- 
nificent concept: 
 
they [epic theorists] inaugurate a new way of looking at the world, which includes a new 
set of concepts, as well as new cognitive and normative standards. Taking this as a sug- 
gestion of how to think about great theories, the first feature shared by epic theorists has to 
do with magnitudes. . . . He [the theorist] aims to grasp present structures and inter- 
relationships, and to re-present them in a new way. Like the extraordinary scientific 
interrelationships, such efforts involve a new way of looking at the familiar world, a new 
way with its own cognitive and normative standards. The second aspect of epic theory can 
be brought out if we look upon a theory not only as a structure of formal features, but also 
as a structure of intentions. The structure of intentions refers to the controlling purposes of 
the theorist, the considerations which determine how the formal features of concept, fact, 
logic, and interconnection are to be deployed so as to heighten the effect of the whole. In 
using the word ‘purposes’ I mean to acknowledge that the structures exhibit considerable 
variety, and yet I also mean to maintain that there has been a persistent feature in all of 
them . . . All of the major theories of the past were informed by ‘public concern’, a quality 
which was not incidental to the activity, but fundamental to the very notion of being 
engaged in political theory (Wolin 1969: 1078-9). 
 
Wolin puts emphasis on two things: first, an epic theorist presents the ‘extra- 
ordinary scientific’ view that inaugurates a new perspective on the world as well 
as new criteria for looking at it; second, political theory requires ‘public 
concern’, which is fundamentally intrinsic to the vocation of political theory. In 
my view, he focuses particularly on the second theoretical perspective, which is 
much more related to ‘problems-in-the-world’ (‘a particular magnitude of 
problems created by actual events or states of affairs in the world’) than to 
‘problem-in-a-theory’ (‘problems related to deficiencies in theoretical know- 
ledge’) (1969: 1079; emphases added). In other words, it is considered that all 
the epic theorists concern themselves with res publica (ta politika), literally mea- 
ning the political affairs, whose tasks are above all accomplished by the theorists. 
In this respect, epic theories, says Wolin, are generated not by ‘crises in tech- 
niques of inquiry’ but by ‘crises in the world’ (1969: 1080). From these perspe- 
ctives, we can precisely understand his intention of describing the epic theorist: 
‘Although each [the epic political theorist and the scientific theorist] attempts to 
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change men’s views of the world, only the former attempts to change the world 
itself’ (1969: 1080; emphases added; cf. 1968b: 144). In this sense, political theory, 
says Wolin, contains the concept of ‘radical critique’ (1969: 1080). 
 
(c) The vocation of political theory 
Here I will summarise what I have discussed as follows. First, my discussion 
has concentrated on Wolin’s sense of theory that, ‘[m]any of the great theories of 
the past arose in response to a crisis in the world, not in the community of 
theorists’. For Wolin, theory means ‘traditional theory’, ‘extraordinary science’ 
and ‘epic theory’, all of which are different from ‘behavioural theory’, ‘normal 
science’ and ‘scientific theory’ respectively – they are not necessarily completely 
different from one another. In short, the former theories have a strong awa- 
reness of changing the world. Second, my discussion has focused on the aspect of 
action, which has been described by both Maruyama’s view of ‘political world’ 
and another view of ‘social action’, in which a political theory that expresses an 
opinion on actual politics is qualified for its vocation as opposed to one which 
concerns itself solely with theories themselves. In other words, this means that 
political theory concern itself not only with theorists’ political theories for them- 
selves but also with politics even if it devotes its attention to one’s political 
theory. Third, it has been stressed that, in addition to the second point, Isaac’s 
viewpoint that ‘substantive political concerns’ are essential and intrinsic to 
political theory is relevant particularly to my discussion. It has led me to the 
significant conclusion that it is necessary that political theory should be sup- 
ported by the definite theoretical consciousness that raises actual political issues. 
Finally, my discussion has laid stress on Wolin’s perspective of political theory 
that its vocation requires that we should show ‘public concern’. 
  All the above four viewpoints have a lot in common with one another. Then, I 
reach a conclusion as follows: political theory is the theoretical activity that is 
concerned about politics, that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in 
politics, and that actually changes politics. From this perspective, I will next pro- 
vide some theoretical standpoints concerning possible meanings of political 
theory with respect to the vocation of political theory. 
 
Political theory 
With regard to the activity of the discipline of political theory, its disciplinary 
issues, undoubtedly, depend heavily upon what the political means. This view, 
however, is profoundly associated with the issue of whether it is possible to 
rigorously distinguish between the political and everything else. To be sure, we 
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have considerable difficulty in dividing the latter from the former, but it is 
noted that most of the things concerning human activities turn into political 
issues if we take account of the feminist view that ‘the individual thing is 
political’. In this respect, Wolin’s argument might seem irrelevant to my inve- 
stigation. Indeed, he does not mention anything about what is counted as the 
political in our society. Nonetheless, it is possible to specify what it means from 
his perspective: 
 
The political signifies the attempt to constitute the terms of politics so that struggles for 
power can be contained and that it is possible for common ends, such as justice, equality, 
and cultural values to be promoted. Commonality is what the political is about (Wolin 1988c: 
253; emphases added). 
 
It is not difficult to see Hannah Arendt’s influence on Wolin’s view of the poli- 
tical.8 In this respect, he regards the political as a positive social component in 
contrast to politics signifying power and force.9 From this perspective, he 
points out that political theory requires that we should seek the ‘community- 
oriented politics’ (1988c: 253). Unfortunately, there is not enough space to prove 
that his conception of the political is plausibly acceptable to my enquiry here. 
Rather, it should be noted that, if we can connect his notion of ‘public concern’, 
by which epic theorists are intrigued, with ‘commonality’, then it is not difficult 
to identify the role of a political theorist. Wolin says: 
 
Political theory, in my view, is both a political and theoretical activity. As a political activity 
it is concerned with and about the being and well-being of collective life, that is, of that comp- 
rehensive form of life and common fate we share with others (1988b: xiii; emphases added). 
 
From Wolin’s perspective, the political is closely related to our life which is 
directly concerned with commonality, that is to say, political theory devotes 
itself to understanding common and shared things with others. Most importantly, 
in many respects, Maruyama’s ‘political world’, Isaac’s ‘substantive political 
concerns’ and Wolin’s ‘public concern’ have a lot in common with each other. 
These concepts more or less indicate that we have already inevitably been 
involved in political life in which we are all political actors. If so, then it is 
appropriately claimed that political theorists are required to contribute to 
society, to develop value judgements and to take responsibility for their beh- 
aviour, all of which are directly linked to the enquiry as to what our life should be. 
In this respect, we are responsible for indicating ‘public concern’ and for taking 
part in politics. 
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3.  The Future of Political Theory 
 
I hope that the above descriptions will contribute to providing a future prospect 
of what political theory ought to be. However, it means neither that one which I 
described above is the sole political theory, nor that it is the best approach to 
political theory. Needless to say, the discipline also displays the raisons d’être of 
Foucauldian political theory, for example, which aims at destructing the domi- 
nant form of discourse and at having a continuous discussion. Rather, we dare 
to pose a challenge to the dominant political theories for contributing to deve- 
loping a more down to earth approach which is neither simply normative nor 
post-modern deconstructive but consists of pluralistic theoretical components, 
and which can tackle contemporary complex disciplinary and political issues. In 
addition, as Bo Rothstein says, political theory will definitely have to work tog- 
ether with the ‘positive/empirical side’ (2005: 10). It is expected that they will 
achieve the dialectical development between both sides. 
  However, if political theory comes to a standstill, then the reflective standpoint 
as seen from Maruyama will be effective for a theoretical reconsideration and 
modification of the discipline (see App. 1, s. 4). It will definitely give a great 
opportunity for reflecting upon what political theory lacks and for reconsi- 
dering its own theoretical standpoints. In these respects, the fact that the task of 
the academic discipline of political theory is an ‘interdisciplinary endeavour’, 
and that it is required to constantly rectify itself (Dryzek et al. 2006b: 4, 6; 
emphasis added), can even work to its advantage in the sense of its own dis- 
ciplinary evolution. In this respect, we do not need to lament the necessity of 
them. For these reasons, political theory rather welcomes the ‘field’s pluralism’ 
(Dryzek et al. 2006b: 6). 
 
 
Notes
 
 1 This word was offered by the Japanese medical doctor Shuntarō Hida, who is a famous 
translator of the Jewish American physicist E. J. Sternglass and the American statistician Jay 
M. Gould, both of whom take a tough stance against nuclear energy (Hida and Morita 2011: 
148). Unfortunately, I was not able to find Sternglass’s original text. 
 2 In addition to this account, David Leopold and Marc Stears give a clear description of the 
present state of the discipline: ‘The books that political theorists write . . . rarely include 
much explicit reflection on method . . . even less frequently do they produce works exp- 
licitly concerned with research methods’ (2008b: 1). 
 3 This does not mean that there are no method and approach in political theory. In this 
academic field, rather, there are a large number of them, such as Rawlsian and Foucauldian 
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approaches, all of which are also related to other disciplines of the social sciences. In the 
sense of these ‘overlapping connections’ with other fields, interdisciplinarity and cross- 
disciplinarity characterise political theory – Dryzek et al. call these characters ‘mongrel’ 
(2006b: 5, 34). 
 4 Dryzek et al.’s work, for instance, explains as follows: ‘Political theory is an unapologetically 
mongrel sub-discipline, with no dominant methodology or approach’ (2006b: 5; emphases 
added); ‘political theory is something of a mongrel sub-discipline, made up of many tra- 
ditions, approaches, and styles of thought, and increasingly characterized by its borrowing 
from feminist and critical theory, film theory, popular culture, mass media, behavioural 
science, and economics’ (2006b: 34). According to their account, the reason for these facts is 
partly because of the use of the ‘shorthand of a key formative influence’, and so the dis- 
cipline seems to ‘lack a core identity’; a political theorist might say that ‘“I’m a Deleuzean”, 
or Rawlsian, or Habermasian, or Arendtian’ (2006b: 5-6). In addition, their work adds that 
‘to be labelled in this way [by way of identifying one as a Rawlsian, Arendtian, and the like] 
by others’ is a characteristic feature of that discipline (2006b: 5). 
 5 On the concept of politics, see App. 1, s. 1. 
 6 In the work, ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ (Politics as a Science in Japan), Maruyama indeed 
employs the term ‘political practice’. It would seem, however, that the expression of 
‘political action’ is also applicable or rather more suitable to this context. 
 7 In this context, referring to Karl Mannheim’s concept of ‘existentiality’ (Seinsgebundenheit, 
Seinsverbundenheit), Maruyama points to the interrelation between the ‘process of knowing’ 
(ninshiki) and the ‘object to be known’ (taishō) in an academic task (Maruyama 1969c: 238; 
[1995c: 149, 152, n. 10]). Not surprisingly, this theme was Habermas’s primary task in 
Knowledge and Human Interests.  
 8 This means that Wolin’s ‘commonality’ resembles Arendt’s ‘public’ in relation to her concept 
of the ‘common world’. Arendt, as is well known, divides the term public up into two 
meanings: first, ‘publicity’, namely ‘public appearance’ or the ‘space of appearance’; second, 
the ‘common world’ noted above (1998: ch. 2, s. 7; on the ‘space of appearance’, see ch. 5, s. 
28, 29, 30). The first concept denotes the public realm where ‘everything that appears in 
public can be seen and heard by everybody’ (1998: 50). The second one means the public 
space in terms of the world which is ‘common to all of us’ (1998: 52). In this respect, the 
public in the latter sense has what common things signify, namely ta politika (res publica), in 
common with Wolin’s concept of commonality, literally meaning the common. Arendt’s foll- 
owing description completely elucidates Wolin’s commonality: ‘To live together in the world 
means essentially that a world of things is between those who have it in common, as a table is 
located between those who sit around it; the world, like every in-between, relates and 
separates men at the same time’ (1998: 52; emphases added). 
 9 Chantal Mouffe, famously, defines the political as ‘a space of power, conflict and anta- 
gonism’ (Mouffe 2005: 9). 
 
Part II 
 
Narcissism: 
An Anthropological Issue 
 
  
 
 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
The Age of Narcissism 
 
 
 
 
 
The term narcissism has been employed by a variety of persons in the social 
sciences in a broad sense particularly since the late twentieth century. Repre- 
sentative scholars who have effectively applied the concept are Erich Fromm, 
Theodor W. Adorno, Christopher Lasch, Richard Sennett, Charles Taylor, Slavoj 
Žižek, Julia Kristeva and Axel Honneth, all of whom are undoubtedly regarded 
as key persons of their respective academic realms. Rigorously speaking, 
Fromm first applied the psychoanalytic term to social studies – taking account of 
his speciality of psychoanalysis, his name might have to be excluded from the 
above list.1 With the exception of Fromm, Lasch, American historian, earlier 
adopted the notion to a rigorous analysis of society in his best-known work The 
Culture of Narcissism (1979).2 In fact, this book was profoundly provocative in 
the sense that it claimed that American society as a whole suffered from nar- 
cissism, which means that its culture itself induced a narcissistic disease which 
aims only at satisfying the present pleasure of the self, and so does not have any 
sense of history; this was profoundly emphasised as a cultural problem of 
America. This view is actually well described by the sub-title of the work, 
American Life in an Age of Diminishing Expectations. To be sure, this writing 
presents a groundbreaking theoretical view in connection with its sensational 
standpoint which extensively adopts psychoanalytic theory for the purpose of 
analysing society. Taylor, absorbing the concept of the ‘culture of narcissism’, 
carried out an analysis of society from a slightly different perspective in his 
work The Ethic of Authenticity (1992). According to him, it is not true that, as 
Lasch says, there are no moral ideals in the culture of narcissism, but it is true 
that, while achieving the aim of some ideals, our society has remained under 
the condition that we have not yet accomplished the objective. In this sense, 
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although Taylor stresses that the ‘ethics of authenticity’ indeed has been realised 
to a certain extent in the narcissistic culture, there is nevertheless no significant 
difference between these two theorists’ views of narcissism in the sense that the 
latter also puts emphasis on the fact that contemporary society has resulted in 
spoiling the purpose of ethics. 
  In sum, narcissism to a greater or lesser degree contains a negative sense. 
Interestingly, the term, which has its origins in psychoanalysis, relates itself as a 
mere individual psychological disease to a social-level pathological phenomenon. 
In this respect, it can be argued that the concept of narcissism describes one of 
the most essential human aspects, which sheds light on an understanding of 
natural human instincts in terms of the relation between the individual and 
society. So far it has hardly been explained that the concept is to theoretically 
contribute to an understanding of some social and political phenomena by pro- 
viding a rigorous systematic description;3 this means that the notion has a great 
potential for laying new theoretical foundations of the social sciences. It is 
undoubtedly true, however, that to demonstrate how relevant it is to effectively 
apply the term to an analysis of society, it is absolutely necessary to provide a 
systematic illustration of how it is appropriate to adopt the psychoanalytic con- 
cept to rigorous social studies. 
In this part, therefore, my aim is to demonstrate how the concept of narci- 
ssism elucidates some characteristic phenomena associated with both the indi- 
vidual and society, and what impact it makes on politics. I shall first find out 
some methodological, epistemological and ontological implications of the con- 
cept provided for political theory, and then discuss the relevance of the term to 
an understanding of politics, relying upon Fromm’s and Kohut’s psychoanalytic 
theories. Through these examinations, I will be able to demonstrate that, above 
all, the concept of narcissism shows problems and matters lying between the self 
and the other. 
 
 
Notes 
 
 1 Except for Fromm, it is believed that Adorno earliest applied the term narcissism to a 
rigorous analysis of society in his work ‘Sociology and Psychology’ (1968) (see App. 2, p. 
249). 
 2 Strictly speaking, while Lasch’s preceding work Haven in a Heartless World (1977) had also 
employed the term, The Culture of Narcissism developed the critical analysis of society that 
rigorously applied psychoanalytic theories such as ‘Object Relations Theory’, represented by 
the British psychoanalyst Melanie Klein. 
 3 While this issue has hardly been tackled in any subject domains of the social sciences, the 
  Introduction 29 
 
 
relation between group personality and political behaviour has been raised primarily in the 
field of political psychology. It does not seem, however, that ‘personalities’ in this academic 
discipline have contained ‘narcissistic personality’ (on the latter concept, see App. 2, s. 2), 
and it seems that, instead, the theme has strongly tended to address the issue of political 
leaders’ personalities (see Ch. 3, pp. 32-5). On the concept of narcissism, as mentioned above, 
it is believed that Fromm introduced the psychoanalytic term to an analysis of group 
(society). Later, in the field of psychoanalysis the issue was also tackled, e.g. by Heinz Kohut 
(see Ch. 3, pp.32-3, Ch. 4, s. 2). 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 3 
 
Narcissism: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The Self 
 
The self, undoubtedly, has been one of the concepts at the centre of the social 
sciences and humanities. Western society, obviously, has so far laid too much 
stress on the term having some philosophical implication.1 It is generally assu- 
med that the history of the concept of self began with Descartes.2 To be sure, his 
famous words elucidate its relevance to the later development of the human 
mind: ‘I think, therefore I am’.3 From this philosophical perspective, it can pla- 
usibly be argued that the modern age began with his discovery of the self. 
However, the absolute trust in this rational self later resulted in being to a large 
extent rejected by some important thinkers, amongst them Friedrich Nietzsche 
and Sigmund Freud (Freud 2001d; Nietzsche 1967). Freud says: 
 
all the acts and manifestations which I notice in myself and do not know how to link up 
with the rest of my mental life must be judged as if they belonged to someone else: they are 
to be explained by a mental life ascribed to this other person (2001d: 169). 
 
This is the moment that it was plausibly explained that ‘I’ (self) am controlled to 
a certain extent by something that I cannot know (the so called ‘unconscious’) – 
famously, this is regarded as ‘Freud’s great discovery’. However, while it was 
appropriately pointed out that the self also relies upon the ‘unconscious self’, it 
does not mean that the raison d’être of the self itself was completely rejected by 
its account. Freud’s psychoanalysis, as is well known, consists primarily of a 
psychological device called the ‘structural model’ composed of the ‘id’, the ‘ego’ 
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and the ‘superego’, which tries to explain ‘conflicts’ inside the human mind 
(Freud 2001e). These ‘three instances’ account for and are generally related only 
to the inside of the human psyche, so his model of psychoanalysis, in this sense, 
does not take account of the other. For psychoanalysts such as Heinz Kohut, as a 
matter of fact, it is impossible to precisely grasp human psychology by applying 
Freud’s structural model, and he instead puts forward the provocative psycho- 
analytic theory based on the ‘Tragic Man’ who ‘is led by his ideals but pushed by 
his ambitions’ (called the ‘bipolar self’) (2011c: 435; 1977: ch. 4). Kohut says as 
follows: 
 
It seems to me that . . . man’s functioning should be seen as aiming in two directions. I 
identify these by speaking of Guilty Man if the aims are directed toward the activity of his 
drives and of Tragic Man if the aims are toward the fulfillment of the self (1977: 132). 
 
In other words, Kohut’s model of psychological device for a ‘Tragic Man’, as 
opposed to Freud’s model, does not aim solely at explaining the inside of his 
conflict, but at understanding his ‘gradient of tension between two differently 
charged (+, -) electrical poles’ (1977: 180), which is, above all, for the purpose of 
providing an account of the individual psyche from the viewpoint of the 
relationship between the self and the other, who is expected to satisfy the 
‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’, meaning the ambitious pole, and the ‘idealized 
parent-imago’, meaning the ideal pole (e.g. 1977: 185). In short, in Kohut‘s psy- 
choanalytic view, in our psyche there is a bipolar pole, namely two poles of 
ambition and ideal: the former needs to be charged with some mirroring 
selfobjects (someone like mother who mirrors and recognises myself), and the 
latter needs to be charged with idealised selfobjects (someone like father who 
makes myself idealise him) respectively – their relations are well explained by 
the metaphor of an electric arc.4 In sum, Kohut describes the self of a human 
being as something that requires being related to others, and this means that it is 
impossible to grasp the depths of our psychology by Freud’s method, which 
automatically attempts to recognise the human mind only from the inside of 
our psyche. In fact, Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory is much more appropriate to 
contemporary society, where, no doubt, there exist many more tragic men than 
guilty men. (These facts are definitely not to deny Freud’s great discovery and 
task.) 
  Significantly, the above evidence elucidates the importance of the existence of 
both the other and the self. This means, most importantly, that the significance 
of the self, whose relevance to human beings was once denied to a large degree 
by Freud, has been revived by Kohut by means of the rediscovery of the other 
from the new standpoint that its existence is necessary for our mental health. 
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This account, needless to say, is also relevant to the present-day social sciences 
carrying out research into contemporary society, which is likely to be composed 
of many individuals all of whom should be regarded as tragic men. 
 
 
2.  Psychoanalysis and Politics 
 
All the above descriptions will contribute to a good illustration of the close 
relation between psychoanalysis and society. As noted above, the self, ironically, 
cannot be well organised only by himself, and the existence of the other is 
therefore essential for his health. What, then, should we recognise here with 
regard to the relationship between psychoanalytic and social scientific views? 
As far as human beings are concerned, we all need each other in order that we 
can manage our lives, and this fact clearly explains what our social life ought to be. 
In this respect, it might be argued that the psychoanalytic stance attempting to 
grasp human intrinsic nature in terms of the essential relationship between the 
self and the other is regarded as one of the social sciences in the sense that the 
self is closely related to society, which can be defined as the ‘group self’5 (e.g. 
Kohut 2011d). Significantly, this fact is much more relevant to the discipline of 
politics. Kohut says: 
 
Churchill . . . , who was unacceptable before the crisis, filled his role to perfection during 
the crisis and was the unquestioned leader of the nation. Yet he was discarded after the 
crisis had subsided. The British people identified themselves with him and with his 
unshakable belief in his and, by extension, the nation’s strength so long as their selves felt 
weak in the face of the serious danger; as soon as victory had been attained, however, the 
need for a merger with an omnipotent figure subsided, and they were able to turn from 
him to other (noncharismatic) leaders. It takes little effort to discern the parallel between 
the temporary needs of the enfeebled self of the creative person and the temporary needs of 
an endangered nation in times of crisis; in both instances, the idealization of the leader, the 
narcissistic transference to him, is abandoned when the need for it has come to an end 
(2011d: 827-8; emphasis added). 
 
The above description explains, no doubt, that our psychological condition, 
more correctly, personality, largely affects the formulation of politics. As far as 
the above example is concerned, it can be argued that, in the sense that, from 
Kohut’s psychoanalytic perspective, the ‘grandiose selves’ (group self) of the 
British people were transferred to Churchill – in fact, Kohut regards this phe- 
nomenon as a ‘narcissistic transference’ (selfobject transference) (e.g. 1971, 1977) 
– British politics at the time was narcissistic. It is little wonder, in this respect, 
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that the more that individuals (selves) become narcissistic, the more politics 
(group self) becomes narcissistic; according to a few psychoanalytic theorists, in 
fact, it is appropriate to consider that the characteristics of these two pheno- 
mena resemble each other (Fromm 1964; Kohut 2011d).6 
 
The personality approach of political psychology 
The relationship between the psychology and personality of an individual, and 
of politics, has primarily been demonstrated by political psychological theories, 
especially in the form of ‘personality and political behaviour’ (see, e.g. Winter 
2003). Indeed, from the political psychological perspective, its relationship is to 
a large extent appropriately recognised, and it seems that a great deal of interest 
in this connection has raised significant issues of political psychology. In fact, 
many political psychological works, whose task has a relatively long history in 
this discipline, have stressed its significance (e.g. Adorno et al. 1950; Erikson 
1958; Lane 1962; Lasswell 1977 [1930]; Smith et al. 1956).7 David O. Sears et al.’s 
work, for instance, first deals with the ‘personality approach’ on the topic of the 
‘psychological approaches to politics’ (2003b: 4-5), and so it would seem that the 
above view is to a certain extent appropriate.8 
  David G. Winter provides an explanation of the ‘personality approach’ in 
more detail; his work raises two important points for my enquiry (Winter 2003). 
First, it refers to Fred I. Greenstein’s significant work, Personality and Politics: 
Problems of Evidence, Inference, and Conceptualization (1969), which points to ‘four 
conditions’ that can be important for personalities of political actors, both lea- 
ders and groups: first, ‘when a political actor occupies a strategic location’; 
second, ‘when the situation is ambiguous, unstable, or complex’; third, ‘when 
the situation is laden with symbolic and emotional significance’; and fourth, 
‘when spontaneous or especially effortful behavior is required’ (2003: 112). 
From these perspectives, then, Winter, laying stress on the fact that all the above 
situations are suitable particularly for the case of ‘crisis’, advances three con- 
tents of the research into personality and political behaviour possibly included: 
first, ‘how leaders act during escalating crisis and war’; second, ‘how they 
structure their advising staff and make decisions’; and third, ‘how public opi- 
nion changes under conditions of threat’. In addition, he points out that perso- 
nalities are primarily apt to be represented by ‘foreign policy’, adding that the 
personality approach can even supplement rational choice theory, due to the 
fact that personality factors largely determine not only leaders’, ‘goals’ and 
‘preferences’ but also their ‘persistence’, ‘endurance’ and ‘management’, and 
their way of response and resistance to ‘cues’, ‘symbols’ and ‘signs’, and of 
interpretation of ‘stimuli’ (2003: 112). 
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  Second, Winter’s work points to a ‘fourfold conception of personality’ whose 
theory literally consists of ‘four elements of personality’: ‘traits’, ‘motives’, 
‘cognitions’ and ‘the social context’ (2003: 114-7) – these are, in other words, 
appropriately considered as the components of personalities from the political 
psychological perspective. Also, these four elements, according to Winter, are 
explained by the following two dimensions: ‘inferential’ (inner) and ‘observable’ 
(public), and ‘typical’ and ‘situational’ or ‘contextual’ (see Table 1 below). First, 
‘cognitions’, says Winter, mean a broad sense of mentality such as beliefs, 
values and attitudes, including mental representations of the self and its ing- 
redients composed of social identity, schemas recognising others, groups and 
social systems, and so on (2003: 116). Second, ‘motives’ mean continuous antici- 
pation and pursuit, particularly in terms of one’s goals; it is interesting to note 
that he stresses that, ‘[w]hen and how any given motive is expressed depends 
on the perceived opportunities and incentives of the specific situation, the time 
since previous satisfaction, and the presence of other activated motives that 
may fuse or conflict’, and so those are sometimes inconsistent with patterns of 
action of themselves (2003: 116). Third, ‘traits’, by contrast, are represented by 
an observable element such as language recognised by others, says Winter. It is, 
for example, noticed as energy level of a person or neurotic on occasion (2003: 
115-6) – the topic of ‘Big Five’, known as ‘five trait factors’, is not discussed here 
(on this, see 2003: 117). Finally, the ‘social context’ is composed of a variety of 
social constructions such as gender, social class, culture and so forth. On this 
point, Winter contends that social contexts need to be observed from the fol- 
lowing three viewpoints; elements of personality, demographic characteristics 
and situational features. From this perspective, he argues that it is possible that 
 
 
Table 1 The Four Elements of Personality by Winter (modified Table 4. 1, Winter 2003: 115). 
 Trans-situational Situation-dependent 
Inferential 
Cognitions Motives 
Typical variables: 
Beliefs, attitudes, values, self-concept(s). 
Typical variables: 
Motives, goals, regulating and defence 
mechanisms. 
Observable 
Temperament, traits Social context 
Typical variables: 
 
Extraversion, energy level, neuroticism. 
Microcontext: 
Immediate situations 
Macrocontexts: 
Gender, social class, wealth and resources, 
ethnicity, race, culture, generation, history. 
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personality can even be regarded as ‘a series or accumulation of past “embodied 
contexts”’ related to the ‘current situation’ (2003: 116-7). 
 
The individual as the psychoanalytic self: an anthropological matter 
In relation to these four personality elements, it should be noted that Winter 
adds that every aspect of personality is determined ‘to some extent’ by and 
depends upon ‘situations’ (2003: 115). In this respect, it is reasonable that some 
research on personality draws particular attention to the ‘social context’ – 
Winter raises Clyde K. M. Kluckhohn et al.’s work as an example of those 
researches (Kluckhohn et al. 1953) (2003: 116) – which is an element of per- 
sonality and not just of demographic characteristics but of situational features 
at the same time, because, while it is presumed that the formation of the per- 
sonality of an individual can most heavily be affected by situational features 
surrounding him which are, meanwhile, the primary factors of its formation, it 
is also possible that those factors can most easily be disregarded.9 Indeed, this 
point is of great interest to me since it is evident that the issue of personality 
relies heavily upon the fact of how the individual is counted; that is, whether man 
is independent of his external contexts and therefore static and autonomous, or 
whether man is dependent of his external contexts – such as economic, social, 
cultural and historical contexts – and therefore dynamic and embedded in them. 
As a matter of fact, I am aware that this issue has been tackled from several 
disciplinary perspectives such as the philosophical and political ‘subject’, the 
sociological ‘individual’ and the philosophical, sociological and psychological 
‘self’ – in addition to the preceding section on the theme of the self, this topic, in 
respect of the first and second one, is also partly addressed in Appendix 1, 
section 3. 
  In my discussion concerning the above first and second issues, the individual 
and the subject were dealt with primarily in terms of the functionalist view of a 
sui generis society as a ‘social fact’ and Foucault’s ‘power/knowledge’. These 
views, as noted above, are profoundly associated with how we consider the 
individual. If we see the individual from the former perspective, then it appears 
as the ‘product of society’ (Durkheim: 1982), and if we see the subject, in rela- 
tion to the individual, from the latter perspective, then it is recognised as the 
‘product of power/knowledge’ (Foucault: 1998). However, it does not seem 
appropriate to consider that, as Durkheim says, the individual is the mere sui 
generis product. Also, it does not seem right to think that, as Foucault says, the 
subject is the mere product constituted by power (knowledge). From these two 
perspectives, it is admitted that Durkheim and Foucault have the same view of 
the subject (individual) in terms of a given ‘product’. However, if we see the 
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individual only from their perspectives reducing individuals to extremely abs- 
tract things, then we fail to precisely understand it. In short, they completely 
ignore or rather are not aware of the existence of the relations between the self 
and the other as an aspect of an individual and a subject, in which one is free to 
a certain extent from both a sui generis society and power. Indeed, it is true that 
the individual is produced by those external entities, but it is also true that the 
self (individual) is affected by the other (individual). Here I hesitate to employ 
the expression that man is produced in the sense that, without understanding of 
another aspect of the individual as the self, its emphasis is merely to lead us to 
see it only as a simple thing, and then to fail to recognise the existence of self- 
other relations. 
  The following diagrams illustrate how individuals are situated from some 
particular of view. Figure 1, for example, shows us how and where individuals 
are placed from Foucault’s subject-object theoretical perspective. From this 
viewpoint, it is admitted that individuals are as if they were unsold products, and 
they must therefore be controlled and charged by a whole logistic system, even 
if they are regarded equally as waste. Thus, one does not even know where he 
is going. In addition, he is not even allowed to have his own will. Rather, he 
cannot possess it as though he was being confined in a jail – he has been 
sentenced to the very life imprisonment of a product from birth! So whether an 
individual has a personality or not is not regarded as problematic. It is irrele- 
vant, therefore, to consider that an individual is related to others, but rather it is 
much more appropriate to acknowledge that all individuals are seen as the 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 The place of individuals from the perspective of Foucault’s subject-object theory 
(i = individual, p = power). 
i 
(i) i i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
i 
an (the?) external context 
p 
  Narcissism: Between Psychoanalysis and Politics 37 
 
equivalent of the mere abstract thing from the point of view of abstract subject- 
object relations, in which, after all, there exist no individual wills by themselves; 
the will of being the subject is simply given by the power of ‘discipline’ that no 
one can know by whom it is activated, and his will is thereby simply interna- 
lised as if it was provided by someone or something else. For these reasons, in 
all circumstances, no one can go outside of these worlds controlled by invisible 
physical forces whose true colour cannot ever be known, and which do not 
have any personality (‘strategy’ of the subject). No matter what the external 
context is, an individual is merely thought of as a ‘product of power’ which 
more or less results in the same quality as the rest. Here there are only indi- 
viduals who do not have their own ‘masks’ (personality). 
In Figure 2, on the other hand, there are no individuals who are not related to 
others. In this context, individuals are seen neither as subjects nor as objects, but 
as based on self-other relationships respectively, that is as selves connected with 
others, all of whom have their own personalities – the modern concept of self, as 
we have seen, is derived from the Latin ‘persona’ (see n. 2 below) – and their 
own conscious wills which are not controlled by the subject which (who) cannot 
be known. The individual as the self supports and is also supported by the 
other, and constitutes and is also constituted by his or her personality, but 
absolutely neither produces nor is produced by the other. The relationship is 
thus a very concrete human activity. In this respect, it is possible, or rather quite 
natural, to consider that individuals as selves have different personalities from 
one another, and that all of them are visible from everyone and everywhere –  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 The place of individuals from a self view from the perspective of self-other rela- 
tionships (r = relations). 
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since respective personalities of selves can occasionally be similar to each other, 
selves are also a potential ‘group self’. Here all the individuals can be recog- 
nised by others all of whom own their respective masks. 
  If we see the Foucauldian individual from the latter above perspective, then 
we can expect things to emerge as in Figure 3 below. The individual there has 
not solely the abstract aspect of the individual as the subject and the object but 
another concrete aspect of the self and the other. He is not, thereby, merely 
controlled by nor does he seize power, but is related to others in the space which 
enables him to break free to a certain extent from the category of power – this is 
called the space of the self. It is considered that in this space others satisfy his 
grandiose self and idealised parent-imago – ‘he is “driven” by his ambitions 
and “led” by his ideals’ (Kohut 1977: 180). An individual who has become a self 
can even connect with other kinds of selves who are in different self contexts by 
using his space of the self. It is profoundly relevant, therefore, that in the world 
of the self he constitutes concrete personal relationships with concrete others, in 
contrast to the world of the Foucauldian Panopticon prison. Hence, it is valid to 
consider that how a self context is going to be depends heavily upon what per- 
sonality and character selves in a group self, or a group self, have. It is rather 
variable and also likely to be constituted by them. Significantly, this world is no 
longer a prison. 
  From these perspectives, I can answer the above significant question (p. 35 
above) as follows: the individual is dependent upon and so embedded in his 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3 The place of individuals on the basis of Foucault’s model of the individual with an 
emphasis on the role of the psychoanalytic relations between the self and the other (i = 
individual, p = power, r = relations). 
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external contexts, but is separated to some extent from them at the same time, 
that is to say, there is a certain space for the self and the other that is managed 
by their own conscious (the sphere of the self) without regard to either society in 
the Durkheimian sense or power in the Foucauldian sense. From this perspe- 
ctive, I can reach the appropriate conclusion that it is unreasonable to consider 
the individual solely as the given abstract product, that is to say, it is absolutely 
not the mere abstract entity observed only from the outside, and that it is in- 
evitable to actually go into his ‘inner world’ (Kohut e.g. 2011b: 205-6) and to 
attempt to precisely know him in the world in which there are the certain 
relations between the self and the other – the method observing the Kohutian 
self as an individual is called the methodological psychoanalysis in my research.10 
As mentioned in note 10, I essentially call the individual from the perspective 
of self-other relations the ‘methodological psychoanalytic individual’, which is 
rigorously distinguished from any other kinds of methodological individuals, 
from the conventional liberalist autonomous individual, from the Marxist mate- 
rialist individual, from the functionalist individual and from the Foucauldian 
and postmodern individual. This new anthropological measure is expected to 
contribute to gaining a new understanding of politics and to establishing a new 
type of political theory. For a while, from this philosophical-anthropological 
perspective I want to see the topic of the relations between human psychology 
(or personality) and politics on track. 
 
Personality approach and self-other relations 
The concept of self, as we saw in Table 1, has already been highlighted from the 
political psychological perspective. It is plausibly understood that the notion is 
of huge significance for present-day scholarship due to the fact that there is firm 
evidence that the discipline has recently laid great stress on a variety of self- 
concepts for understandings of political behaviours (e.g. Hermann 1999; Kohut 
2011d [1976]; Post 1997; Schütz 2001). In fact, the personality approach, as noted 
in the above table, contains the ‘self-concept’ approach of the cognitive section 
in the four types of personality approaches, and, according to Winter, self- 
concepts are also the ‘most important cognitive structure’ for us; the reason for 
the importance, he says, is because the self that expresses what and how we 
regard ourselves is profoundly associated with our ‘political decision-making 
and action’ (2003: 125-6). The works noted above, however, focus on the topic of 
individual political leadership, and it does not seem, therefore, that they tackle 
the issue of group political behaviour, with the exception of Kohut. To be sure, 
as Winter puts it, ‘any attempt to assess psychological characteristics of large 
groups and especially whole nations quickly runs into formidable conceptual 
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and empirical difficulties’ (2003: 111), so I am aware, in this sense, that we 
should be cautious about the immediate application of psychological and 
psychoanalytic approach to research on political group behaviour without any 
regard to its methodological difficulties. Nonetheless, it is noted that, as Kohut 
stresses, it is ‘not too early to suggest that it [the approach of the group self] 
should be tried’ (2011d: 838), and so we certainly should not give up tackling 
the issue simply due to the methodological problems. 
Political psychology, as Sears et al. suggest, is an approach of psychology to 
politics (2003b: 4). In this sense, if it is regarded as the psychology focusing on 
political topics from the psychological side, then it will result in being merely 
considered as one type of psychology – indeed, this seems most appropriate 
account of the present-day discipline. It is impossible, on the other hand, to 
overlook it in terms of politics, simply because political psychology is not poli- 
tics, even if it can be a psychological approach of the study of politics – generally, 
it is not called psychological politics. For instance, there is no space of the 
disciplinary genre of ‘political psychology’ in the Oxford handbook series of 
political science.11 As mentioned in note 8, political psychology does not consist 
of one psychology; in this respect, as Sears et al. say, it is appropriate to 
recognise that there are a variety of political psychologies. My account above 
employing the singular form of ‘political psychology’, then, might not appear to 
be suitable for the fact of its discipline. But it is highly valid, nonetheless, to 
choose its style there if it is recognised simply as a discipline’s name. In short, 
neither political psychology nor the psychological approach is a complete theory 
of politics; they are, so to speak, theories borrowing from psychology – the 
former is rather appropriate to consider as a branch of psychology. Much more 
importantly, however, whether it is possible to shed new light on politics 
depends heavily upon whether we manage to employ those borrowing theories. 
In this sense, it must be noted that the success of one’s research, above all, is 
dependent on one’s insight. 
  At the same time, nonetheless, it must be pointed out that what I aim to 
achieve in this research differs from and thus does not belong to political 
psychology – first of all, I do not intend to do political psychology. My aim is 
instead to illustrate the impact of the concept of narcissism on politics; in this 
respect, it is associated with methodological and anthropological views of this 
research. From the political psychological perspective, indeed, my research 
might seem to partly introduce the cognitive approach of the personality app- 
roach, but it should be emphasised that the intention of my approach is defi- 
nitely not simply to apply a political psychological theory. Rather, it must be 
stressed that my purpose is to illuminate politics from the perspective of the 
self-other relationship, whose view gives rise to a relevant understanding of 
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what our social life ought to be. For these reasons, it is noted that my attempt is 
to generate a very new theoretical framework, which is expected to contribute 
to the foundations of a new aspect of political theory, and therefore that the 
theoretical structure of this research constituted by the concept of narcissism is 
basically associated with methodology and philosophical anthropology. 
 
 
3.  Narcissism: Between the Self and the Other 
 
Essentially, narcissism is concerned with the mental condition of the self. This is 
elucidated by the expression that ‘Narcissus vainly reaches out to embrace his 
own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added). It is plausible to assume, 
therefore, that this depiction sheds light on the fact that narcissism is associated 
with the self as the myth is generally represented as ‘self-love’ and ‘self-refle- 
ction’ – as Elsa F. Ronningstam points out, it is possible to see that self-love 
means the ‘inability to love’ (2005: 3). As a matter of fact, narcissism, as Kohut 
stresses, expresses the ‘cathexis of the self’ (e.g. 1971: xiii). To be sure, in this 
sense, it is noteworthy that the term narcissism may illuminate the natural 
instinct between the individual and politics since the face of its term conveying 
the mythical concept of self, no doubt, has well depicted our essential character. 
  Here I want to refer to Kohut again. He identifies what animal we are from 
his psychoanalytic perspective. Human beings, according to him, are intended 
to be supported by others so that they can continue living; it is achieved by way 
of the ‘charge of their two poles’ (see p. 31 above), and ourselves can only 
thereby be healthy. In this respect, it is profoundly reasonable to believe that, as 
Kohut insists, our aims are directed towards ‘Tragic Man’. Kohut highlights the 
fact that man is twofold being, referring to Eugene O’Neill: ‘Man is born broken. 
He lives by mending. The grace of God is glue’ (1977: 287; emphasis added). It 
would seem that this literary expression leads me to an appropriate under- 
standing of my issue here. We ourselves need the other for ourselves and vice 
versa (narcissism); in fact, this point has been stressed by Kohut (e.g. 1984: 47; 
2011e: 343).12 This narcissistic desire does not ever have to be denied, indeed it 
is impossible to throw it away.13 Most importantly, in this respect, man is a 
vulnerable animal who requires others, that is to say, he is Tragic Man who needs 
to be ‘“driven” by his ambitions and “led” by his ideals’. On this essential point, 
it must be claimed that Kohut provides us with a much more precise view of 
what it is to be human beings. From these perspectives, it would appropriately 
acceptable to maintain that it is necessary not to deny our narcissism but rather 
to fulfil its need. This is why we are in need of the other. 
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Notes 
 
 1 Winter, for example, emphasises that the concept of self has origins in an important western 
tradition which gave rise to its later evolution: ‘The concept of “self” . . . derives from the 
western philosophical tradition of individualism and is closely linked to many features of 
western industrial society’ (2003: 126; emphases added) – on the views of the self in relation 
to this ‘individualism’, see ns. 2-3 below. 
 2 The ‘modern Western self’, as Graham Cassano highlights, is derived from the ancient 
Roman concept of the ‘persona’. This view, according to him, was presented by the socio- 
logist and anthropologist Marcel Mauss in his ‘The Subject: The Person’ (1979) (Cassano 
2008: 194-5). Although it is appropriately considered that its history started with the ancient 
Rome, says Cassano, it is noted that its self is different from the modern meanings of the self 
in the sense of the ‘modern Western notion of the person as a psychological being’ (2008: 
195). Cassano takes the view that the Protestant Reformation contributed to the rise of the 
concept of self in its terms, relying upon Weber’s discussion. He says: ‘With this emphasis 
on conscience and personal responsibility, a new notion of self emerged, a psychological 
being with a complex interior life visible to God but concealed from the world at large’ 
(2008: 195; emphasis added); here we can see the emergence of the modern concept of self, 
as far as Weber ’s view is concerned. It seems, however, that his view does not match my 
stance on this subject (cf. n. 3 below). Most importantly, however, it would appear that this 
religious self in the Weberian sense can be distinguished to a certain extent from the philo- 
sophical self in the Descartesian sense. 
 3 For example, Daniel Garber stresses Descartes’s discovery of the concept of self: ‘The first 
step towards certainty, the Archimedean point from which the whole structure will grow, is 
the discovery of the existence of the self. At the beginning of Meditation II, reflecting on the 
evil genius posited at the end of Meditation I, Descartes observes: “Let him deceive me as 
much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am 
something . . . I must finally conclude that this proposition, I am, I exist, is necessarily true 
whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind”.’ (Garber 1998). After these 
sentences, he adds that its proportion is seen in the famous form, ‘Cogito Argument’, in 
works such as Principle of Philosophy (1644). 
 4 On Kohut’s important concept of ‘selfobject’, also see Ch. 4, s. 2. 
 5 Rigorously speaking, as far as I know, Kohut’s term ‘group self’ was first employed in his 
article ‘Creativeness, Charisma, Group Psychology: Reflections on the Self-Analysis of 
Freud’ (1976) – abbreviated to ‘CCGP’ below (2011d: 799). While, however, in ‘On 
Leadership’ (1969-70), for example, he had already used such concepts in some forms such 
as ‘a shared grandiose self’ (1985b: 55), ‘the group’s grandiose self’ (1985b: 57) and ‘the 
grandiose self of the masses’ (1985b: 67), at its stage it had not yet been made clear as a 
rigorous term – this means that he later gradually began to draw too much attention to the 
issue about which he had cared in his actual works. In the later essay ‘CCGP’, as noted 
above, the completed term of ‘group self’ was first introduced: ‘a firm group self supports 
the productivity of the group just as a firm individual self supports the productivity of the 
individual’ (2011d: 799). It is also noted, however, that the validity of its concept was 
hypothetical at its stage as he in fact highlighted difficulties with a psychoanalytically 
relevant concept despite the fact that it potentially had a great deal of relevance: ‘It is too 
early to say how successful this approach will be, but not too early to suggest that it should 
be tried. The difficulties are great, since the relevant depth-psychological data about the 
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group self have to be obtained with the aid of a specific instrument of observation’ (2011d: 
838). Nonetheless, it did not take him a long time to illustrate the appropriateness of the 
concept. In ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of Man’ (1978), Kohut used solid concepts 
based on his psychoanalytic theory such as ‘nation’s group self’, ‘the national self’ (1985c: 78, 
91), ‘the German group self’ and ‘the German self’ (1985c: 81-93) as examples of the group 
self, ‘a healthy group self’ (1985c: 88) and ‘the (a) diseased group self’ (1985c: 83, 84, 86); this 
fact is largely the result of the illustration of the validity of the concept. (While employing 
the term ‘group self’ in his work The Restoration of the Self (1977), Kohut does not give 
consideration to it in any detail. In fact, it is provided solely in a footnote – see 1977: 184, n. 
7.) 
 6 Fromm, for instance, argues in favour of this view as follows: ‘the sociological function of 
group narcissism . . . parallels the biological function of individual narcissism’ (1964: 78; 
emphasis added) – I find that the former is intended as narcissism in sociological meaning 
(group narcissism), and that the latter is intended as narcissism in Freudian sense (individual 
narcissism). Also, Kohut argues in the same way by emphasising the function of self: ‘the 
group self . . . is analogous to the self of the individual’ (2011d: 837-8). This illuminates the 
fact that the narcissism of the self, and of the group (society), are also in parallel. On this 
point, it is observed that Kohut uses the latter concept in the form of ‘the narcissism of the 
group’ (e.g. 1985c: 84). 
 7 According to David O. Sears et al., political psychology as an academic discipline started in 
the late 1960s (2003b: 3). Obviously, in this sense, it is not appropriate to consider that its 
field has a long history. It is presumed, however, that research into the connection between 
‘personality and political activity’ has been conducted for a relatively long time in the sense 
that the discipline has its origins in the canonical work Harold D. Lasswell’s Psychopathology 
and Politics (1930); he is appropriately regarded as a ‘pioneer’ in research into the ‘perso- 
nalities of political activists’ by introducing the psychoanalytic unconscious theory (Sears et 
al. 2003b: 5). This means that Lasswell is a pioneer in the exploration of the relationship 
between ‘personality and political activity’ (‘personality approach’). 
 8 Sears et al. raise six types of general psychological approaches to politics: ‘personality’, 
‘behaviourist learning theories’, ‘developmental theory’, ‘incentive theories’, ‘social cog- 
nition’ and ‘intergroup relations’ (2003b). Significantly, in addition, they emphasise that 
political psychology does not consist of a simple theory, arguing that it is the studies of 
politics from the psychological perspective: ‘there is no one “political psychology”. Rather, 
there are a number of political phenomena that have been investigated from a psychological 
approach, and using a number of different psychological theories. In that sense there are a 
number of “political psychologies”.’ (2003b: 4). Furthermore, they point out that Lasswell’s 
Psychopathology and Politics is the pioneering work on the personality approach, as men- 
tioned in note 7, and that Adorno et al.’s The Authoritarian Personality (1950) is the best- 
known work applying the ‘idiographic approach’ of the personality approach, which focuses 
on the ‘idiosyncrasies of specific individuals’; they add that ‘the “nomothetic” approach, 
statistically places of larger numbers of people at various positions on a specific dimension 
of personality’, is the antonym of the former approach (2003b: 5). 
 9 For example, the Neo-Freudian psychiatrists such as Fromm, Karen Horney and Harry Stack 
Sullivan are representatives who highlight the influence of the social and cultural factors on 
the formation of personality from the psychoanalytic perspective; in this context, Erik 
Erikson should also be recognised (see, e.g. Fromm 1956 [1955]; Sullivan 1997 [1953]; Erikson 
1963). (To be honest, I do not feel inclined to recognise someone by attributing his academic 
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works to a group, a circle, etc. with a label (e.g. schools and political labels). Here I therefore 
emphasise only that this method is convenient for identifying one.) 
10 Psychoanalysis, as is typically seen in Kohut, sees the individual as the self characterised as 
a concrete human being by separating it to a large extent from any abstract entities such as 
currency, power and the sui generis. In other words, an individual as a psychoanalytic self 
cannot be observed by such abstract measures. On this view, Kohut says: ‘The inner world 
cannot be observed with the aid of our sensory organs. Our thoughts, wishes, feelings, and 
fantasies cannot be seen, smelled, heard, or touched. They have no existence in physical 
space, and yet they are real, and we can observe them as they occur in time: through 
introspection in ourselves, and through empathy . . . in others’ (2011b: 205-6; emphases added). 
In sum, it is noted that, from Kohut’s perspective, in order to fully understand the indi- 
vidual apart from his other aspects, we need to actually go into ‘his inner world’, in which 
‘introspection’ and ‘empathy’ are employed as the sole methods of observing its world. 
From this perspective, I call the method that sees the Kohutian self (individual) in an ana- 
lysis of society the methodological psychoanalysis and such an individual the method- 
ological psychoanalytic individual. 
11  This series contains ten volumes of the branches of politics: Political Theory, Political 
Institutions, Political Behaviour, Comparative Politics, Law and Politics, Public Policy, Political 
Economy, International Relations, Contextual Political Analysis and Political Methodology. 
12 In this context, indeed, Kohut employs the term ‘selfobject’. However, this is a being exc- 
lusively as seen from the self side and therefore the narcissistic object; in this respect, it is not 
already the other. From the political perspective, thus, we need to replace the word with the 
other, thereby establishing genuine and authentic human relationships, namely self-other 
relationships, since in actual politics man is required to be the self and to be the other at the 
same time – not to be an object of the self (selfobject). 
13 This understanding is in favour of Kohut. Opposed to him, however, Klein asserts that 
narcissism, basically, is ‘secondary’, and therefore means a pathological defence mechanism 
(Klein 1975); in her view, therefore, it must be treated – on the concept of ‘secondary 
narcissism’, see App. 2, s. 2. On the contrary, Kernberg contends that it is possible to dis- 
tinguish between ‘pathological and normal narcissism’ (1975: ch. 10). In his view, therefore, 
it is most important to distinguish between them. Thus, it is important to remember that 
understandings of narcissism vary amongst theorists – with respect to the overall concept of 
narcissism, see App. 2. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 
 
The Politics of Narcissism 
 
 
 
 
 
In the preceding chapter, I raised and discussed the issue of how narcissism is 
methodologically and ontologically related to politics by focusing on the con- 
cept of self. It is plausibly presumed that, through this examination, I suc- 
cessfully managed to obtain an essential perspective in relation to the basic 
anthropological position of my research that essentially we need the ‘other’. In 
this respect, it is believed that man is by nature intended to be narcissistic; 
throughout my research, I basically rely upon this stance. On the other hand, it 
has been demonstrated that the term narcissism has significant implications for 
and makes a provocative impact on politics. In the preceding chapter, I was able 
to gain an appropriate theoretical understanding of the relation between per- 
sonality and political behaviour from the perspective of political psychology, 
and this led me to prove my hypothesis that the term narcissism, which acco- 
unts for a fundamental aspect of our personality, gives politics a high relevance 
in terms of the above essential connection. Hence, from these perspectives it has 
been concluded that the concept, elucidating not only the natural instinct of 
human beings but also the substance of politics, sheds new light on politics. 
Narcissism, then, has given rise to an essential conceptual device for my rese- 
arch. 
  As has been mentioned, the concept of narcissism is basically concerned with 
methodological and ontological standpoints in my research. In other words, it 
provides the fundamental viewpoints of how to be involved in politics and how it 
comes into being. In fact, Part II aims to offer methodological and ontological 
perspectives – of course, the notion is also associated with the epistemological 
view of how to recognise political issues, and with regard to this view, in my 
research it basically presents diagnostic and remedial standpoints on the grounds 
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that the concept has its origins in psychiatry in a broad sense. A great deal of 
interest in methodological issues is of vital importance to my research. As a 
matter of fact, the concept of narcissism my doctoral thesis raises also contains a 
methodological and ontological (epistemological) sense. In short, it is expected 
that I will examine political issues from a new perspective which presents a 
research methodology based on the psychoanalytic term. To put it another way, 
narcissism puts forward a methodological viewpoint based on the self-other 
relationship and medical diagnosis and remedy. These perspectives, then, faci- 
litate the application of the three therapeutic steps: examination, diagnosis and 
prescription. 
  In this chapter, I will actually see a political issue in terms of narcissism. This 
does not mean, however, that I attempt to analyse politics by applying some 
psychoanalytic theory of narcissism. It is fundamentally extremely difficult 
unless I am a psychoanalyst even if I am intrigued by its method – although I 
will actually carry out an analysis of the ‘Tennō system’ by applying a psy- 
choanalytic theoretical perspective in the next chapter. Indeed, I have never 
specialised in psychoanalysis and psychology, nor have I had any special pra- 
ctice of psychoanalysis in an academic institution. In this chapter, instead, I will 
scrutinise the issue from two psychoanalytic perspectives, that is from two 
psychoanalytic theoretical viewpoints of politics with a focus on the concept of 
narcissism: from Fromm’s and Kohut’s theories. In some respects, their theories 
have a great deal in common with each other. For they take the same stance on 
the formulation of politics particularly with respect to the emergence of fascism. 
We must gain some significant insight for seeing politics from their psycho- 
analytic perspectives. Thereby, it is hypothesised that the term narcissism ena- 
bles us to address political issues. This must illustrate that the mere mythical 
and psychoanalytic clinical term and concept illuminate an understanding of 
politics. Here I want simply to refer to Kohut’s emphasis on new attempts. As 
he puts it, ‘[i]t is too early to say how successful this approach will be, but not 
too early to suggest that it should be tried’ (Kohut: 2011d: 838). 
 
 
1.  Narcissism and Fascism: Fromm 
 
Fromm, as far as I know, first described the connection between narcissism and 
fascism. In his early psychoanalytic work, ‘The Method and Function of an 
Analytic Social Psychology: Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical 
Materialism’ (1932),1 he had already suggested that narcissism can have poli- 
tical implications: 
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In a society that pays the highest recognition and admiration to the rich man, the nar- 
cissistic needs of the society’s members inevitably lead to extraordinary intensification of 
the desire for possessions. On the other hand, in a society where services performed for the 
whole society rather than property are the basis of social esteem, the same narcissistic 
impulses will find expression as a ‘drive’ to contribute to society in some important way. 
Since narcissistic needs are among the most elemental and powerful psychic strivings, it is 
most important to recognize that the goals (hence the concrete content) of these narcissistic 
aspirations depend on the specific structure of a society (Fromm 1991: 152). 
 
It is assumed that in this phase Fromm had already implied the relation bet- 
ween narcissism and fascism he later mentioned. More precisely, he stressed 
that how politics is formed is explained to a certain extent by the fact that ‘the 
goals of … narcissistic aspirations depend on the specific structure of a society’. 
Needless to say, this accounts for a great deal of emphasis on the concept of 
narcissism not only in his psychoanalytic theory but also in his political theory. 
 
Narcissism and self-love 
Despite the aforementioned fact, in his works such as Escape from Freedom (1941), 
Man for Himself (1947) and The Sane Society (1955), narcissism has a small role, 
and only a simple account of the concept is offered in those respective writings 
(Fromm 1941: 116; 1971 [1947]: 127-31; 1956 [1955]: 30-6). By contrast, in the 
subsequent works such as The Art of Loving (1956), the notion of narcissism is 
given an important role in relation to the concept of love. 
  Interestingly, for Fromm narcissism in most respects differs from ‘self-love’. 
In fact, putting emphasis on the connection between narcissism and ‘selfishness’, 
and referring to Freud, he says: ‘Freud holds that the selfish person is nar- 
cissistic, as if he had withdrawn his love from others and turned it toward his 
own person. It is true that selfish persons are incapable of loving others, but they are 
not capable of loving themselves either’ (Fromm 1962 [1956]: 61). Selfish persons, 
according to Fromm, are exactly narcissistic, that is to say, this type of persons 
means exact narcissists who cannot love others and themselves as well. From 
this perspective, he briefly points out as follows: ‘Selfishness and self-love, far from 
being identical, are actually opposites’ (1962: 60). This elucidates the fact that he 
considers that narcissism meaning selfishness is definitely different from self- 
love – he takes the same view in some other works (1971: 131; 1956: 36). On this 
view, in Escape from Freedom Fromm has claimed: ‘narcissistic person, who is not 
so much concerned with getting things for himself as with admiring himself. 
While on the surface it seems that these persons are very much in love with 
themselves, they actually are not fond of themselves, and their narcissism – like 
selfishness – is an overcompensation for the basic lack of self-love’ (1941: 116). 
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From individual narcissism to group narcissism 
It should be noted that Fromm’s view of narcissism is basically negative.2 It is 
little wonder, therefore, that his position on its human need generates some 
negative connection between narcissism and politics. As a matter of fact, he 
takes the view that ‘social narcissism’ (group narcissism) – Fromm basically 
employs the latter term though they essentially have the same meaning – can 
even contribute to violence and war (Fromm 1964: 78).3 In The Heart of Man 
(1964), as he puts it: 
 
From the standpoint of any organized group which wants to survive, it is important that 
the group be invested by its members with narcissistic energy. The survival of a group 
depends to some extent on the fact that its members consider its importance as great as or 
greater than that of their own lives, and furthermore that they believe in the righteousness, 
or even superiority, of their group as compared with others. Without such narcissistic 
cathexis of the group, the energy necessary for serving the group, or even making severe 
sacrifices for it, would be greatly diminished (1964: 78). 
 
Indeed, this way of understanding narcissism explains that Fromm believes that 
it performs one of the most fundamental functions of human nature; he calls 
this the ‘sociological function of group narcissism’ (1964: 78). According to 
Fromm, this functions in three ways: first, in the ‘narcissistic cathexis’, with 
which group members provide their group as a whole they belong to – this is 
highlighted in the above quotation; second, in the dialectical process of ‘benign’ 
and ‘malignant’ narcissism; 4  and third, in the way of giving members a 
‘malignant narcissistic satisfaction’ (1964: 78-9). 
  With regard to the second function, Fromm explains that, if the needs of 
group narcissism are directed towards creative things, then they will be red- 
uced to one which is ‘compatible with social co-operation’ (benign narcissism), 
on the one hand, but if its needs are directed towards the ‘splendour’ of a group, 
‘its past achievements’ and ‘the physique of its members’, then they will be 
converted to ‘narcissistic passion’ (malignant narcissism), on the other; he adds 
that these two types of narcissism are generally intertwined (1964: 73-8). Signifi- 
cantly, on this view, Fromm stresses that narcissism undergoes the dialectical 
developmental process. In addition, with respect to the third function, an 
‘extreme form of narcissism’, says Fromm, stems from the malignant function of 
narcissism since the narcissistic satisfaction that is part of a group is the sole 
contentment for members who are neither economically nor culturally satisfied 
with their group; he points to the Third Reich and the ‘racial narcissism’ in the 
Southern US as examples of this type of narcissism (1964: 79). In short, these 
functions are fulfilled, on the one hand, by absorbing the narcissistic energy 
  The Politics of Narcissism 49 
from members, and, on the other hand, by providing them with a malignant 
narcissism, when a group gives them only dissatisfaction. In Fromm’s view, 
above all, individual narcissism enables group narcissism to be alive, i.e. the 
latter narcissism inevitably needs the cathexis of the former, and it can thereby 
gain its own energy. 
  Furthermore, Fromm provides a significant account of the four characteristics 
of group narcissism from a pathological perspective with reference to the nega- 
tive relation between narcissism and politics: first, the ‘lack of objectivity and 
rational judgement’; second, the need for ‘narcissistic satisfaction’; third, the 
‘reaction of rage’ caused by vulnerability; and fourth, narcissistic ‘symbiosis and 
identification’ (1964: 85-7). It is noted that these features of group narcissism are 
regarded as analogous to those of individual narcissism (1964: 78). Most imp- 
ortantly, his above account elucidates why group narcissism is negatively ass- 
ociated with politics.5 Individual narcissism, then, is allowed to become group 
narcissism. As a matter of fact, as Fromm puts it, ‘[i]nasmuch as the group as a 
whole requires group narcissism for its survival, it will further narcissistic att- 
itudes and confer upon them the qualification of being particularly virtuous’ 
(1964: 80). In other words, group narcissism results mostly in a spiral of 
malignant narcissism when the narcissistic energy of individuals continues to 
be offered to their group. This is why for Fromm group members necessarily 
have considerable difficulty in retaining their benign group narcissism – it is 
also one of the primary reasons why he sees narcissism essentially as an obs- 
tacle to human beings. Next, I will need to go on to tackle the primary issue of 
the connection between narcissism and fascism. Since, however, it has already 
been partly discussed, I will focus on the functions of ‘malignant group narci- 
ssism’. 
 
Group narcissism and fascism 
From Fromm’s perspective, group narcissism leads people to fascism. As noted 
above, in his view, an extreme form of group narcissism means malignant 
narcissism, which gives rise to passionate fascist politics, an extreme racialism, 
and so on. Fromm, as a matter of fact, stresses the importance of the influence of 
this group narcissism on the formulation of politics in his work Greatness and 
Limitations of Freud’s Thought (1979). As he says, ‘[g]roup narcissism is a phe- 
nomenon of the greatest political significance’ (Fromm 1980b [1979]: 51). His 
account, above all, illuminates one of the primary reasons for the emergence of 
fascism from a psychoanalytic perspective. In this respect, it is particularly imp- 
ortant to gain a full understanding of group narcissism on the grounds that the 
concept largely explains why fascism comes into being as our politics. 
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  First, I will look at the characteristics of group narcissism which triggers 
insane and abnormal political phenomena such as fascism and authoritarianism 
apart from the above four character features.6 From Fromm’s psychoanalytic 
perspective, fascist group narcissism denotes a malignant type of narcissism. 
Malignant group narcissism, which is analogous to individual narcissism, lacks 
self-regulatory abilities, and it therefore cannot control its own narcissism with- 
out outside helps, in contrast to benign narcissism. For this reason, it is app- 
ropriate to assume that this type of group narcissism is always in danger of 
developing cruel behaviour induced by its uncontrolled state of mind – with 
regard to this feature, for instance, Fromm stresses ‘fanaticism’ and ‘destruct- 
iveness’ (1964: 83). In addition, malignant narcissism generally aims at obta- 
ining ‘something he has’ (1964: 77; and see n. 4 below). It is plausibly presumed, 
therefore, that a malignant type of group narcissism directs its needs at ‘nation’, 
‘race’, ‘religion’, and the like (1964: 73). 
  Second, I will see the process of the emergence of political fanaticism from 
Fromm’s perspective. In order to clarify this mechanism, it is most important to 
grasp his conception of ‘social transference’. Fromm says: 
 
He is nothing – but if he can identify with his nation, or can transfer his personal narcissism 
to the nation, then he is everything. . . . The individual satisfies his own narcissism by 
belonging to and identifying himself with the group. Not he the nobody is great, but he the 
member of the most wonderful group on earth (1980b: 51-2; emphases added). 
 
The mechanism that generates fascism is very simple from his perspective. In 
Fromm’s view, it is done simply by transferring one’s own individual narcissism 
to his narcissistic objects – this is understood as equivalent to Kohut’s selfobject 
transference (narcissistic transference) (on this, see Ch. 3, pp. 32-3).7 Of course, 
however, this factor is not sufficient to fully elucidate the emergence of fascism. 
Nonetheless, taking account of the characteristics of malignant group narciss- 
ism, we perceive that the appearance of fascism is illuminated by that dyna- 
mics: the lack of objectivity and rationality, the necessity for narcissistic satis- 
faction, the reaction of rage, fanaticism, destructiveness and the distorted narci- 
ssistic object (e.g. nation, race, and the like). It would seem that these factors are 
enough to provide a cogent account of why fascism comes into being, if I add 
that one cannot endure his loneliness and fear (Fromm 1941: chs. 2-4). 
  Malignant group narcissism, then, is ready to give rise to fascism. However, it 
is important to note that Fromm does not primarily draw attention to the above 
mechanism. His primary concern is rather to identify the conditions under 
which fascism develops. In fact, as he puts it, ‘[t]he most important and most 
difficult problem, however, is that group narcissism can be produced by the 
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basic structure of society, and the question is how this happens’ (1980b: 53; emp- 
hases added). With regard to this issue, for instance, Fromm stresses the pos- 
sible connection between the ‘structure of industrial cybernetic society’ and the 
dynamics of individual narcissism in Greatness and Limitations of Freud’s Thought 
(1980b: 53). So let us see it briefly below. 
Fromm points out that in our industrial society ‘loneliness’ and ‘hostility’ 
amongst individuals are the primary factors in increasing narcissism (1980b: 53). 
He adds, however, that contemporary industrial society has developed the 
‘worship of industrial production’ regarded as the primary conditions inducing 
our narcissism (1980b: 53). With respect to our fetishistic behaviour, Fromm 
emphasises that human beings have turned into a god. As Fromm puts it, 
 
it happens that modern man has developed an extraordinary pride in his creation; he has 
deemed himself to be a god, he has felt his greatness in the contemplation of the grandeur 
of the man-made new earth. Thus admiring his second creation, he has admired himself in 
it. The world he has made, harnessing the energy of coal, of oil, and now of the atom, and 
especially the seeming limitless capacity of his brain, has become the mirror in which he 
can see himself (1980b: 54). 
 
Has he fetishised his mirror as if ‘vainly reach[ing] out to embrace his own 
reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added)? In fact, Fromm employs the myth 
of Narcissus in order to illuminate the bizarre behaviour that we worship ind- 
ustrial products we produced, and that we see ourselves through them. He says: 
‘Will he drown in this mirror as Narcissus drowned gazing at the picture of his 
beautiful body mirrored in the lake?’ (1980b: 54). To be sure, whether he stays 
gazing at his figure reflected on the surface of the water until death (on this, see 
App. 2, p. 241) depends heavily upon his future imagination. Most import- 
antly, however, Fromm stresses that ‘antagonism’, which is the primary factor 
in causing narcissism, is provoked by ‘an economic system’ which allows peo- 
ple to be extremely selfish and to make it work to their advantage (1980b: 53). 
From his prescriptive perspective, he suggests that we should cultivate the 
spirit of ‘sharing’ and ‘mutuality’, or else we will result in inducing narcissism 
(1980b: 53). 
  Fromm is always intrigued by the precondition of a social structure which 
enables us to love each other and to get rid of our intrinsic condition of narci- 
ssism – it is even possible to think that he continually sought for it in his entire 
life. Indeed, with regard to this point, he mentioned in his early years as fol- 
lows: ‘The progress of psychology lies not in the direction of divorcing an 
alleged “natural” from an alleged “spiritual” realm and focusing attention on 
the former, but in the return to the great tradition of humanistic ethics which 
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looked at man in his physico-spiritual totality, believing that man’s aim is to be 
himself and that the condition for attaining this goal is that man be for himself’ 
(1971: 7). This means precisely that Fromm’s primary concern is to find out the 
social conditions not simply under which fascism develops, but rather under 
which our humanistic ethics develop; in this respect, it is emphasised that the 
latter is much more important for his work.8 For this reason, it must be pointed 
out that his most important conceptual device of ‘social character’ elaborated 
through his early works is of huge significance in the sense that it is essentially 
capable of seeking for the conditions as identified by his above task. In this 
sense, most importantly, I should devote myself to carrying out the essential 
enquiry as to how industrial cybernetic society, the primary structure of con- 
temporary society, can be related to fascism, and, much more importantly, ano- 
ther enquiry as to what social conditions enable our society to break free from 
fascism and to establish genuine and authentic democracy.9 
 
 
2.  Narcissism and Fascism: Kohut 
 
Kohut also highlights the connection between narcissism and fascism from his 
self psychological perspective. First of all, it must be pointed out that Kohut 
proceeded with his discussion of fascism in conjunction with the ‘group self’, 
one of his most important concepts (we saw this notion in the preceding cha- 
pter). Indeed, this point is of huge importance to my exploration due to the fact 
that his investigation into the significant political theme was conducted by 
applying the provocative idea. Second, it must be noted that the group self 
(vis-à-vis the self), whose conceptual device attempted to carry out a social and 
historical enquiry, was invented for his analysis of social phenomena from his 
psychoanalytic perspective, and that Kohut hypothesised that the concept 
would establish a valuable connection between psychoanalysis and the hum- 
anities (sciences of man) such as history and politics (e.g. 1985c: 81). 
  According to Kohut, psychoanalysis based on ‘self psychology’ – this is the 
theoretical scheme of Kohut’s psychoanalysis – offers some significant insights 
into the respective fields of the social sciences; it is rather expected, he stresses, 
that his psychoanalysis has a great deal of interest in applying his psycho- 
analytic conceptions to those disciplines (1985c: 75-6, 81). As Kohut puts it, 
‘[t]he cultural, economic, political, and military situation that followed the 
military defeat and the effectiveness of the “blockade” led . . . to the situation in 
which a proud, gifted, moral and highly civilized nation became ready to accept 
the leadership of a man who offered it the instantaneous feeling of intense power 
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and pride and the sense of action-poised idealized omnipotence with which indi- 
vidual Germans could merge’ (1985c: 81; emphases added). Kohut’s account 
explains that he in fact highlights a strong probability that psychoanalysis will 
shed new light on some important historical and political themes such as fas- 
cism. This is why I am very much intrigued by Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, 
which illuminates politics from a psychoanalytic perspective with a focus on the 
self, that is from self psychology. (However, the reason why I draw too much 
attention to his theory is not only because of being of significance in that sense 
but rather because of being capable of giving my research a relevant methodo- 
logical and epistemological viewpoint concerning philosophical anthropology.) 
 
The group self 
It is likely that, as explained in the previous chapter, the complete term ‘group 
self’ was first applied in ‘Creativeness, Charisma, Group Psychology’ (1976) – 
abbreviated to ‘CCGP’ below (see Ch. 3, n. 5). With regard to this concept, most 
importantly, it enabled Kohut to tackle historical and social themes, that is to 
say, he came up with the academic device so as to attempt to address those 
topics which were provoked by his interest in the humanities. Significantly, the 
concept was aimed at his important academic experiment that psychoanalytic 
self psychology could approach some historical issues.10 The historical enquiry 
always requires, therefore, that we should take account of the concept of group 
self. In other words, it was rather impossible for him to conduct his exploration 
without the conceptual device. 
  Kohut, while dealing with the issue in his essay ‘CCGP’, proceeds with it 
primarily in his ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of Man’ (1978) – abbreviated 
to ‘SPSM’. The group self, as mentioned in Chapter 3 (see pp. 32-3 and ns. 5-6), 
is analogous to the individual self, and in fact, Kohut admits that all the obser- 
vations of the concept are ‘in analogy to phenomena of individual psychology 
to which we have comparatively easy access in the clinical (psychoanalytic) 
situation’ (2011d: 838). Needless to say, this means that, as Kohut himself puts it, 
the group self is theoretically regarded as the straightforward equivalent of the 
self as the individual ‘being laid down and formed in the energic arc between 
mirrored self-object greatness (ambitions) and admired selfobject perfection 
(ideals)’ (1985c: 82). In addition, he stresses that not only does the conceptual 
device offer three types of transference (mirror, idealising and alter-ego trans- 
ferences), but it also works in two ways: first, by way of ‘gross identifications’, 
meaning the ‘revival of an archaic state’; and second, by way of ‘working- 
through’, meaning the ‘fluid processes [of those identifications] of alternating 
self-strength through empathic merger and renewed self-weakness subsequent 
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to breaks in the empathic state’ (1985c: 83). Furthermore, Kohut explains that a 
group is created and managed in two ways: first, by way of ‘unstable iden- 
tifications’ in the existential form of its group leader; and second, by way of 
‘mature internal changes’ (1985c: 83). On the other hand, he points to two 
essential differences in the developmental process of the self between psycho- 
analysis and history: first, while the former is concerned with ‘a single person’, 
the latter is concerned with both a leader as a single person and a group; and 
second, in the historical arena, while gross identifications are based on ‘a single 
dominant figure’ and are occurred ‘by his presence’, the working-through pro- 
cess needs the ‘interpretative presence of many active and influential minds’ 
(1985c: 83). 
  Despite some clear differences mentioned above, Kohut acknowledges that 
his psychoanalytic theory requires ‘empathy’ and ‘introspection’ as the essence 
of self psychology whether a psychoanalytic or historical enquiry (1985c: 73; 
and see Ch. 3, n. 10). In this sense, there is no difference between them, and both 
investigations try to go into man’s inner world. He says: 
 
Self psychology is instrumental in ushering in a new phase in the history of psycho- 
analysis: the move from a preoccupation with the elaboration and refinement of the esta- 
blished theories to one of renewed emphasis on the gathering of primary data, a return to 
the empathic observation of inner experience (1985c: 73). 
 
Interestingly, Kohut suggests that, from his psychoanalytic perspective, a his- 
torical enquiry should be conducted by a ‘psychohistorian’ who proceeds with 
his investigation, keeping a tight grip on the concept of group self (1985c: 82). In 
this respect, it must be stressed that crucial political issues such as fascism, 
which have been tackled in the field of the humanities and the social sciences, 
will be addressed by psychohistorians who work primarily on history by app- 
lying the conceptual device elaborated through Kohut’s experience from his self 
psychological perspective. The existence of the scholars, therefore, must enable 
us to address those topics on the basis of the inner experience of the self, for 
instance, for examining why fascism emerges, and why our politics has always been 
in danger of developing fascist politics particularly after the twentieth century by emp- 
hasising our narcissistic personality from a self-psychological perspective. 
 
The German group self: the essence of ‘Self Psychology and the Sciences of 
Man’ (1978) 
We now turn to the main issue here, namely an exploration of the relation 
between the formulations of fascist politics and narcissism. With regard to his 
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account of this connection, it is noted that Kohut takes an example of Nazi 
Germany. First of all, it must be stressed that, in his important essay ‘SPSM’, in 
which he focuses particularly on the ‘German group self’, he begins to carry out 
an analysis of the relationship, making the following statement. He claims: 
 
The primary psychological cause of the historical events under scrutiny was a serious dis- 
turbance in the strength and cohesion of the German group self, which was experienced 
without the empathic sustaining voice of the truly creative individuals among the artists or 
political leaders or from the world that surrounded Germany during the 15 years between 
the peace of Versailles and the assumption of power by the Nazi party (1985c: 81; emphases 
added). 
 
Kohut, as far as I know, first applied the complete term of ‘German group self’ 
in this sentence. However, it is provided simply as an important example of a 
group self which actually suffered from a ‘serious disturbance’ in history. In 
addition, the above expression makes it clear that a mere experimental con- 
ceptual device has turned into a solid notion that enables him to conduct an 
analysis of historical events without any doubt.11 Obviously, this explains that 
Kohut has got a firm grip on the concept of group self. 
  Next, Kohut actually starts to discuss the formulation of Fascism particularly 
by focusing on the Third Reich. First, from his psychoanalytic perspective, he 
observes that the Nazi party took advantage of ‘German sensibilities’; as he puts 
it, ‘the Nazis clearly exploited German sensibilities in order to harness the ens- 
uring narcissistic rage in the service of their vengeful atrocities and of a ven- 
geful war’ (1985c: 86). Second, he points out that the German group self had a 
‘chronic weakness’ which ‘suffered a serious acute or subacute disorder’, and 
‘which took the form of serious fragmentation’, before the rise of the Nazi 
government (1985c: 87). Third, Kohut maintains that its group self ‘shattered the 
pole of self-confidence’ through a series of bitter experiences such as the Treaty 
of Versailles and the deep recession in the 1920s and early 1930s, and that it 
‘wiped out the pole of ideals’ (1985c: 87).12 From these perspectives, Kohut 
comes to the essential conclusion in relation to the ‘principles’ which psycho- 
historians are required to follow: 
 
A healthy group self, as is the case for the healthy self of the individual, is continuously 
sustained in its course throughout time – during its life one can say – by ongoing psycho- 
logical work that provides the cohesion and vigor of its changing yet continuous structure 
within a matrix of selfobjects who are in empathic contact with its changing needs. The 
sum total of the results of this work that must affect all layers of a people or at least the 
great majority of them – those minorities who are excluded are the disenfranchized, the 
outsiders, the true pariahs of a nation – we call ‘culture’ (1985c: 88; emphases added). 
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According to Kohut, a ‘healthy group self’ is maintained by the sustainable 
‘cohesion’ and ‘vigor’ over a period of time; as we shall see in more detail below, 
they can be offered by a series of ‘artistic works’. In addition, he contends that 
those works can have a profoundly psychological effect on the majority of 
people, that is to say, a result of the works can give rise to a ‘culture’. In other 
words, an analysis of a German group self has led Kohut to a careful inves- 
tigation into a whole social culture with a focus on the meaning of ‘civilization’. 
In fact, he has resulted in conducting a significant enquiry into, ‘[w]hy . . . did 
the cultural work fail to respond to the disease of the fragmented and depleted 
German self?’ (1985c: 88). 
  Finally, through the aforementioned analyses, Kohut makes a conclusive dis- 
cussion of ‘art’ in relation to a lump of culture coming into being as a result of 
the sum of artistic, cultural works. First of all, he asserts that artists who make a 
great work always generate the ‘preeminent psychological tasks of a culture’ – 
Kohut calls this artistic role the ‘anticipatory function of art’ – and, much more 
importantly, that they know how people react to the psychological experiences 
of their work, and can therefore bring individuals to a better position parti- 
cularly with a significant cultural effect (1985c: 88-9). With reference to this cru- 
cial matter concerning the artistic circumstance of Weimar Germany and the 
Third Reich, Kohut claims that no artist managed to identify what Germany 
needed for its own politics at the time. He says: 
 
A large sector of Weimar Germany, including all classes and those with all levels of edu- 
cation, knew that they were not in touch with modern German art and felt preconsciously 
that German art was out of touch with them. And the Nazis knew it. They heaped endless 
scorn on the art of Weimar, they paraded it in large exhibits under the banner-title Entarte 
Kunst (Degenerate Art) all over the Reich. Why this display, why the bitter sarcasm, why 
the angry laughter? I think the Nazis accurately reflected a disappointment that they 
shared with a broad sector of Germany, a disappointment over the fact that their artists had 
failed to understand their needs and had failed to portray them with any degree of sensi- 
tivity (1985c: 89). 
 
In addition, Kohut maintains that, while prominent artists who intrigued peo- 
ple in the German cultural world – he raises the specific names such as Franz 
Kafka, Rainer M. Rilke and Kurt Weill – appeared in great numbers, their works 
generally created ‘lonely’, ‘estranged’, ‘disintegrating’ and ‘depleted’ characters 
who did not successfully manage to form a ‘reliable sustaining matrix of 
selfobjects’ (1985c: 90). In particular, Kohut stresses that art in this context in 
some way required the ‘empty’, ‘devitalized’ and ‘fragmented’ state of people, 
who ‘felt alive, strong and cohesive’, and that they called for the ‘symbol of a 
Kaiser and a strong and disciplined army’ and the ‘ideals of Imperial Germany 
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and German Christianity’ (1985c: 90). As he puts it, however, ‘[t]he great works 
of the German past could not fill the void’ (1985c: 90). According to him, by 
contrast, the ‘Nazi-supported art’ including Wagner’s music and Hitler’s arch- 
itecture greatly contributed to generating ‘a strong German group self’. He 
writes: 
 
Nazi-supported art . . . unlike the art that would have been needed at the time, was the 
symptom of a pseudo-cure for a selfobject. It helped deny the persisting self-defect via 
sudden and wholesale identifications with symbols of strength and failed to deal with the 
depressive, devitalized and fragmented state of Germany. Nazi art fostered regression to 
archaic symbols of power and unity (1985c: 90; emphasis added). 
 
Furthermore, Kohut points out that ‘political thought’ was also doomed to 
failure particularly by offering an appropriate German group self to create ‘a 
new self-image’ (1985c: 90-1). Above all, ‘political thinkers’, he says, could not 
identify the core problem of the German group self as the ‘yearning for a feeling 
of wholeness’ – in this context, Kohut applies the term ‘national self’ regarded 
as equivalent to the group self (1985c: 91). 
  Second, Kohut turns to the core discussion of the relation between Hitler’s 
self and the German group self. He begins by claiming that Hitler was com- 
petent neither in ‘his psychological knowledge’ nor in ‘his rhetorical gifts’ but in 
‘his total resonance with the disease of the German self’ (1985c: 91). Kohut, then, 
devotes himself to accounting for the development of Hitler’s self. Hitler, says 
Kohut, accomplished a ‘cure for the devitalization and fragmentation of his 
nuclear self’ (on this self, see, e.g. 2011a: 747). This means that he recovered 
from ‘a traumatically failing selfobject to the archaic grandiose self’ (1985c: 91). 
It follows: 
 
The core of the self, except for one nucleus of infantile grandiosity, is lost. Thus the per- 
sonality, however extensive its grown in the many layers that are acquired around the 
archaic core, remains cold. Having severed its relationship with a traumatically frustrating 
selfobject, it never acquires the capacity for modulated empathy with others. Such a per- 
sonality is characterized by a near-total absence of compassion, except where total identifi- 
cation is concerned, when the ‘other’ is totally experienced as part of the self. Such people – 
and they may well be the majority of the charismatic and messianic leaders of all nations, 
whether in the historical and political arena, or in religion or health cults, or as the cry- 
stallization point for cultural fads – are no longer in need of selfobjects. They have acquired 
self-sufficiency. Whatever the details of their personality organization may be, such people 
become ideal targets for those who are in desperate need of selfobjects (1985c: 91-2). 
 
Kohut’s above description is of vital importance to my analysis. Here I am 
intrigued by his essential theoretical view of the direction of a German group 
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self particularly in relation to the rise of the Nazi party. Most importantly, it is 
noted that a self in ‘a near-total absence of compassion’ no longer needs to be 
satisfied by his selfobjects. In principle, his needs, says Kohut, are fulfilled only 
by selfobjects who fully recognise him by way of satisfying his abnormal imp- 
ulse. 
  Kohut ends his discussion by pointing to the possible difference between the 
two ‘selfobject transferences’ of the German group self by comparing the tran- 
sference to Weimar leaders and to Hitler. First, Kohut observes that, although 
the group self of the German people at the time was ‘most severely damaged’ as 
a result of World War I, their leaders responded to them by means of the ‘silly 
diagnosis’ (1985c: 92). Next, he turns to the issue of why the ‘Nationalists’ 
offered the ‘broken German self’.13 Kohut stresses that the ‘pre-Hitler’ and ‘non- 
Nazi elite’ failed to give effective remedies for the damaged self. He says: ‘The 
Nationalists denied the presence of the depression, the devitalisation, the frag- 
mentation of the German self and failed to outline the difficult but exhilarating 
task of forming a new one out of the ruins of the old, followed by persistent 
support as the creative work moved on’ (1985c: 92-3). Finally, Kohut points out 
that at the time, after all, no one could successfully offer a ‘really new German 
self’ with the exception of Hitler (1985c: 93). 
Through these examinations, Kohut particularly emphasises that ‘analysts’ 
lacked both the ‘power to influence populations’ and the ‘insights . . . to support 
the remnants of good will and of constructive political action’ (1985c: 93). In 
other words, psychoanalysis failed to understand the ‘pathology of the self, 
both in the individual and in the group’ (1985c: 93). It is important to note that 
‘analysts’ do not necessarily mean psychoanalysts, but rather include artists 
who can generate cultural works fulfilling the ‘anticipatory function of art’ 
noted above; Kohut rather intends the latter by the word. To put it another way, 
in so far as the ‘preeminent psychological tasks of a culture’ always have a 
significantly psychological and remedial effect on people’s psychology, it is true 
that artists are also regarded as psychoanalysts. However, neither artists nor 
political thinkers nor politicians managed to appropriately recognise the psy- 
chology of the German self at the time, and this fact led to a fatal effect on the 
German group self. Most importantly, Kohut shows that society can be ext- 
remely narcissistic whenever there is no person who can diagnostically grasp 
people’s psychological condition and remedially offer an appropriate solution 
with a possibly psychological influence. Hence, it is necessary that an injured 
group self should be treated by analysts. 
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The relevance of Kohut’s self psychology for the social sciences 
At this point I need to make concluding remarks about my investigation into 
Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory with a focus on the possible connection between 
narcissism and fascism. It seems to me that, most importantly, what Kohut 
significantly tells us by applying his concept of group self is that it is par- 
ticularly important to gain a deep understanding of the condition of our group 
self for maintaining our society and politics, namely our life itself. In this 
respect, the crucial issue is whether our culture is being led by the ‘preeminent 
psychological tasks’, and what shape it is in, because our psychology should be 
diagnosed and cured by them, and we can thereby shed light on the present 
condition of our politics. In short, Kohut’s psychology with a particular emph- 
asis on the self illuminates and greatly helps us to understand our society and 
politics. In other words, it offers an important criterion of how to see them in 
order that we may bring about some appropriate remedial effects on our life. 
This is why it is expected that Kohut’s self psychology will make a significant 
impact on the social sciences. In these respects, perhaps the fact that Kohut 
shines a light on the connection between the narcissistic self and the formu- 
lation of fascism indicates that the relationship is based on the fundamental 
psychological framework of human beings. 
 
 
Notes
 
 1 This work was originally published in German in 1932. Later it was translated into English 
and partly modified by Fromm himself; however, most parts of the original text were not 
changed. In fact, he says as follows: ‘There is little I would change in these early papers . . . 
the only changes I made were to shorten essays where they seemed too lengthy or where 
they dealt with small points that are of little interest today’ (Fromm: 1991: ‘Preface’). It is 
much more reasonable, therefore, to employ the English version, due to the following three 
reasons: first, the English text is more suitable for the present academic situation; second, he 
translated the German text into English himself; and third, my doctoral thesis is written in 
English. (Having said that, it would be better that we should refer to the German version so 
long as it is the original, and so long as he was not a native English speaker. Nonetheless, 
this merely means that to do so will be better, and so I do not necessarily need to use the 
German version.) 
 2 Although it is fundamentally negative, Fromm nevertheless provides a pathological stand- 
point which takes the view that narcissism can be somewhat positive, distinguishing bet- 
ween benign and malignant narcissism (Fromm 1964: 77). For him, above all, narcissism is 
essential for human existence due to its ‘biological function’, and it is therefore negative. 
This point is actually illuminated by his stress on his sociological view: ‘once we recognize 
that narcissism fulfills an important biological function, we are confronted with another 
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question. Does not extreme narcissism have the function of making man indifferent to others, 
incapable of giving second place to his own needs when this is necessary for co-operation 
with others? Does not narcissism make man asocial and, in fact, when it reaches an extreme 
degree, insane? There can be no doubt that extreme individual narcissism would be a severe 
obstacle to all social life. But if this is so, narcissism must be said to be in conflict with the 
principle of survival, for the individual can survive only if he organizes himself in groups; 
hardly anyone would be able to protect himself all alone against the dangers of nature, nor 
would he be able to do many kinds of work which can only be done in groups’ (1964: 73). 
Hence, for Fromm narcissism essentially fulfils a negative function; as he puts it, it under- 
goes the ‘dialectical process’ of development (1964: 78). 
 3 The term ‘social narcissism’, which is mostly replaced by ‘group narcissism’, is presented 
primarily in his work The Hart of Man. This concept, according to Fromm, is analogous to 
‘individual narcissism’, which is psychoanalytically understood and performs the socio- 
logical function of narcissism (1964: 78) (cf. Ch. 3, n. 6). 
 4 With respect to these two types of narcissism, Fromm provides detailed accounts of those 
respective concepts. He says that benign narcissism is characterised as ‘self-checking’, but by 
contrast, malignant narcissism is not ‘self-limiting’. As to the former, he explains: ‘In the 
benign form, the object of narcissism is the result of a person’s effort. Thus, for instance, a 
person may have a narcissistic pride in his work as a carpenter, as a scientist, or as a farmer. 
Inasmuch as the object of his narcissism is something he has to work for, his exclusive 
interest in what is his work and his achievement is constantly balanced by his interest in the 
process of work itself, and the material he is working with. The dynamics of this benign 
narcissism thus are self-checking. The energy which propells the work is, to a large extent, of 
a narcissistic nature, but the very fact that the work itself makes it necessary to be related to 
reality, constantly curbs the narcissism and keeps it within bounds. This mechanism may 
explain why we find so many narcissistic people who are at the same time highly creative’ 
(1964: 77). As to the latter, he claims: ‘In the case of malignant narcissism, the object of nar- 
cissism is not anything the person does or produces, but something he has; for instance, his 
body, his looks, his health, his wealth, etc. The malignant nature of this type of narcissism 
lies in the fact that it lacks the corrective element which we find in the benign form. If I am 
“great” because of some quality I have, and not because of something I achieve, I do not need 
to be related to anybody or anything; I need not make any effort. In maintaining the picture 
of my greatness I remove myself more and more from reality and I have to increase the 
narcissistic charge in order to be better protected from the danger that my narcissistically 
inflated ego might be revealed as the product of my empty imagination. Malignant narci- 
ssism, thus, is not self-limiting, and in consequence it is crudely solipsistic as well as xeno- 
phobic. One who has learned to achieve cannot help acknowledging that others have achi- 
eved similar things in similar ways – even if his narcissism may persuade him that his own 
achievement is greater than that of others. One who has achieved nothing will find it dif- 
ficult to appreciate the achievements of others, and thus he will be forced to isolate himself 
increasingly in narcissistic splendour’ (1964: 77). 
 5 As Fromm suggests, however, group narcissism does not necessarily have a negative effect 
on politics – this mechanism is identical to individual narcissism (cf. n. 3 above). It must be 
stressed, nonetheless, that from Fromm’s psychoanalytic perspective, basically, group narci- 
ssism negatively affect politics, in the sense that he stresses that, ‘[t]he full maturity of man 
is achieved by his complete emergence from narcissism, both individual and group narciss- 
ism’ (1964: 90). 
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 6 Indeed, Fromm does not mention that group narcissism causes fascism by the use of the 
term. 
 7 The mechanism of social transference is completely explained by the sociological function of 
group narcissism noted above; in Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, the phenomenon of social 
transference leads narcissism to cause the vicious cycle of malignant narcissistic cathexis and 
malignant narcissistic satisfaction. 
 8 Fromm’s humanistic theory is not discussed in this chapter. It will be raised in Chapter 6. 
 9 With regard to this issue, it should be pointed out that famously Fromm takes the view that 
democracy and fascism are two sides of the same coin. He does not consider that the former 
is simply the opposite of the latter and vice versa. It is noted that he rather see the pos- 
sibility that fascism comes into existence from democracy. Basically, this explains that 
Fromm stresses the importance of the essential conditions under which fascism is esta- 
blished. He sees that it is fundamentally possible that democracy should develop fascism, 
and that ‘industrial cybernetic society’ should propagate some fascist tendencies. We shall 
discuss this crucial issue in Chapter 6. 
10 In fact, Kohut mentioned that its conceptual device was an experimental attempt (see, e.g. 
2011d: 838). 
11 As far as I know, the idea of group self was developed in ‘On Leadership’ (1969-70), in which 
Kohut employed a series of terms such as ‘a shared grandiose self’, ‘the group’s grandiose 
self’ and ‘the communal narcissistic self’, all of which are closely connected with the present 
form of group self. 
12 For example, in his essay ‘On Leadership’ Kohut also gives a similar explanation by pro- 
viding expressions such as the ‘loss of self-esteem’ and the ‘loss of national prestige’ (1985b: 
64). 
13 Interestingly, Kohut raises two names, Alfred Hugenberg and Kurt von Schleicher, in respect 
of ‘Nationalists’. With reference to this issue, Kohut says that they lacked ‘unique talents’ 
and ‘charisma’, and according to him, this fact is regarded exactly as the primary reason 
why they failed to give people remedies for the damaged self (1985c: 93). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Part III 
 
Political Theories of Narcissism 
 
  
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Political Theories of Narcissism 
 
 
 
 
 
In Part I, I demonstrated that political theory ought not only to carry out 
research on political thoughts but also to tackle methodological issues of its 
own theory for rectifying and improving the disciplinary quality and to indicate 
value judgements on politics in conjunction with social theory and the empirical 
sciences: political theory is ‘the theoretical activity that is concerned about politics, 
that is conscious of politics, that publicly participates in politics, and that actually 
changes politics’ (see Ch. 2, p. 20). From this perspective, we saw that it can and 
should aim at being a pluralistic theory and at making an ‘interdisciplinary end- 
eavour’. 
  In Part II, on the other hand, I considered the implications of narcissism that 
can affect the disciplinary attempt of political theory and actual politics. This 
examination led me to find that narcissism is a social phenomenon found in 
contemporary society, and that the mental disease of society is profoundly asso- 
ciated with the self. We became aware, however, that narcissism is not neces- 
sarily a negative human constructive ingredient through focusing particularly 
on Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory; it is, on the whole, the psychological con- 
dition and distortion of the relationship between the self and the other. From 
this perspective, it was understood that ‘man is a vulnerable animal who req- 
uires others, that is to say, he is Tragic Man, who needs to be ‘“driven” by his 
ambitions and “led” by his ideals’ (see Ch. 3, pp. 38, 41). That is, man needs the 
help of others. 
In Part III, then, I will conduct a theoretical exploration of the political tho- 
ughts of the two theorists Erich Fromm and Shōzō Fujita, and consider some 
issues concerning democracy on the basis of the disciplinary stance put forward 
in Part I and the philosophical-anthropological standpoint of narcissism eluci- 
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dating the intrinsic relationship between the self and the other. How do the two 
political theorists see narcissism, and what can we learn from them? Would it be 
possible to deny narcissism? If not, how should we think of it? How do we see 
democracy amongst narcissists, and how does democracy come out as seen 
from narcissism? The key point of this part is that narcissism is the mental 
condition under which the self cannot glue himself to the other. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 5 
 
Shōzō Fujita:1 
The Death of the ‘Other’ (Tasha) 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  What Connects Fujita with the Concept of Narcissism? 
 
In this chapter, my aim is to examine the political theory of the Japanese poli- 
tical theorist Shōzō Fujita (1927-2003) through focusing on his quasi-psycho- 
analytic perspective, particularly on his conception of narcissism. In Japan, as 
we shall see below, he is known as a pupil of Masao Maruyama (on him, see 
App. 1, s. 4), who is often regarded as a founder of modern politics in Japan, 
and also as a person who contributed to the study of the ‘Tennō system’ 
(Tennōsei) particularly from the standpoint of the history of ideas (shisōshi). 
Perhaps the reason why this image of Fujita exists is primarily due to the 
following two facts: first, that he began his academic career by publishing an 
article entitled ‘Tennōsei’ (The Tennō System) (1954),2 which contains an inte- 
resting anecdote that this particularly important earliest work was written on 
behalf of his mentor Maruyama – this story has often been referred to when this 
writing is introduced (e.g. Iida 2006a: 254-5, 287, 351; Iida 2006b; 348-9); and 
second, that his representative early work was ‘Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri’ 
(The Principles of Rule of the State of the Tennō System) (1956) – abbreviated to 
‘Shihai genri’ below. As regards this issue, it is important to remember that the 
theme of ‘Shihai genri’ addressed subsequent to the first essay was to ‘construct 
the adequate logic that blows a hole in the “state of the Tennō system” (Tennōsei 
kokka) in prewar and wartime Japan – and the society of the Tennō system 
(Tennōsei shakai) . . . by finding out the logical essence of the system and by 
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objectifying the whole structure’ (Iida 2006a: 255).3 From these perspectives, it 
is admitted that Fujita’s early concerns gave rise to his image as a scholar of the 
Tennō system that has haunted him since. 
  To be sure, it seems true that the most popular image of Fujita noted above 
has so far confined his role to a scholar of the history of Japanese ideas who 
devoted himself primarily to analysing the Tennō system as a Maruyama’s fol- 
lower by laying great stress on the aforementioned facts. On this view, giving 
firm evidence, the Japanese sociologist Yū Wada says: ‘in general, Shōzō Fujita, 
when referring to his thought, is categorised as part of Maruyama’s genealogy, 
that is as a scholar of the history of Japanese ideas (Nihon shisōshi-ka) who 
“analysed and criticised, for example, the Tennō system and the principles of 
the system of the Meiji state (Meiji kokka) in his works such as ‘Shihai genri’ 
(1966) and ‘Ishin no seishin’ (The Spirit of the Meiji Restoration) (1967) by 
highlighting western modernist senses of value” (The Asahi Shimbun, 04.06.20 
03)’ (Wada 2004: 186).4 In fact, as the Japanese philosopher Takashi Kawamoto 
refers to himself as, ‘a university student who had had a secret longing for the 
discipline of the history of political thought (seiji shisōshi) knew the name of 
Shōzō Fujita on the extension of Masao Maruyama and Bunzō Hashikawa.5 The 
first of Fujita’s books I bought were Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri (Miraisha 1966) 
[abbreviated to Shihai genri below] and Ishin no seishin (Misuzu Shobō 1967)’ 
(Kawamoto 2004: 231). This story provides enough evidence that we have lab- 
elled Fujita as a pupil of Maruyama, that is to say, his academic efforts have been 
seen exclusively as an extension of his great mentor’s work, namely as a scholar of 
the ‘Maruyama School’ (Maruyama gakuha). 
  Despite these facts, on the other hand, it is also true that Fujita has another 
aspect of his career, apart from being a scholar of the school, which has been 
commented on. Indeed, it is acknowledged that it is not only this aspect, being 
under the shadow of Maruyama, but also another aspect characterising his 
post-‘“despair” period’ (zetsubō no jidai) (Iida 2006a: 260),6  that have been 
recognised (e.g. Higashi 2004; Hondō 2004; Taraba 2004). Representative works 
written in the period undoubtedly include Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu (Reflections on 
Intellectual History) (1982) – abbreviated to Kōsatsu below – which, as Taizō Iida 
(who has the same mentor as Fujita and was a colleague of Fujita’s) puts it, is 
regarded as ‘the memorial writing signifying the birth of “the world of Shōzō 
Fujita” (Fujita Shōzō no sekai)’ (Iida 2006a: 330). One of his masterworks, 
Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (The Experience of the Twentieth Century of 
Totalitarianism) (1995) – abbreviated to Zentaishugi below – is also counted as 
his representative writing published after his ‘despair’. Roughly speaking, the 
concept constituting these two works is to restore the ‘substance of things’ 
(honrai-teki na mono) on the basis of ‘experience’ (keiken) (Iida 2006a: 336); now- 
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adays these two notions have become important key terms for understanding 
the essence of the ‘later Fujita’ (kōki Fujita) that is provided primarily in the 
above two works.7 For instance, all the three essays on Fujita noted above often 
refer at least to one of those two works – Akira Hondō’s and Masashi Taraba’s 
articles deal with both works. In these respects, it is admitted that this data 
supports the fact that there exists a different aspect constituted primarily by the 
two books regarded as his representative later works, whose importance has 
sometimes been highlighted in addition to his early contributions. 
  It should be noted, however, that the psychoanalytic issue of Fujita’s theory 
has hardly been addressed in related academic fields. Rigorously speaking, no 
work on Fujita has so far tackled the topic. In this respect, it is generally beli- 
eved that there is no such thing as a psychoanalytic subject of Fujita.8 Some 
scholars of his thought might say, therefore, that there is no need to deal with 
such a topic concerning Fujita, even if this perspective is quite relevant to res- 
earch into his theory. Rather, it would seem natural that any works have not 
addressed the psychoanalytic issue in the sense that the topic in respect of his 
thought has not been recognised by the many. For it might even seem weird to 
raise Fujita’s thought in terms of the subject. In fact, the theme has been dealt 
with simply in relation to other theorists (e.g. Iida 2006a: 316) and other subjects 
of his thought (e.g. Hondō 2004: 87) in accordance with those respective topics 
intriguing them. Also, it is important to note that even the term narcissism inc- 
luding the equivalent concept of the Japanese jiko-ai has hardly been applied to 
any issues of his thought. 
  On the other hand, however, it is also certain that, in the sense that the theme 
I will tackle below is profoundly associated with Maruyama’s essential issue 
that was his primary concern, it can be argued that it was inherited from him. 
To take an example, the subject of ‘Chō-kokkashugi no ronri to shinri’ (Logic 
and Psychology of Ultra-Nationalism) (1946) – abbreviated to ‘Chō-kokkashugi’ 
below – which is definitely regarded as one of Maruyama’s most important 
articles, as he himself put it, was undoubtedly to provide an ‘analysis of the 
spiritual structure (shisō kōzō) [and] the psychological basis (shinriteki kiban) of 
Japanese ultra-nationalism’ (Maruyama 1995b: 17; emphases added; [1969b: 1; 
translation modified). In other words, the purpose of the essay, no doubt, was to 
diagnose the ‘diseases of the spiritual structure of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei-teki 
seishin kōzō no byōri) (Maruyama 1964: 496; emphases added; [1969b: 23; tran- 
slation modified]). Maruyama thereafter retained this essential perspective, 
namely an ‘understanding of “diseases” of “the Tennō system as a spiritual 
structure”’ in terms of Japan’s ‘modernisation’ (kindaika) for his entire career, 
regardless of whether or not significantly he later attempted to reconstruct his 
conception of modernisation in itself (Iida 2006a: 148-9). With regard to his 
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concept of ‘spiritual structure’, which was continually stressed by Maruyama, 
we should rather consider this theme from the following perspective: ‘for 
Maruyama, the “postwar” (sengo) was aimed at restarting by reflecting upon his 
academic subject that he had engaged with since his first article, that is by 
“exploring the developmental process of the modern thinking of Japan” (Nihon 
ni okeru kindaiteki shii no seijuku katei no kyūmei)’ (Iida 2006a: 147). This demon- 
strates that the idea of spiritual structure was conceptualised for the purpose of 
understanding the process of maturation of the modern thinking of Japan. In 
short, Maruyama consistently took the most fundamental theoretical standpoint 
that carries out an analysis of his subject from the inside of a problem since his 
first academic task. From this perspective, it is possible to believe that his 
essential viewpoint of observing some social and human illnesses is even asso- 
ciated with social psychology and psychoanalysis. 
  It is no wonder, then, that with respect to his psychoanalytic standpoint Fujita 
inherited Maruyama’s method of diagnosing some disease. In fact, with regard to 
this theme, he later clearly mentions in the significant letter for the memorial 
service for Maruyama: ‘I clearly decided to attend “Maruyama Seminar” 
(Maruyama zemi) at the University of Tokyo in the light of the theme of 
“Gunkoku shihaisha no seishin keitai” (Thought and Behaviour Patterns of 
Japan’s Wartime Leaders) [on this, App. 3, p. 251] . . . in particular, I wished to 
study the “spiritual structure” (seishin kōzō) at the time’ (Fujita 1998c: 680).9 This 
shows that Fujita started out to study the method of analysing the spiritual 
structure of the Tennō system. This perspective leads me to concentrate on the 
core issue of this chapter, that is what we should count as narcissism with 
respect to Fujita’s political theory. 
  Fujita puts forward his view of narcissism primarily in his quasi-psycho- 
analytic work ‘Narushizumu kara no dakkyaku: Mono ni iku michi’ (To Break 
Free from Narcissism: A Way of Finding out the Essence of Things) (1983) – 
abbreviated to ‘Narushizumu’ below.10 His psychological view, however, is pre- 
sented not only in this article but also in some of his other important writings 
such as ‘Kon’nichi no keiken: Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’ (Experience in 
These Days: What Prevents Us Experiencing?) (1982) and ‘Anraku e no 
zentaishugi: Jūjitsu wo torimodosu beku’ (Totalitarianism to Unruffled Ease: 
Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity) (1985) – abbreviated to ‘Anraku’ 
below.11 In particular, these three works, in my view, present his essential 
quasi-psychoanalytic view, or rather it is possible to assume that they aim at 
carrying out his fundamental analyses of the psychology of human beings and 
society. 
  With regard to the reason why Fujita became interested particularly in the 
analysis of the psychology of society, in ‘Kaidai’ (Editor’s Note) for Fujita Shōzō 
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chosakushū 6: Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (The Writings of Shōzō Fujita, vol. 6: The 
Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism) (1997) – abbreviated to 
Chosakushū 6 (and others as well) – Keiji Katō gives a good description from a 
slightly different viewpoint which, as I mentioned in note 7, provides the fact 
that the new disciplinary perspective forms a link in the chain of Fujita’s 
attempt at establishing the ‘studies of the twentieth century’. First of all, Katō 
writes that Fujita regarded his primary task as laying the foundations of a new 
knowledge constituted by a multiple structure made up of three types of the- 
mes, ‘reflections on human history in contemporary times’ (jinruishi-teki mondai), 
‘reflections on the twentieth century’ (nijusseiki ron) described by the notion of 
‘intolerable experience’ (junan keiken) and ‘reflections on contemporary Japanese 
society’ (gendai Nihon shakai ron) at the time when marking his turning point in 
his career, particularly when writing ‘Seishin no hijōji’ (Crisis of Our Thought) 
(1981) – abbreviated to ‘Hijōji’ below – soon after his ‘despair’; for Fujita, the- 
reafter, his tasks all had to be carried out for establishing the structure con- 
sisting of his above three fundamental issues (Katō 1997: 233-4). Next, Katō 
explains that, in the essay ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, Fujita started to examine the 
psychology and mentality of human beings and society and diagnose their disease, 
which elucidates ‘why people avoid experience’, on the basis of his funda- 
mental diagnosis that ‘Japanese society is nowadays being confronted with the 
crucial problem that experience has gradually ceased to exist’ (1997: 234-5). 
According to Katō, ‘Narushizumu’ published after ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ pro- 
poses a more clear perspective of the psychology and mentality in comparison 
with related viewpoints offered by works published before the article (1997: 
235). Also, ‘Anraku’, he says, carries out a more detailed analysis of them (1997: 
236). The psychological perspective in this work, Katō claims, is presented in 
conjunction with the new concept of ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ 
(anraku e no zentaishugi), which is used as a title of his work, by combining the 
two terms ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) and ‘a voluntary servitude to unruffled 
ease’ (anraku e no jihatsuteki reizoku)12 developed by Richard Sennett (1997: 236). 
Finally, Katō points out that Fujita had preserved his sociopsychological pers- 
pective till the late 1980s while his concern changed from such a simple analysis 
of the psychology of society into the new point of view of ‘personal relation- 
ships’ (pāsonaru rirēshon) (1997: 239) – on this concept, see s. 7 below. 
  From Kato’s perspective, it is not surprising that Fujita became much inter- 
ested in the term narcissism that has been the concept at the centre of psycho- 
analysis (see App. 2). Rather, in so far as his earliest concern and research aim 
themselves had been to dive straight into studying the method of a ‘spiritual 
structure’, which diagnoses some illness of society, it was quite natural that he 
should show a great deal of interest not only in the notion of narcissism, des- 
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cribing ‘human nature’ (on this view of narcissism, see Pt II), but also in the 
disciplines of psychology and psychoanalysis, both of which deal with the 
human psychosis. As a matter of fact, it is evident that Fujita consistently 
concerned himself with those approaches even during the last ten years of his 
life. In his ‘Chiisana kibō no shushi: 1996 nen “Misuzu” dokusha ankēto’ (Small 
Seeds of Hope: Misuzu Book Reviews in 1996) (1997), for example, referring to 
the Japanese psychiatrist Hisao Nakai, Fujita says: ‘by necessity I read Shakai to 
byōsha [sic] (Patients and Society)13 (1991) containing “Seken ni sumu byōsha” 
(Patients Living in the World) several years ago, underlining sentences at least 
twice and writing notes in the margin’ (1997e: 218). In addition, it is note- 
worthy that he highlights the importance of ‘intersubjectivity’ (sōgo shukanteki 
kankei) – on this, see s. 7 below – and ‘common sense’ (shakaiteki jōshiki) amongst 
‘others’ (tasha), referring to the German psychiatrist Wolfgang Blankenburg 
(1997e: 215). These viewpoints put forward by Blankenburg and emphasised by 
Fujita are particularly relevant to the above Japanese psychiatrist raised by the 
latter. In fact, Nakai stresses both the above concepts. For instance, disting- 
uishing between ‘common sense’ (jōshiki) and ‘social mind’ (shakai tsūnen), he 
claims that the former is of great significance for clinical treatment (Nakai 
1991b: 9). He then lays emphasis on ‘human relationship’ in terms of Harry S. 
Sullivan’s psychoanalytic theory: ‘In reality, many patients are suffering for 
personal relationships (taijin kankei). Perhaps the reason why Harry Stack 
Sullivan’s psychoanalytic theory based on the standpoint that “mental diseases 
are concerned with personal relationships in disorder” has been accepted by 
Japan rather than by his country, the US, is because the problem appears pro- 
minently in Japan in particular’ (1991c: 244; emphasis added). This knowledge 
enables us to understand how important intersubjective human relationships 
are – in fact, there is some evidence that Sullivan lays stress on the importance 
of intersubjectivity in the therapeutic process (see, e.g. Evans 1996: 166). What 
Fujita highlights through referring to the two psychiatrists Nakai and Blanken- 
burg in his book review, most importantly, is not only to shed new light on 
politics and contemporary society but also to suggest some remedies for society’s 
illness of narcissism particularly by introducing the two concepts of intersub- 
jectivity and common sense. These facts precisely explain that and why he was 
consistently intrigued by psychiatric and psychoanalytic issues. 
  From these analyses, then, the following question arises: why was Fujita par- 
ticularly interested in the psychoanalytic concept of ‘narcissism’ as his new 
analytic device? As we have seen, however, we do not have any difficulty in 
understanding why he was intrigued by the academic discipline represented by 
psychiatry and also by the notion; rather, it seems natural that the concept 
should be applied to his study, taking account of the above pieces of evidence. 
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Despite this fact, however, it must be admitted that I have not yet answered the 
question appropriately. I will carry out this task by means of presenting a 
possible view of what narcissism should be counted in relation to Fujita. Here 
giving an answer to this enquiry, which seems crucial to my exploration in this 
chapter, is regarded exactly the same as replying to the question about the 
reason for Fujita’s interest in a psychoanalytic approach stressing narcissism. In 
my view, an answer should be provided by focusing on the concept of ‘other’ 
(tasha). Perhaps this is the most appropriate perspective on this issue because 
the concept has been of huge importance to psychoanalysis particularly since 
the discipline established ‘object relations theory’ and ‘self psychology’, on the 
one hand, and because it was greatly stressed by his academic mentor 
Maruyama, on the other. On the concept, for example, Iida maintains, ‘a “sense 
of the other” (tasha kankaku) Maruyama-san14 says . . . how important it is to 
understand the other. We absolutely should not exclude others simply on the 
grounds that they are different from us. Laying the foundations of society is 
based on the fact that we autonomously establish relationships and associations 
with heterogeneous others (ishitsu na tasha) by ourselves . . . this is why I want 
to highlight the importance of his theory of “sense of the other”’ (2006a: 131-2; 
emphases added). In fact, Jiko nai taiwa: Sansatsu no nōto kara (Dialogue in the 
Self: As Suggested in Maruyama’s Three Notebooks) (1998) based on Maru- 
yama’s three notebooks, which contain his diary and memorandums recorded 
by himself from 1943 to 1987, tries to penetrate both the other and a sense of the 
other. Particularly through writing down ideas concerning these concepts in his 
notebooks, Maruyama sought to view the ‘absence of a sense of the other’ (tasha 
kankaku no nasa) as the root of all evils.15 His account of this notion, on the 
whole, was provided as if relying upon some psychoanalytic theory of nar- 
cissism, regarding the communal sense viewed to be specific to Japan as a pri- 
mary problem of its politics, that is focusing on ‘zuruzuru bettari’ (going along to 
get along)16 and ‘mochitsu motaretsu’ (pathologically depending upon and being 
depended upon), in which the self and others have not been separated from each 
other.17 
These analyses enable me to give an appropriate answer to my question on 
the basis of the above fact as follows. The absence of the other, namely the psy- 
chological condition that views others as extensions of the self in a psycho- 
analytic sense, is the intrinsic feature of narcissism, and the concept of other is 
nowadays of vital importance to a psychoanalytic understanding apart from the 
concept of self (e.g. Cohen 2007; Ronningstam 2005; Wada 1999). From this 
psychoanalytic perspective, it is acknowledged that Fujita counted narcissism 
not simply as a psychoanalytic concept illuminating contemporary society and 
politics for conducting an analysis of them from a new perspective, but rather 
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as one which he enhanced after having inherited Maruyama’s above standpoint. 
If this is true, then this viewpoint in Fujita’s theory must rather be regarded as 
one of his most important theoretical devices. 
 
 
2.  The Tennō System (Tennōsei) and Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi): 
Between Fujita’s Early and Later Works 
 
In this section, I want to establish a fundamental connection between Fujita’s 
early and later works. First of all, I am well aware that, in his early work, Fujita 
had had a great deal of interest in politics, but in his later work, by contrast, he 
gradually lost his political concern. His great declaration (see App. 3, pp. 256-8) 
must have been issued when his high hopes for politics were publicly raised. 
This clearly explains that in those days Fujita retained a strong interest in the 
creation of his political theory, focusing on his conception of jinmin-shugi (see 
App. 3, p. 253 and n. 13). He remained interested in its task in the period when 
he wrote ‘Jiyū kō’ (On Liberty) (1970). We perceive that in this essay, in which 
he did not lose his hope, employing and based on the methods of ‘critique’ 
(hihan) – this was consistently his style since his first work – and ‘self-control’ 
(jiko seigyo) (cf. App. 3, p. 267), Fujita gave possible remedies for rationalising 
without reason: 
 
What can and ought we, as individuals respectively, to do for it [high growth] in such a 
society? One is to criticise (hihan), and another is to have one’s self-control (jiko seigyo) as 
much as one can. To put it another way . . . it is most important to walk slowly, not to take 
part in ‘walking race’ (kyōho), and to refrain from exaggerated self-advertisement, as much 
as possible; to pick up one’s pace, that is to criticise problems appearing from the capitalist 
structure of Japan (Nihon shihonshugi no kōzō) and the spiritual structure of our advertising- 
oriented society (kōkoku shakaiteki seishin kōzō) in one’s own pace (1998c: 49). 
 
Here it is possible to see an adequate political theorist who suggests what we 
ought to do for politics.18 In the above essay, however, Fujita no longer put all 
his energies into developing his theory. The writing does not seem to be open to 
his more general attempt to formulate his political theory based on the ‘sove- 
reignty of the people’. While it was indeed aimed at dealing with political the- 
mes by suggesting some ways of coping with the evils of high growth (Kōdo 
Seichō), there was already no strong purpose of advancing his political theory in 
the work. It is evident that, in ‘Jiyūkō’ published in 1970, he lost his iron will to 
actively build a theory for establishing jinmin-shugi in contrast to his early 
theoretical contributions, such as ‘Shaku-shaku daiji wo eien ni hakaran: Kikyō 
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gakusei S-kun e no tegami’ (On the Basis of Common Sense: A Letter to Mr S, 
Students in Favour of Their Home Villages) (1960) – abbreviated to ‘Shaku- 
shaku’ below – ‘Zero kara no shuppatsu’ (Start from Scratch) (1960) and ‘Gendai 
ni okeru “risei” no kaifuku’ (The Restoration of Reason in Contemporary 
Times) (1962) – abbreviated to ‘“Risei” no kaifuku’ below – all of which were 
oriented towards formulating and laying the foundations of his political theory. 
Rather, roughly speaking, particularly since ‘“Kōdo Seichō” hantai’ (A Protest 
Against ‘High Growth’) (1969) – abbreviated to ‘Kōdo Seichō’ below – Fujita 
drew attention to the identification of evils produced by the Kōdo Seichō, that is 
of the conditions that made society impossible to realise democracy in postwar 
Japan, and he sought to find some ways of surmounting the ‘culture of finished 
products’ (on this concept, see App. 3, pp. 261-2); that is to say, he worked on 
the theme of identifying the conditions that prevent people having an oppor- 
tunity of encountering the ‘essence of things’ and the ‘fundamental conditions 
of contemporary times’ (on these concepts, see App. 3, s. 2), relying upon his 
essential method of analysing a ‘spiritual structure’. 
Despite these facts, Fujita’s consistent subject must have been to identify and 
cure diseases of the spiritual structure of the ‘society of the Tennō system’ 
(Tennōsei shakai).19 This theme that was dealt with in the best article in the early 
Fujita ‘Shihai genri’ is undoubtedly regarded as one of the most important 
notions for grasping his political theory. While employing the term with a focus 
on the concept of ‘society’ in the brilliant writing, Fujita did not provide any 
detailed account of the concept in the work. Instead, he gave a description of 
the notion in his postscript to the third edition of Shihai genri (1996).20 Accor- 
ding to Fujita, the ‘society of the Tennō system’ is rigorously distinguished from 
the ‘state of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei kokka). At this point it is important to 
define the latter concept exactly in order to know what the former is. So let us 
first have a look at it below. 
 
The state of the Tennō system (Tennōsei kokka) 
Fujita claims that the state of the Tennō system, whose basic theoretical fra- 
mework was already presented in ‘Shihai genri’, was established during the 
three years before and after 1889, that is before the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) 
in the Meiji period (1868-1912) (1998a: 17-9).21 Roughly speaking, Fujita’s ‘Tennō 
system’ means the system of rules (regime) organised by the constitution based 
on the Tennō-centred social structure. This is characterised as follows: on the 
one hand, as the ‘political state’ (seiji kokka) unified by Tennō’s supreme power 
(kunken), in which he becomes and takes on the role of a ‘monarch’ (kunshu); on 
the other hand, as the ‘land of the kami (gods)’ (shinkoku) ruled by his absolute 
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value, in which he comes into existence as a kami, and as the ‘family state’ 
(kazoku kokka) organised by his patriarchal and paternalistic emotional values, in 
which he is regarded as a ‘patriarch’ (kafu, kafuchō) – the former denotes the 
basic political (power) structure of this political system, and the latter means the 
political function fulfilled in it (1998a: 2-5, 14-63; cf. Seifert 2010: 214-8). 
  It is important to note that the mechanism of the Tennō system with a focus 
on its ideological aspect had been proposed to a certain extent by Maruyama in 
his most important early writing ‘Chō-kokkashugi’ (1946) before identified by 
Fujita.22 However, it must be pointed out that the dual constructive function of 
the ‘political power’ of the system and the ‘interior value’ of the system, which 
Maruyama and Fujita considered as most problematic concerning politics in 
modern Japan, was actually realised, that is institutionalised, after the emergence 
of the society of the Tennō system (1998a: 17-9); most importantly, in fact, Fujita 
distinguishes between the ‘logical process’ (ronri katei) determined in the Meiji 
Era (the establishment of the ‘state of the Tennō system’) and the ‘historical 
process’ (rekishi katei) actualised after the Russo-Japanese War (the historical 
process that Japan underwent after establishing the ‘society of the Tennō sys- 
tem’) (1998a: 15). Perhaps this is a crucial point in gaining an understanding of 
the essence of this issue. Here I must therefore shine a light on the ‘process of 
the transformation’ so as to grasp the state of the Tennō system. 
First, it must be noted that Fujita draws attention to the process of building 
the state of the Tennō system that was, he highlights, ‘healthier’ (kenkō) than the 
social version of the system (e.g. 1997e: iii-iv; 1998a: 15-7, 44-8; 1998c: 504).23 At 
this point I am aware that the reason why he stresses the importance of distin- 
guishing between those two kinds of Tennō system is primarily because there is 
such a significant difference between them. As has already been pointed out, in 
Fujita’s view the task of establishing the state of the Tennō system had been 
completed before the Russo-Japanese War began – perhaps this is a key point. 
Thus, second, it is noted that Fujita particularly emphasises that the war was a 
‘epoch-making’ (kakkiteki) event in the sense of the first ‘total war’ (sōryokusen) 
occurring in Japan, and therefore that it gave a provocatively historical meaning, 
namely a profound effect on Japanese history, just as the Meiji Restoration and 
the Kōdo Seichō had huge impacts on it (1998a: 298); to put it simply, the event 
profoundly affected all the things there. Despite these facts, Fujita asserts that 
there is an important difference in degree and quality between a ‘political cha- 
nge’ and a ‘radical change in lifestyle’ brought about throughout a society. From 
this perspective, then, let us look briefly at the process of the building and tran- 
sformation of the state of the Tennō system, focusing primarily on the postscript 
to the third edition of Shihai genri below. 
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  According to Fujita, one of the most important characteristics of the Tennō 
system as a state is described by the fact that statists and statesmen (seijika)24 
were independent of society, and therefore kept a proper distance from ordi- 
nary people and their life and from thinkers and scholars, and vice versa (1998a: 
298-9). This, says Fujita, resulted in this system maintaining a good balance 
between state and society, and between politics and thoughts (1998a: 299). This 
is why he stresses that statists and statesmen there managed to comply with the 
raison d’état (kokka risei) required by the state (1998a: 299-301). In his view, how- 
ever, the concept of ‘statesman’ profoundly changed the way of expressing its 
own important political implication from an ‘actor in politics’ (seiji kōdōsha) into 
a ‘symbolic character’ (shōchōsei), ‘status’ (shakaiteki chii) and ‘authority’ (ken’isei) 
after the Russo-Japanese War, that is exactly since the Taishō period (1912-26) 
(1998a: 301).25 Above all, Fujita lays stress on Taishō Tennō’s character of a 
‘mikoshi portable shrine’ (o-mikoshi) – on this, see p. 79 below – which was emp- 
loyed for intensifying the unification of groups (1998a: 302; cf. 1998a: 45-8);26 
here Fujita sees the emergence of the society of the Tennō system. In addition, 
he contends that the birth of the new system is characterised not only by the 
‘transformation (change of leadership qualities) of statesmen (seijika)’ (seijika no 
henshitsu) from ‘political actors’ (seijiteki kōisha) to ‘ritual beings’ (gishikiteki 
sonzai) but also by ‘social reform’ (shakai kairyō) promoted by the government 
(1998a: 304). 
Fujita must have considered that healthy politics needs a proper distance from 
its objects. From this perspective, much more importantly, it is presumed that 
the transformation divided the Tennō system up into two kinds of character- 
istics. In other words, there is a huge difference in the above degree of distance 
between them. Obviously, in this way, Fujita recognised a ‘radical change’ in 
lifestyle implemented throughout society as noted above. Presumably, this is 
primarily why Fujita needed to particularly highlight the Russo-Japanese War, 
which transformed the history of Japan thereafter, that is to say, which triggered 
the emergence of the society of the Tennō system. 
 
The society of the Tennō system (Tennōsei shakai) 
At this point I need to look at the Tennō system as a society Fujita particularly 
emphasises. According to him, as mentioned in note 23, a kind of ‘sense of the 
responsibility’ in the period when Japan established the state of the Tennō 
system gave Japan’s political leaders ‘fairness’ and ‘toleration’. In this respect, I 
described it figuratively by the word of ‘healthy’. In fact, as noted above, Fujita 
clearly mentions that the state version of the system was healthier than its social 
version. As we have seen, the historical process of losing this healthiness is cha- 
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racteristic of the process of establishing the society of the Tennō system. Above 
all, then, what is it? With respect to this vital point, I suggest tackling this issue 
from the following perspective: ‘Fujita’s consciousness of history (rekishi ishiki) 
highlights Japan’s aspect of the “society of the Tennō system” that has been 
deep-seated in this society up till now, or rather that has been even increasingly 
intensified through the negative epoch-making (kakki) discontinuity caused by the 
direction of postwar society, since the Russo-Japanese War (Nichiro igo) as a start- 
ing point of history (rekishiteki shiten)’ (Miyamura 2009: 168). This elucidates why 
Fujita draws too much attention to the concept, which illuminates our society 
per se. In short, in Fujita’s view Japan has remained the society of the Tennō 
system since the Russo-Japanese War. 
  It must be noted, however, that with regard to this concept, Fujita gives a 
complex description. Indeed, it was developed in conjunction with some other 
important political concepts such as ‘fascism’ (fasizumu) and ‘totalitarianism’ 
(zentaishugi), which were applied to the society of the Tennō system constituted 
by its state version that accomplished the institutionalisation (seidoka) of the 
dual construction of the ‘state of the apparatus of political power’ (kenryoku 
kokka) and the ‘communal state’ (kyōdōtai kokka) (Fujita 1998a: 18). Despite these 
facts, the complicated perspective gives great consistency to his political theory. 
In fact, his following words refer to the certainty of the view: ‘Japanese society, 
while flustered soon after the war had exposed its own disease of Japan’s total 
war, gradually became stable through re-establishing the social system and its 
organisation (kikō). Democracy in this society cannot control itself (jiko) and results 
simply in self-assertion for fulfilling its own desire even though politics exists 
there. A new framework of behaviour is also organised by the pattern of phy- 
sical laws (butsuriteki kikaku) of the society institutionalising (kakuitsuka) man’ 
(Fujita 1998a: 193). This elucidates why Fujita stresses that the society of the 
Tennō system came into existence as ‘Fascism’ in wartime Japan and as ‘totali- 
tarianism’ in the twentieth century. As Miyamura emphasises, the society of the 
Tennō system ‘has been deep-seated in this society up till now’, or rather it ‘has 
been even increasingly intensified’. In Fujita’s view, for these reasons, Japanese 
society still retains social evils brought about by the Tennō system, and the exis- 
tence of this system therefore still has an actual meaning. 
To fully understand the society of the Tennō system, then, is definitely not 
impossible even though it is composed of a complicated conceptual structure as 
mentioned above for Fujita gives a consistent account of the system. Rather, on 
this view, it is presumed that a postscript added to ‘Shihai genri’ forty years later 
when the article first had been published aimed precisely to cast new light on his 
concept of the society of the Tennō system as the ‘greatest enemy’ (saidai no teki) 
(Miyamura 2009: 169), which is, Fujita highlights, still deep-rooted in Japan, 
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taking the form of ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ (see pp. 94-6 and App. 3, pp. 
265-6) – significantly, this task was his last academic work. As Fujita puts it: 
 
What is the society of the Tennō system? This is the existential form of fear that indi- 
viduality (kobetsusei) is exposed by the destruction of harmony (ittaikan) in respective group 
dimensions, and it signifies a social group in which all group members constantly avoid 
individualising themselves (1998a: 304). 
 
From this perspective, Fujita mentions that there are three kinds of society of 
the Tennō system. However, he puts forward only its two types: first, ‘a group 
and an organisation in which decision-making on the raison d’être and pro- 
blems of group depends heavily upon certain persons regarded as “religious 
leader-like” (kyōso-teki), “boss-like” (bosu-teki) and “feudal lord-like” (tonosama- 
teki)’ – this can be called the tonosama type of society of the Tennō system;27 
second, ‘a group in which there is no certain (core) person who represents its 
own group’ – the ‘common and partial ownership’ (sōyūteki bun’yū) type of 
society of the Tennō system’ (1998a: 305-8). With respect to the first type, Fujita 
focuses particularly on the feature of a ‘mikoshi portable shrine’ noted above, 
which illuminates the transformation from the state to the society of the Tennō 
system and Taishō Tennō. According to Fujita, the following two elements are 
key characteristics of this kind of society of the Tennō system: first, a ‘person 
carried on his members’ shoulders’ (katsugareru mono) – as if he was a portable 
shrine – who is always required to make an unnatural smile signifying the 
symbol of ‘stable optimism’ (anteishita rakutensei) – Fujita applies the Tennō to a 
typical person carried; and second, ‘persons carrying (portable shrine-like) one’ 
(katsugiya) who signify the ‘way of social behaviour’ (shakaiteki kōdō yōshiki) 
(1998a: 305-6). The second type, says Fujita, is that all the behaviours of almost 
all the members of a group, with the exception of ‘odd persons’ (kawari mono), 
are directed particularly at preventing the dissolution of the harmony of its 
group and the appearance of their individual personality; this aspect of Japa- 
nese tradition, remaining until today, is still deep-seated. 
  To identify the third type is hard for me in terms of his final suggestion for its 
characteristics. Rather, it would seem meaningless to devote my efforts to the 
identification of the whole structure. I should, much more importantly, direct 
my attention to an understanding of the essence of the deep-rooted character- 
istics of the society of the Tennō system; this task will probably contribute to an 
appropriate understanding of the core of Fujita’s political theory connecting his 
early work with his later work. I will therefore attempt to shed light on it, 
referring to the above two analyses and focusing primarily on the connection 
between the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism. 
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Contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaishugi) as the society of the Tennō 
system 
As noted above, the society of the Tennō system first emerged as the distortion 
of its state version in the beginning of the twentieth century. It meant a pro- 
found change in the quality of statesmen, on the one hand, and a radical change 
in people’s lifestyle, on the other. This led to an inevitable logical consequence 
for the state of the Tennō system. In other words, the logical process of esta- 
blishing the ‘dualism of the constitutive principles of the state of the Tennō 
system’ (kokka kōsei genri no nigenron) (e.g. 1998a: 39-45) completely determined 
Japanese history thereafter. In this sense, it is not surprising that the Russo- 
Japanese War triggered the emergence of the society of the Tennō system con- 
nected with ‘totalitarianism as war’ and ‘political totalitarianism’ (1997e: 49-61; 
see pp. 75-9, 95-6 and App. 3, pp. 264-6. With respect to Fujita’s political theory, 
it would rather seem more appropriate to consider that the appearance of these 
political diseases were natural consequences of the logical process, so to speak. 
  Perhaps here I should concentrate on the concept of the ‘twentieth century’, 
which probably illuminates the core issue of Fujita’s political theory shining a 
light not only on the society of the Tennō system but also on totalitarianism 
called a ‘monster’ (kaibutsu) (1997e: 77). That is to say, to grasp his theory is 
exactly to look back on the twentieth century. For Fujita, in this respect, both the 
concepts undoubtedly best explain contemporary Japan, which inherited the 
essence of the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism, both of which are 
supposed to have lasted up until now, as inextricably interwoven. In sum, in 
Fujita’s view the twentieth century is the time distorted by the pathology of the 
spiritual structure of society. In this respect, totalitarianism and the society of 
the Tennō system are the core social diseases of the time. Roughly speaking, it is 
believed that, in his view, the former characterises the tendency of the world as 
a whole, and the latter describes the social conditions of Japan, in the twentieth 
century. In fact, as Fujita puts it, ‘[t]he twentieth century is the age of total- 
itarianism’ (1997e: 197). For him, it is a deep-rooted ‘monster’ in society as a 
whole on the grounds that it has subsequently continued to appear, taking 
slightly different forms. Most importantly, therefore, ‘contemporary totalitaria- 
nism’ noted above is our inner enemy that has remained up until now in Fujita’s 
view. 
 
Theoretical problems: the society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism 
Admittedly, Fujita’s theoretical framework is essentially consistent throughout 
his works focusing on the two concepts of society of the Tennō system and total- 
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itarianism. The key notions that his political theory shines a light on, no wonder, 
are these two notions. At this point it is important to raise some potential pro- 
blems of his political theory through focusing on the two important concepts to 
the extent that it concerns my research. It should be noted, however, that we 
have considerable difficulty in dealing with the issue in the sense that both the 
ideas contain complex political and sociological themes, such as ‘fascism’ and 
‘mass society’, that are associated with both the concepts, and that its task req- 
uires an enormously long space. Here I will therefore simply deal with logical 
problems included in Fujita’s theory in respect of his two most important con- 
cepts – for I am always intrigued by the logic of a theory rather than the contents 
of a theory. 
  First, it is pointed out that the introduction of the concept of totalitarianism to 
Fujita’s work has obscured some characteristics of Japanese problems that his 
theory has identified. For example, indeed, the ‘character of a mikoshi portable 
shrine’ and ‘common and partial ownership’ may have some aspects of tota- 
litarianism, but paradoxically, the application of the political concept, derived 
from Fascist Italy, has proved that his political theory has not needed those 
Japanese concepts.28 In this respect, it must be noted that, on the one hand, the 
political notion serves to shed light on the fundamental problems of twentieth- 
century Japan, but on the other hand, it rather serves to make it unclear what 
problems are peculiar to Japan.29 For these reasons, indeed, Fujita’s attempt at 
understanding all the things by applying the concept of totalitarianism contri- 
buted solely to concealing the essence of problems specific to Japan. Hence, it is 
possible to acknowledge that his view that ‘Japan [has] becom[e] a leading and 
typical contemporary totalitarianism as the third type of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 
86) has even spoilt the concept of the society of the Tennō system even if con- 
temporary Japan is totalitarian. 
  Second, I point to the problem of to what extent the concept of the society of 
the Tennō system can characterise contemporary Japanese society, or, to put it 
another way, whether it is possible to characteristically describe society nowa- 
days by applying the concept, even if it is possible to consider contemporary 
Japan as Tennō system society-like. Undoubtedly, it is not plausible to think that 
society nowadays is exactly the same as society a hundred years ago. Of course, 
presumably he did not intend to say such a thing. Rather, my questions are as 
follows: first, until when Japan will continue to be the society of the Tennō sys- 
tem – this enquiry is not ridiculous to this issue, as we shall see below; and 
second, whether it can be applied only to Japan. (It is important to note that the 
society of the Tennō system, including the original ‘Tennō system’, is a phe- 
nomenon appeared only in Japan. If not, then what does the name of the ‘Tennō 
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system’ mean?) On this point, there seem to be logical aporias in the theory of 
the society of the Tennō system. 
  With regard to the first question, since no one can know the future, it might 
be irrelevant to this issue. Is it possible, then, to assume that Japan a hundred 
years later will be the society of the Tennō system? It will probably be impo- 
ssible to think so for it absolutely cannot be the same as the present one even 
though it will retain some characteristics of the society of the Tennō system. It 
seems, however, that the concept allows Fujita to apply it to every age. In fact, 
this is clearly explained by his theory putting emphasis on its logical consequence, 
as we saw above. In this sense, precisely because Fujita was not aware of this 
fact, he assumed that, ‘[s]ince society is a merely external condition, a possible 
great social upheaval might simply result in a knee-jerk reaction to the instan- 
taneous variation’ (1998a: 193). Rather, he should have identified some differ- 
ence in the society of the Tennō system between the Taishō, Shōwa and Heisei 
periods, taking account of the flow of ‘mass society’ emerged in 1950s Japan.30 
As a matter of fact, Fujita does not practically employ either the terms ‘masses’ 
or ‘mass society’ in his later contributions; instead, his theory gives us the 
impression that the term totalitarianism suddenly appeared in his work.31 
  With regard to the second question, I draw attention to his precise definition 
of the society of the Tennō system, namely ‘the existential form of fear that 
individuality is exposed by the destruction of harmony in respective group 
dimensions, and a social group in which all group members constantly avoid 
individualising themselves’, as noted above (1998a: 304). Are they relevant only 
to the Tennō system and Japan? I do not think so. As far as Fujita’s above acc- 
ount of the society of the Tennō system is concerned, it is presumed that many 
groups in the world to a greater or lesser extent have such features, or rather, that 
there are some groups which have stronger characteristics of them than those of 
the society of the Tennō system.32 Surely, as we saw above, Fujita divides it up 
into its three types and gives clear descriptions of them, putting forward some 
interesting concepts presenting some important Japanese characteristics such as 
a ‘mikoshi portable shrine’. In this respect, there appears to be no difficulty in his 
theory of the society of the Tennō system because concerning this concept he 
can show some significant differences between Japanese and other societies by 
applying some concepts describing problems specific to Japan. To be sure, as 
Fujita says, the ‘fear that individuality is exposed’ may primarily characterise 
the ‘form of social beings’ (shakaiteki sonzai keishiki) and the ‘way of behaviour’ 
(kōdō yōshiki) of the society of the Tennō system in the sense that he considers 
the fear chiefly as the primary characteristic of the society of the Tennō system 
(1998a: 304-5). Does this fear, however, have its origins in the ‘society of the 
Tennō system’, and is it therefore the sole feature of the system? Isn’t it rather 
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appropriate to assume that the phenomena described by the Japanese cultural 
product of o-mikoshi and the concept of sōyūteki bun’yū, which, says Fujita, 
characterise the existence of the fear, can be seen in many groups and places in 
the world? Shouldn’t we presume that there is only a difference in the degree of 
the fear? In my view, in many respects, there is no reason why the theory aims 
exclusively to explain the Tennō system, even though it is meaningful to divide 
the society of the Tennō system up into its three types. From the logical per- 
spective of Fujita’s theory of the Tennō system, the raison d’être of the concept 
of the Tennō system is fulfilled only by the fact that it is simply somewhat of a 
traditional political system which has continued to exist since the Meiji period. 
  For these reasons, indeed, the concept designed for explaining the character 
traits of twentieth-century Japan, paradoxically, enables us to apply it to diffe- 
rent kinds of societies which are likely to have the same features as the former 
society. In short, in many respects, the Tennō system has already had only a 
nominal sense, but has not had an actual sense particularly with respect to its 
contemporary social type.33 In these respects, it must be stressed that Fujita 
should have differentiated between what is the society of the Tennō system-like 
in contemporary Japan and what is not – theoretically, it is contradictory to allow 
the concept to adopt itself to non-Japanese societies on the grounds that it must 
characterise only Japan as noted above. Therefore, it is irrelevant to consider 
that the society of the Tennō system ‘has been even increasingly intensified’ 
(Miyamura 2009: 168) unless taking account of the above structural fault in the 
theory. For these reasons, the concept results in exactly the same logical con- 
sequence as the first problem that it is impossible to peculiarly characterise 
Japan by focusing exclusively on the term totalitarianism concerning Fujita’s 
conception of totalitarianism as noted above. 
  Perhaps, we should rather regard the concept of the society of the Tennō 
system as a metaphor to explain contemporary Japanese society particularly in 
the postwar period – in this sense, the concept of Tennō is nowadays even 
regarded as a metaphor for a boss, a religious reader and the like. If not, what 
does it mean to particularly stress the term Tennō system despite the fact that 
the ‘dual construction’ explained above has collapsed in these days? In many 
respects, it is much more appropriate to believe that the Tennō system in the 
postwar period has simply played a practical role of an image formed in terms 
of contemporary social conditions than to believe that the root of all evils, which 
has constantly appeared in political reality, is the result of the existence of the 
system, namely some characteristics of the society of the Tennō system, such as 
‘little Tennō systems’ (chiisana Tennōsei, shō-Tennōsei), which have remained 
everywhere in Japan (Fujita 1998a). The Japanese political theorist Keiichi 
Matsushita, for example, focuses on the social aspect of the function of building 
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politics based on the ‘consent of the masses’ (taishū no dōi) by way of mani- 
pulating their ‘image of Tennō’ directed exactly towards the ‘masses’ (taishū) – 
the ‘mass Tennō system’ (taishū Tennōsei) (Matsushita 1994). In this respect, it 
can be argued that the image as an advertisement produced by ‘mass media’ 
actually has had a more powerful influence on the creation of political reality 
than the Tennō system per se – in this sense, there is some evidence that Tennō 
himself and the Imperial Household of Japan (Kōshitsu), instead of the system, 
have effectively fulfilled the function of forming public opinion, namely politics. 
From this perspective, reality created by ‘mass society’ must be regarded as more 
problematic. Hence, it might be much more appropriate to conclude that, as far 
as contemporary evils are concerned, the roles of mass media and advertise- 
ment – namely the way of using contemporary technology – are more relevant to 
the ‘root of those evils’. For these reasons, the Tennō system has to a large 
extent been depoliticised – here there is not enough space to provide a detailed 
explanation of its historical process, e.g. focusing on the process of the trans- 
formation of the political meanings of the Tennō system. 
  There is, then, no longer any actual meaning in the system in itself. From this 
perspective, it is not appropriate to emphasise that ‘little Tennō systems’ sig- 
nifying Japan as a society of the Tennō system still exist unless it is proved that 
the signification intended by the concept must be the Tennō system. Hence, it can 
be argued that there is no conceptual significance of the Tennō system. Rather, it 
is important to identify the meaning of the ‘continuity of the spirit’ (seishin no 
renzokusei) between wartime and postwar Japan (1998a: 148) not by laying stress 
on the concept. In sum, it must be noted that Fujita should have changed the 
name of the society of the Tennō system either to the Tennō system-like society 
(Tennōsei-teki shakai) or to the society of the Tennō system-like society (Tennōsei 
shakai-teki shakai), and that he should have distinguished between the society of 
the Tennō system-like and contemporary things, so as to clarify the difference 
between communal society and mass society in postwar Japan. To put it another 
way, he should have made a rigid distinction between his two concepts of the 
society of the Tennō system and totalitarianism concerning what they describe 
and what they do not, respectively. Presumably, thereby, he must have succe- 
eded in showing some potential contemporary significance of the Tennō system; 
most importantly, thus, these tasks must be completed by our academic efforts. 
With regard to this issue, over twenty five years ago the Japanese historian 
Shigeki Tōyama gave a significant tip for shedding light on those tasks, taking 
account of the flow of Japanese society in the 1980s as follows: 
 
It seems to me that society nowadays in the 1980s is increasingly highlighting the impor- 
tance of recognising ideological control (ideorogī shihai), which is not simply elucidated by 
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nationalism of the Tennō system (Tennōsei nashonarizumu) in the prewar period. With 
regard to issues of our society, complex themes such as modernisation (gendaika and 
kindaika), mass society (taishū shakai), welfare state (fukushi kokka), large economy (keizai 
taikoku), middle-class consciousness (chūryū ishiki), generated in postwar society, are inter- 
twined with each other. In a rigorous sense, therefore, Tennō regulated by the Constitution 
is not concerned with the Tennō system (1987: 16). 
 
From his viewpoint, it is possible to see that Tōyama implies the possible ide- 
ological effect of the Tennō system that took different form from one in the 
wartime period on Japanese society in the 1980s. It is unclear, however, what 
the ideology of Japanese society meant in this period. Nonetheless, his analysis 
made it clear that the Tennō system no longer has any substantial meaning in 
itself. Having said that, this view definitely does not spoil the theoretical sig- 
nificance of the concept of the society of the Tennō system. Rather, in my view, 
Matsushita’s and Tōyama’s perspectives do not fully grasp problems internalised 
in society in the sense that they are both not aware of the existence of the 
pathology of society stemming from certain sociocultural conditions. In this respect, 
Fujita’s theory of the Tennō system whether the state or social version is of great 
value particularly in illuminating some specific social circumstances of Japan in 
terms of its pathological perspective. 
  My research is not concerned with the Tennō system. For this reason, there is 
no longer any space for further discussion. Only a point, however, should be 
noted here. My survey and analysis of Fujita’s political theory have particularly 
highlighted his aspect of a political actor. As a matter of fact, Fujita laid great 
stress on the autonomy of political subjects who came into existence in the Anpo 
Tōsō (US-Japan Security Treaty): ‘[t]he protest movement against the US-Japan 
Security Treaty has widely spread out throughout Japan, and has been based on 
the universal principles of democracy that require the people to be autonomous 
subjects (jiritsuteki shutai) in most respects’ (1998b: 244). Of course, this view 
affects the fundamental stance of my research. From this standpoint focusing 
particularly on the political function of human beings, it is appropriate to emp- 
hasise that my exploration has shined a light on Fujita’s aspect of a political 
theorist, namely a political actor, who creates political reality. This is why my 
survey has depicted him not as a scholar of the history of ideas nor as a simple 
thinker but as a political theorist (on the conception of ‘political theorist’ in my 
research, see Ch. 2 and App. 1). 
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3.  Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (1): 
 The Death of the ‘Other’ (Tasha) 
 
In my view, Fujita’s important conception of ‘narcissism’ is a medium connect- 
ing the society of the Tennō system with totalitarianism in his political theory. 
Admittedly, as noted earlier, the psychological state of mind of the ‘absence of a 
sense of the other’ in the self, which Fujita recognised as a contemporary dis- 
ease through his mentor Maruyama, signifies the exact narcissistic condition 
that is depicted as the ‘loss of the other’; on this view, it is important to rem- 
ember that the crisis of the expansion of this psychological feature characte- 
rising contemporary times was particularly stressed by Fujita’s words that ‘the 
self (jiko) concentrates all his interest on his ego (jiga e no kanshin no shūchū)’ 
(1997e: 21).34 Indeed, it is admitted that, after having been aware of the disease, 
he was always of the opinion that such a mental condition denotes a serious 
human psychosis throughout the twentieth century in relation to the above two 
political concepts; in this respect, Fujita related the society of the Tennō system 
to totalitarianism. Above all, for these reasons, narcissism sees through the 
spiritual structure common to these two structural diseases in his works. 
However, it is not easy to precisely grasp Fujita’s conception of narcissism. 
Perhaps one of the primary reasons for the difficulty is because in his theory the 
notion is not simply understood by a monolithic structure. Significantly, at least 
his two important political conceptions and even his other conceptions such as 
‘experience’ (keiken) and ‘high growth’ (Kōdo Seichō) are concerned with the psy- 
choanalytic concept in his theory and methods. Admittedly, this clearly explains 
that the term narcissism constitutes the multilayered structure of Fujita’s poli- 
tical theory in relation to philosophical, historical, political, economic, socio- 
logical and psychoanalytic controversies. In short, his method of analysing 
some spiritual structure retained since his first encounter with Maruyama’s 
article ‘Thought and Behaviour Patterns of Japan’s Wartime Leaders’ even learnt 
to fathom the depths of the unconscious world of society by absorbing the myt- 
hical and psychoanalytic concept. 
  Although, as we have seen, narcissism is an important conception in Fujita’s 
political theory, this psychoanalytic term is not used in his early works at all. 
Perhaps this fact is associated particularly with his methodological change in 
1970s (see App. 3, p. 259). In fact, rigorously speaking, Fujita first employed it in 
‘Sōsōki’ (1974), written in his period of ‘pause’ (rōnin) meaning his significant 
reflection which gave rise to his change.35 To be sure, it is admitted that, in the 
reflective pause, he devoted himself to studying relatively new disciplines 
established during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, such as 
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anthropology, linguistics, psychoanalysis and folklore, which were all aimed at 
identifying the ‘primordial conditions’ (genshoteki jōken), namely the fundam- 
ental conditions of human nature (see n. 8). I believe, however, that one of the 
most important ingredients of his theory is definitely a psychoanalytic element, 
and this is actually elucidated by the fact that, from Maruyama, as we saw 
above, Fujita learnt the huge importance of being aware of both the other as the 
heterogeneous and the contemporary crisis of its absence (see pp. 73-4 above). Pre- 
sumably, this experience must have triggered his concentration on the psycho- 
analytic concept, and must have led him to recognise the necessity of curing the 
disease of narcissism. Indeed, my research has drawn too much attention to the 
psychoanalytic concept and the discipline of psychoanalysis. Actually, one of 
the primary reasons for my devotion to an understanding of the idea and the 
discipline is because Fujita continually highlights the importance of interest to 
the other, namely the existence of the other, sounding the alarm about a growing 
narcissistic tendency for contemporary society (e.g. 1997d: 265, 272; 1997e: 26-8; 
1998c: 68-9); that is to say, he has also contributed to creating my intention of 
identifying what narcissism as a contemporary menace to our politics signifies in a 
negative sense by concentrating on an understanding of the psychoanalytic 
meaning of the concept. For these reasons, it is acknowledged that what psy- 
choanalysis intends by the concept of narcissism does not give Fujita any spe- 
cifically new impression, or rather, that for him the connection between his 
important interests in the concept of other and the psychoanalytic term is sim- 
ply the result of his original concern per se, which must have been generated 
primarily through Maruyama’s lectures. 
The above pieces of evidence clearly explain that in Fujita’s view narcissism is 
connected particularly with the human psychic condition of the absence of the 
other.36 In fact, he points out that contemporary people have a strong tendency 
to avoid encountering ‘others’ (tasha). He says: 
 
Others (tasha), whether human beings or things (mono, koto), are avoided so as not to 
suddenly encounter them; one capsulates himself. In a cocoon-like chamber (mayu no yōna 
katei), he feels really comfortable only with homogeneous friends (yasashii tomodachi). In this 
way, experience aiming to establish interpersonal relationships (sōgo kōshō) with others is 
eliminated (1997e: 24). 
 
Admittedly, these sentences clearly explain that Fujita warns us against our 
strong narcissism which, in his view, has spread out in contemporary society. 
According to him, as shown above, narcissists are afraid of meeting others due 
to the latter heterogeneity – this means that, strangely enough, from the general 
perspective, simply for its reason, the former seems to avoid encountering the 
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latter.37 For Fujita, most importantly, it is the primary contemporary crisis; he 
calls this condition the ‘loss of experience’ (keiken no shōmetsu) (e.g. 1997d: 17, 
190; 1997e: 15). Through seeking to identify and examining the essence of some 
historical changes in society, such as the conclusion of the US-Japan Security 
Treaty and high economic growth, indeed, he recognised that ‘experience’ mea- 
ning the interrelationship between the self and the other has disappeared from 
society, and diagnosed the psychic condition of contemporary society as nar- 
cissism, which can be thought of exactly as the ‘loss of the other’ in the self. 
Presumably these ways of understanding contemporary people and society pro- 
vided Fujita with his essential standpoint of the death of the other. (It should be 
noted that Fujita himself does not give the expression of the ‘death of the other’. 
Obviously, however, he regards interrelationships with others as the appear- 
ance of experience, on the one hand, and the loss of an encounter with them as 
the disappearance of experience, on the other. Most importantly, in this respect, 
he no doubt intended experience as the meeting with others. For these reasons, 
it is asserted that for him the loss of experience denotes the death of the other. 
On this view, as we shall see in the next chapter, Fujita takes a similar stance to 
Fromm’s.) 
 
Narcissism: shii 
After having first introduced the term narcissism, Fujita applied it, for example, 
to his study of the poet in the Edo period Matsuo Bashō’s Nozarashi kikō 
(Exposure in the Field: A Travel Account),38 which was presented as the lecture 
‘Nozarashi kikō ni tsuite no oboegaki’ (Notes on Exposure in the Field: A Travel 
Account) (1978). In this lecture, significantly, he regards a narcissist who emb- 
odies ‘narcissism’ (shii) as the opposite of a ‘cosmopolitan’ (ekkyōsha), meaning a 
‘beggar’ (kotsujiki mono) who is counted as Bashō (1997d: 270). 
  According to Fujita, a beggar who is a metaphorical person and so actually 
does not exist has no narcissistic characteristics such as ‘self-containment’ (jiko 
kanketsusei) and ‘autistic withdrawal’ (jiheiteki gyōko), and he is willing to accept 
his status in which he is in ‘the place of “praxis” (‘jitsuen’ no genba), in which 
others (tasha) and things (mono) first correlatively appear in accordance with the 
degree of “spiritual preparedness” (kakugo)’ (1997d: 270).39 This beggar tries to 
‘distance himself from narcissism’ (shii wo hanare yo) so as to ‘“encounter” 
heterogeneous others and things (ishitsu no tasha ya mono ni deau)’, only thereby 
‘gain[ing] an understanding of the ‘world’ (sekai) including himself’ (1997d: 272). 
As Fujita stresses, this beggar’s attitude that he ‘gets his narcissistic self out of 
the way’ (jiko wo tsukihanasu) are diametrically opposed to narcissism (1997d: 
273). 
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  This beggar, as mentioned above, does represent Bashō, who, in Fujita’s view, 
characteristically attempted to ‘undertake’ (hikiukeru) the difficult task of doing 
‘praxis’ noted above (1997d: 270). In other words, he sought to provide the 
subjective viewpoint of ‘seeing’ (miru) in exactly the same way as the objective 
viewpoint of ‘being seen’ (mirareru), just as Plotinos says (1997d: 265) – in this 
argument, needless to say, Bashō and Plotinos are treated in the same line with 
respect to the standpoint of seeing others. As Bashō himself puts it, it is done by 
way of ‘know[ing] pine, study pine’ (Matsu no koto wa matsu ni narae),40 distan- 
cing himself from narcissism; this is the exact ‘way to know the essence of 
things’ (mono e yuku michi) (1997d: 272-4). Not surprisingly, it is a little known 
fact that, in his early writings, Fujita already put forward the same view con- 
cerning the importance of facing the other. In ‘Taisei no kōsō’ (A Framework of 
Politics) (1961), for example, he stressed the way of ‘seeing oneself as if seeing 
others, seeing others as if seeing oneself’ (1997c: 162). Similarly, in ‘Manhaimu 
no episōdo’ (1971) (on this, see n. 35), he highlighted the necessity of obtaining 
its capacity, namely ‘curiosity (kōkishin), which enables one to try to understand 
others as otherness different from oneself, namely “alterity” (tazai), from the 
inside (uchigawa), and which is open to others’ (1998c: 68). ‘Matsu ni kike: 
Gendai bunmei e no rekuiemu’ (Study Pine: Requiem for Contemporary 
Civilisation) (1982), which focuses particularly on Bashō’s words quoted above, 
undoubtedly elucidates the importance of ‘being aware of the other’ (tasha no 
ninshiki) explained above (1998c: xii). These facts give a good illustration of how 
important it was for Fujita to do ‘praxis’. (As we shall see later, these pers- 
pectives emphasising the mutual self-other relationships presented by Fujita 
have much in common with Hegel’s ‘self-knowledge of the other’ (Sich-Wissen 
des Anderen) – see Hegel 1983: 115.) 
  Fujita’s above way of addressing Bashō’s issue in relation to a major hindr- 
ance, namely our natural narcissistic desire, to constructing ‘mutuality’ (sōgosei) 
presents his original viewpoint (on this word, see, e.g. 1997d: 289). It must be 
emphasised, however, that Fujita was entirely consistent in aiming particularly 
to establish the interrelationships mentioned above. In fact, he much earlier 
drew attention to some concepts describing such personal relationships bet- 
ween us; for instance, ‘personal communication’ (kojinteki ningen kōryū, pāsonaru 
komyunikēshon), which is used in ‘Tōzen no koto: Seiji shisō no genzaiteki jōkyō 
to kadai’ (A Political Matter: Present Conditions and Problems in Political 
Thoughts) (1961), and which is understood to be classified into the same cate- 
gory as the idea of ‘interpersonal relationship’ (1998b: 303). In addition, it is also 
clearly shown that Fujita consistently concerned himself with this perspective in 
other writings (e.g. 1997b: 107, 196; 1998c: 461). These pieces of evidence, above 
all, illustrate that he continued to seek for the opposite of narcissism. From this 
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perspective, most importantly, the relevance of the concept of shii found thro- 
ugh encountering Bashō was largely supported by Fujita’s interest in narcis- 
sism. 
 
Narcissism: narushizumu 
It is not inappropriate, then, to consider that Fujita’s above important perspe- 
ctive developed by Bashō’s view led Fujita to write the quasi-psychoanalytic 
work ‘Narushizumu’, which is in fact subtitled ‘Mono ni iku michi’, meaning an 
effort to know the ‘essence of things’; it is important to remember that the 
essays referring to Bashō noted above pays particular attention to this concept. 
As mentioned above, Fujita’s three works, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ (1982), 
‘Narushizumu’ (1983) and ‘Anraku’ (1985), can be regarded as a series of quasi- 
psychoanalytic articles, in the sense that they put forward and are based to 
some extent on diagnostic and remedial perspectives, actually using psycho- 
analytic terms – this fact suggests that he had devoted himself to psychiatry and 
psychoanalysis in a certain period of time before he published these three 
essays (see p. 70 above). (It might seem that precisely those essays should be 
thought of as sociopsychological to the extent that they all focus not simply on a 
general psychoanalytic perspective analysing individuals but rather on a social- 
scientific viewpoint laying stress on society. However, they attempt not only to 
diagnose (analyse) but also to give some remedy for diseases of society, and 
therefore they rather take a medical psychoanalytic standpoint. This is why I 
identify the three works as psychoanalytic.) 
  It might be argued, however, that the influence of this medical perspective on 
Fujita’s work is also slightly seen in his previous essays, such as ‘Sengo no giron 
no zentei’ (The Conditions of Postwar Theory) (1981) and ‘Hijōji’ (1981), both of 
which primarily concern the concept of ‘experience’, as exemplified by the fact 
that several words and expressions describing some psychoanalytic meanings 
are embedded in them (e.g. 1997d: 196-7; 1997e: 3-5). It might be the case, the- 
refore, that his interest to psychoanalysis is associated with the fact that he too 
much cared about the notion of experience almost in the same period, that is 
between the middle 1970s and the early 1980s – concretely speaking, in my view, 
he started to draw attention to the term in ‘Keiken to iu hon’ (A Book on 
Experience) (1976). Admittedly, as Katō says, Fujita changed his primary con- 
cern from the concept of experience to ‘“psychology” (shinsei) “avoid”ing (kaihi) 
experience’ after ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ (Katō 1997: 234). As we have seen, how- 
ever, it is noteworthy that he already recognised the importance of some mea- 
nings described by the term narcissism at the latest in the phase of giving his 
lecture on Nozarashi kikō; this means that he had already been aware of some 
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psychological implications for his work before presenting it. In addition to this 
fact, it is noted that, much earlier, for example, in 1971, Fujita perceived the sig- 
nification of the concept (1998c: 68-9). In other words, it is much more plausible 
to suppose that his psychoanalytic viewpoint of narcissism was already related 
to his another important conception of experience around in the middle 1970s, 
which means that we should not think that the former standpoint followed the 
latter, but that both his perspectives were correlated with each other in 1970s.41 
  These analyses demonstrate why Fujita was consistent in laying stress on and 
aiming to construct our mutual ‘personal relationships’, whose idea must have 
been absorbed primarily through reading several psychoanalytic writings – I 
shall discuss this issue later. This mutuality, in his view, is based not on ‘an 
experience’ (taiken) which is not mutually but privately experienced,42 and 
which is only once experienced, but on ‘experience’ (keiken) which can be gained 
only through attempting to know the ‘essence of things’, that is through mutual 
relationships (e.g. 1997d: 204-5). If this is true, then experience is fundamentally 
interpersonal. To put it another way, Fujita argues that the acquisition of keiken 
requires the establishment of interrelationships. From this perspective, it is 
admitted that Fujita rather retained his great attention to one of his essential 
viewpoints, experience, in his lifetime. In contrast to the logic of experience and 
mutuality, however, in Fujita’s view narcissism does not rely upon either enco- 
untering or interrelating with others and things. Roughly speaking, in his con- 
ception narcissistic personality evades facing what is in front of one. This mec- 
hanism is clearly depicted primarily in ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’. Let us see this 
psychological viewpoint Fujita proposes in conjunction with his important con- 
ception of experience in more detail. 
  The work ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ is subtitled ‘Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’, 
meaning that we are living in the world which prevents us having experience; 
in Fujita’s view, this world is exactly narcissistic. Significantly, this short article 
also provides his fundamental standpoint of seeing the opposite. First of all, it 
takes the view that in our daily living we are put into a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ 
(hoikuki) in which only the things determined in advance may be done, and in 
which everyone therefore knows beforehand what to do (1997e: 7-8). From 
another perspective, thus, in this nursery capsule people have a strong tendency 
to avoid doing things that have not been known, namely the unknown. This 
attitude, according to Fujita, leads them to require some kind of ‘apriorism’ 
(senken-shugi) – the Japanese original term will be provided below – that we 
should know everything in advance; this mind, in his view, is linked to and 
causes ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) (1997e: 9). This psychological state means 
exactly the ‘loss of experience’. Second, the writing also aims to examine why 
such a psychology has been generated and spread out in society. In conclusion, 
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it is the result of our ‘anxiety’ (fuan) about and ‘fear’ (kyōfu) for the encounter 
with things and others. On this view, Fujita begins by contending that the psy- 
chological state of mind of senken-shugi needs and tries to behave in accordance 
with a ‘blueprint’ (sekkeizu) (1997e: 10). He points out, then, that the psychic 
attitude of ‘positive avoidance’ (nōdōteki kaihi) stems from such a psychological 
condition; this is why senken-shugi induces the pathology of ‘voluntary servi- 
tude to unruffled ease’ (anraku e no jihatsuteki reizoku), presented by Richard 
Sennett (1997e: 10) – in Fujita’s theory, this is counted as an alternative to ‘given 
comfort’ (shohō sareta kōfuku), as previously provided (1997e: 4). To put it ano- 
ther way, it acts as a defence mechanism that one attempts to avoid accidents 
which have not been expected beforehand due to great anxiety and fear. For 
living in the outside world causes ‘pain’ (kutsū). In other words, one requires a 
perpetual nursery capsule, so to speak; this means that he always needs to stay 
in such a place which ensures them a life of ease without uncertainty. He cannot 
even accept ‘conflicts’ (kattō). Through these examinations, Fujita metaphori- 
cally identifies contemporary society, looking healthy at first glance, as a ‘corpse 
with chubby cheeks’ (hōkyō wo tataeta shitai) (1997e: 11). Paradoxically speaking, 
while people in this world are not interested in, or rather, avoid others, they 
drive themselves towards depending upon others – for there are no others in them. 
In this sense, this world is a place in which the other is no longer alive. 
  Fujita always sees not only plain facts but also opposite facts and things that 
can be extrapolated. In this respect, for him reality is an important mirror ref- 
lecting what we ought to be – he sees it as if gazing at the self mirrored in the 
surface of the water. ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ highlights the necessity of inter- 
relating others repeatedly (1997e: 13). This article, however, is not only involved 
in discussion simply by referring to his philosophy of experience. Significantly, 
its quasi-psychoanalytic work proceeds with its own argument, employing the 
words of ‘conflicts’, ‘avoidance’, ‘pain’, and so forth, all of which carry psy- 
choanalytic implications. In Fujita’s conception of the other, for this reason, it is 
possible to recognise multilayered significations concerning the functional stru- 
cture of the term. In short, Fujita’s attention to the concept enabled his fund- 
amental analytical method of understanding a spiritual structure even to exa- 
mine the unconscious mind. 
  The reason why we avoid encountering others and things is explained pri- 
marily in the subsequent works ‘Narushizumu’ and ‘Anraku’ in more detail. 
The former analyses an ‘ego’ (jiga) which has suffered from narcissism 
(narushizumu) – indeed, this is demonstrated to some extent by the fact that the 
term ego is used thirty nine times in this short essay consisting of only ten pages. 
Apparently, this writing, which begins by declaring that ‘the contemporary 
psychological state of mind is depicted as “the time of the ego on a mass scale”’ 
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(1997e: 20), characteristically displays the psychoanalytic feature of Fujita’s 
work. Although it shines a light on the ego for the purpose of exploring the 
reason for the mechanism of avoidance, the primary concern is nevertheless 
rather to account for the importance of experience, namely mutuality, highligh- 
ting the concept of ‘other’ – as we shall see below, this implies that the most 
important aim of that article is neither to examine nor to diagnose but to 
prescribe society – whether or not its prescription is effective. At first glance, 
however, it is difficult to understand its intention through seeing its psycho- 
analytic method provided in the work. In fact, the term other is applied simply 
in the last section in contrast to the application of the term ego.43 Nonetheless, it 
must be emphasised that the above view is too much appropriate to this issue in 
the sense that Fujita believed, no doubt, that the ego mirrors contrasts to itself; 
through this prescriptive significance, the disease should be prescribed. Indeed, 
this is why Fujita actually introduced the psychoanalytic concept of narcissism. 
According to Fujita, the ego in contemporary society has suffered from 
narcissism (1997e: 23). This ego, he says, aims only at satisfying itself, and 
therefore, paradoxically, results in itself causing the strong emotions of ‘frus- 
tration’ (yokkyū fuman) and ‘anxiety’ (fuan) despite regarding its own satisfaction 
as its main purpose, as characteristically presented by the famous metaphor of 
Narcissus (1997e: 23), who ‘vainly reaches out to embrace his own reflection’ 
(Holmes 2001: 3). Narcissists are simply insanely interested in themselves, and 
possess instrumental reason only for fulfilling their own needs (1997e: 19-22). 
This, after all, shuns dialogue with others; experience, thus, has disappeared 
(1997e: 24). Strong narcissistic needs induce not only ‘ego narcissism’ (jiga no 
narushizumu) but also ‘collective narcissism’ (shūdanteki narushizumu) in Fujita’s 
view; to put it differently, the latter is based on the former (1997e: 25-6).44 Fujita, 
however, does not proceed with this discussion by focusing on his concept of 
collective narcissism. Rather, thereafter, his concern turns to examining how to 
change our narcissistic society to what it ought to be, that is giving some possible 
remedies – I perceive that this is indicated by the title of ‘To Break Free from 
Narcissism’. 
 
 
4.  Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (2): 
Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi) 
 
Totalitarianism towards ‘unruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi) 
Another work ‘Anraku’, as mentioned above, also primarily tackles the issue of 
why people escape from reality, that is from experience. Interestingly, however, 
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it connects narcissism with ‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi). In this sense, his view 
of society has become much more negative. This article mainly analyses the 
psychology of ‘uprootedness’ (nekogi), similarly applying a series of words pro- 
viding psychoanalytic implications, such as ‘pain’, ‘avoidance’ and ‘discomfort’ 
(fukai) (e.g. 1997e: 30). This essay intends the notion of uprootedness as era- 
dicating everything. This way of explaining people’s defence mechanism, how- 
ever, is basically the same as the above work’s regarding the ego, while intro- 
ducing the new concept. The different points between these articles are concer- 
ned only with whether referring to totalitarianism. So far, we have not seen the 
term totalitarianism in writings raising the topic of narcissism with the exce- 
ption of ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, in which it is only once used. This implies that 
his psychoanalytic method was first completely related to the political concept in 
‘Anraku’. It is quite important to recognise this fact in the sense that Fujita 
diagnosed the essence of the Kōdo Seichō as totalitarianism. In other words, he 
saw the impulse of uprootedness in the unconscious instinct of narcissism. That 
is to say, in his view contemporary society does not hesitate to exterminate all 
the things causing discomfort, or, more precisely, it is driven by the desire to 
root out the uncomfortable for obtaining ‘ease’; for Fujita, thus, this is the exact 
sense of ‘totalitarianism towards “unruffled ease”’ (anraku e no zentaishugi). 
  There is some evidence, however, that the above examination concerning the 
psychology of society already began with ‘Kōdo Seichō’ (1969), which showed 
the birth of the later Fujita. This work, in fact, characterises the Kōdo Seichō pri- 
marily as the attitude of ‘foresee[ing] how things will turn out’ (jōkyō no sakidori) 
(1998c: 8). From this perspective, Fujita observes that, paradoxically, people 
cannot see the surroundings, namely reality, as always driven by the desire to 
foresee, that is to ‘follow a situation’ (jōkyō ni tsuizui suru) (1998c: 8; emphasis 
added). It seems to me that this discussion to a certain extent determined the 
later introduction of the concept of totalitarianism. In other words, his above 
view had predicted later society turning to an ‘economic bubble’ (baburu keizai) 
starting just from around the year when ‘Anraku’ was published.45 That is to say, 
Fujita’s above description had anticipated that Japan would fall into ‘a volun- 
tary servitude to unruffled ease’ (emphasis added), or, more strictly, ‘totalitari- 
anism to unruffled ease’, as negatively emphasised by the article. This is why in 
‘Kōdo Seichō’ he had to express the attitude of the Kōdo Seichō as ‘follow’. 
 
Totalitarianism as contemporary way of life (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru 
zentaishugi) as contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaishugi) 
These diagnoses lead Fujita to provide a much more strict view of society. In 
fact, his attitude to examinations characterises his work as much more political. 
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(This means only that his research objects are – substantially almost all are – 
coloured to a great extent by the term totalitarianism just as this concept sign- 
ifies.) ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken’ (The Experience of the Twentieth Century of 
Totalitarianism) (1995) – abbreviated to ‘Zentaishugi’ below – is depicted tho- 
roughly as the world ruled by the idea of the political system bringing back 
brutal memories.46 Significantly, this writing was once revised for adding the 
concept of ‘totalitarianism as contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru 
zentaishugi), which enhanced ‘totalitarianism to unruffled ease’ (on this point, 
see, e.g. Katō 1997: 236-9). This is why he begins this article by declaring that, 
‘[t]he twenty century has brought about totalitarianism. The former has pro- 
duced the latter, and is even continuing to produce it’ (1997e: 43). 
  According to Fujita, there are three types of totalitarianism: ‘totalitarianism as 
a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) (totalitarianism as war), 
‘totalitarianism as a way of political rule’ (seiji shihai no arikata ni okeru zentai- 
shugi) (political totalitarianism) and ‘totalitarianism as contemporary way of 
life’ (contemporary totalitarianism) (e.g. 1997e: 43).47 With regard to the first 
one, he explains that it is the result of World War I, which provoked ‘com- 
mercial war’ (senden-sen) and ‘total war’ (zentai sensō) that primarily generated 
‘another type of soldiers especially having a psychological effect on the war’ 
(mōhitotsu no sentōin) and removing the ‘distinction between the “front line” 
(zensen) and the “rear line” (kōhō)’ by applying the method of ‘mass destruction’ 
(tairyō satsuriku) (1997e: 49-56).48 Hannah Arendt is introduced to the second 
one, which is, says Fujita, typically described by her account. It is therefore 
basically ruled by using ‘ideology’ (ideorogī) and ‘terrorism’ (teroru), and thus 
inevitably continues to produce ‘displaced persons’ (nanmin) for maintaining 
the system itself (1997e: 45-9, 61-76).49 In addition, David Riesman’s discussion 
in conjunction with Arendt’s is applied through focusing on the psychological 
aspect of ‘lonely crowds’ (kodoku na gunshū), which, in Fujita’s view, describes 
people’s narcissistic attitude that ‘vainly reaches out to embrace only the self’ 
(jiko ni dake mōmokuteki ni shūchakusuru), and that greatly contributes to induc- 
ing ‘heroism’ (eiyū taibōron); this mind enables a totalitarian regime to come into 
existence (1997e: 56-9). The third one follows the above two types. ‘Reducing 
the things which have been sophisticated through affected by Western civili- 
sation to a simple quantitative dimension’ (ryōteki jigen e no kangen) typifies this 
kind of totalitarianism (1997e: 76). To put it another way, most importantly, it is 
based on the logic of ‘currency’ (kahei); this signifies exactly our society. While 
currency was once a simple means of exchanging things, it has aimed at exchan- 
ging itself; all the things, on the whole, have been explained by this logic (1997e: 
77-85). From these perspectives, contemporary market society is also diagnosed 
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as ‘a new totalitarianism’ (atarashii zentaishugi), that is to say, we are ‘continuing 
to produce totalitarianism’ (1997e: 43, 83). 
 
The theoretical functions of narcissism and totalitarianism 
This world in a sense looks like places depicted by Fromm’s Escape from Freedom 
(1941) and Horkheimer’s and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) rather 
than Friedrich Hayek’s The Road to Serfdom (1944) and George Orwell’s 1984 
(1949). In this respect, Fujita’s zentaishugi seems to have more in common with 
fascism and authoritarianism than totalitarianism – Fromm, Horkheimer and 
Adorno, indeed, rarely use the latter term.50 It is more than mere coincidence, 
therefore, that they all come from Germany. Much more importantly, however, 
Fujita’s argument fulfils paradoxical and dialectical logical functions. This may be 
to some extent the result of accepting Maruyama’s viewpoint. However, it is not 
right simply to think so on this issue. As has often been mentioned, Fujita’s 
work is thoroughly performed by the method of ‘internal understanding’ 
(naizaiteki rikai, naizaiteki kentō) (e.g. Hondō 2004: 86-7; Ichimura 2010: 413-8; 
Makimura 2004: 107-8; Wada 2004: 192-5;).51 For him, needless to say, this is 
aimed at recognising the ‘essence of things’. If so, then the introduction of both 
the concepts of narcissism and totalitarianism to his study must have also been 
aimed at carrying out its crucial task in his work. 
  To conclude, the two terms narcissism and totalitarianism provided Fujita 
with paradoxical and dialectical viewpoints which were probably necessary for 
gaining a deep understanding of others and things. In fact, the derivation of 
narcissism clearly tells us the paradoxical logic of the concept in the mythical 
sense, particularly in Ovid’s myth: while Narcissus had insanely tried to emb- 
race his own reflection, he nevertheless failed to reach it and ended up dead 
(see App. 2, p. 241). From this perspective, one may highlight Tiresias’s famous 
prophecy that ‘Narcissus will have a long life . . . unless he knows himself’ (si se 
non noverit) (Levy et al 2011: 3). On this view, it is possible to understand that it 
corresponds to the standpoint that, paradoxically, narcissists cannot love (e.g. 
Fromm 1941: 116; 1962: 57-63; 1971: 119-33).52 In addition to this stance on nar- 
cissism, from some psychoanalytic perspectives such as Donald W. Winnicott’s 
‘false self’ and Fromm’s ‘pseudo self’,53 they are not capable of loving either 
genuine others or themselves due to the fact that the self of a narcissistic person 
is occupied to a large extent by his false or pseudo self; if so, then the narcis- 
sistic self is necessarily identified by the other. Similarly, the concept of totali- 
tarianism expresses a quite paradoxical implication. In fact, this is typically des- 
cribed by relying upon Arendt’s argument. By ideology and terrorism as a pri- 
mary means of ruling in totalitarianism, paradoxically, a totalitarian regime is 
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controlled; this is explained to a certain extent by the fact that an extremely 
totalitarian politics always results in self-destruction.54 Quite interestingly, ano- 
ther paradoxical fact concerning a totalitarian rule is also provided by Fujita: 
‘Stalinism practically utilised Marxism containing the radiant, rich tradition of 
Western culture for eliminating the vanishing class and for getting rid of intellec- 
tuals who raise an objection to the political power, reducing it to political doct- 
rines (kyōgi mondōshū) convenient to mass manipulation and political manifesto’ 
(1997e: 47). To put it differently, as Fujita puts it, ‘rampant totalitarianism in the 
twentieth century is an absolute monster (kaibutsu) which, unexpectedly, has 
come into existence from illustrious, continuous efforts of Western modern int- 
ellectual movement’ (1997e: 77). From these three viewpoints, I must make sure 
of a common feature between Fujita’s conceptions of narcissism and totalitaria- 
nism with respect to the paradoxical function of logic. 
  It is important to note that these two concepts are related to one another. That 
is to say, totalitarianism is a function of narcissism in relation to the logic of para- 
dox without regard to Fujita’s intention of relating the terms. Perhaps this is elu- 
cidated by the following descriptions. I suggest referring to the mythical story: 
 
Catching a glimpse of himself in a pool of water, Narcissus was paralyzed by the beauty of 
his own reflected image. The more he gazed at himself, the more infatuated he became, but 
like the many others whose affection he did not return, he was left empty in his futile love. 
He remained gazing at his own reflection in despair until death, with Echo by his side to repeat to 
him his last dying words (Levy et al 2011: 3; emphases added). 
 
When Narcissus fell in love with the image in the pool, he mistakenly took it for a real body 
and did not understand that it was a reflection of his own body. In other words, Narcissus 
could not conceive that he was in love with his own reflection; he was caught in an illusion. 
All efforts to converse with the unreachable image in the spring left Narcissus disheartened 
and filled with despair. Finally he realized: ‘I am he! Oh, now I know for sure the image is 
my own; it’s for myself I burn with love; I fan the flames I feel’ . . . Heartbroken, he wished he 
could separate himself from his own body so that the image he loved would go away. He then sensed 
that death was the only solution as ‘now we two – one soul – one death will die’ . . . He faded away, 
and when the nymphs came to bury his body, they found a flower at its place (Ronning- 
stam 2005: 3; emphases added). 
 
These pictures should not be understood simply either as metaphors of an 
aspect of human beings or as expressions of a human psychosis. It seems to me 
that some of the most fundamental intrinsic characteristics concerning human 
nature are represented in the above sentences. One of them is that the self who 
is always attracted only to himself is paradoxically to depend upon the other; 
that is, such a self misidentifies the other with oneself, and is therefore identified 
only by the other. In this sense, for this self the fact that he is interested in the 
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other exactly means that he is interested in the self for he does not and cannot 
have either the genuine self or the other. This is probably another expression of 
the fact that he cannot see his surroundings (reality). Not only does the myth- 
ology illuminate this paradox, but it also indicates to us that the self is driven by 
the desire to engage in destructive behaviour when failing to obtain objects of 
his desire (selfobjects). In other words, Narcissus did not even hesitate to die in 
order to achieve his objective. 
Also, such human features are more concretely conveyed by Kohut. They are 
expressed almost only by relying upon his concept of ‘grandiose self’ – alth- 
ough the following quotation was already given in Chapter 3, this issue allows 
me to cite it again in order that we can see it from a slightly different pers- 
pective. As he puts it, 
 
the British people identified themselves with him and with his unshakable belief in his and, 
by extension, the nation’s strength so long as their selves felt weak in the face of the serious 
danger; as soon as victory had been attained, however, the need for a merger with an omnipotent 
figure subsided, and they were able to turn from him to other (noncharismatic) leaders. It takes little 
effort to discern the parallel between the temporary needs of the enfeebled self of the 
creative person and the temporary needs of an endangered nation in times of crisis; in both 
instances, the idealization of the leader, the narcissistic transference to him, is abandoned 
when the need for it has come to an end (Kohut 2011d: 828; emphases added). 
 
This description suggests essential human vulnerability. Perhaps an understan- 
ding of the primary reason for this man’s vulnerable character is provided by 
Kohut’s account that, ‘[t]he unconscious fantasies of the group’s grandiose self, 
expressed in the transference upon the image of an appropriate leader figure . . . 
can play at times a crucial role in its cohesion. . . . Individuals seek to melt into 
the body of a powerful nation (as symbolized by a grandiose leader) to cure their 
shame and provide them with a feeling of enormous strength, to which they react with 
relief and triumph’ (Kohut 1985b: 57; emphases added). The words of ‘at times’ 
denote the period that Germany was governed by Nazi party. Kohut explains 
that the ‘grandiose self’ abnormally developed was ready to transfer to a certain 
Nazi political figure (Hitler) of its selfobject for satisfying its own narcissistic 
self; as a result, this enabled Nazi to come to power in Kohut’s view. To put it 
simply, the narcissistic, vulnerable self is – generally unconsciously – willing to 
depend upon anyone who fulfils his needs mostly so as simply to gain his 
distorted feelings as if breathing ‘relief’ and ‘triumph’. Such grandiose selves, 
thus, turned an unhealthy group’s grandiose self, namely the Nazi ‘diseased 
group self’ (e.g. Kohut 1985c: 83, 86). 
  Perhaps these viewpoints best explain why paradoxical logic with regard to 
narcissism and totalitarianism comes into existence. They elucidate, on the one 
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hand, why the self who is infatuated with himself, paradoxically, is bound to 
rely upon the other, and, on the other hand, why the narcissistic self is similarly 
bound to be driven by the desire to exterminate everything regarded as obstacles 
to satisfying his narcissistic needs including others. In this respect, the classic 
mythical story and Kohut shed much light on this issue. In sum, such a self 
always unconsciously conceals an opportunity for establishing fascist and tot- 
alitarian politics behind his distorted self-image – this is basically triggered 
regardless of whether or not it aims to organise such political rules. 
  Fujita, undoubtedly, was not aware of such a narcissistic self in a more rigo- 
rously psychoanalytic sense. For instance, this is clearly explained by the fact 
that he often mistakenly takes the ‘self’ for the ‘ego’, as mentioned in note 43. 
For this reason, he often seems to unconsciously hesitate to use the term narci- 
ssism. His conception of narcissism, therefore, appears to be obscured by the 
term totalitarianism. On the contrary, however, with regard to the latter his term 
of zentaishugi quite precisely gives us its implications with a focus on the par- 
adoxical function of the term. In addition to this fact, it performs a dialectical 
logical function. This means, most importantly, that Fujita’s stance is far from 
the view that totalitarianism and fascism are the opposite of politics meaning 
liberal democracy.55 Admittedly, this is characteristically described by his imp- 
ortant concepts of ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ and ‘contemporary 
totalitarianism’. To put it simply, zentaishugi contains dialectical contradiction, 
that is to say, our society does not contradict either totalitarianism or fascism. 
From this perspective, most importantly, there exists some possibility that total- 
itarian or fascist politics emerges from democracy; for Fujita, this is much more 
problematic in the sense that its logic is very often not recognised, and is 
therefore disregarded. In this sense, it is admitted that he takes the same pos- 
ition not as Arendt, Hayek and Orwell but rather as Adorno, Horkheimer and 
Fromm. In these respects, Fujita’s work is self-reflective and self-critical. 
  Obviously, as noted above, Fujita’s perspective providing paradoxical and 
dialectical logic is profoundly associated with his epistemological position of 
‘internal understanding’. Admittedly, in this connection his theory has much in 
common with Critical Theory;56 in this sense, it is more than coincidence that it 
gives self-reflective and self-critical perspectives. Much more importantly, how- 
ever, it is claimed that the two most fundamental logical functions of Fujita’s 
theory fulfilled by the term narcissism have the primary effect on his immanent 
critical method of ‘understand[ing] others as otherness different from oneself, 
namely “alterity”, from the inside’ quoted above. It is noted that, evidently, this 
perspective is much more sophisticated by absorbing the concept. In other 
words, Fujita accomplished ‘seeing [him]self as if seeing others, seeing others as 
if seeing [him]self’ through understanding human characteristics offered by the 
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meaning of pathological narcissism – while narcissists could not meet real 
others, he managed to do it ironically by using his mirror reflecting a narcissistic 
self-image. It is interesting to note, however, that Fujita already succeeded to a 
certain extent in putting forward such a standpoint, for example, in the writing 
on Yukichi Fukuzawa in 1964 (on him, see App. 3, p. 266); it was given as seeing 
‘our self-image’ (seishinteki yōshi) through a picture of the Meiji government 
(1997b: 48). Although at the time Fujita must have not been aware of the concept 
in its rigorous sense, he no doubt recognised some implications described by 
the term. However, he acquired its viewpoint not only by the concept but also 
by many other positive influences. One of them is definitely the Hegelian dia- 
lectic. Significantly, Fujita learnt the method of seeing the opposite of a thing to 
a large extent from Hegel (e.g. 1997b: 156-8).57 This, then, leads me to be aware 
that the philosophical methods of dialectic and immanent critique are closely 
intertwined with one another. Indeed, this is relevant to Fujita’s perspective. To 
put it differently, his encounter with Hegel greatly contributed to his immanent 
critical method of ‘internal understanding’, as Fujita calls it – as we have seen, 
this was attained not only through Hegel but also through many other persons, 
amongst them Bashō, Fukuzawa and Mannheim. For these reasons, it is claimed 
that Fujita connected the Hegelian ‘mind that recognizes itself in nature as in its 
other’ (Habermas 1987: 32) with the method of narcissism that the self is iden- 
tified by the other. 
Without regard to Fujita’s philosophical-psychoanalytic theory, the epistem- 
ological perspective of narcissism substantially coincides with Hegelian imm- 
anent critique in terms of intersubjective understanding – namely ‘knowing- 
oneself-in-the-other’ (Sich-im-anderen-Erkennen) (Honneth 1995: 37).58 From this 
perspective, Fujita’s research style is much closer to Hegel’s and Freud’s than 
Kant’s and Marx’s in connection with highlighting immanent criticism based on 
intersubjective recognition through shining a light on dialectical logic and thro- 
ugh seeing the unconscious mind.59 Furthermore, when adding Marx’s ‘praxis’ 
here, then Fujita’s philosophical standpoint functioning in his political theory, 
on the whole, comes close to Critical Theory in epistemological and ontological 
dimensions.60 For these reasons, Fujita epistemologically and methodologically 
takes dialectical-phenomenological position primarily through intermediating bet- 
ween Hegel and Freud. 
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5.  Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism (3): 
The Society of the Tennō System (Tennōsei shakai) 
 
In Fujita’s political theory, as has been mentioned above, narcissism functions 
intermediately between totalitarianism and the society of the Tennō system. 
Since we already saw what he intends by the latter concept in detail in the 
preceding section, only a simple account of the concept will be provided for 
establishing the relationship between narcissism and the society of the Tennō 
system. For this purpose, I simply bring my discussion back to the core issue 
relating the state version to the social version concerning the Tennō system. 
Here I can thereby focus my attention on the task of connecting them. 
According to Fujita, as we have seen, there are two distinct versions of the 
Tennō system: the state of and the society of the Tennō system. The former type, 
in his view, is the system of rules on the basis of the Tennō-centred social order, 
and is approximately characterised by the two aspects of the modern ‘political 
state’ and the communal ‘family state’. He claims that, after having come into 
existence in the late nineteenth century, the establishment of the Tennō system 
was completed in around 1889. In Fujita’s view, however, this version of the 
Tennō system changed its own essential feature from a political action into a 
symbol particularly through the Russo-Japanese War, that is just before the 
Taishō period; this is, according to him, exemplified by the change of the features 
of statists and statesmen. From this perspective, Fujita points out that Taishō 
Tennō representing his era typifies this fundamental transformation of the sys- 
tem; that is to say, Tennō transformed himself from a political actor into a simple 
ritual symbol. On this view, Fujita must have seen that this marked change 
stemmed primarily from the completion of the task of excluding ‘the hetero- 
geneous’ from society by bringing about the unconscious elimination of an 
appropriate certain distance between statesmen and people which had enabled 
the state to adequately perform a function of its own system; this significant 
distance, as he stresses, was kept until around the war. This social change is 
explained to a large extent by his emphasis on Taishō Tennō’s ‘character trait of 
a “mikoshi portable shrine”’ (‘o-mikoshi’-sei) in contrast to the ‘transcendent’ 
(chōetsuteki) independence of the statists of the Meiji period (1998a: 298-302). 
Most importantly, however, the transformation of society was triggered not by 
some strong intention but by some invisible automatic physical force in my view. 
Indeed, it is profoundly associated with Fujita’s expression of the existential 
characteristics of Taishō Tennō, which can be regarded exactly as one of the 
most fundamental, typical features of the society of the Tennō system (1998a: 
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302). In Fujita’s view, this greatly contributed to strengthening the conformity of 
society. This exactly means the emergence of the society of the Tennō system. 
In conclusion, apparently the society of the Tennō system is quite narcissistic 
in Fujita’s sense on the grounds that the existence of the system depends upon 
the narcissistic selves of members, for example, in the sense that the avoidance 
of ‘fear’ (kyōfu), says Fujita, is exactly characteristic of this kind of society, or 
rather avoiding it even seems their major purpose (e.g. 1998a: 304; 1998e: 7-12, 
22-6); that is to say, this kind of society seems to be based on human vulne- 
rability characterising narcissism, as we have seen. In this respect, its organi- 
sation is no longer a political system, and indeed, illuminating this point is his 
exact intention of presenting this type of Tennō system.61 Does it, indeed, exp- 
ress its own essential vulnerability in its intrinsic nature? Also, from Fromm’s 
sociopsychological perspective the society of the Tennō system seems to have 
suffered from ‘malignant group narcissism’ (Ch. 4, s. 1). Fujita, however, could 
not link this concept, which had been proposed in his early masterwork ‘Shihai 
genri’, to his conception of narcissism, as opposed to his intention – he did not 
even make clear the former notion in detail. It is admitted, therefore, that I am 
oriented to this task, and that I will actually attempt to establish its connection. 
To address this issue, I will be a quasi-psychohistorian – whose importance was 
highlighted by Kohut, as we saw Chapter 4 – relying primarily upon Fromm’s 
theory of narcissism. Let us begin this important work by seeing Fromm’s con- 
cept of malignant group narcissism. (It is important to note, however, that my 
exploration will simply slightly develop the concept of the society of the Tennō 
system, depending upon psychoanalytic knowledge gained through examining 
Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory in Chapter 4, for the purpose of diagnosing the 
society of the Tennō system as malignant narcissism. This is therefore a simple 
experimental attempt to contribute to the future mutual development between 
social and political theory and psychoanalysis. For this reason, I cannot help 
leading this examination to propose a partial and incomplete view of narcissism, 
and thus there remain some methodological problems as to whether Fromm’s 
theory of narcissism should be applied to this issue, as we shall see later.) 
 
Malignant group narcissism: a sociopsychological analytic device 
As we saw in the previous chapter, Fromm puts forward two types of narci- 
ssism in accordance with its individual and sociological functions: individual 
and group (social) narcissism – on the latter, here I will use the term group 
narcissism. Basically, as mentioned above, he is of the opinion that individual 
narcissism is analogous to group narcissism (Ch. 4, n. 3); or, to put it another way, 
there is a simple quantitative difference between them, as represented by the 
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same distinction between individual and social psychology (Funk 1990). In fact, 
Fromm did not abandon this view of psychoanalysis in favour of social psy- 
chology even in his later years (e.g. Fromm 1980b). This elucidates great imp- 
ortance of taking its position to Fromm, which actually led his psychoanalytic 
theory to tackle social issues; as noted in Chapter 4, he requires that, intrinsi- 
cally, the task of psychoanalysis or individual psychology must be carried out in 
conjunction with social psychology on the grounds that an individual is always 
regarded as a ‘social being’ (also a ‘socialised being’), or, more precisely, for him 
individual psychology must be social psychology (e.g. 1941: 290; 1991: 142; cf. 
Funk 1990). As a matter of fact, his perspective relating a psychoanalytic stand- 
point to a sociological standpoint enabled him to come up with provocative 
theoretical ideas such as ‘group narcissism’ and ‘socially patterned defect’ (1956: 
15) – in this respect, while Fromm strongly recognises himself as a follower of 
Freud (e.g. Evans 1966), he nevertheless takes a completely different position 
from his mentor (e.g. Fromm 1980b). This is of huge importance to me for its 
exact standpoint as his essential analytic device can contribute to dealing with 
some issues concerning the society of the Tennō system in terms of Fromm’s 
psychoanalytic theory. (For this reason, my research relies not only on Kohut’s 
psychoanalytic theory but also on Fromm’s sociological psychoanalytic theory.) 
  According to Fromm, as we saw above, both individual and group narcissism 
necessarily develop in their dialectical process. (Some might anticipate that the 
society of the Tennō system also dialectically functions. However, this issue is 
not tackled in my exploration here.) In other words, malignant factors always 
lurk in ‘benign narcissism’ (Ch. 4, s. 1); in this sense, his theory is fundamentally 
dialectical. That is to say, Fromm claims that ‘if the needs of group narcissism 
are directed towards creative things, then they will be reduced to one which is 
“compatible with social co-operation” (benign narcissism), on the one hand, but 
if its needs are directed towards “its splendour”, “its past achievements” and 
“the physique of its members”, then they will be converted to “narcissistic 
passion” (malignant narcissism), on the other’ (Ch. 4, p. 48). In my view, how- 
ever, we have considerable difficulty in sublating the contradiction of narci- 
ssism by the above former way of development in his theory of narcissism 
because, as mentioned in the preceding chapter, his group narcissism mostly 
results in a negative narcissistic spiral. (It would seem that, in Fromm’s psycho- 
analytic theory, in so far as a socioeconomic structure giving rise to narcissism – 
also, thereby transforming it into group narcissism – does not change, then it is 
impossible to sublimate it. As we shall see in the next chapter, it seems to me 
that Fromm’s social and political theory has limitations in this respect.) This is 
primarily because Fromm suggests that his important concept of ‘having mode’, 
which, he says, characterises contemporary consumer society, intrinsically typi- 
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fies malignant narcissism; in fact, he writes, ‘[t]he nature of the having mode of 
existence follows from the nature of private property’ (1964: 77; 2005: 57-64). In 
his view, therefore, the narcissism of human beings must be ‘overcome’ (1962: 
118-21; 1964: 90; cf. Bacciagaluppi 1993: 6). Fromm, however, avoids falling into 
a serious aporia to some extent by providing a significant account of distin- 
guishing between narcissism and ‘self-love’. In fact, his conception of self-love 
defined by this interesting difference, Marco Bacciagaluppi stresses, is of great 
relevance for developing an alternative scheme of psychoanalytic theory of 
narcissism (1993: 11). The distinction established by Fromm, then, contributes to 
making the fundamental connection between narcissism and the society of the 
Tennō system. In other words, it allows my investigation to identify some 
‘malignant group narcissism’ differentiated to a certain extent from ‘benign 
group narcissism’, namely collective self-love. 
  From these perspectives, it is hypothesised that the narcissistic characteristics 
meant by Fujita’s concept of the society of the Tennō system can be defined by 
extracting some intrinsic features of the social system, namely the ‘shared, socially 
relevant psychic attitudes’ (Fromm 1991: 149). Or, to put it another way, if there 
are some ‘socially patterned defect[s]’ based on the sociological standpoint of 
socialised beings not in an individual dimension but in a social dimension, then I 
am allowed to diagnose the group narcissism of the society of the Tennō system 
particularly by focusing on some kind of its existential and behavioural pattern. 
Here in Frommian terms I refer particularly to the psychoanalytically signi- 
ficant concept of ‘pathological symbiosis’, which provides a person with ‘an 
illusory sense of power’ (Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993: 6). At this point it is 
important, first, to look again at Fromm’s theory of narcissism concerning the 
negative relationship between narcissism and politics, namely the framework of 
pathological group narcissism inducing negative politics, as examined in Chap- 
ter 4, and then, to provide a brief description of the sociopsychological mecha- 
nism of how malignant group narcissism develops, shining a light on Fromm’s 
method of analytic social psychology. 
  Fromm defines four kinds of characteristics of the pathology of group narci- 
ssism, the ‘lack of objectivity and rational judgement’, the ‘need for “narcissistic 
satifaction”’, the ‘“reaction of rage” caused by vulnerability’ and ‘narcissistic 
“symbiosis and identification”’ (Ch. 4, p. 49). In his view, however, only the 
existence of these character traits is not sufficient for generating malignant 
group narcissism. According to Fromm, ‘social transference’ is always necessary 
for generating a group type of narcissism (Ch. 4, pp. 50-1). As we saw above, it 
implies not only that it is needed for laying out the framework of collective 
narcissism causing some negative politics, but, most importantly, that group 
narcissism is fully based on our social structure, or, more accurately, a way of 
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developing it is almost completely determined by what society it is. From this 
perspective, we must expect that the formulation of group narcissism depends 
to a large extent upon the ‘character structure’ of a society (Fromm 1941: 277), or, 
to put it differently, it is conceivable in the abstract that the character structure 
of a group might be more narcissistic than others; that is to say, theoretically, 
there can exist a society which is apt to induce malignant group narcissism. 
Fromm, then, identifies a society constituted by this character structure as 
contemporary industrial society (e.g. 1980b: 53-4). From this perspective, he 
leads this topic to apply the Marxist concept of the ‘worship of industrial pro- 
duction’ on the basis of his stance that the endurance of society is determined 
by the most fundamental socioeconomic framework (Ch. 4, p. 51). Here I will 
draw attention to the latter logic of socioeconomic system as the basic structure 
of contemporary society. Fromm writes: 
 
the phenomena of social psychology are to be understood as processes involving the active 
and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the socio-economic situation. In a 
certain fundamental respects, the instinctual apparatus itself is a biological given; but it is 
highly modifiable. The role of primary formative factors goes to the economic conditions 
(1991: 149). 
 
Fromm’s stance, however, is only in a sense completely different from Marx’s 
position of historical materialism. Fromm offers a provocative account of the 
reason for the ‘active and passive adaptation of the instinctual apparatus to the 
socio-economic situation’ from his psychoanalytic perspective. In this respect, 
he is not only an heir of Marx but also of Freud. As Fromm puts it, 
 
Marx and Engels are the last people to whom one would impute the idea of transfiguring 
bourgeois and capitalist traits into a universal human trait. They were well aware of the 
place psychology had within sociology, but they neither were nor wanted to be psycho- 
logists. . . . Psychoanalysis was the first to provide this psychology, and showed that the 
‘acquisitive drive’, although important, did not play a predominant role in man’s psychic 
armament by comparison with other (genital, sadistic, narcissistic) needs. Psychoanalysis, 
in fact, indicates that in large measure the ‘acquisitive drive’ is not the deepest cause of the 
need to acquire or possess things; it is rather the expression of a narcissistic need or wish to 
win recognition from oneself and others (1991: 152; emphases added). 
 
Admittedly, this account elucidates why the ‘having mode’ is of huge imp- 
ortance to our society. In Fromm’s view, the reason for the importance of 
‘having’ is because it ensures ‘recognition’. (Or, from a Kohutian perspective, 
acquiring selfobjects – that is having someone or something – is the sole means 
for obtaining admiration at which the narcissistic self aims – without referring 
to Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory, however, Fromm’s above account enables us 
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to understand why narcissism is the most fundamental human intrinsic fea- 
ture.) From this standpoint, we can grasp how malignant group narcissism 
comes out, specifically by caring about and in accordance with the basic character 
traits of a society, particularly through examining how members are given recog- 
nition in its society. In these respects, significantly, Fromm’s social psychology 
precisely illuminates the process that a society strengthens its own malignant 
group narcissism. 
 
The society of the Tennō system as one type of malignant group narcissism 
From these viewpoints, how can we explain the society of the Tennō system by 
applying the concept of malignant group narcissism? As noted above, here I 
want to suggest the method of employing another psychoanalytic concept of 
‘pathological symbiosis’ for tackling its issue. According to Bacciagaluppi and 
Romano Biancoli, narcissism is caused by this pathological symbiosis, which is, 
they say, offered by both the parents through fulfilling an ‘inappropriate par- 
ental role’ (1993: 6); as mentioned above, this leads their children to possess an 
‘illusory sense of power’. Indeed, this dynamics is best explained by Fromm’s 
The Heart of Man from a pathological perspective. However, my exploration is 
unable to devote itself to an analysis of the concept due to the fact that it needs 
an enormously long space for describing its whole logical framework. Here I 
therefore simply carry out introductory research into the society of the Tennō 
system by introducing the notion. 
  Fromm’s above work addresses some issues of the inner evil of human beings, 
which from a pathological perspective he calls the ‘syndrome of decay’, divid- 
ing it primarily up into three kinds: ‘love of death’ (necrophilia), ‘incestuous 
symbiosis’ and ‘malignant narcissism’ (1964: e.g. 13, 37). This evidence, in rela- 
tion to my research, explains the importance of the concept of pathological 
symbiosis to Fromm in addition to the last one – of course, the first one is also 
of huge importance to him, but it is disregarded in my examination on the 
grounds that my research does not aim at dealing with its issue in terms of the 
concept. This fact is profoundly relevant to my investigation too. In fact, as we 
saw above, Fromm highlights the notion of symbiotic fixation through analy- 
sing individual and group narcissism in the same writing. In addition, the con- 
cept of pathological symbiosis, which has been aimed at the therapeutic trans- 
formation of Fromm’s conception of narcissism, is profoundly associated with 
malignant narcissism, that is to say, as Bacciagaluppi and Bianncoli put it, 
‘narcissism is the result of the pathological symbiosis’ (1993: 6). Significantly, 
indeed, this is also clearly shown by Fromm himself (1964: 108). In the book, he 
gives a brief account of the pathological function performed by an incestuous 
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type of symbiosis, regarded as a pathological symbiosis, in terms of narcissism 
(cf. 1964: 101). Fromm says: 
 
First of all there is a close affinity between incestuous fixation and narcissism. Inasmuch as 
the individual has not yet fully emerged from mother ’s womb or mother’s breasts, he is not 
free to relate to others or to love others. He and his mother (as one) are the object of his 
narcissism. This can be seen most clearly where the personal narcissism has been trans- 
formed into group narcissism. There we find very clearly incestuous fixation blended with 
narcissism. It is this particular blend which explains the power and the irrationality of all 
national, racial, religious and political fanaticism (1964: 108). 
 
This psychoanalytic description contributes to understanding why Fromm had 
to suggest the four kinds of characteristics of malignant group narcissism as 
shown above. Roughly speaking, it can be argued that symbiotic fixation sig- 
nifies and stems from immaturity, similarly as other types of features of mali- 
gnant group narcissism are all characterised as its signification (e.g. Fromm 
1964: ch. 5). Most importantly, indeed, this is directly relevant to the primary 
characteristics of the society of the Tennō system. 
  As we have seen, Fujita stresses that Taishō Tennō represents himself as a 
mikosi portable shrine character. According to him, this primarily performs the 
function of enforcing group conformity. That is to say, he suggests that Tennō 
became a ritual symbol simply enshrined and carried on his subjects’ shoulders as 
if being a portable shrine. Indeed, this is quite important for knowing the int- 
rinsic feature of the society of the Tennō system, which, as Fujita highlights, 
started to come into existence in around the Taishō period. In other words, the 
terms ‘enshrine’ (matsuru) and ‘carry on a shoulder’ (katsugu) signify the nature 
of the system. In additon, as Fujita writes, if Taishō Tennō’s character stren- 
gthens the conformity of the society, then it is possible to presume that the 
system contains some kind of socially patterned feature – namely a ‘social way 
of being’ (shakaiteki sonzai keishiki) or a ‘behavioural pattern’ (kōdō yōshiki) (Fujita 
1998a: 305). Significantly, as Fromm puts it, 
 
by adapting himself to social conditions man develops those traits that make him desire to 
act as he has to act. If the character of the majority of people in a given society – that is, the 
social character – is thus adapted to the objective tasks the individual has to perform in this 
society, the energies of people are molded in ways that make them into productive forces 
that are indispensable for the functioning of that society (1941: 283). 
 
In short, it would seem that some specific meanings expressed by the above 
Japanese verbs are provided exactly by the reason why the group of the society 
evades ‘fear’, which is likely to be induced by vulnerability, that, as Fujita says, 
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the group members’ own respective ‘individuality’ (kobetsusei) is unmasked 
(1998a: 304). (My research, however, does not conduct any further investigation 
into this topic. As noted above, it simply demonstrates that Fujita’s society of 
the Tennō system signifies that it suffers from malignant narcissism.) 
  To conclude, the characteristics depicted by the passive verbal expressions, be 
enshrined and be carried on a shoulder, which signify exactly Tennō’s character 
traits, concern the quasi-specific form of symbiotic fixation induced by the 
immature narcissistic needs of the society of the Tennō system. Or, more pre- 
cisely, both individual and group narcissism offered by its society have given 
rise to a social range of pathological symbiosis between a ‘person carried on his 
group members’ shoulders (katsugareru mono), described as a metaphorical per- 
son of Tennō, and ‘persons carrying him’ (katsugiya), described as group mem- 
bers (Fujita 1998a: 305); in this respect, both their existence and their existence 
value are dependent upon each other. (Perhaps individual malignant narcissism 
one has once suffered from can most often cause a negative narcissistic spiral. 
This must be the primary factor of social transference, and the reason why nar- 
cissism springing from the pathological symbiosis is bound to fall again into a 
condition causing narcissism and group narcissism.) The individual and group 
narcissism of the social sytem satisfy their own narcissistic needs for acquiring 
recognition in this way. Psychoanalytically, those desires also explain why super- 
ficially the group members are willing to accept ‘arbitrary teachings’ (oshie), on 
the one hand, and why substantially their attitudes are determined by their 
‘naturalistic egoism’ (shizenshugiteki egoizumu), on the other (Fujita 1998a: 231). 
For probably it is the best way to obtain recognition, and also for some beha- 
viour disturbing a symbiotic fixation (harmony) is regarded as a negative factor 
in achieving the objective in that society. It might be the case that this results 
exactly in their ambiguous attitude to any decisions which, in this sense, always 
brings group members to ‘unexpected results’ (ito sezaru kekka). Perhaps the 
state of the Tennō system must have transformed itself into the society of the 
Tennō system in this way. 
 
Some suggestions for the concept of the society of the Tennō system 
Presumably Fujita must have wished to provide such account as the above 
describes by way of connecting his concept of the society of the Tennō system 
with some psychoanalytic method in detail, focusing on the notion of narci- 
ssism despite the fact that he was not able to complete its task primarily due to 
a lack of his sociopsychological concern. Perhaps, regardless of Fujita, it is nece- 
ssary to view one’s own research object from some sociopsychological pers- 
pective for analysing society by introducing a psychoanalytic theory, that is to say, 
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one’s research cannot be acceptable in social studies simply by adopting psy- 
choanalysis when using some psychoanalytic approach since, as a matter of fact, 
most of the contemporary psychoanalytic theories do not concern the social (cf. 
Millán 1996: 5); to put it simply, most of them are not oriented to examining 
society. For this reason, we necessarily run into methodological difficulties 
whenever applying some psychoanalytic theory. In these respects, Fromm was 
one of few scholars who were involved in both psychoanalysis and social 
psychology (cf. Funk 2006: 2). Of course, it is not right to believe that there is no 
problem in Fromm’s sociological psychoanalytic theory. To be sure, it lays too 
much stress on the significance of his most famous sociopsychological device of 
‘social character’, which primarily supports his sociological view of a socialised 
individual and his sociopsychological view of a character structure common to 
group members in a group. Also, as has sometimes been said, the concept is quite 
relevant not only to social studies but also to psychoanalytic clinical practice 
(Funk 1990, 1996; Ortmeyer 2002), and it even has the great potential for effec- 
tively incorporating psychoanalysis into social science (Grey 1993) – my above 
examination and diagnosis, needless to say, are also essentially based on that 
sociopsychological analytic tool. In my view, however, it is still regarded as an 
insufficient and partial concept, and should therefore be improved to some extent, 
in the sense that the analytic device very often functions in overgeneralising indi- 
vidual character traits. In addition, it seems that Fromm’s theory of narcissism 
has got into difficulties with putting too much emphasis on a narcissistic aspect 
of contemporary industrial society. For example, it is questioned why are highly 
developed countries at present much more narcissistic than others, while autho- 
ritarian and fascist politics are similarly too narcissistic regardless of wartime and 
postwar? Also, is it possible to presume that a past society was largely nar- 
cissistic? On these issues, it would seem that we fail to penetrate their logic 
simply by way of dialectic. I shall deal with those issues in the next chapter. 
  Having said that, my examination analysing Fujita’s concept of the society of 
the Tennō system in terms of narcissism is of considerable significance in gain- 
ing a new understanding of the topic despite the fact that my exploration is 
biased in favour of Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory. It is expected that this task 
will lead Fujita’s early important political concept to develop particularly in 
terms of social psychology and psychoanalysis so that it can much more illu- 
minate our society and politics. Of course, nonetheless, my research still rema- 
ins in the dark about many other problems, in addition to a further psycho- 
analytic investigation: first, concerning some ways of understanding of the 
cultural, social phenomenon as to why the society of the Tennō system takes the 
cultural form of a mikoshi portable shrine, whether it is specific to the society – I 
had to employ the expression of ‘quasi-specific’ above – and what enables the 
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social system to maintain its own style, not from a psychoanalytic perspective 
but from different perspectives (other problems also come into existence from 
theses perspectives, e.g. whether it is appropriate to apply the term mikoshi por- 
table shrine to an understanding of the social system, and whether it is possible 
to identify the system by other expressions); second, concerning methodology 
as to whether to apply Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory proposed over fifty years 
ago to studying Fujita’s society of the Tennō system, and whether it is possible to 
understand the concept from a psychoanalytic or sociopsychological perspe- 
ctive in the first place and from other perspectives. To deal with these issues, 
therefore, we need to work together with other disciplines providing different 
viewpoints – politics, sociology, history, social psychology and psychoanalysis – 
such as cultural studies, cultural anthropology and folklore apart from philo- 
sophical epistemology. With regard to those themes, it would seem that they 
require some other explorations from the above disciplinary perspectives, and 
also that a reconsideration of the modern and contemporary history of Japan is 
of vital importance. In addition, we should tackle some topics of the concept, 
dividing the system up into its three patterns Fujita proposes – unfortunately, as 
mentioned above, one of them has not been made clear by him. Furthermore, it 
is noted that Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory can also be applied to and shed 
much light on both the society of the Tennō system and the state of the Tennō 
system. In that case, I suppose the concept of Japanese group self, whicn can be 
suggested by Kohut’s term ‘German group self’, focusing particularly on his 
other important concepts such as the ‘group’s grandiose self’, the ‘communal 
narcissistic self’ and the ‘nation’s group self’, and taking account of the diffe- 
rence between a ‘healthy group self’ and a ‘diseased group self’ (e.g. 1985b: 57, 
67; 1985c: 78, 81-93). His psychoanalytic theory caring about our ‘cultural back- 
ground[s]’, notwithstanding primarily stressing an understanding of human 
nature, must illuminate some social concepts specifically describing Japan (e.g. 
2011b: 210). 
 
 
6.  Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Conception of Narcissism 
Did I successfully manage to illustrate some significations given by Fujita’s 
conception of narcissism, focusing primarily on his terms totalitarianism and 
society of the Tennō system, and drawing attention to the psychoanalytic con- 
cept of narcissism? Yes, I did in some respects, but, no, I did not in some 
respects. On the former, I argue that the above research is highly acceptable to 
the extent that the introduction of the psychoanalytic standpoint is regarded as 
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appropriate and relevant to Fujita’s issue of narcissism – it would seem, how- 
ever, that this has been demonstrated in large measure. On the latter, I argue 
that I was not able to completely establish the connection between Fujita’s 
totalitarianism and society of the Tennō system, penetrated by his conception of 
narcissism, and thus that I have not yet made it clear apart from some other 
enquiries particularly concerning the society of the Tennō system as noted 
above, even though I have described those respective concepts in conjunction 
with the term narcissism. In addition, I have not examined his term society of 
the Tennō system from any philosophical-epistemological perspective; indeed, 
this task is quite important for me in the sense that my research highlights the 
logical function of a theory, and therefore that I always motivate myself to inve- 
stigate the logic of a theory as my research object. Indeed, these attempts are of 
huge importance for a better understanding not only of Fujita’s political theory 
but also of our society. In particular, with regard to the first point, unfortunately 
Fujita has not tackled the issue as opposed to his wishes, or rather he has 
remained in the dark about its crucial task, and it seems that he has even 
oriented us towards undertaking the work. (With regard to this issue, it would 
appear that despite some difficulties Fromm’s theory of fascism, which stresses 
the dialectical aspect of democracy, focusing on its sociopsychological personality, 
can be helpful in and a vital clue to accounting for the relation between Fujita’s 
totalitarianism and society of the Tennō system.) 
With regard to Fujita’s theory of narcissism, does it have some theoretical 
possibilities for developing our insight not only into gaining an understanding 
of some problems of society and politics but also into dealing with them? On 
the one hand, I must point to its negative aspect. As exemplified exactly by the 
word negative, his theoretical view thoroughly emphasises only a negative asp- 
ect of narcissism – in this respect, as we shall see in the final chapter, Fujita 
shows a stark contrast with Kohut. In this sense, it should be noted that Fujita 
simply takes the same stance as Maruyama’s, and that, for this reason, he has 
not been able to break free from and overcome the narrow-minded framework 
of his mentor’s, with respect to his theory of narcissism. For these reasons, it is 
difficult to precisely grasp human nature and to find some solutions to narci- 
ssism solely by applying his theory. In addition, it seems to me that, although 
having aimed at curing the narcissistic disease of society, Fujita abandoned the 
crucial task in the middle of its process. In fact, it can be argued that, when he 
said that ‘the time I have lived has come to an end’, there was no strong will to 
deal with the problem in his words (1997e: 208) – it might be more appropriate 
to believe that he had to give up completing the task for he suffered from rectal 
cancer and was therefore operated for it in the same year. However, it is evident 
that Fujita precisely aimed at reforming society, that is at giving some remedy 
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for narcissism, for example, when writing ‘Narushizumu’ – in this respect, it 
might be the case that he metaphorically applies a medical standpoint by way 
of the remedial three steps of examination, diagnosis and prescription. Admittedly, 
as a matter of fact, this has been demonstrated to some extent by my above 
analysis. On the other hand, therefore, my research has sought for and shined a 
light on Fujita’s theoretical possibilities for fining some clues to curing social 
narcissism with respect to his theory of narcissism. This will be achieved by 
examining Fujita’s important conceptions of ‘intersubjectivity’ (sōgo shutaisei) 
and ‘personal relationships’ (pāsonaru rirēshonshippusu), both of which are dire- 
cted exactly towards the restoration of experience, that is towards the treatment of 
narcissism, as we saw above. With regard to those concepts, he draws his ins- 
piration from psychoanalysis, and for him they are likely to have some remedial 
effects on the disease despite many problems in addition to the above difficult 
point. In short, they are directed toward curing narcissism. This is the exact 
positive aspect of his theory of narcissism. 
 
 
7.  Fujita’s Theory of Phenomenology: 
His Conception of Intersubjectivity (Sōgo shutaisei) 
 
The ‘self-reform of its own spiritual structure’ (seishin kōzō no jiko henkaku): 
Towards the restoration of experience 
I want to begin this issue by looking again at the three quasi-psychoanalytic 
essays putting forward Fujita’s primary view of narcissism. So far I have dis- 
cussed his conception of narcissism particularly in conjunction with his two 
important terms totalitarianism – I have occasionally chosen to employ the 
Japanese original term zentaishugi – and society of the Tennō system. With reg- 
ard to the connection between these political terms, it seems to me that Fujita 
gradually drew his attention primarily to an understanding of the former imp- 
lications after his crucial turning point of ‘despair’ despite the fact that, as has 
sometimes been mentioned, he was consistent in concerning himself with the 
latter term he himself originally presented even equally as important as the 
former (Cho 2012: 144-7; Iida 2006a: 351; Miyamura 2009: 168-71). In particular, 
on this view, the Kōdo Seichō undoubtedly triggered his significant interest in 
totalitarianism, whose impact, in my view, is also made on his conception of 
narcissism. In other words, Fujita sought to precisely grasp the new pheno- 
menon of Kōdo Seichō, which started to come into existence in the middle 1950s, 
by devoting himself exclusively to a deep understanding of some significations 
intended by the negative political term, similarly as caring about the same fea- 
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tures as meant by the conventional characteristics of the society of the Tennō 
system inherited from the previous society in wartime; in this respect, presu- 
mably he became aware that it was already impossible to see his society simply in 
terms of his original concept. For this reason, with regard to this issue, it is app- 
ropriate to believe that the new problem under his very nose, ‘“positive total- 
itarianism to finished products” (shōhin e no nōdōteki zentaishugi), generated as a 
result of the development of the disease of “totalitarianism to unruffled ease”’, 
was inherited from the familiar problem, retained since his first article, that is 
rigorously distinguished from the state system, on the one hand, and that is 
regarded as specific to Japan and has been deep-seated in Japanese society after 
the Russo-Japanese War, on the other; in this respect, Fujita did not lose his 
original concern (Fujita 1997e: 98). To put it simply, he found that contemporary 
Japan has fallen into a ‘serious crisis’ (shinkoku na kiki) due to the appearance of 
a new totalitarianism as serious as or as more serious as its two other versions in 
war and in politics, as preserving the character traits since the early twentieth 
century (Miyamura 2009: 170) – on this view, for example, Ichimura is also 
aware and points out that Fujita consistently held a ‘sense of imminent crisis’ 
(kiki ishiki) of the decline of society, which must have been triggered by the Kōdo 
Seichō (2010: 422). In the first place, in my view, the reason why he applied the 
concept of totalitarianism to an analysis of society is because of his more pes- 
simistic view than before. In fact, this is precisely explained by his words that 
‘there is neither any remedy nor solution to the structural crisis of contem- 
porary society (gendai shakai no kōzōteki kiki)’ (1997e: 41). We are thereby aware of 
his negative view of contemporary things. 
However, it is not right to think that Fujita does not provide any remedies for 
the new disease. As mentioned above, basically his logic is constituted by dia- 
lectic. In this respect, in his view, society always immanently contains negative 
factors, thereby necessarily taking the dialectical development; it therefore defi- 
nitely cannot be understood in terms of a simple aspect. Perhaps this a priori 
assumption led Fujita to self-critically and self-reflectively recognise his society 
particularly by seeing the dialectic of the Kōdo Seichō; from this perspective, we 
can accurately understand why he had to leave the above pessimistic words. 
Fujita nonetheless seeks to find some effective ways to sublate the internal 
contradiction included in the Kōdo Seichō through focusing on the ‘dialectic of 
“experience”’ (keiken no benshōhō) (Iida 2006a: 334). This way of dealing with a 
problem is therefore not found simply by a single subjective therapeutic process. 
For him, the purpose is accomplished through intersubjectively constituted per- 
sonal relationships; in this sense, it is achieved as if undergoing a psychoanalytic 
therapeutic process. To put it differently, essentially Fujita requires us to be inv- 
olved in the interrelationship between the self and the other, even though they 
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accompany ‘pain’, in order that we can cure our respective diseases of narci- 
ssism and the narcissism of our society by ourselves – to this extent, it is implied 
that selves are prescribed by others. That is to say, it appears to be intended that 
‘the analyst is required to undergo analysis in the role of patient in order to free 
himself from the very illnesses that he is later to treat as an analyst’ (Habermas 
1987: 236; emphases added), and thereby, ‘both the social structure as a whole 
and the relation of the theoretician to society are altered, that is both the subject 
and the role of thought are changed’ (Horkheimer 2002b: 211; emphases added). 
Perhaps this is why Fujita particularly highlights the importance of ‘reforming 
our spiritual structure by ourselves’ (seishin kōzō no jiko kakumei) (1997c: 18; emp- 
hases added; cf. 1998b: 213; 1998c: 180, 191; 1997g: 61). 
 
(a) ‘How, then, ought we to do?’ 
As we have seen, Fujita provides his theoretical stance of narcissism primarily 
in his three quasi-psychoanalytic essays, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, ‘Narushizumu’ 
and ‘Anraku’. Basically, these articles make an examination of society and carry 
out a diagnosis of the disease of society. It is important to note that not only do 
those tasks conduct analyses of society, meant by the two terms examination 
and diagnosis, but significantly they also aim at achieving treatment through 
examining society and diagnosing the disease. In fact, they are respectively 
subtitled ‘What Prevents Us Experiencing?’, ‘A Way of Finding out the Essence 
of Things’ and ‘Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity’, all of which intend 
the objective of prescription. Also, his emphasis on a remedial purpose can be 
explained by his series of normative enquiries as to ‘[h]ow, then, ought we to 
do?’ (1997e: 15), and ‘[h]ow should we do . . . ?’ (1997e: 26). In these respects, 
Fujita, while quite pessimistically viewing the present social circumstances, att- 
empts to relieve society in a seriously diseased condition, seeking for the exact 
meaning of his most important conception of experience by using his funda- 
mental method of internal understanding. 
  ‘How, then, ought we to do?’ Fujita answers this enquiry in terms of his 
phenomenological-psychoanalytic standpoint, which indeed integrates his con- 
ventional perspective into a new one. He begins this task by reflecting on the 
process that society has lost experience – admittedly, for him his later work was 
directed entirely towards identifying this process. Fujita’s conception of expe- 
rience, however, covers a wide range of his theory of philosophy, so here I 
cannot develop his argument about it, following my above discussion concer- 
ning the signification of the concept. Instead, I concentrate my exploration on 
seeing his phenomenological-psychoanalytic viewpoint intertwined with his 
psychoanalytic perspective, which sheds much light on an understanding of his 
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suggestions on the basis of reflections on some meanings of the ‘loss of expe- 
rience’. 
 
(b) Intersubjectivity (sōgo shutaisei) 
In Fujita’s phenomenological theory, the existence of his conception of ‘inter- 
subjectivity’ is indispensable for restoring experience. Basically, this term is 
offered by his representative later works, such as ‘Shinpin bunka’ (The World 
Surrounded by Finished Products) (1981) (1997d: 8) and ‘Aru sōshitsu no 
keiken: Kakurenbō no seishinshi’ (The Experience of Deprivation: An 
Intellectual History of Hide-and-Seek) (1981) (1997d: 30, 31, 37), in which that is 
oriented towards establishing a ‘free society interrelating people’ (jiyū na 
sōgoteki shakai) (1997d: 42). To be sure, his conception of intersubjectivity is con- 
structed primarily in his later writings, but the construction is not confined to 
those works. For instance, ‘“‘Puroretaria minshushugi’ no genkei” e no hochū’ 
(A Postscript to ‘The Principles of Proletarian Democracy’), which is supposed 
to have been written just after having published the original text (1964) – 
unfortunately the published year of this writing has not been made clear – 
employs the term ‘intersubjective’ (sōgo shutaiteki) for describing Lenin’s poli- 
tical theory in conjunction with his series of sociopolitical terms ‘interrelation’ 
(sōgo kankei, sōgosei) and ‘interrelatedness’ (sōgo kanrensei, sōgo izonsei, sōgo 
kainyūsei), all of which signify exactly the appearance of intersubjectivity (1997b: 
107). Also, it is believed that the method of immanent critique attained through 
studying Hegel’s dialectic was aimed precisely at founding interrelationships 
based on its intersubjectivity, that is at ‘establishing “society”’ (shakai no kōchiku) 
(Ichimura 2010: 418); the mind that recognises a ‘“being in nature” “as in itself 
and as reasonable”’ (sonzaisuru mono wo sore jishin ni oite riseiteki na mono to shite) is 
one which Fujita learnt from Hegel in his understanding (1997c: 156). That is to 
say, this epistemological tool helps Fujita to construct his phenomenological- 
psychoanalytic conception of intersubjectivity. In other words, the existence of 
Hegel, constituting Fujita’s philosophical epistemology formulated in his early 
years, is indispensable for the foundation of society based on the mutual rela- 
tionship between the self and the other. These pieces of evidence clearly explain 
why the concept connects his early concern with his later concern. 
  Perhaps the term intersubjectivity is most famous as Husserl’s important 
conception, and the concept is therefore understood mostly through his pheno- 
menology. My investigation, however, does not refer to his theory of phenome- 
nology. Instead, my concern is simply to briefly examine how it has been for- 
med, focusing on Honneth’s terminology of intersubjectivity; for his exact con- 
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ception draws its inspiration from Hegel. It would seem that his conception of 
the term will greatly contribute to grasping the central meaning of the concept. 
  Scholars in the English-speaking world must have known the name of 
Honneth primarily through his theory of ‘recognition’, constituted by his rep- 
resentative works such as The Struggle for Recognition (1995 [1992]), whose idea 
was put forward by drawing attention to the role of the young Hegel’s notion of 
‘struggle for recognition’. Indeed, this work precisely provides Honneth’s con- 
ception of intersubjectivity. As a matter of fact, he recognises that there is an 
important clue to a new foundation of socially formed, given and received 
recognition in the young Hegel’s conception of the theory of recognition. In 
Honneth’s view, recognition is based on intersubjective mutual relationships in 
the positive sense of having some possibilities for normatively founding a social 
theory by transforming the concept, on the one hand, and it later led Hegel to 
establish The Phenomenology of Spirit in the negative sense of reducing the nor- 
mative concept simply to labour, on the other. My investigation, however, will 
not describe the developmental process of Honneth’s theory of recognition, but 
it will instead concentrate its task on gaining a brief understanding of the con- 
cept of intersubjectivity through shining a light on his phenomenological epis- 
temology.62 
  As mentioned above, Honneth’s theory of intersubjectivity is proposed pri- 
marily by The Struggle for Recognition, which attempts to reflect on the young 
Hegel’s theory of recognition. In my view, it is an epoch-making work in the 
sense of incorporating the concept of intersubjectivity into normative theory. In 
fact, it seems that in the writing it effectively functions in establishing his theory 
of recognition, which first of all tries to transform the conceptual value of reco- 
gnition from the mere labour, which Hegel reduced normative significance to, 
into intersubjective recognition responding to normative claims, seeking to change 
the sociophilosophical view of human history from the ‘struggle for self- 
preservation’ into the ‘struggle for recognition’ (Honneth 1995: chs. 1-3). 
Honneth aims not only to lead the term to fulfil its function, but quite inte- 
restingly, also to practically lay the foundations of the concept of recognition 
primarily by introducing Mead’s social psychology and psychoanalytic object 
relations theory in the work (1995: ch. 4). Then, he enables intersubjective fun- 
ctions to work in ‘empirical events within the social world’ (1995: 68). This 
allows intersubjective recognition to be regarded as the three actual forms of 
recognition, ‘love’, ‘rights’ and ‘solidarity’, which Honneth himself has pro- 
posed through arranging Hegel’s motif (1995: chs. 5-6). Finally, he shows that 
intersubjective mutual relationships result in performing a function in moral 
foundations in the following two ways: first, by comparing Hegel’s theory of 
recognition to Marx’s, Sorel’s and Sartre’s social theories, all of which, according 
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to Honneth, failed to be aware of the moral basis of recognition (1995: ch. 7); 
and second, by demonstrating that social conflicts are essentially provoked for 
gaining intersubjective recognition (1995: ch. 8). He comes to the conclusion that, 
‘[t]he three distinct patterns of recognition then represent intersubjective condi- 
tions that we must further presuppose, if we are to describe the general stru- 
ctures of a successful life’ (1995: 174; emphases added). 
  From these perspectives, what can we see in respect of Honneth’s conception 
of recognition particularly concerning its intersubjective functions I emphas- 
ised above? Perhaps, first, one must perceive that it is basically concerned with 
a way of understanding of history. Second, one might recognise that it affects 
ways of understanding of social justice (e.g. Fraser and Honneth 2003). Third, 
one can see that it is about what morality should be. It would seem that they are 
all appropriately acceptable. However, I am unwilling to highlight all those 
views on the grounds that they are aware simply of an aspect of recognition 
respectively, and therefore fail to precisely grasp the core of the conception. To 
conclude, in my view, Honneth’s conception of recognition is rather associated 
primarily with his philosophical-anthropological viewpoint of how the self and 
the other are interrelated with each other, and thus, if the above standpoints do 
not notice this fact, then they miss the most important point. 
From this perspective, we can probably see the individual in a considerably 
different way, in which individuals are not intertwined with one another simply 
in one direction of influence. Honneth suggests that they instead mutually affect 
and are affected by each other, and therefore that their behaviour is determined 
by their respective effects per se; this elucidates why we are fundamentally 
intersubjectively correlated with one another. The psychiatrist Harry S. Sullivan, 
for example, well explains this dynamics in terms of interpersonal relationships 
in psychoanalytic interviews – while his account, however, is insufficient for 
completely describing intersubjectivity, it is nevertheless quite relevant to my 
research. He writes: 
 
The gist of the matter is that self-understanding is not primarily an intellectual achieve- 
ment. . . . it is a work primarily of intuition, of grasping the ‘whole’ of a configuration. . . . 
the method of statement, unsupported by the method of free fantasy, cannot provide rati- 
onal insight – however much the insight of the questioner may assist the intuition of the 
subject-individual. And . . . the rational insights of the interviewer cannot expend the tota- 
lity of human personality, be he the most ‘analyzed’ person extant. There is always inter- 
action between interviewer and interviewed, between analyst and analysand, and from it, 
both must invariably learn if sound knowledge of the subject-personality is to result (1984: 
334).  
 
First of all, it is noteworthy and we cannot help being surprised that Sullivan 
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presented this view through conducting practical experience of psychotherapy 
over eighty years ago. For his description clearly shows that in psychoanalytic 
therapeutic interviews the perception of an analyst as an interviewer psycho- 
logically brings about the change of his patient’s mind as an interviewee and vice 
versa. Most importantly, however, we definitely should not think that this psy- 
chological mechanism functions only in psychoanalytic therapy. It should rather 
be regarded as a function in actual interrelationships in miniature. Significantly, 
in other words, Sullivan precisely tells us that human beings are essentially 
mutually correlated with each other, that is to say, ‘[n]o two people have ever 
talked together with entire freedom of either one from effects of interaction of 
the other’ (1984: 328); for this reason, in his view, ways of our personality 
development even depend upon the same principle. This is why, as Sullivan 
puts it, ‘in the schizophrenic process and in the preliminaries of schizophrenic 
illness – so common among adolescents who are having trouble in their social 
adjustments – can be seen . . . glimpses which will combine as a mosaic that 
explains many more than half of the adult personalities that one encounters’ 
(1974: 201-2; emphases added); in this sense, for him schizophrenia is a mental 
disorder of interpersonal relationships, that is Schizophrenia as a Human Process 
(Sullivan 1974; cf. 1973, 1997). Most importantly, this signifies that human 
beings are intrinsically interrelated with each other. 
As noted above, however, his standpoint does not succeed in offering the 
complete intersubjective view; it has not yet achieved a rigorous understanding 
of the concept in the sense that Sullivan’s ‘subject’ has not been able to fully 
absorb the eye of the other. With respect to this issue, phenomenological psy- 
chopathology appears to manage to provide a more thorough perspective of 
intersubjectivity. Wolfgang Blankenburg is one of the persons who enable their 
disciplinary stance to shed much light on the implication of the notion. (On this 
view, I will also have to concern myself with Husserl’s conception of inter- 
subjectivity in conjunction with his term ‘lifeworld’ in the future.) He says: 
 
The other is not simply a specific form made up inside the world. Rather, relationships 
with others – since they establish intersubjectivity (Intersubjektivität), and constitute the 
world at the same time – are a constitutive component which defines inner-worldliness 
(innerweltlichkeit) and natural self-evidence (natürlichen Selbstverständlichkeit) concerning 
human existence (1971: 199). 
 
His account illuminates why the human mind is constituted not only by the 
perception of the self but also of the other. The semantic importance described 
by the above viewpoint does not simply give this fact. Much more importantly, 
it rather emphasises that the constitution of the ‘natural self-evidence’ (natür- 
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lichen Selbstverständlichkeit) of the self is largely dependent upon the existence of 
and relationship with the other. This well explains that the formation of our 
mind essentially undergoes intersubjective cognitive processes amongst the self 
and the other. At the same time, therefore, the above view elucidates why the 
schizophrenic patient requires ‘himself to recognise himself as in others’ 
(Kimura 2005: 235); in this respect, as the psychopathologist Bin Kimura stresses, 
indeed non-schizophrenia patients are even no exception to this rule (2005: 
248-51).63 (This would perhaps remind one of Hegel’s ‘self-knowledge of the 
other’ we saw above in respect of this issue. As regards this concept, it is inte- 
resting to note that Kimura has introduced into this argument primarily con- 
cerning the constitution of intersubjectivity in schizophrenic patients the con- 
cept of the ‘absolute other’ (zettai no ta), whose term was put forward by the 
Japanese philosopher Kitarō Nishida (1870-1945), who profoundly affected the 
later foundation of the Kyoto School (Kyōto gakuha) (2005: 70-1, 176-7, 250-70, ch. 
10). It is expected that, in relation to Fujita’s phenomenological perspective, this 
topic will be dealt with in the future.) 
What, most importantly, do these psychiatric perspectives intend by highligh- 
ting intersubjectivity? One is, no doubt, that the perception of our mind is 
created through a mutual-subjective cognitive process – it is noted that my dis- 
cussion does not care about the issue of whether this view is experimentally 
plausible, but it rather draws attention to the intention that can be anticipated in 
terms of the above exploration carried out by applying some psychiatric stand- 
points. Indeed, this point is closely associated with Honneth’s theory of recog- 
nition. As a matter of fact, he takes notice of the ‘subject’s self-perception’, 
which is indeed always built through intersubjective relationships, attempting 
to challenge and modify the classical standpoint of political theory. Honneth 
claims: 
 
In acting, the property-seizing subject had initially been occupied only with itself. It carried 
out the act of seizure, egocentrically conscious solely of expanding its economic holdings 
by one additional object. The counter-reaction of its partners to interaction brings home, for 
the first time, the fact that in acting it related indirectly to its social environment as well, by 
excluding others from the use of the object. In this sense, the other is constitutively inc- 
luded in the propertied subject’s self-perception as well, since the other has enabled it to 
decentre its initially egocentric way of looking at things (1995: 45). 
 
This subject, thus, first attained the ‘self-knowledge of the other’. It must be 
stressed, however, that this picture tries to depict not only the fact that social 
conflicts are aimed at the acquisition of intersubjective recognition between sub- 
jects, but also the fact that recognition has been constituted and gained through 
social conflicts based on intersubjective interactions. Notwithstanding these acco- 
 120 Political Theories of Narcissism 
 
unts, nonetheless, there remains a troublesome problem of why intersubjective 
recognition comes into existence even in the state of nature. With regard to this 
issue, Honneth answers as follows: ‘the conflict in the state of nature pre- 
supposes an implicit agreement between subjects, one that consists in the aff- 
irmation of each other as partners to interaction’ (1995: 46). According to him, 
this is justified on the grounds that ‘if the social meaning of the conflict can only 
be adequately understood by ascribing to both parties knowledge of their 
dependence on the other, then the antagonized subjects cannot be conceived as 
isolated beings acting only egocentrically’, and therefore that ‘in their own action- 
orientation, both subjects have already positively taken the other into account, 
before they became engaged in hostilities’ (1995: 45).64 Honneth thus manages 
to lay the foundations of the concept of intersubjectivity in his social theory, 
contending that ‘the first step in developing a morality of recognition consists in 
the essential proof that the possibility of moral injures follows from the inter- 
subjectivity of the human form of life’ (2007: 137). From this perspective, we can 
see that indeed all human actions are based on intersubjective perceptions bet- 
ween subjects. 
  Not surprisingly, Fujita must have been aware of these pieces of knowledge 
despite a lack of his careful attention to psychiatry in general including psy- 
choanalysis. In fact, his theory of intersubjectivity is profoundly affected by 
such disciplinary standpoints combined together by Honneth (e.g. Fujita 1997d: 
289; 1997e: 84-5, 89, 214-8). (It is evident that Honneth’s theory of recognition 
constituted by the phenomenological semantics of intersubjectivity is built up 
intermediately between Hegel and psychoanalysis in particular. It is notewor- 
thy that, apart from Hegel, Honneth’s epistemological framework of recognition 
relies heavily upon social psychology and psychoanalysis particularly for establishing 
his theory of intersubjectivity – see, e.g. 1995: pt II; 2007: chs. 7-8.) It is quite 
interesting to note that, for instance, Fujita lays great stress on the political- 
theoretical significance of intersubjectivity in conjunction with the term expe- 
rience in his several important later works (1997d: 1-45, 259-89; 1998c: 435-62); 
this clearly shows that for him the concept was aimed precisely at restoring 
experience, that is at curing the narcissism of society. In this respect, it is admi- 
tted that the concept gives him a certain positive sense of leading society to reform 
itself. As a matter of fact, as we have seen, the term intersubjectivity, episte- 
mologically signifying some intrinsic human nature, contributes to recognising 
that we human beings are intrinsically involved in interpersonal relationships 
with others, exactly thereby creating our society by ourselves. Fujita writes: 
 
How ought we to do . . . ? . . . basically, we should achieve a full-scale reform of the ego 
(jiga). We ought to aim at changing the narcissistic ego (narushizumu no jiga) to one who 
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considers others (tasha); . . . so that I can think about others, therefore I am (watashi wa tasha ni 
tsuite kangaeru. Yue ni watashi wa sonzaisuru). . . . Nowadays, however, it is difficult to carry 
out this task by such a Descartian way of requiring absolute certainty. . . . there is only the 
way that, ‘[s]ometime I think; and sometime I am’ (watashi wa tokidoki kangaeru. Yue ni 
watashi wa tokidoki sonzaisuru).65 . . . Although, however, ‘I’ (watashi) have become an 
intermittently existent being (kanketsuteki sonzai) who sometimes exists after losing the 
Descartian certainty and stability, this being, importantly, performs the function of giving 
us inhibition and control; it plays a significant role in stopping narcissism increasing itself. 
The narcissistic way is disrupted and inevitably restarts the action whenever encountering 
beings who care about things (mono). And if the number of intermittently existent beings 
increase, and if intermittency (kanketsusei) increases the frequency of appearance of those 
beings, then it will be possible to identify the existence of others and to restore natural 
beings outside them as a result of making sure of mutuality (sōgoteki na shūgō) amongst the 
beings; thereby, they will be us (wareware) who connect ourselves with such beings without 
seeking return (1997e: 26-8). 
 
It might seem that we have difficulty in accurately understanding these sen- 
tences rhetorically expressed. In my view, however, the main point in grasping 
some important meanings of his above description lies in the last section, which 
makes us aware of an intersubjective aspect of human beings in terms of a 
phenomenological epistemology. In short, Fujita attempts to lead us to redis- 
cover the social that proposes its significant normative implication through pre- 
senting his view of intersubjectivity. Here I need to refer to neither Arendt nor 
Nietzsche for describing the concept, relying upon its simple negative imp- 
lication; the validity of this way of understanding is shown exactly by the fact 
that the term is a typically dialectical concept. Perhaps, nonetheless, with regard 
to this issue it is worth recalling that, since zōon politikon was put forward by 
Aristotle, it has aroused a long-lasting controversy about the concept of ‘the 
social’ (shakaiteki na mono) primarily between the disciplines of politics and 
sociology (Ichinokawa 2006: pt II) – on this view, as the Japanese sociologist 
Yasutaka Ichinokawa suggests, it is possible to suppose that in Aristotle there 
already existed knowledge about the latter academic field (2012: 1-6). 
 
Through the social (shakaiteki na mono) 
Significantly, Ichinokawa seeks to find a normative and positive implication of the 
social through shining a light on Jean-Jacques Rousseau in particular. He, first, 
explains that Seneca had translated Aristotle’s zōon politikon as the Latin animal 
socialis, and that this translation was later absorbed by Thomas Aquinas, depen- 
ding upon Arendt’s discussion (2006: 90). Ichinokawa, second, points out that 
Arendt’s view of this issue is not right about Aquinas as he had also understood 
Aristotle’s original term as civilis, and therefore that it is believed that this 
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genealogy of the word gave rise to another translation of animal civile (2006: 
90-2). He, third, observes that Rousseau later translated this term denoting the 
English ‘civil animal’ as the French ‘I’homme civil’, which in his view signifies 
‘court society’ (kyūtei shakai) and ‘civil animals’ in palaces (reigi tadashiku 
furumau dōbutsu tachi) typifying the ‘class system’ (mibunsei) that existed since 
the Middle Ages (2006: 93-5). Ichinokawa, finally, comes to the conclusion that 
Arendt failed to understand this negative genealogy of the Greek politikon and 
the Rousseauian sense of civilis, and that, in contrast to her, Rousseau critically 
broke free from this difficulty by applying the exact term social, thereby ena- 
bling the concept of ‘civil’ to change itself to a positive term (2006: 95). Indeed, 
Ichinokawa subsequently continues this discussion. However, it is important to 
note that, exactly from the above perspective, he starts to modify the status quo 
of the social, whose normative sense, as he emphasises, has been removed pri- 
marily by Durkheim, Weber and Parsons, for the purpose of seeking for ‘what 
society ought to be’ (aru beki sugata no shakai) (2006: 35-45, 96); this is why he 
particularly highlights the significance that the social is a normative concept. 
Admittedly, in these respects, Ichinokawa reappraises Rousseau’s conception of 
the social primarily in the sense of its normative possibilities for enhancing the 
concept as required to comply with ‘equality’ (byōdō) and ‘liberty’ (jiyū) despite 
the fact that it failed to sublate the discrepancy between ‘difference’ (sai) and 
‘equality’ (2006: 98-127). 
  How can we optimistically develop the dialectic of the social supported by 
Rousseau? For this purpose, I want to give a clue to its positive development by 
presenting the following standpoint: ‘human beings are vulnerable in th[e] spe- 
cific manner we call “moral” because they owe their identity to the construction 
of a practical self-relation that is dependent upon the help and affirmation of 
other human beings’ (Honneth 2007: 137; cf. Habermas 1990: 43-57). It is admi- 
tted that this stance is very close to my standpoint attained through laying the 
anthropological foundations in Part II as relying upon Kohut’s self psychology; 
that is to say, the signification described by this picture is almost the same as 
narcissism. This image of human beings, however, penetrates only a passive asp- 
ect of their characteristics – although in my view this is the exact most funda- 
mental human intrinsic feature – and it therefore does not enable them to est- 
ablish democratic politics. To deal with this problem, I need to seek to transform 
our simple way of thinking into a dialectical one, even though supporting the 
negative view of human characteristics. Again, I want to refer to Ichinokawa: 
 
Man cannot live alone. He needs interpersonal relationships (sōgo kōryū) and cooperation 
(tasukeai) with others, namely the so-called society (shakai). In this respect, human beings are 
social beings (shakaiteki na sonzai) (2012: 3). 
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In sum, no one can live alone while being alone (the necessity of society), man is 
intrinsically passive while he cannot always be passive (narcissism), and he the- 
refore needs to interact with others because of essentially being interrelated with 
them (the necessity of democracy); that is to say, everyone intrinsically requires 
others for themselves and thus the social, for they always stay in solitude. For this 
reason, man is a dialectical being in the first place. Ichinokawa seems to succeed 
in sublating the de-normative and normative concept of the social concerning 
the semantics of the term. It would seem that I also achieved my objective with 
the exception of the dialectic between ‘difference’ and ‘equality’, whose themes 
I did not concern myself with – my task here is only to see a normative imp- 
lication of the social. From these perspectives, I find that the social definitely 
holds the normative sense of ‘interpersonal relationships’, by which we might 
‘identify the existence of others and restore natural beings outside them as a 
result of making sure of mutuality amongst intermittently existent beings; the- 
reby, they will be us who connect ourselves with such beings without seeking 
return’ (Fujita 1997e: 28). This implies that, only if we can be aware of others 
and the importance of the existence of them through intersubjectively interacting 
with subjects, then we will also sublate the difference between the self and 
others amongst us; thereby the social would come into existence. However, I 
still remain in the dark about the issue of whether it is possible to realise ‘a 
full-scale reform of the ego’ (jiga no kumikae) (1997e: 26) – in this context Fujita’s 
term ego should be replaced with the self. Would that be possible? I do not 
believe so; rather, it would be enormously difficult to accomplish the task. (I 
shall discuss this view in the final chapter.) Basically, however, from this pers- 
pective Fujita’s social theory seeks to reform the ‘spiritual structure’ of our soci- 
ety for realising the social, only thereby actually bringing others who have been 
dead back to life in his view. 
 
 
8.  Concluding Remarks on Fujita’s Political Theory 
 
Social theory or political theory? 
Apparently, Fujita’s work shows itself to be a social theory rather than a political 
theory to the extent of my research. With regard to the adjective ‘social’, how- 
ever, we definitely should not understand it only in Rousseauian terms and in 
Durkheimian terms. As we have seen, social theory as a discipline is concerned 
at least in both normative and descriptive engagements. In addition, it does not 
perform simply these two functions but also diagnostic and remedial functions, 
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both of which are indeed considered as descriptive in so far as those metho- 
dological standpoints are derived from Durkheim. With respect to the latter 
point, however, I rigorously divide these two important viewpoints from them 
in Durkheim’s sociological sense on the grounds that practically they contain 
reflective and critical features, and are based on the reflection of what society has so 
far been, in my view. Basically, therefore, I understand social theory as follows: 
 
social philosophy is primarily concerned with determining and discussing processes of 
social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments (Fehlentwicklungen), disorders 
or ‘social pathologies’. . . . Since [the] primary task [of social philosophy] is the diagnosis of 
processes of social development that must be understood as preventing the members of a 
society from living as ‘good life’, it relies upon criteria of an ethical nature. Unlike both 
moral and political philosophy, therefore, social philosophy can be understood as pro- 
viding an instance of reflection (Reflexionsinstanz), within which criteria for successful 
forms of social life are discussed (Honneth 2007: 4). 
 
Honneth’s terms ‘social philosophy’ and ‘political philosophy’ are regarded exa- 
ctly the same as social theory and political theory, respectively. As regards the 
former disciplinary functions, he clearly describes how the discipline sees its 
own research objects. While primarily social theory seeks for and identifies 
what disturbs the realisation of ‘good life’ (diagnoses), it also reflects upon what 
actually prevents human beings achieving a ‘healthy life’ (Fromm 1956). From 
this perspective, the critical function is indispensable for social theory, which 
aims precisely at emancipating us from the exact pathological situation (Hork- 
heimer 2002b: 242-3; 2002c: 264-5, 270). For this purpose, in my view, somewhat 
reliable psychoanalysis and social psychology must be applied particularly for 
identifying what are ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ concerning society (Fromm 1956; 
Funk 2006; cf. Honneth 2007: 34-5), and we can thereby give an appropriate 
remedy for the first time. (As to the relation between social theory and political 
theory, see Appendix 1, section 3, in which it has been pointed out that my 
research is in favour of and reflects upon Critical Theory.) 
  From these perspectives, it is not surprising that Fujita’s social theory seems 
endowed with all the above theoretical features. Admittedly, to the extent of my 
research his theory fulfils those functions, as we have seen, taking account of 
the purpose of his work of diagnosing society as narcissism (reflection) and 
criticising the society of Tennō system and totalitarianism, that is attempting to 
help us to break free from them (prescription). In addition, these tasks were dir- 
ected exactly towards laying the normative foundations through his series of 
descriptive attempts. In these respects, in Fujita’s work the accent is on social 
theory rather than on political theory. Presumably, however, it is not right to 
believe that his theory thoroughly functions as a critical social theory for it 
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seems simply to act like that when focusing on his later work as far as my 
theoretical attempt is concerned. Nonetheless, it is undoubtedly true that, in 
Fujita’s theoretical framework, there exist the two types of theoretical com- 
ponents, social and political theories. 
 
The status quo 
I still remain in the dark about many issues concerning Fujita’s social and 
political theory. On this, first of all, I point to his conception of the ‘people’ 
(jinmin). This related particularly to his theory of the ‘sovereignty of the people’ 
(jinmin-shugi) is of huge importance for his political theory in the sense that, as 
Miyamura says, it is profoundly associated with his earliest task of the criticism 
of the Tennō system (Iida 2006a: 353) – for this research aim, for example, the 
following sources will be helpful (Fujita 1998b: 211-24, 225-7, 228-57, 335-48, 
349-70, 380-3; 2006a: 119-48, 189-219, 279-310; cf. Iida 2006a: 280-329, 343-55; 
Makimura 2004; Wada 2004). Second, I point to his theory of ‘common sense’ 
(komon sensu, kyōtsū no shiki, kyōtsūkō). It seems that he bases his theory of the 
sovereignty of the people largely on this concept – Fujita employs these Jap- 
anese terms, e.g. in the following sources (Fujita 1998b: 223, 318, 360, 383; 2006a: 
337). Third, I refer to the theory of the ‘reform of spiritual structure’, whose 
issue was addressed by the above final investigation of this chapter but has not 
yet been completely made clear – on this, sources are as follows (Fujita 1997c: 
1-43; 1998b: 211-24, 335-48; 1998c: 45-9, 177-86, 187-94). There also remain other 
important issues on Fujita’s work. To take one example, his theory of the state of 
the Tennō system his earliest concern proposed is characterised as one of them. 
His theory of fascism is also typified as one; significantly, this looks different 
from his theory of totalitarianism. Unfortunately, my primary aim was not to 
deal with these issues. It will be particularly interesting to carry out an exp- 
loration of connecting his theory of the Tennō system with the theory of mass 
society. Chikanobu Michiba, for instance, tackles this theme in relation to the 
Japanese political theorist Keiichi Matsuhita’s theory of mass society (Michiba 
2004). 
  With regard to the status quo of research into Fujita’s work, many scholars 
either organise his materials (e.g. Iida 2006a, 2006b) or aim at conducting an 
explanatory task of his thought (e.g. Hondō 2004; Ichimura 2010; Iida 2006a; 
Miyamura 2009) on the basis of their historical concern. Of course, I do not deny 
the significance of these tasks, and they are even of considerable relevance to 
present-day scholarship – in particular, Iida’s work is a noteworthy historical 
effort. Instead, however, it is problematic that most of them do not try to deal with 
and overcome problems proposed by Fujita nor those of his theory, do not seek to see 
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them in accordance with some social concern, and therefore result in simply generating 
explanatory works; this might be associated with the fact that most works on 
Fujita have been conducted by the Maruyama circle and its acquaintances. 
Quite ironically, many researchers, while categorising their own branch as one 
of the social sciences, have not attempted and have failed to tackle social issues 
in respect of Fujita’s theme; they seem simply to have showed historical and 
philological concern.66 In fact, in works focusing particularly on Fujita there are 
only a few articles written by scholars who specialise in the academic fields in 
the so-called social sciences (Makimura 2004; Nagahara 2004; Taguchi 2001; 
Wada 2004); in this respect, the status quo is a natural consequence.67 In add- 
ition, therefore, the many do not pose any challenge to Fuijta’s view of society, 
politics, methodology, epistemology, and so on, that is to his exact theory itself, 
and thus there is no criticism of his work with the exception of Wada’s article; 
they solely praise Fujita and his thought to the skies. Obviously, this is a crucial 
matter. As opposed to them, I am critical of his theory while admitting the 
relevance of his theoretical ingredients; to take one example, as far as my rese- 
arch is concerned, it seems to me that, with respect to Fujita’s remedies for nar- 
cissism (and totalitarianism as well), while effective to a certain extent to those 
diseases, they nevertheless include some great difficulties. To consider this issue, 
I want to quote the following sentences: 
 
The more one shows his respect (sonkei), the more he shows a lack of criticism (hihanryoku), 
on the one hand, and the more one shows his disrespect (keibetsu), the less he shows his 
sympathy (kasetsuteki kyōkanryoku). Russell claims that it is necessary to keep a balance 
(dōjisei) between respect and criticism (Hondō 2004: 87). 
 
This standpoint was provided precisely by a researcher in Fujita’s thought. 
Indeed, his view may be methodologically quite relevant to research in general, 
and so I want to absorb it. It must be noted, however, that in Hondō’s style there 
is a troublesome problem that he himself, while referring to this relevant method, 
has ironically failed to accomplish the practice. It would seem that there is the 
core difficulty with scholarship in Japan exactly in this point. Not surprisingly, 
Fujita is the exact person who criticises such an ironical state Hondō has fallen 
into. He stresses: 
 
They (university lecturers), first of all, cannot strictly criticise any tasks of their forerunners 
to whom they owe a debt of gratitude for caring about and hooking them up with a job 
there – particularly in very narrow Japanese academic circles. They, second, have consi- 
derable difficulty in becoming simple readers (ikkai no dokushonin) and disorganised thinkers 
(datsu-soshikiteki shisakusha) in so far as they are concerned in studying knowledge (gakumon) 
in the university system. . . . Under the symbolic Tennō system (shōchō Tennōsei), the actions 
  Shōzō Fujita 127 
 
of understanding (rikai) and critique (hihan) are taken with neutral care (genseteki hairyo) 
and ordinary diffidence (jōshikiteki enryo) (1997e: ii-iii). 
 
He quite accurately sees the core problems in scholarship in Japan. How, then, 
can we deal with it? Significantly, Fujita actually replies to this question. 
 
From a spiritual structural (shisō kōzōteki) perspective . . . many scholars cannot distinguish 
between a respectful internal understanding (songen ni michita naizaiteki rikai) of accumulated 
past works and a strictly relevant critical analysis (kon’nichiteki hitsuyō kara suru genkaku na 
hihanteki kentō), and therefore cannot balance the former and the latter or combine them; a 
genuine and authentic understanding, by no means affected by trends or popular consci- 
ousness, is brought about by a balance between and a combination of them. . . . the task of 
studying works carried out previously, in contemporary society, requires one’s attitude that 
distinguishes, balances and establishes the connection between understanding (rikai) and 
critique (hihan), and between respect (sonkei) and earnestness (kibishisa) (1997e: iii). 
 
Perhaps we have a lack of ‘critique’ and ‘earnestness’ in Fujita’s sense, which has 
brought social theory and political theory in Japan to a fatal flaw; in this sense, 
we might be unable to either understand or respect anything. In the first place, 
however, in my view it is unnecessary to refer to any knowledge in order to see 
such a crucial fact easily to know. This signifies that the fault is our exact problem 
that underlies our style itself, and that must and can definitely be dealt with only by 
us. Hence, it is directed not at Fujita, who is not alive, but at scholars in exi- 
stence; needless to say, in this respect, this fact is not necessarily mediated by 
Fujita. Did, then, Fujita himself in large degree achieve this practice? It would 
be possible to know the truth for the first time after gaining the genuine and 
authentic method of ‘immanent critique’. We have not yet dealt with the prob- 
lem raised by Fujita at the moment when it has taken ten years since he passed 
away. In these respects, overcoming Fujita signifies exactly overcoming this pro- 
blem. 
 
 
Notes 
 
 1 With respect to the person of Fujita, there are some great works such as biographies that 
precisely depict both the man and his intellectual activities (e.g. Iida 2006a, 2006b; Miyamura 
2009; Sakurai 2014 – in particular, Iida’s works describe Fujita’s theoretical activities 
including his bibliography in great detail). Unfortunately, however, there is no translation of 
his writings nor any work focusing on Fujita in English and any other European languages. 
But there exists a translation of Zentaishugi no jidai keiken into Korean (Fujita 1998d), the 
contents of which are slightly different from the original. Also, there is a great work on 
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Fujita in German that focuses on his early contributions (Seifert 2010). Furthermore, Miriam 
Silverberg’s Erotic Grotesque Nonsense refers to Fujita in English (2007: 265-6). 
 2 This is counted as Fujita’s ‘first article’ (shojo ronbun) despite the fact that he previously 
published several essays, such as ‘Kōdōryoku to shite no gunbu: Nihon fashizumu no kōzō’ 
(The Military as Leverage: The Structure of Fascism in Wartime Japan) (1951), contributed to 
Tōdai Shinbun (The University of Tokyo Newspaper) when he was a student at the 
University of Tokyo, and ‘Shohyō: Shinobu Seizaburō Taishō seijishi 1, 2’ (A Book Review: 
Seizaburō Shinobu’s The Political History of the Taishō Period, vol. 1, 2) (1952), written in 
conjunction with Giichi Inumaru, who was a member of Tōkyō Daigaku Rekishigaku Kenkyūkai 
(Historical Science Society) – on this view, see, e.g. Miyamura 2009: 149. It is noted that 
Haruo Miyamura uses the expression of shojo ronbun, meaning the first written and pub- 
lished article, in his ‘Editor’s Note for The Writings of Shōzō Fujita, vol. 1’ (1998: 318). However, 
this word is not provided in his work later published noted above, in which the contribution 
was to some extent modified. In the latter work, Miyamura has replaced it by the words of 
‘Fujita’s first writing’ (Fujita no hajimete no ronbun) (2009: 149; emphases added). 
 3 Fujita’s terms ‘state of the Tennō system’ and ‘society of the Tennō system’ will be explained 
in sections 2 and 5 below. 
 4 In his lecture in 1985 – this was later published as ‘Tennōsei ni tsuite’ (On the Tennō System) 
printed in the work Hōsei Heiwa Daigaku kōgiroku 3: Heiwa to yutakasa wo toinaosu (Transcripts 
of Lectures at Hōsei Peace University 3: The Reflection of the Meanings of Peace and 
Affluence) edited by Hōsei Heiwa Daigaku (Origin Publishing Centre, 1991) – with respect 
to the view that he is regarded as a scholar of the Tennō system, Fujita himself says as 
follows: ‘he [facilitator of the programme] requested me to give a lecture on the Tennō 
system on the grounds that I’m regarded as a specialist in the system . . . . To be sure, I 
explored and wrote some articles on it in youth, but I didn’t do anything about it except for 
such tasks, and merely carried out research into the Tennō system in the post-Meiji period . . . 
so I’m not even a leading professional or a working specialist in the Tennō system’ (Fujita 
1998c: 480-1). 
 5 Hashikawa is a famous follower of Maruyama. 
 6 It is believed that the ‘period of despair’ marked a turning point in his career, around 
between the early 1960s and the middle 1970s. For example, Iida clearly mentions that 
‘“Kōdo Seichō” hantai’ (A Protest Against ‘High Growth’) (1969) marked the point (e.g. Iida 
2006a: 346-7). 
 7 The early and later Fujita will be explained in Appendix 3. 
 8 Exceptionally, Iida perceives that Fujita devoted himself to the subject especially in his later 
years. In fact, Iida gives a brief description that Fujita willingly conducted research into 
‘psychopathology’ (seishin byōrigaku), which is, according to him, one of the ‘studies of the 
twentieth century’ (nijusseikiteki na gakumon), such as anthropology (jinruigaku), mytholo- 
gical studies (shinwagaku), linguistics (gengogaku), social history (shakaishi-gaku) and folklore 
(minzokugaku), in which it is important for Fujita to lay the foundations of the ‘primordial 
conditions’ (genshoteki jōken) (see App. 3, pp. 254, 262) of human beings, society and culture 
(2006a: 316). 
 9 Here Fujita clearly mentions that he knew the term spiritual structure through the Japanese 
translation of a German term (1998c: 680) which is presumed to be ‘die geistig-seelische 
Struktur’ (Maruyama 2007: 142). 
10 This article is printed in Zentaishugi no jidai keiken. 
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11 These articles are also printed in Zentaishugi no jidai keiken. 
12 Fujita introduced this term from Richard Sennett’s The Uses of Disorder (1970) (see Sennett 
1974: 8). 
13 Correctly, this work is entitled Byōsha to shakai. 
14 The Japanese expression of ‘-san’ is a title that is put to the right of both a man’s name and a 
woman’s name equivalent to the English Mr, Ms, Miss and Mrs. 
15 This expression, indeed, is not offered in the work Jiko nai taiwa. As far as I know, it has not 
yet been made clear when and where the words were first provided. However, it is some- 
times said that the term was often used in Maruyama’s later seminars. 
16 This is David Noble’s translation (Karube 2008: 117). 
17 Interestingly, in his later years Maruyama drew attention to the narcissistic connection bet- 
ween the self and the other – it is important to remember, however, that his view is simply 
based on its negative aspect, and also that it does not absorb any specific psychoanalytic 
perspective. In 1969, for example, on the theme of the meaning of ‘self-critique’ (jiko hihan) 
he provides a brief account of the undifferentiated self, actually employing both the terms 
self (jiko) and other (tasha): ‘it is contradictio in adjecto that [t]he self criticises the self for the 
purpose of criticising the other’ (Maruyama 1998: 86-7). Also, around between 1961 and 1987 
– the certain dates when sentences were written are often not recorded in the work, in which 
two memorandums and a diary were edited and printed, as noted above – Maruyama wrote 
that ‘society with pathological symbiosis’ (mochitsu motaretsu shakai) – this is also used in a 
negative sense – relies upon the feature that ‘everyone is not independent [of others] and is 
dependent upon others (tasha) one another’ (1998: 147). Instead, he highlights the necessity for 
society to consist of ‘heterogeneous others’ (ishitsu na tasha) and others (1998: 148). Further- 
more, in my view Maruyama already put forward the same viewpoint in his early writing 
‘Chō-kokkashugi’. See his following sentences: ‘the self comes to identify his own interests 
with those of the Emperor, and the self automatically regards his enemies as violators of the 
Emperor’s powers’ (1969b: 13; translation modified; [1995b: 28]); ‘the self involved a constant 
impulse to unite oneself with the ultimate entity, and the resultant sectionalism was of a far 
more active and aggressive type than that associated with feudalism’ (1969b: 15; translation 
modified; [1995b: 30-1]); ‘Society was so organized that each component group was cons- 
tantly being regulated by a superior authority, while it was imposing its own authority on a 
group below’ (1969b: 16; [1995b: 31]). It is possible to presume that all of these pathological 
phenomena essentially stem from a symbiotic fixation in which the self are undifferentiated 
from the other, and perhaps Maruyama must have been aware of the essence of this pro- 
blem; this can be regarded exactly as a negative aspect of narcissistic dependency. If this is 
true, then Maruyama’s famous and important concepts such as the ‘system of irresponsi- 
bility’ (musekinin no taikei) and the ‘transfer of oppression’ (yokuatsu ijyō) are also elucidated 
by some theories of narcissism. It must be noted, however, that his above descriptions and 
terms are directed towards the criticism of Japan, particularly towards the criticism of a 
Japanese narcissistic tendency that, in Maruyama’s view, is deep-seated in Japanese society. 
18 Taking account of his early work, Fujita is definitely regarded as an ‘epic political theorist’, 
whose concept was presented by Wolin: ‘he attempts [not only] to change men’s views of the 
world . . . [but also] . . . to change the world itself’ (1969: 1080; emphases added). It is admitted 
that Fujita’s political theory contains a ‘radical critique’ in Wolin’s sense in the sense that 
Fujita aimed at reforming politics itself through formulating some significant theoretical 
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frameworks directed at establishing genuine and authentic democracy, such as the sovere- 
ignty of the people and jinmin-shugi. 
19 This term was first employed in ‘Shihai genri’ (1998a: 45). Its framework, however, had 
already been provided in the preceding work ‘Tennōsei’: the ‘society of the Tennō system’ 
fulfils the ‘political and social functions of the Tennō system’ (Tennōsei no seijiteki shakaiteki 
kinō) (1998a: 4). 
20 This postscript, which was written forty years later after ‘Shihai genri’ (1956) had been first 
published on November 1996, and which consists of fifteen pages, is entitled ‘Shinpen e no 
atogaki: Kakinokoshita bubun no suan no danpen’ – abbreviated to ‘Shinpen e no atogaki, 
“Shihai genri”’ below. This elucidates how important the subject of the society of the Tennō 
system was for Fujita. 
21  In ‘Tennōsei’, Fujita explains that the establishment of the ‘absolutist Tennō system’ 
(zettaishugi Tennōsei), namely the state of the Tennō system, was completed just at the time 
when the Meiji government started to open the Imperial Diet (Teikoku Gikai) and promul- 
gated the Imperial Edict on National Education (Kyōiku Chokugo) in 1890 (1998a: 7). As he 
says, the year was exactly ‘during the three years before and after 1889’ (1998a: 18). 
22 In this writing, Maruyama says, ‘“Those things”, writes Hegel, “that are free in an interior 
sense and that exist within the individual subject must not enter into the purview of the 
law.” It was precisely the sanctity of such an interior, subjective sphere that the Japanese law 
failed to recognise. On the contrary, inasmuch as the law of the land in Japan arose from the 
“national polity” [kokutai], which was an absolute value, it based its validity on inner or 
contentual [sic], rather than on external or formal, norms and was thus free to operate in all 
those interior realms from which law in the West had been excluded’ (Maruyama 1969b: 6; 
[1995b: 22]). Here Maruyama analyses the ‘spiritual structure’, focusing particularly on the 
ideological function of the ‘national polity’. Fujita does it, drawing attention to the fund- 
amental framework of the ‘Tennō system’. 
23 In an introduction to The Writings, vol. 6, Fujita writes by using the adjectives ‘unprejudiced’ 
(kōsei de) and ‘broad-minded’ (kan’yō na): ‘the “state of the Tennō system” is distinguished 
from the “society of the Tennō system” in the sense that statesmen responsible for the state 
often made unprejudiced and broad-minded decisions; they were far from enthusiasm 
(nekkyōshugi) . . . because their sense of responsibility brought about their sense of balance 
and fairness’ (1997e: iv). Needless to say, he intends this fact by the word of healthier. 
24 Here Fujita intends Hirobumi Itō (1841-1909) and Masayoshi Matsukata (1835-1924), in 
addition to Tarō Katsura (1848-1913), who was less than a third-rate statesmen, says Fujita 
(1998a: 300-1). In Fujita’s view, even Meiji Tennō (1852-1912), who was also classified as a 
third- or fourth-rate Emperor by him, is included in statists in the period of the state of the 
Tennō system (1998a: 299). 
25 In this context, he puts some names of ‘ruling elites’ (seijika), who differed from seijika as 
statesmen noted above, such as Gonnohyōe Yamamoto (1852-1933), regarded as ‘military 
elites’ (gunjin) (1998a: 301). 
26 In ‘Shihai genri’, Fujita writes, ‘[h]ere society is ordered and institutionalised by the micro- 
cosmic hierarchy of the state of the Tennō system constituted by a host of Tennōs; this is 
regarded exactly as the establishment of the society of the Tennō system’ (1998a: 45). This 
elucidates why the feature of a mikoshi portable shrine is the core characteristic of the society 
of the Tennō system on the grounds that the mikoshi is the ‘palanquin of a Shinto god’ (Befu 
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and Guichard-Anguis 2003: 212), namely the symbol of the religious authority of the 
Imperial Household (Kōshitsu) and of communities in Japan. 
27 Fujita does not use this term. Rather, I aim only at simplifying the concept. 
28 On this view, rather ‘Shinpen e no atogaki “Shihai genri”’ (1996) even gives the impression 
that he intended to eliminate this aporia of his theory.  
29 To be sure, Fujita distinguishes to a certain extent between Japanese problems which can be 
depicted by totalitarianism and those which cannot be done by the concept. As regards this 
issue, he says, ‘[t]he difference in the quality of Japan’s contemporary totalitarianism is 
drawn by the national heritage (dentō)’ (e.g. 1997e: 86). However, then, why did he particu- 
larly highlight the concept of the society of the Tennō system in his later years again? Did he 
intend to illuminate and address some characteristics of problems of Japan even if they are 
connected to totalitarianism? For these reasons, Fujita should rather have made the exp- 
ression that contemporary Japan also has a strong aspect of totalitarianism. 
30 To be sure, Fujita makes some significant distinction between some historical periods in 
respect of the society of the Tennō system by applying the term totalitarianism. However, it 
does not make any difference in national character between Japan and others on the grounds 
that the latter political concept also describes non-Japanese society – the concept of ‘contem- 
porary totalitarianism’ does not seem to clearly describe the character traits peculiar to con- 
temporary Japan too. In other words, a wide range of applications of the concept of totali- 
tarianism contributes to removing clear differences between Japanese and other national 
characters. Is it true that Fujita intended such a thing? Of course, it is not. As a result, how- 
ever, he has not been able to display the sole raison d’être of the term Tennō system. (As 
noted above, the term totalitarianism is derived from Fascist Italy, and the range of app- 
lication of the concept has been expanded over the world. Famously, the term characte- 
ristically depicts Nazism and Stalinism, but it has also been applied to industrialised and 
democratic countries). Nonetheless, with respect to the process of the formation of Japanese 
Fascism in the 1920s, Fujita’s following view might appropriately be accepted in relation to 
totalitarianism: ‘[t]he corporatist state imagery drawn by revolutionary bureaucrats looks 
strikingly similar to Fascist Italy’s state corporatism declared by Mussolini’ (1998a: 168). 
31 For example, as Chikanobu Michiba says, Fujita was indeed aware of the relation between the 
‘society of the Tennō system’ and ‘mass society’ in 1957 (Michiba 2004: 214) – in his essay, 
Michiba compares Fujita’s theory of the society of the Tennō system with Keiichi Matushita’s 
theory of ‘mass Tennō system’ (taishū Tennōsei) (on this, see pp. 83-4), focusing on Fujita’s 
early works. Most importantly, however, Fujita did not make any connection between those 
concetps by giving a detailed description. 
32 On this view, it is interesting to note that Fujita says that, ‘[t]he function of a Tennō as an 
individual can be applied to everyone else’ (1998b: 319). This principle is directly applied to 
his theory of the society of the Tennō system, that is to say, he has showed that the theory is 
applicable to different kinds of societies despite the name of the ‘Tennō system’. 
33 I do not mean that substantially the Tennō system has not fulfilled its function in postwar 
Japan. Rather, I admit that the Tennō system has played a role in influencing people’s mind 
in the postwar period too, for example, in the sense that the emergence of the ‘mass Tennō 
system’, which is based on the new legitimacy of the Tennō system conferred by the ‘consent 
of the masses’, and which is therefore closely linked to the appearance of a ‘mass society’ in 
postwar Japan, explains how it has continued to perform a political function in Japan 
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(Matsushita 1959). This new movement has often been raised by mass-media as the topic of 
the ‘Imperial Household of Japan’ (Kōshitsu) particularly in the late of the twentieth century. 
34 As we shall see later, Fujita confuses the self and the ego in the sense that he does not dis- 
tinguish between them. 
35 It should be noted that Fujita had already applied the Japanese term jiko-ai, which is often 
regarded as equivalent to the English narcissism, for example, in his short article ‘Manhaimu 
no episōdo: Shohyō no seishinteki zentei’ (An Episode of Mannheim: The ‘Psychological 
Requisites’ for Writing a Book Review) (1971). It must be stressed, however, that to devote 
myself to an identification of when he first employed the term is irrelevant to my discip- 
linary enquiry despite the importance of some differences between narcissism and jiko-ai in 
respect of his view. 
36 As we have seen, this is also relevant to a psychoanalytic understanding of narcissism. For 
example, in Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory others always appear as ‘selfobjects’ (see Pt II 
above). Interestingly, it puts forward the view that, for the self, the other exists as an ext- 
ension of himself; in this sense, the Kohutian self is essentially narcissistic. Kohut, however, 
does not deny this narcissistic need. In these respects, it must be noted that Kohut’s view is 
the diametrical opposite of both Fujita’s and Fromm’s. This issue will be tackled in the final 
chapter. 
37 As regards this issue, it is interesting to note that Hiromasa Ichimura, who studied under 
Fujita, gives a great description of why the tendency to avoid encountering others has 
spread out in contemporay times from a psychopathological perspective with the use of 
Sennett’s expression of the ‘fear of the unknown’ (on this, see Sennett 1994 [1976]) (Ichimura 
1996). According to Ichimura, contemporary people avoid encountering ‘the unknown’ 
(michi naru mono), namely the other, for ‘preventing “the unexpected” happening’ (yoteigai no 
dekigoto no kaihi); he says that this psychological attitude is essentially based on and stems 
from the ‘fear of the unknown’ (tasha e no osore) (1996: 77). From this perspective, Ichimura 
contends that ‘our psychological foundation constituting the “self” (jiko) is extremely vulne- 
rable (kijaku)’, and that ‘this anthropophobia (kankei kyōfushō) escapes from conflicts (kattō) in 
a complex context, and evades decision-making (sentaku no ninmu)’ (1996: 78). I am aware 
that this way of explaining the contemporary state of mind is very similar to Fujita’s argu- 
ment. However, considering that Ichimura’s essay, referring to Sennett, was published in 
1986, it is plausible to think that Fujita’s later work affected Ichimura’s. 
38 This is Don Sanderson’s translation (Katō 1997: 155). 
39 It is noteworthy that, in the same period when Fujita gave the lecture, he also learnt the 
importance of being aware of others from the Japanese Buddhist monk in Kamakura period, 
Shinran, in relation to the concept of spiritual preparedness (1997d: 298). 
40 The original translation is ‘To know pine, study pine’. 
41 Or, more rigorously, it can be argued that Fujita’s psychoanalytic perspective preceded his 
attention to the concept of experience for the former emerged much earlier. In ‘Kōdo Seichō’ 
(1969), for example, Fujita provided an interesting account of the narcissistic mind that, quite 
paradoxically, the self (jiko) gets caught up in the emotion of the moment (1998c: 6). 
42 According to Hannah Arendt, as is well known, the signification of the adjective ‘private’ is 
‘a state of being deprived of something’ (Arendt 1998: 38; emphases added). 
43 In this respect, it is pointed out that Fujita regards the symmetrical object of other as both the 
self and the ego. This is, however, inappropriate as an understanding of contemporary psy- 
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choanalysis (e.g. Wada 1999). Admittedly, he confuses the ‘self’ (jiko) with the ego (jiga). I 
shall later raise this issue. 
44 It is particularly important to note that first of all his way of understanding narcissism is 
profoundly associated with Fromm’s theory of narcissism. As we saw in the preceding 
chapter, it presents two kinds of narcissism, individual and group (social) narcissism. 
Significantly, Fujita’s account is in the same line of Fromm’s that individual narcissism 
causes social narcissism, in so far as ego narcissism and collective narcissism are reg- 
arded almost the same as individual and group narcissism respectively – group narci- 
ssism, in Fromm’s view, needs the cathexis of individual narcissism (see Ch. 4, s. 1). Also, 
Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory is in favour of Fujita’s way of understanding the mech- 
anism in the sense that, as we have seen, Kohut’s important concept of ‘group self’ is 
regarded as an analogy with the individual self (see Ch. 4, s. 2). On this point, it is likely 
that Fujita read Fromm’s works while it is unlikely that he read Kohut’s. 
45 More precisely, Japan moved to the bubble economy in 1986. 
46 Osamu Kawasaki, for example, provides a great account of this work with regard to the 
implications of totalitarianism (2005: 352-3). 
47 It is important to note that Fujita has abbreviated these three types of totalitarianism pri- 
marily to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (sensō (no) zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 59, 74, 76), ‘political 
totalitarianism’ (seijiteki zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 69, 70, 75, 77) and ‘contemporary totali- 
tarianism’ (gendai zentaishugi) (1997e: e.g. 86) respectively, for it is handy for repeated use. 
48 In the sense of total mobilisation, Fujita’s understanding of total war has a lot in common with 
Erich Ludendorff’s famous classic account (Ludendorff 1936). In this respect, the former 
view, no doubt, has been affected by the latter. 
49 It is important to remember that, basically, Fujita’s view of totalitarianism is different from 
Arendt’s in respect of ‘political totalitarianism’ only in the sense that he highlights the imp- 
ortance of the ‘decline of ideology’ (ideorogī no keigaika) (1997e: 63-76). 
50 Interestingly, in this respect, they take the same stance as Maruyama. 
51 This term was provided by Fujita himself (e.g. 1997e: iii; 1998b: 383). 
52 Quite interestingly, distinguishing self-love from narcissism and selfishness, Fromm high- 
lights a paradoxical fact contained in the former concept, namely love for others (1949: 119- 
33; 1962: 57-63); in this respect, for him self-love has a positive meaning. On the contrary, 
however, according to Fromm, narcissism is the same as selfishness, and therefore means 
the incapacity to love (e.g. 1962: 61). 
53 Fromm’s ‘pseudo self’ was put forward in his early writing Man for Himself (1947) (1949: 157- 
8). On the ‘false self’, see, e.g. Winnicott 1965. I borrow the connection between these two 
concepts from Marco Bacciagaluppi (e.g. 1991: 579; 1993: 2). 
54 This is characteristically depicted by Arendt’s The Origins of Totalitarianism (1951). 
55 For example, Sung-Eun Cho and Taraba also highlight the importance of this point (Cho 
2012: 144-5; Taraba 2004: 175-6). 
56 With respect to this issue, Fujita’s essay on Adorno, ‘Hihanteki risei no jojishi’ (An Epic of 
Critical Reason) (1979), may contribute to an understanding of the relationship. 
57 On this point, I might seem to misunderstand when highlighting the importance of Fujita’s 
‘experience of Marxism’ (Marukusushugi to iu keiken). Through this experience, as some res- 
earchers say, he took the opportunity of accepting Marx’s ‘method of immanent critique of 
objects’ (taishō naizaiteki hihan no hōhō), as Fujita himself called it (e.g. Ichimura 2010: 413-7). 
Hegel, however, should be much more emphasised in respect of Fujita’s method of internal 
 
 134 Political Theories of Narcissism 
 
 
understanding in the sense that it is essentially based on intersubjective recognition, as we 
shall see later – undoubtedly, there must have been no such thing as an epistemological con- 
cept in either Marx or Marxism, which Fujita learnt knowledge from. For this reason, his 
method made up of phenomenological epistemology is aimed neither only at the history of 
writing nor at social reform. This is why my research lays too much stress on psycho- 
analytic epistemology, which no doubt influences Fujita’s political theory. Fujita’s later work, 
in my view, much more strongly puts forward this viewpoint, as exemplified by the fact that 
in his later writings his research accent is on intersubjectivity. 
58 With regard to Hegel’s conception of intersubjectivity, Honneth sheds much light on an und- 
erstanding of it (see Honneth 1995: ch. 2). Also, with respect to Honneth’s discussion it is 
important to remember that he establishes such a connection not by introducing some theory 
of narcissism but by applying George Herbert Mead’s theory of social self and the British 
psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s object relations theory. It is thus my understanding. 
59 Perhaps Habermas best explains why psychoanalysis proposes an immanent-critical stand- 
point. He says: ‘the ego of the patient recognize [sic] itself in its other, represented by its 
illness, as in its own alienated self and identify with it. As in Hegel’s dialectic of the moral life, 
the criminal recognizes in his victim his own annihilated essence’ (1987: 235-6). Also, the 
reason why Freud’s psychoanalysis requires intersubjective recognition is primarily because 
psychoanalytic treatment (dialogue) is always offered by the other as a psychoanalyst; in this 
sense, it establishes a quasi-intersubjective relationship. However, it is noted that Freud’s ego 
psychology is not based on and interested in the concept. 
60 Not surprisingly, this epistemological standpoint was proclaimed by the early Habermas’s 
best writing Knowledge and Human Interest (1968). Thereafter, however, he seems to have gra- 
dually abandoned this stance. By contrast, Honneth appears to have retained this significant 
tradition of the Frankfurt School. 
61 As we saw above, however, it does not seem to have been made clear why it must be called the 
Tennō system. In fact, unfortunately, no one has so far tried to answer this enquiry with res- 
pect to Fujita’s theory of the society of the Tennō system in any detail. 
62 In this examination, however, I will not care about either whether Honneth’s understanding 
of Hegel is plausible or what Hegel actually intended by dialectical recognition. As far as my 
research is concerned, the theoretical validity of Honneth’s view of Hegel’s theory of recog- 
nition does not matter in so far as his interpretation helps me to accomplish the purpose of 
gaining a clear understanding of an aspect of the concept of intersubjectivity even if it is not 
acceptable. For developing the potential of Fujita’s phenomenological theory, I will simply 
establish a theoretical connection between Fujita’s and Honneth’s conceptions of intersubjec- 
tivity in my exploration. 
63 Basically, this means that the the person to whom one is talking largely determines one’s 
speech, tone, gesture and the like; that is to say, it is believed that the self changes his attitude 
in accordance with the fact of who the other is, and this apparent change, in Kimura’s view, 
stems from one’s ‘intuitive experience’ (chokusetsu keiken) made up by Husserl’s ‘noesis’ on 
the basis of the intersubjective relationship between the self and the other (Kimura 2005: 
248-50). Needless to say, this mechanism is profoundly associated with the experience of 
intersubjectivity of human beings. 
64 Honneth gives a further detailed account of this point by focusing on the ‘claim to indi- 
vidual rights’ after pointing out that ‘the anticipation of one’s own or the other ’s death is 
supposed to lead to . . . recognition’: ‘through the reciprocal perception of their mortality, the 
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subjects in the struggle discover that they have already recognized each other insofar as 
their fundamental rights are concerned and have thereby already implicitly created the 
social basis for an intersubjectively binding legal relationship. For the explanation of this 
subsequent discovery, however, the reference to the existential dimension of death seems to 
be completely unnecessary. For it is the mere fact of the morally decisive resistance to its 
interaction partner that actually makes the attacking subject aware that the other had come 
to the situation harbouring normative expectations in just the way that it itself had vis-à-vis 
the other. That alone, and not the way in which the other asserts its individual rights, is 
what allows subjects to perceive each other as morally vulnerable persons and, thereby, to 
mutually affirm each other in their fundamental claims to integrity. In this sense, it is the 
social experience of realizing that one’s interaction partner is vulnerable to moral injury – 
and not the existential realization that the other is mortal – that can bring to consciousness 
that layer of prior relations of recognition, the normative core of which acquires, in legal 
relations, an intersubjectively binding form’ (1995: 48-9). 
65 Famously, this expression was provided by Paul Valéry. 
66 With respect to this issue, Wada’s work (2004) is exceptional in research into Fujita in the 
sense that it actually to a certain extent achieves an ‘immanent critique’ of Fujita’s theory. 
67 Neither the history of ideas nor the history of political thought – occasionally, ironically, neither 
political theory nor social theory – is regarded as a branch of the social sciences. If they are 
believed to be the sub-disciplines of the social studies, then they necessarily hold some direct 
interest at least either in the social or in society itself; indeed, however, most often these disci- 
plines do not seem to contain them. As a matter of fact, as far as I can see, it is difficult to 
find such a concern in any articles on Fujita published so far – to this extent, however, this 
fact may have no relation to their respective research areas. Notwithstanding these views, 
they definitely do not give the social sciences any priority. 
     Despite these circumstances, Hideharu Saitō’s work, ‘Genshiryoku no sangyōteki riyō to 
“shijō keizai zentaishugi”: Fujita Shōzō, Kāru Porannī, Misheru Fūkō no shijō keizai ninshiki 
no kentō wo tōshite’ (The Industrial Use of Nuclear Energy and ‘Totalitarianism as Market 
Economy’: As seen from Shōzō Fujita’s, Karl Polanyi’s and Michel Foucault’s Theories of 
Market Economy) (2013), is quite interesting in the sense that it attempts to grasp the core 
problems of nuclear power and to find a clue to solving those difficulties primarily by 
applying Fujita’s concept of ‘totalitarianism as market ecomony’ – this is the same as con- 
temporary totalitarianism – and by seeking for common characteristics of Fujita’s, Polanyi’s 
and Faucault’s theories of totalitarianism and market economy. His work shows that we are 
in our daily living involved in an enormously risky game, in which we are all taking part in 
free competitive markets at the risk of our human capital, namely our lives. Indeed, it is not 
impossible to understand the present situation only in terms of totalitarian market economic 
system. His standpoint is nonetheless absolutely relevant to dealing with the issue. Saitō’s 
article tries to help us to cope with the dialectical problem between two aspects of human 
capital as our life and ‘totalitarianism as market economy’ as our system, and it is thus a 
reflective and critical effort – in relation to my research, it is therefore regarded as an imm- 
anent criticism. In these respects, it is noted that the standpoint his work proposes is close to 
my research interest. For these reasons, it would seem that Saitō’s concern can help us to 
break free from the current theoretical impasse. 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 6 
 
Erich Fromm: 
The Death of Man 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  Psychoanalysis for Fromm 
 
Perhaps Erich Fromm (1900-80) is a typical scholar whose certain branch is dif- 
ficult to identify. This is elucidated primarily by his work as a whole which 
cannot be categorised simply as either sociology or psychology or social psy- 
chology or politics or philosophy or psychoanalysis. This clearly shows that 
Fromm carried out a wide variety of studies, and therefore that his efforts are 
not reduced to a certain academic field, despite the fact that he conducted res- 
earch essentially on the basis of social psychology and psychoanalysis. His fol- 
lowing words clearly tell his interdisciplinary concern: ‘[p]sychology can not 
[sic] be divorced from philosophy and ethics nor from sociology and econo- 
mics’ (1971: ix). In fact, the interdisciplinarity of his academic concern is typi- 
cally described by a series of Fromm’s writings themselves, for example, as 
follows: by his doctoral work which tackled the issue of ‘Jewish law’, which is 
profoundly associated with his Hebrew background, based on his sociological 
concern (1922); by his first sociopsychological article, ‘The Method and Function 
of an Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932), which underlay and greatly contri- 
buted to developing his fundamental analytic tool, ‘social character’; by Escape 
from Freedom (1941), which established the dialectical connection of politics bet- 
ween fascism and democracy, as laying the foundations of the above socio- 
psychological, methodological concept; by The Art of Loving (1956), which add- 
ressed philosophical and ethical aspects of love, relying primarily upon his 
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knowledge of philosophy and psychoanalysis; by The Hart of Man (1964), which 
put forward three kinds of human psychological evil on the basis of his psy- 
choanalytic theory; by To Have or to Be? (1976), which sought what society 
ought to be, dividing our way of life up into the two modes, ‘having and being 
modes’. This picture leads us exactly to know that Fromm’s academic activity is 
not restricted to a certain discipline, and that his scholarly concern is conside- 
rably variable, while Weber, Marx and Freud form the intellectual framework 
of his work, as has often been mentioned (e.g. Okazaki 2004). From this per- 
spective, it is plausible to believe that Fromm is an exact intellectual who acc- 
omplished the objective of philosophy in its original sense of loving knowledge. 
    Nonetheless, it appears that there is one common feature expressed throu- 
ghout Fromm’s works: they all aimed at establishing a society in which human 
beings can fully develop their personality that displays ‘spontaneity’ – this is 
most often replaced by his conception of ‘activity’ meaning the ‘active’ – and 
‘productive love’ on the basis of his humanistic ethics.1 From this perspective, it 
is possible to see that his therapeutic activity based on his psychoanalytic the- 
ory was rather directed towards the above end. However, this does not provide 
us with some new impression of Fromm. For example, in his relatively recent 
research Harold B. Davis has put forward almost the same view as mine, par- 
ticularly emphasising ‘human development’ and ‘humanistic ethics’ (2006: 42). 
József Koch, over twenty years ago, also pointed out that ‘Fromm considered 
the supreme goal of human life to be the full development of one’s own per- 
sonality and of one’s fellow man’ (1990: 4). These views show that the achieve- 
ment of the above aim was the exact objective of Fromm’s psychoanalytic the- 
rapy and social and political theory. 
    With regard to this issue, however, I do not concern myself with the enquiry 
as to whether Fromm is a social theorist or a political theorist. For his theory no 
doubt contains theoretical components requisite for both theories; in particular, 
it is natural to regard him as the former to the extent that he began his work 
with sociology, which the former theory belongs to in the sense of its tradition 
(see App. 1, s. 3) – there already exist some works presenting this view (on the 
former, see, e.g. Elliott 2004; Wilde 2004, and on the latter, see, e.g. Okazaki 
2004; Wilde 2004). Instead, my research interest is directed towards identifying 
some theoretical possibilities and difficulties of Fromm’s social and political theory, 
focusing on his theory of narcissism. With respect to his latter theory, however, 
virtually the issue is hardly dealt with in the field of psychoanalysis. As a 
matter of fact, for instance, several articles observe that his psychoanalytic theory 
has mostly been disregarded by the mainstream of psychoanalysis despite its 
significant contributions to the discipline (Bacciagaluppi 1990: 6; Bacciagaluppi 
and Biancoli 1993: 6; Greenberg and Mitchell 1983: 106; Lesser 2002: 23). 
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According to Marco Bacciagaluppi and Romano Biancoli, Fromm’s psycho- 
analytic theory of narcissism characterises this tendency (1993: 6). It would 
seem that this is a right view in the sense that, for example, The Handbook of 
Narcissism and Narcissistic Personality Disorder (2011), published by John Wiley 
and Sons, Inc., only once refers to Fromm. In this lexicon, his prominent work To 
Have or to Be? is referenced by social psychologists simply for describing 
‘consumer behaviour’, which is, in their view, regarded as a contemporary 
narcissistic form (Sedikides et al. 2011: 382) – his theoretical contributions are 
almost completely disregarded by forty four articles included in this handbook 
despite the fact that the name of Christopher Lasch, albeit no specific contri- 
bution to psychoanalytic theory, is mentioned three times (Campbell and Miller 
2011: 498). In addition, Narcissism: A Critical Reader (2007), edited chiefly by the 
psychoanalysts Anastasios Gaitanidis, contains only a work raising the topic of 
Fromm’s theory of narcissism (Mawdsley 2007: 176). The famous psychoana- 
lytic theorist of narcissism Elsa F. Ronningstam, in her recent work, does not 
refer to Fromm at all (Ronningstam 2005). From these perspectives, it seems that 
those respective writers even intend to disrespect for him. In fact, my view of 
this issue does not appear to be wrong, taking account of the following evi- 
dence of its fact: quite interestingly, the psychoanalyst Ruth Lesser claims that 
one of the primary reasons for ignorance of Fromm is due to his ‘negative 
impact of the marketplace mentality’ (Lesser 2002: 24). 
    Despite the aforementioned facts, some researchers reappraise Fromm’s great 
contributions to the scholarship of the theory of narcissism. One of them is def- 
initely Rainer Funk, who does highlight not only the significance of Fromm’s 
psychoanalytic theory particularly from a therapeutic perspective (e.g. Funk 
1994, 2002, 2009) but also of his theory of narcissism (e.g. Funk 1993, 1994, 2000). 
Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli, whom I referred to in the last chapter, also lay 
stress on the present-day relevance of Fromm’s idea of narcissism (Baccia- 
galuppi 1993, 2012; Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993). Leonidas K. Cheliotis, in 
his recent article, tries to find the theoretical possibilities of Fromm’s concept of 
‘benign narcissism’ (Cheliotis 2012). It must be noted, nonetheless, that the 
many scholars are so careless about his contributions to the psychoanalytic 
theory of narcissism. On this view, it is difficult to seek for works concentrating 
on Fromm’s theory of narcissism with the exception of the above writings. No 
doubt, this is profoundly associated with the aforementioned fact Lesser points 
out. For essentially Fromm’s study is carried out by the dialectical method of 
‘immanent critique’, that is to say, for his theoretical perspective above all 
points to inconvenient truths about contemporary society, that is about ourselves. 
In my view, his endeavour to develop the theory of narcissism forms a link in 
the chain of this task. In his best early work, for instance, Habermas claims that 
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psychoanalysis intrinsically requires ‘self-reflection’ (1987: chs. 10-2), and that 
this signifies that it takes an immanent-critical standpoint.2 He says: ‘the process 
of inquiry . . . is at the same time a process of self-inquiry’ (1987: 287). In my view, 
Fromm is one of the persons who best understood some signification and int- 
ention of it. In this respect, Habermas’s early perspective that epistemologically 
regards psychoanalysis as social theory (1987: 274-90) is related to Fromm’s 
essential viewpoint of ‘establishing a society’ through applying psychoanalytic 
method requiring self-reflection. 
    From this fundamental standpoint, I will start my exploration by seeing 
Fromm’s early work ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social 
Psychology’ (1932), which helped Fromm to develop his concept of ‘social 
character’ (e.g. Funk 1990: 3), whose sociopsychological device enables us to 
understand narcissism in the ‘level of social pathology’ as ‘a character structure’ 
(Bacciagaluppi 1993: 3). Second, I will actually examine Fromm’s theory of 
narcissism by focusing particularly on its social implications, following my 
discussion developed especially in Chapter 4. From this perspective, third, I 
will tackle the topic of his dialectical view of politics presented primarily by 
Escape from Freedom, in which narcissism intermediates between Fascism and 
democracy, as we shall see later. Finally, I will address the issue of Fromm’s 
concept of ‘human change’, which is counted as his sole solution to narcissism 
in contemporary society in which ‘man is dead’ (Fromm 1956: 74). On this view, 
however, essentially I will doubt the relevance of his remedy, and instead seek 
to find another solution to social narcissism, while accepting this intrinsic 
human and social need. That is to say, this chapter will conclude that it is 
possible to change our society, paradoxically, only by confessing that we are 
intrinsically narcissistic. 
 
 
2.  Fromm’s Early Work: Analytic Social Psychology 
 
The ‘social character’ 
According to Funk, Fromm’s sociopsychological concern is older than the time 
when he started his academic study, which was conducted as a religious work 
on ‘Jewish law’ in terms of sociology at the University of Heidelberg in 
Germany;3 he later attempted to link his sociological perspective to his psy- 
chological perspective by encountering with ‘Freud’s instinct theory’ (1990: 1). 
Curiously enough, however, his effort into establishing this connection is rarely 
recognised by any related branches for generally there is great difficulty in und- 
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erstanding both the standpoints of those two fields at the same time, that is to 
say, sociological and psychological ways of thinking are different from each 
other (1990: 1). This disciplinary condition actually affects his view of the socio- 
psychological device of ‘social character’, which is virtually ‘a difficult concept 
that crosses academic boundaries of psychology, sociology, anthropology and 
economics’, says Michael Maccoby (2001: 21); in this respect, the adjective social 
of the notion covers a wide range of social sciences. Perhaps this is primarily 
why it seems that on the whole Fromm’s work has not been accepted by the 
mainstream of any disciplines. 
    It is interesting to note that Fromm, working together with Maccoby, cond- 
ucted empirical research into the social character of the people in a Mexican 
village for examining the relevance of the concept (Fromm and Maccoby 1970). 
Maccoby, following their own report on this research published in 1970, recen- 
tly presents three kinds of significations the social character intends (Maccoby 
2001). First of all, a social character is distinguished to a certain extent from an 
individual character. This means that the former character is mostly determined 
not by the latter but by the ‘internalization of cultural norms that determine 
social attitudes and give meaning to social behavior’ (2001: 23). Second, 
‘Organizational Social Character’ explains how a character structure changes on 
the basis of the ‘socio-economic base, the social character, and the ideals, ide- 
ology, or social self rooted in the bureaucratic and interactive social characters’ 
(2001: 24). Third, there are two ways of developing a social character as to whe- 
ther it takes ‘bureaucratic’ or ‘interactive’ course (2001: 24-5). Above all, what 
does Maccoby’s research show us? On the one hand, I notice that Fromm’s 
method of ‘social character’ is a troublesome analytic device in the sense that 
the research team sometimes ran into methodological difficulties with the concept 
particularly in explaining how and to what extent it can show the ‘rigidity of 
character’ (Millán 1992: 57);4 it would seem that this problem is also illustrated 
by the above fact that the concept crosses several disciplines in the social sci- 
ences. Perhaps, for these reasons, it often seems to overgeneralise some character 
features of a group, as I mentioned in the last chapter (Ch. 5, p. 109). On the 
other hand, however, I stress that the provocative socio-psychological tool can 
have a profound impact on many fields in the social sciences. Alan Grey, for 
instance, supports my view in the sense that it relevantly ‘integrat[es] psycho- 
analysis more effectively with social science’ (1993: 13). In addition, it should be 
noted that the clinical significance of the concept has already been highlighted 
by some psychoanalysts (Funk 1994; Ortmeyer 2002). In these respects, I find 
that the ‘social character’ as a concept, illuminating an understanding society 
and individuals, is of considerable relevance to present-day scholarship while it 
needs to be improved to some extent. 
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    However, my primary concern in this section is not to show the significance 
of that concept. It is rather to focus on Fromm’s early work ‘analytic social 
psychology’, whose task was carried out primarily through his most important 
early contribution, ‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’. 
Virtually, this article had aimed to lay the foundations of the methodological 
tool of ‘social character’, which was actually later named and first came up for 
discussion in Escape from Freedom, which primarily described the dialectical 
development of politics between fascism and democracy. In fact, Fromm took 
up a long space to account for the concept in an appendix in the latter work 
(1941: 277-99); this elucidates how important it was for him to clarify and con- 
ceptualise the device at the time. My purpose is therefore to examine how the 
former work affected and determined his later contributions. In this respect, I 
believe that everyone can first grasp Fromm’s other works after reading his 
fundamental article published in 1932. 
 
‘The Method and Function of an Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932) 
Fromm’s early sociopsychological work ‘The Method and Function of an 
Analytic Social Psychology’ – abbreviated to ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ below 
– is subtitled ‘Notes on Psychoanalysis and Historical Materialism’. Obviously, 
this means that Fromm sought to relate Freud to Marx through conducting its 
research. It is important to remember that this task led him to depart the simple 
influence of both his great mentors, or, to put it another way, it signifies that he 
achieved the sublation of the contradiction between the two thinkers through 
writing the article (e.g. Erös 1992; cf. Funk 1990). From this perspective, we can 
perceive that his task of analytic social psychology aimed precisely at integ- 
rating Freud’s psychoanalysis and Marx’s historical materialism. 
 
(a) Fromm and Reich 
With regard to this issue, a comparison of Fromm with Wilhelm Reich will 
probably best explain the background of Fromm’s method of analytic social 
psychology. Ferenc Erös illustrates that the young Fromm and the young Reich 
had significantly affected each other (Erös 1992); this experience actually deter- 
mined Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology. Quite interestingly, Erös 
contends that their approaches have much in common with one another, but, at 
the same time, that Fromm’s is ‘more sophisticated’ (1992: 71). First of all, Erös 
implies that both Fromm and Reich succeeded in ‘esca[ping] from [Marx’s and 
Freud’s] dogmatism’; according to Erös, Fromm tried to achieve it by putting 
forward ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ (1932), on the one hand, and Reich atte- 
mpted to accomplish it by coming to his standpoint in ‘Dialectical Materialism 
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and Psychoanalysis’ (1929), on the other (1992: 71-2). That is to say, their res- 
pective perspectives marked turning points in their careers. Second, much more 
importantly, while Reich claimed that the application of psychoanalysis to soc- 
iety is restricted to its ‘irrational phenomena’, Fromm, on the contrary, argued 
that the disciplinary capacity of psychoanalysis is based on both individual and 
social behaviours (1992: 70). The following description, for instance, well chara- 
cterises the latter stance. 
 
In the very beginning – and even later on – Freud concerned himself with the psychology 
of the individual. But one the instincts were discovered to be the motive force behind 
human behavior, and once the unconscious was seen as the source of man’s ideologies and 
behavior patterns, it was inevitable that analytic authors would make an attempt to move 
from the problem of the individual to the problem of society, from individual to social 
psychology. They had to try to use the techniques of psychoanalysis to discover the hidden 
sources of the obviously irrational behavior patterns in societal life – in religion, custom, 
politics, and education. This obviously meant that they would encounter difficulties that 
were avoided so long as they restricted themselves to the realm of individual psychology 
(Fromm 1991: 141-2). 
 
Interestingly, Fromm later slightly modified these original sentences first pub- 
lished in German when rewriting them in and translating into English in 1970 
(cf. Fromm 1991: 9-10). Since the transformation of Fromm’s standpoint of psy- 
choanalysis, namely ‘escape from dogmatism’, is of huge importance, I will also 
quote the original sentences in German below. We will see that there is almost 
no difference between his stances of 1932 and of 1970. 
 
Freud hat sich ursprünglich – und auch späterhin vorwiegend – mit der Psychologie des 
Individuums beschäftigt. Nachdem aber einmal in den Trieben die Motive menschlichen 
Verhaltens, im Unbewußten die geheime Quelle der Ideologien und Verhaltungsweisen 
entdeckt waren, konnte es nicht ausbleiben, daß die analytischen Autoren den Versuch 
machten, vom Problem des Individuums zu dem der Gesellschaft, von der Personal- 
psychologie zur Sozialpsychologie vorzustoßen. Es mußte der Versuch unternommen 
werden, mit den Mitteln der Psychoanalyse den geheimen Sinn und Grund der im 
gesellschaftlichen Leben so augenfälligen irrationalen Verhaltungsweisen, wie sie sich in 
der Religion und in Volksbräuchen, aber auch in der Politik und Erziehung äußern, zu 
finden. Gewiß mußten damit Schwierigkeiten entstehen, die vermieden wurden, solange 
man sich auf das Gebiet der Personalpsychologie beschränkte (Fromm 1989: 39-40). 
 
It is quite difficult to identify some change between the original German version 
and the later English translation in these sentences. This means exactly that 
Fromm was consistent in taking the standpoint in his lifetime. Or, more accu- 
rately, for him individual psychology had always to be social psychology since 
having written the significant article, and the primary aim and intention of the 
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work were exactly to declare this position; in the above quotations, his certain 
view first clarified is quite precisely shown. In these respects, Fromm’s criticism 
of Reich that, ‘[t]he fact that a phenomenon is studied in sociology certainly does 
not mean that it cannot be an object of psychoanalysis’ (1991: 142), brought the 
two persons to the crucial difference. ‘[E]scape from dogmatism’, however, had 
not been completed in the first sociopsychological work; this was, Erös claims, 
achieved in his later book Escape from Freedom. With regard to their ‘escape[s]’, 
nonetheless, Erös is much more in favour of Fromm than Reich: first, in the 
sense that the former conducted empirical research; second, in the sense that he 
broke free from Freud’s orthodox psychoanalysis. This is why Erös states that 
Fromm’s ‘escape from dogmatism’ is ‘more successful and more fruitful’ (1992: 
72). (I do not refer to Reich’s ‘escape’, primarily for it is not my research object, 
and for here I cannot devote myself to tackling its issue.) 
 
(b) The current position of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ 
It is surprising that many researchers seem careless about ‘Analytic Social 
Psychology’ when referring to Fromm’s sociopsychological foundations at least 
as far as its English and German contexts are concerned. As a matter of fact, for 
example, Helmut Johach does not often notice Fromm’s early contribution in 
his writing Analytische Sozialpsychologie und gesellschaftskritischer Humanismus: 
Eine Einführung in das Denken Erich Fromms (1986). Biancoli simply slightly 
raises the topic in his report ‘Erich Fromm and His Criticism of Sigmund Freud’ 
(1988), which draws attention to Fromm’s critique of Freud according with the 
title, focusing on Fromm’s stress on the ‘social aspect’ of psychoanalysis; this is 
therefore regarded as the exact theme of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. Funk also 
does not too much refer to the early theoretical work in his lecture ‘Fromm’s 
Method of Social Psychology’ (1990), which, on the whole, however, tackles the 
precise issue of Fromm’s sociopsychological approach, taking notice of the sign- 
ificance of Fromm’s view of a ‘social being’. Bacciagaluppi cares little about the 
early essay in his short report ‘The Relevance of Erich Fromm’ (1990), which 
primarily mentions Fromm’s psychoanalysis that can be seen in his main works. 
Burkhard Bierhoff has little concern about the sociopsychological writing in his 
recent article ‘Analytische Sozialpsychologie und humanistischer Sozialismus’ 
(2008), which shines a light on Fromm’s later theoretical activity that his early 
sociopsychological theory contributed to, focusing on his ‘humanistic socialism’. 
It would seem that there exist his other works concerning this issue. Of course, 
not all of them are mainly concerned with Fromm’s early conception of analytic 
social psychology, but admittedly, nonetheless, there is a strong tendency for 
them to disregard the significance of the work. In fact, surprisingly, there are 
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not so much writings which concern themselves with the theme of ‘Analytic 
Social Psychology’. In these respects, it is rather plausible to believe that the 
many rarely concentrate their tasks on his early contribution. On this view, the 
task is indeed undertaken merely by a few works such as Gerald Mackenthun’s 
Die Entstehungsgeschichte der ‘Analytischen Sozialpsychologie’ Erich Fromms 1928-
1938: Eine Einführung (1991), Bierhoff’s Analytische Sozialpsychologie und Visionäre 
Gesellschaftskritik (1993) and Erös’s above article – these writings, nonetheless, 
do not aim only at understanding and shining a light on the early contribution, 
and are therefore insufficient to see the whole essence. Rather, it appears that 
most researchers are interested particularly in the concept of ‘social character’ 
when conducting a study of Fromm’s sociopsychological method (e.g. Essbach-
Kreuzer: 1978; Funk 1996; Gojman de Millán and Millán 2001; Grey 1993; 
Maccoby 2001; Millán 1992; Ortmeyer 2002). 
    Okazaki’s book (2004), which is, however, written neither in English nor in 
German but in Japanese, is one of the contributions devoting themselves to an 
understanding of Fromm’s ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. In fact, his work tack- 
les the core issue of Fromm’s early theoretical foundations, and the fourth cha- 
pter aims primarily at shedding new light on the article, particularly at seeking 
for Fromm’s conception of ‘politics’ in the work – this book manages exactly to 
precisely describe Fromm’s socioeconomic-psychoanalytic standpoint put forward 
in the work. My investigation, however, does not focus on the topic concerning 
whether the early writing presents some political concepts. I will rather try to 
highlight the considerable significance of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’, while 
admitting the huge importance of Escape from Freedom, which puts forward the 
‘social needs’ (kankeisei no yokkū) whose concept contributes exactly to Fromm’s 
later theoretical activities, as Okazaki stresses (2004: 85).5 That is to say, in my 
view Fromm had laid his theoretical foundations of psychoanalysis primarily in 
the early sociopsychological writing, and this experience profoundly affected 
his later psychoanalytic tasks. I think, therefore, that no one can precisely und- 
erstand his theory of narcissism and psychoanalysis unless reading ‘Analytic 
Social Psychology’ which takes the dialectical view. For these reasons, I rather 
believe that this early writing captures the essence of Fromm’s psychoanalysis, 
and marked a turning point in his career which first allowed him to be a 
‘sociological psychoanalyst’ (Grey 1993: 11). In this respect, I drive myself to pay 
attention to the dialectical development of his theoretical ingredients rather than 
to his conception of politics for the purpose of gaining an understanding of his 
social and political theory. 
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(c) The method of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ 
Perhaps Funk’s ‘Fromm’s Method of Social Psychology’ (1990) best summarises 
the essence of Fromm’s ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. However, this work is not 
sufficient for a better understanding of the early work for it does not concent- 
rate on the essay as my research object, as mentioned above. Nonetheless, Funk 
seems to succeed in grasping the core point through undertaking the task. In 
fact, a ‘socialized being’ he highlights is a key concept of ‘Analytic Social 
Psychology’. As Funk mentions, Fromm’s sociopsychological concern is pro- 
vided not only by ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. As a matter of fact, as we saw 
above, it is derived from his ‘religious upbringing’ (Funk 1990: 1), and the 
standpoint had been clarified to a certain extent by some other essays before 
publishing the writing. To be sure, for instance, ‘Psychoanalyse und Soziologie’ 
(1929), ‘Der Staat als Erzieher’ (1930), ‘Zur Psychologie des Verbrechers und der 
strafenden Gesellschaft’ (1931) and ‘Politik und Psychoanalyse’ (1931) already 
provided his sociopsychological viewpoint. To take one example, the above first 
article sought to apply psychoanalysis to sociology and vice versa, and in fact 
terms giving a sociopsychological implication such as the ‘mass psyche’ 
(Massenseele), contrasting with the ‘individual psyche’ (Individualseele), came 
into existence in the work (Fromm 1989: 3). Funk is also well aware of this fact, 
and shows how provocative it was to make its attempt at the time as exem- 
plified by the contradiction between the metapsychology of psychologists and 
the conventional standpoint of sociologists (1990: 1-2). It must be noted, how- 
ever, that there is another important issue concerning Fromm’s efforts: Weber’s 
sociological influence on Fromm’s method of analytic social psychology. With 
respect to this topic, Okazaki quite precisely describes this signification. First, 
according to him, it explains that Fromm regards society as a ‘group of indi- 
viduals’ (2004: 110).6 Second, Weber’s effect, says Okazaki, accounts for the fact 
that Fromm tried to modify Marx’s view of the ‘ideological superstructure’ by 
applying Weber’s sociology. (2004: 116-8). Virtually, to be sure, this standpoint 
was first put forward in his later works such as Escape from Freedom, as Okazaki 
clarifies, but the awareness of its point is nonetheless of particular importance 
for gaining a rigorous understanding of his method of analytic social psycho- 
logy. In fact, Fromm attempted the sublation of his theoretical incompatibility 
between Marx and Freud to a large extent by applying Weber to the work 
‘Analytic Social Psychology’. In contrast to Okazaki, however, Funk does not 
perceive this fact, and takes no notice of Marx or Weber in respect of Fromm’s 
early foundations of analytic social psychology. As a matter of fact, Funk’s 
lecture notes ‘Fromm’s Method of Social Psychology’ are prejudiced in favour 
of an analysis of Fromm’s knowledge of Freud’s psychoanalysis concerning his 
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socio-psychological method, and the work has therefore resulted in ignorance 
of Fromm’s acceptance of historical materialism and Weber’s sociology. This is 
why in the work Funk has failed to rigorously understand Fromm’s sense of 
‘social’ despite his success in seeing the signification of Fromm’s analytic social 
psychology as a whole. 
    From these perspectives, I want to begin to analyse the provocative writing 
‘Analytic Social psychology’. My primary enquiry in this topic is what the 
purpose of this essay was. Superficially, it seems that the work simply integrated 
Marx into Freud and vice versa, but this does not mean that I provide an 
account of it. In order to know something about human beings, it is always 
most important to seek for one’s intentions. One of his intentions of writing the 
essay is definitely to get out of disciplinary difficulties with the conventional met- 
hodologies of sociology and psychoanalysis – this is explained to a certain ext- 
ent by the above evidence concerning the incompatibility between both disci- 
plines to which Fromm actually devoted himself. Another intention is probably 
to lay the foundations of his methodology of social science. It is surprising to me that 
these standpoints, identifying some intentions of one’s action, have hardly been 
presented by any researchers who have carried out a study of Fromm’s work – 
with regard to this issue, by contrast, Okazaki attempts to understand the back- 
ground of the foundations of the method of analytic social psychology (2004: 
116-8). Perhaps this problem is characterised by the research style of conducting 
a study of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. These two viewpoints, however, seem 
quite appropriate to Fromm primarily in the sense that, as mentioned earlier, 
his work is characteristically not regarded as any certain disciplines in a narrow 
sense. This means precisely not only that Fromm had a variety of scholarly 
concerns, but also that he already showed such a quality at the time when 
writing ‘Analytic Social Psychology’. Indeed, this evidence is of huge impor- 
tance for being aware of the implications of Fromm’s academic activities them- 
selves. 
    From these viewpoints, I will start an investigation into ‘Analytic Social 
Psychology’ by identifying my first enquiry into the position of Freud’s instinct 
theory in the work concerning the above first purpose. With regard to this issue, 
to be sure this writing to a large extent supports Freud’s orthodox approach. 
However, it tries to put forward a new perspective different from his original 
instinct theory. Fromm says: 
 
The active and passive adaptation of the biological apparatus, the instincts, to social reality is the 
key conception of psychoanalysis, and every exploration into personal psychology pro- 
ceeds from this conception (1991: 141). 
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This depiction signifies the emergence of Fromm’s original standpoint which 
leads him to propose the ‘social instinct’ (1991: 144). On this view, Fromm cle- 
arly points out that Freud had denied this viewpoint, and thus that, as a result, 
he failed to recognise social psychology even though having been aware of the 
existence; in Fromm’s view, after all, Freud confined psychology to the matter of 
individuals (1991: 141-2). Through taking this view, Fromm does not abolish the 
instinct theory, but nonetheless obviously distances himself from his mentor of 
psychoanalysis. His following view allows him to become much more indepen- 
dent of Freud: 
 
[Psychoanalysis] seeks to know the psychic traits common to the members of a group, and 
to explain these common psychic traits in terms of shared life experiences. These life exp- 
eriences, however, do not lie in the realm of the personal or the accidental – the larger the 
group is, the more this holds true – but rather they are identical with the socio-economic 
situation of this particular group. Thus analytical social psychology seeks to understand the ins- 
tinctual apparatus of a group, its libidinous and largely unconscious behavior, in terms of its socio-
economic structure (1991: 144). 
 
Here we can see that Freud’s instinct theory was integrated into Marx’s mate- 
rialist view – it would be possible to see that Freud’s was integrated into Marx’s 
in this context. Fromm’s strong interest in Marx, even though in his view the 
latter theory needs to be modified, is also depicted by his expression that, ‘[t]he 
theory of society with which psychoanalysis seems to have both the greatest 
affinity and also the greatest differences is historical materialism’ (1991: 142). This 
is concerned with my second enquiry with respect to Fromm’s first purpose of 
writing the article. First, why, however, does he adhere firmly to historical materi- 
alism? Perhaps this is best illustrated by his words that ‘historical materialism 
teaches that social events (gesellschaftlische Geschehen) are explained by economic 
conditions (ökonomischen Bedingungen)’ in the preceding work ‘Politik und 
Psychoanalyse’ (1989: 32). Why, then, psychoanalysis is required for this standpoint? 
I believe that the primary reason is because the approach is associated with his 
fundamental method of analytic social psychology, that is to say, ‘[p]sycho- 
analysis can enrich the overall conception of historical materialism’ (1991: 154). 
This position, as Okazaki notices, stems primarily from Fromm’s emphasis on 
the necessity of accounting for the ‘psychological factor’ apart from his accep- 
tance of Marx’s stress on the economic factor (2004: 115). In Fromm’s view, to 
put it simply, Marx’s historical materialism has to be improved by Freud’s 
psychoanalysis. On this view, according to Fromm, Marx and Engels ‘neither 
were nor wanted to be psychologists’, while coming to know that sociology 
substantially contains psychology (1991: 152). For Fromm, this is a crucial factor 
in explaining the necessity of integrating psychoanalysis into Marx’s original 
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standpoint of historical materialism. In sum, while essentially supporting Freud 
instinct theory, and while transforming individual psychology into social psy- 
chology, Fromm supplemented Marx’s defect with ‘a psychoanalytic social psy- 
chology’ (1991: 157, 162). 
    Next, I will conduct an exploration of Fromm’s attention to ‘social processes’ 
concerning his second purpose noted above. This notion, as Funk implies, is 
one of Fromm’s most important theoretical ingredients in addition to the con- 
cept of ‘social character’ in his social psychology (1990: 3). That is to say, the 
concept is of vital importance for Fromm’s theory of social science in a broad 
sense – this follows the discussion developed earlier – in the sense that, on the 
whole, his theory seeks to understand how social processes perform their functions 
by integrating philosophy, sociology, social psychology and psychoanalysis into 
a theory – in fact, this is the exact task of Escape from Freedom – and, much more 
importantly, in his theory both the concepts were first conceptualised together 
in the work in 1941. However, it is not right to think that Fromm first theorised 
the notion of ‘social process’ in its writing. The term social process had already 
been employed in ‘Analytical Social Psychology’ (1991: e.g. 154-5, 157), and this 
later gave rise to a key concept of Fromm’s social science; it is believed that in 
his work this writing first provided the term. He definitely laid the foundations 
of his theory of social science in ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ – on this view, 
Erös, for example, contends that ‘in 1932 . . . Fromm first formulated his thoughts 
on the tasks and methods of analytical social psychology’ (1992: 73; emphases 
added). Indeed, this fact is quite important for understanding his later works 
published after its significant article. After successfully integrating psycho- 
analysis into historical materialism, Fromm makes it clear how the former fun- 
ctions in the latter. He claims: 
 
[Psychoanalysis] can provide a more comprehensive knowledge of one of the factors that is ope- 
rative in the social process: the nature of man himself (1991: 154). 
 
His socio-psychoanalytic stance, as this sentence clearly shows, was taken over 
and more sophisticated, for example, by the later work Escape from Freedom pri- 
marily through focusing on ‘character structures’ (e.g. 1941: app.). We can make 
sure of this fact by looking at the following description: ‘although character deve- 
lopment is shaped by the basic conditions of life and although there is no biologically 
fixed human nature, human nature has a dynamism of its own that constitutes an 
active factor in the evolution of the social process’ (1941: 289). Here Fromm’s pri- 
mary concern is not how the instinctual needs affect the social process of human 
beings, but how one’s character structure determines his social process and vice 
versa. To put it another way, his main interest changed to social processes of 
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individual and social characters. This basically means that his psychoanalytic 
theory first clarified the ‘social needs’ in Escape from Freedom. Much more imp- 
ortantly, however, Fromm definitely did not completely reject Freud’s instinct 
theory nor fall into ‘sociological relativism’ (1941: 289), but succeeded in over- 
coming Freud’s orthodox psychoanalytic theory by incorporating the concept of 
social needs into his psychoanalytic theory even though supporting Freud’s the- 
ory in that work; Fromm is regarded as a great supporter of dialectic. I believe, 
nonetheless, that the basic framework of his method of analytic social psycho- 
logy had been developed in the essay ‘Analytic Social Psychology’, which in 
fact profoundly affected the subsequent works. For we can clearly see that he 
sublated the contradiction between his disciplinary components to a certain 
extent in the early sociopsychological work. It is also elucidated, for example, 
by his expression that, ‘[t]he fruitfulness of a psychoanalytic social psychology 
will depend, of course, on the significance of the libidinal forces in the social 
process’ (1991: 157). 
    With regard to Fromm’s acceptance of Weber’s sociological view, finally, how 
can we connect this theoretical standpoint with his work of analytic social psy- 
chology? To be sure, as Okazaki says, we have considerable difficulty in seeking 
to complete this task through concentrating on ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ 
(2004: 117). In order to try to establish its connection, it might be necessary to 
trace my exploration back to his PhD thesis. It should be noted, however, that 
the framework of ‘Analytic Social Psychology’ precisely gave rise not only to 
Fromm’s theoretical foundations of his analytic social psychology but also to 
those of his theory of social science, and that it greatly contributed to const- 
ructing the idea of Escape from Freedom, in which he first completed the dialectic 
of his analytic social psychology, coming up with the concept of social character. 
 
 
3.  Fromm’s Conception of Narcissism: The Death of Man 
 
How is Fromm’s theory of psychoanalysis relevant? 
Not only has research on Fromm’s theory of narcissism hardly been conducted, 
but his psychoanalytic theory itself has also been disregarded by the main- 
stream of psychoanalysis (pp. 137-8 above). Perhaps disrespect for his former 
theory should be understood as an extension of the latter fact. At the same time, 
however, it must be stressed that the present-day relevance of his psycho- 
analytic theory has definitely attracted many researchers. In fact, they have so 
far considered that Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory is relevant in the following 
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respects: first, to the discipline of psychoanalysis itself in terms of his method of 
‘analytic social psychology’ (Bacciagaluppi 1990; Funk 1990), his theory of 
‘social transference’ (García 1991; Millán 1996) and his unique conception of 
‘mental health’ (Buechler 2006; Funk 2006; Lesser 2002); second, to therapeutic 
practice (Funk 1990, 1996; Ortmeyer 2002) and to theoretical foundations rela- 
ting psychoanalysis to some social sciences (Grey 1993; Millán 1992, 1996) in 
terms of the theory of ‘social character’; third, to psychoanalytic therapy in the 
sense of making an ethical impact, based on his humanistic ethics, on clinical 
practice (Buechler 2006; Davis 2006; Eckardt 1996; Funk 2002; cf. Panfilova 
2007); fourth, to psychoanalytic disciplinary tasks in both theoretical and the- 
rapeutic dimensions in terms of his theory of ‘narcissism’ (Bacciagaluppi 1993; 
Bacciagaluppi and Biancoli 1993; Funk 1993; cf. Funk 2000). From these pers- 
pectives, we can see that Fromm’s psychoanalysis has primarily fascinated psy- 
choanalysts as a natural consequence. It is not right to believe, however, that it 
has attracted them without regard to any social issues. In reality, ways of add- 
ressing all the above four topics are diametrically opposite to conventional psy- 
choanalytic approaches. Funk, for instance, claims that Fromm’s psychoanalytic 
approach can have a provocative impact on psychoanalytic therapy in the sense 
that his theory, laying stress on the socioeconomic effect on individuals, brings 
the field of psychoanalysis to the awareness of the importance of ‘unreflected 
social determinants’ (1990: 5; emphasis added). Grey, focusing on the concept of 
social character, contends that Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory does not only 
enhance the quality of remedies for ‘psychosocial disorders’ but also incorporate 
psychoanalysis within social science (1993: 10-1; emphasis added). Jorge Silva 
García maintains that prejudices such as racism, on the whole, stem from the 
‘irrational social component’, shining a light on Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory 
of transference (1991: 4; emphasis added). Salvador Millán allows that the 
psychoanalytic dialogue is constituted simultaneously in individual and social 
dimensions, primarily seeing Fromm’s theory of social transference (1996: 6; 
emphasis added). On the basis of his clinical experience, Davis, referring to 
Fromm, contends that an individual character structure is made up of a ‘socio-
economic-political structure’ (2006: 42; emphases added). These pieces of data 
clearly show that direct interest in psychoanalysis has triggered another interest 
in society; perhaps this best characterises Fromm’s theoretical contribution to 
psychoanalysis. 
    However, my primary task is not to tackle general issues of Fromm’s psy- 
choanalytic theory. Rather, my attention is directed to his theory of narcissism, 
the topic of which has rarely been dealt with, as mentioned earlier. In this 
respect, my purpose is to identify the possibilities and difficulties of the theory 
on the basis of the above fourth concern. I believe that to shine a light on his 
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forgotten theory of narcissism, requiring dialectical immanent critique, is exa- 
ctly to give both theory and practice an opportunity for self-reflection. 
 
Fromm’s theory of narcissism 
As noted above, only a few scholars have so far conducted research into 
Fromm’s theory of narcissism. Bacciagaluppi (1993), for example, contributed 
his article on Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, focusing on his conception of 
narcissism, particularly of ‘self’, and comparing other kinds of notions concer- 
ning narcissism – my discussion has a few times referenced this work. Signi- 
ficantly, this article divides the semantic scope of Fromm’s theory of narcissism 
up into its three levels, theoretical, social pathological and clinical levels (1993: 
3-8). My research objective in this section is primarily to gain an understanding 
of the signification of Fromm’s conception of narcissism in line with the second 
level, in which narcissism comes into existence as ‘character structures’ (1993: 4-
6). In this investigation, therefore, I will draw my attention to the concept of 
‘social (group) narcissism’, evolved in parallel with ‘individual narcissism’ in 
Fromm’s psychoanalytic theory, and to the distinction between benign and 
malignant narcissism, particularly in terms of Fromm’s conception of the esse- 
ntial character structure of contemporary society, the primary function of which 
relies upon market economy. From this perspective, we will exactly notice why 
Fromm diagnoses our society in which ‘man is dead’ (1956: 74) as malignant 
narcissism. This will lead me to draw careful attention to the dialectic of nar- 
cissism concerning the ‘productive orientation’ and the ‘nonproductive orien- 
tations’ (Fromm 1971: 62-117). 
 
(a) Social (group) narcissism 
As already argued primarily in Chapter 4, Fromm’s conception of narcissism 
puts forward two types of narcissism, individual and social (group) narcissism, 
in the two respective dimensions of the individual and society (Ch. 4, s. 1). 
According to Fromm, social narcissism is analogous to individual narcissism 
(1964: 78). In other words, there is simply a quantitative difference between them 
in his theory of narcissism; this is precisely described by the distinction between 
his individual and social psychology (cf. Funk 1990: 1). In Fromm’s view, this is 
described by another differentiation between the ‘biological function’ and the 
‘sociological function’ of narcissism (1964: 72-3, 78). This point is of vital imp- 
ortance to his theory of narcissism for these two quantitatively distinguished 
versions of narcissism perform their respective functions on the basis of its 
sociopsychological rule, which exactly allows him to diagnose not only indi- 
vidual but also social diseases. (In this context, I am aware of the exact influence 
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of Freud and Weber on Fromm’s method of the theory of narcissism concerning 
the meanings contained in the respective terms ‘individual’ and ‘social’. In 
addition, it is pointed out that, in the pathological level of Fromm’s psycho- 
analytic epistemology, the theory involves Freud and Marx (e.g. 1980a: chs. 6-7) 
– needless to say, Fromm’s early methodological foundations gave rise to this 
theoretical development. These pieces of evidence enable us to admit the long-
term effects of his method of analytic social psychology on his work.) 
 
(b) Narcissism and contemporary society: the ‘structure of industrial cybernetic society’ 
To fully understand Fromm’s conception of narcissism, it is most important to 
see its great stress on an aspect of narcissism in contemporary society. Indeed, this 
is precisely explained by his account of the ‘relation between the structure of 
industrial cybernetic society and the narcissistic development of the individual’ 
(1980b: 53; emphases added). The term ‘cybernetics’ suggested by the adjective 
cybernetic, as is well known, has gradually been used after WWII. Perhaps the 
most famous definition of the term in its contemporary sense is provided by the 
title of the mathematician Norbert Wiener’s book (1948): Cybernetics: or Control 
and Communication in the Animal and the Machine. In his sense, cybernetics is 
understood as a scientific approach aiming at controlling the world. To be sure, 
it would seem that this task is considered as the exact end that the ‘Enlighten- 
ment’ has attempted to achieve since Bacon and Descartes. If Enlightenment 
reason indicated by the intention of controlling the world, however, aims sim- 
ply to control the world, then it means only that we control the world and 
ourselves by knowledge. On the contrary, if it aims to emancipate us by con- 
trolling both the world and ourselves, then it leads us to control ourselves by 
ourselves. Quite ironically, nonetheless, while the latter is our purpose, the 
former is a consequence in reality. Rather, this aim has brought about the 
paradoxical fact that we are controlled by science (technology) exactly we have 
developed; in this respect, it is plausible to suppose that a result of the 
Enlightenment is dialectical, that is to say, we always intrinsically contain anti- 
thesis. 
    Fromm attempts to transform this dialectic by establishing his social theory 
particularly by considering how to overcome human narcissism. To put it dif- 
ferently, in his view the contradiction included in contemporary society, the 
outcome of the Enlightenment, should be sublated by overcoming ourselves. For 
these reasons, it can be argued that Fromm’s suggestion is that we should 
revive the position of subject only by getting rid of our subjectivity. For him, 
narcissism is exactly the condition in which man has not yet attained objectivity 
– in Fromm’s view, in this sense, science whether natural or social science is 
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quite subjective per se. (With respect to this issue, it would be necessary to offer 
a further account of his view of contemporary science. My stance on this theme 
is thus a simple provisional conclusion. It is expected that I will carry out res- 
earch into this topic in the future.) 
 
(c) Narcissism and the productive and nonproductive orientations 
In this section, first, it is important to look at the two kinds of character 
orientations, the ‘productive orientation’ and the ‘nonproductive orientations’. 
These ideas were first conceptualised in Man for Himself (1947), which on the 
whole related psychological problems to ethical matters. With regard this theme, 
Funk explains that, ‘[w]ith his [Fromm’s] theory of character (and of social 
character) he made values into an integral part of psychoanalytic theory’, and 
that, ‘[i]n so doing, he simultaneously advanced an ethical theory that gave a 
fruitful turn to the . . . psychoanalytic insight’ (Funk 2002: 4). In other words, 
Fromm turned his attention to ‘norms and values leading the realization of 
man’s self and of his potentialities’ (Fromm 1971: vii), taking over the issue of 
his preceding book Escape from Freedom; in this respect, his social psychology 
requires itself to be a normative theory too. With regard to this issue, much 
more importantly, the two concepts have contributed particularly to laying 
Fromm’s later theoretical foundations of his ideas, two kinds of character 
modes, ‘having and being modes’, in To Have or to Be? (1976); these two concep- 
tions drew their inspiration primarily from Marx and the theologian Meister 
Eckhart (e.g. Fromm 2005: pt III; 2011: 13-4, chs. 3, 7). Fromm asserts that the 
‘having mode’ characterising contemporary industrial society needs to be cha- 
nged to the ‘being mode’ in accordance with the transformation of its social 
character and its social structure (2011: ch. 7). He also tackles the issue of how it 
is possible (2011: chs. 8-9). In order to know this crucial point, however, we 
should first of all see the ethical theme presenting the two types of character 
orientations. 
    The productive orientation, Fromm explains, is concerned with a person- 
ality theory ‘refer[ring] to a fundamental attitude, a mode of relatedness in all 
realms of human experience’ (1971: 86). Fromm, then, makes it clear that the 
adjective ‘productive’ means the individual potential of whether one can show 
one’s ability one is endowed with. In other words, it is about how one relates 
himself to the world, that is about ‘a particular mode of relatedness to the 
world’ (1971: 91). Here Fromm’s conception of ‘relatedness’ is of enormous 
importance for grasping the signification of the term ‘productiveness’. For this 
purpose, his following account is supposed to be of considerable relevance. 
Fromm says: 
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Human existence is characterized by the fact that man is alone and separated from the 
world; not being able to stand the separation, he is impelled to seek for relatedness and 
oneness. There are many ways in which he can realize this need, but only one in which he, 
as a unique entity, remains intact; only one in which his own powers unfold in the very 
process of being related. It is the paradox of human existence that man must simultane- 
ously seek for closeness and for independence; for oneness with others and at the same 
time for the preservation of his uniqueness and particularity (1971: 96-7). 
 
As we shall see later, this description signifies the dialectic of human narcissism, 
namely ‘existential dichotomies’ (Fromm 1971: 41-5) – Koch, for example, calls 
this ‘existential contradictions’ (1990: 2). Regardless of Fromm’s psychoanalytic 
philosophy, however, it is possible to point out that it is always unavoidable 
that we run into difficulties with our narcissistic needs intrinsic to human 
nature despite some possibilities for coping with them; we have already known 
this fact particularly through carrying out some explorations of narcissism in 
Part II. In Fromm’s view, his conception of ‘productiveness’ enables us to ach- 
ieve the sublation of those dialectical contradictions (1971: 97). He points, for 
example, to ‘productive love and thinking’, which bring us to the full realisation 
of its aim (1971: 96-107). ‘Care’, ‘responsibility’, ‘respect’ and ‘knowledge’, says 
Fromm, produce productive love, on the one hand (1971: 97-101), and 
‘objectivity’ that respects the object, and that ‘see[s] the object as it is and not as 
he wishes it to be’, and ‘subjectivity’ that is interested in the object, bring about 
productive thinking, namely ‘reason’, differentiated from ‘intelligence’, on the 
other (1971: 102-7); love allows us to relate ourselves to others, and reason 
allows us to ‘reach to the essence of things and processes’ (1971: 102). To put it 
simply, each of productiveness is about ways of relating oneself to others and the 
world. In contrast to the productive orientation, in Fromm’s view, the non- 
productive orientations, on the whole, are the result of failing to establish those 
relationships. Any persons in these orientations, in other words, are not aware 
of the dialectic of narcissism, and thereby cannot sublate their intrinsic contra- 
dictions. 
    According to Fromm, the nonproductive character structure consists of four 
kinds of character orientations: ‘receptive’, ‘exploitative’, ‘hoarding’ and ‘mar- 
keting orientations’ (1971: 62-82). Dependence, on the whole, typifies the first 
orientation. Fromm claims that, for this type of persons, it is always quite dif- 
ficult to say ‘no’, and instead they say ‘yes’, whose attitude stems primarily 
from their ‘loyalty’ based on the senses of ‘gratitude’ to authorities and extreme 
‘fear’ of losing their help; this results in them being dependent upon anything 
and anyone for gaining any support despite the fact that superficially they seem 
‘optimistic’ and ‘friendly’ (1971: 62-3). The second type of orientation is chara- 
cterised by the character trait of ‘kleptomaniac’. This kind of person, Fromm 
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explains, is driven by the desire to use ‘cunning’ to obtain whatever they want 
for they cannot produce anything; he makes it clear that ‘suspicion’, ‘cynicism’, 
‘envy’ and ‘jealousy’ are characteristic of kleptomaniac personality that con- 
siders that, ‘[s]tolen fruits are sweetest’ (1971: 64-5). ‘[O]bsessive punctuality’ is 
the general character of the third type of orientation. On this view, Fromm 
argues that hoarding character trait does not put trust in anything except for 
oneself, and therefore that this attitude leads this type of persons to ‘hoarding’ 
and ‘saving[s]’; in his view, thus, they are always driven only to save their 
money by suspicion at the sacrifice of interpersonal relationships with others 
(1971: 65-7). 
    It is important to note that Fromm mostly devotes himself to accounting for 
the above fourth character orientation. The main reason for this devotion, how- 
ever, is clearly given by his explanations that, ‘[t]he marketing orientation deve- 
loped as a dominant one only in the modern era’ (1971: 67), and that, ‘[t]he mar- 
keting orientation does not come out of the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries 
[but] . . . is a modern product’ (1971: 81). In other words, it is typical of ‘modern 
society’ and ‘modern man’ fulfilling the ‘economic function of the market’ 
(1971: 67). This is a quite natural consequence because, in addition to the facts 
mentioned above, Fromm sees that an essential contradiction of contemporary 
society lies exactly in this issue – in this respect, his theory is self-critical. This is 
quite explicitly drawn by his following words, focusing on the function of ‘time’ 
in its contemporary sense: 
 
In industrial society time rules supreme. He current mode of production demands that 
every action be exactly ‘timed’, that not only the endless assembly line conveyor belt but, in 
a less crude sense, most of our activities be ruled by time. In addition, time not only is time, 
‘time is money’. The machine must be used maximally; therefore the machine forces its own 
rhythm upon the worker (2011: 104; emphases added). 
 
Moreover, Fromm adds: 
 
Via the machine, time has become our ruler. Only in our free hours do we seem to have a 
certain choice. Yet we usually organize our leisure as we organize our work. Or we rebel 
against tyrant time by being absolutely lazy. By not doing anything except disobeying 
time’s demands, we have the illusion that we are free, when we are, in fact, only paroled 
from our time-prison (2011: 105; emphases added). 
 
Fromm sees a great paradox in his society and his times in which he himself is 
embedded too, that is to say, he sees that although we are exactly the subject 
generating technology, we have been transformed into its object by our object; 
‘time’ as a manmade invention, in his view, confines man to its routine operation. 
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To be sure, such a view is not a new way of understanding modern and con- 
temporary times, as mentioned below, but it is characterised by a specific fea- 
ture: Fromm’s theory is self-critical, and requires itself to give an opportunity 
for self-reflection at the same time.7 This clearly explains, most importantly, that 
his primary concern is to struggle with his times, namely contemporary times. 
From this perspective, we can understand why Fromm concentrates his atten- 
tion on addressing the above fourth orientation concerning our character stru- 
cture. 
    What kind of character, then, is the ‘marketing orientation’? He quite pre- 
cisely tells that it ‘is rooted in the experience of oneself as a commodity and of 
one’s value as exchange value’ (1971: 68). To put it differently, one aims at 
satisfying his needs, on the one hand, and one sees himself as a means of fulfilling 
them, on the other. Significantly, this viewpoint reminds me of my research on 
Fujita’s political theory in the last chapter, that is to say, I am aware that in a 
sense it has much in common with a paradoxical understanding that, ‘[w]hile 
currency was once a simple means of exchanging things, it has aimed at exch- 
anging itself’ (see Ch. 5, p. 95). It is interesting to note that this is profoundly 
associated with the classic argument, or, more accurately, it implies that, as is 
well known, when capitalism highly develops its own mechanism, depending 
upon its specific ‘mode of production’, we human beings come into being as the 
object of products exactly we have produced in its system of society which relies 
upon the capitalist system of production. Perhaps, therefore, these two desc- 
riptions indicate that modern times have brought about a paradox peculiar to 
the era concerning the weird phenomenon of alienation; from this perspective, 
thus, we have become a simple commodity called ‘labour-power’. In philo- 
sophy, needless to say, the term alienation gives the certain signification that, in 
a capitalist market economy, human beings are controlled by the exact man- 
made methods fulfilling an important function of capitalist economy, such as 
currency, production and commodity, all of which generate ‘surplus value’, that 
is by ‘capital’, thereby losing the position of the subject; in this system, paradox- 
ically, capital turns into the subject. With regard to Fromm’s view of alienation, 
in connection with this situation, it must be stressed that Marx’s conception of 
Entfremdung, no doubt, must have occurred to Fromm when he was acutely 
aware of man’s bizarre attitude of regarding oneself as a means of preserving 
one’s own life. As a matter of fact, he received his interest in this concept almost 
completely from Marx’s theories of philosophy and economics particularly from 
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and Capital, vol. 1 (1867) (e.g. 
Fromm 2004: ch. 5). This is precisely explained, for example, by Fromm’s fol- 
lowing words provided in his work on Marx, Marx’s Concept of Man (1961): 
‘Marx’s philosophy, like much of existentialist thinking, represents a protest 
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against man’s alienation, his loss of himself and his transformation into a thing’ 
(2004: v; emphases added). On this view, it is noted that Marx’s significance for 
Fromm is given precisely by Marx’s description itself as follows: 
 
A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the product of his labor, from his life 
activity and from his species life is that man is alienated from other men. When man con- 
fronts himself he also confronts other men. What is true of man’s relationship to his work, 
to the product of his work and to himself, is also true of his relationship to other men, to 
their labor and to the objects of their labor. In general, the statement that man is alienated 
from his species life means that each man is alienated from others, and that each of the 
others is likewise alienated from human life (Marx 2004: 103). 
 
In Marx’s sense, alienation means that man is alienated not only from others, 
but, most importantly, also from himself, that is from his ‘species-being’ (e.g. 
2004: 100). In this situation, in Marx’s view, ‘species-life’ is completely spoilt by 
the phenomenon and disappears as a result (2004: 100-3). That is to say, this is 
the exact condition of ‘alienated labor’, which is done at the expense of species-
life, namely ‘human life’ (Marx 2004: 93-109). Fromm, needless to say, is too 
much aware of this fact. After pointing out that these circumstances give us an 
‘existential egotism’ represented by alienated labour as ‘a means for [our] 
individual existence’, Fromm cites Marx: ‘[i]t [alienated labor] alienates from man 
his own body, external nature, his mental life and his human life’ (2004: 53; cf. 
Marx 2004: 103). 
    Marx’s influence on Fromm particularly in respect of the latter view of alie- 
nation is of huge importance for gaining a rigorous understanding of the con- 
cept of ‘nonproductive orientations’ – this point is also relevant to Fromm’s 
theory of ‘having and being modes’. In fact, his conception of alienation cha- 
racterises his theory of marketing orientation as a nonproductive orientation. 
This is typically illustrated, for example, by his following description concern- 
ing self-identity formulated in societies based on the function of market eco- 
nomy. Fromm says: 
 
In the marketing orientation man encounters his own powers as commodities alienated 
from him. He is not one with them but they are masked from him because what matters is 
not his self-realization in the process of using them but his success in the process of selling 
them. Both his powers and what they create become estranged, something different from 
himself, something for others to judge and to use; thus his feeling of identity becomes as 
shaky as his self-esteem; it is constituted by the sum total of roles one can play: ‘I am as you 
desire me’ (1971: 72-3). 
 
It is plausible to believe that this human attitude leads to the precise process of 
alienating us from ourselves explained by Marx. Everything in this marketing 
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orientation is required to obey the principle of exchange, and the person cha- 
racterised as this type of orientation therefore needs always to be liked by 
others; that is, the self is identified only by the other – surprisingly, we perceive 
that this state of mind is exactly the same as narcissism. According to Fromm, in 
such persons, much more seriously, even the notion of equality is to stimulate 
‘selflessness’. He says: 
 
Equality, instead of being the condition for the development of each man’s peculiarity, 
means the extinction of individuality, the ‘selflessness’ characteristic of the marketing ori- 
entation. Equality was conjunctive with difference, but it has become synonymous with ‘in-
difference’ and, indeed, indifference is what characterizes modern man’s relationship to 
himself and to others (1971: 74). 
 
‘Equality’, then, has turned into a meaningless concept only inducing the atti- 
tude of ‘indifference’ typifying contemporary society. However, it is not yet 
clear how Fromm associates individual character traits with the social level of 
phenomenon of alienation. With regard to this issue, he provides a precise acc- 
ount by focusing on the ‘correlation between character orientation and social 
structure’ (1971: 78): ‘the whole personality of the average individual is molded 
by the way people relate to each other, and it is determined by the socio-
economic and political structure of society to such an extent that, in principle, 
one can infer from the analysis of one individual the totality of the social stru- 
cture in which he lives’ (1971: 79). Although to be sure Fromm basically dis- 
tinguishes between a social character and an individual character, and although 
he admits that there is a certain difference between them, he lays stress on 
‘social and cultural patterns’, paying attention to a common feature characterised 
by the majority of members in a society (1971: 60-1; 1980a: 74-5; cf. 1941: 277-8). 
This clearly means that individual character orientations enable him to identify 
social structures bringing about the phenomenon of alienation. We can thereby 
understand why the marketing orientation is the result of the development and 
existence of market economic society. 
    How are these four character orientations related to each other? Quite intere- 
stingly, Fromm points out that the three character traits, receptive, exploitative 
and hoarding orientations, have a common feature that they are specific to one’s 
character structure. By contrast, the marketing orientation is characterised by 
the fact ‘that no specific and permanent kind of relatedness is developed, but 
that the very changeability of attitudes is the only permanent quality of such orien- 
tation’, says Fromm (1971: 77; emphases added). This is why he concludes that 
the ‘ability to play the expected role is one of [the] main assets’ to contemporary 
people (1971: 82; emphasis added). In sum, man in the marketing orientation 
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believes that what he behaves as desired by others determines his value as a 
human being. 
    To be sure, Fromm’s personality theory seems to be in danger of over- 
generalising individual character traits. It is important to remember, however, 
that he notes that those distinctions are ‘ideal-types’, and that they definitely do 
not denote the certain individual character traits (1971: 61). In addition, he cla- 
rifies the psychological meaning of the categorisation of the character orien- 
tations, that is to say, he shows that ‘the character of any given person is usually 
a blend of all or some of these orientations in which one, however, is dominant’ 
(1971: 61). To put it simply, in Fromm’s view, despite the fact that one’s per- 
sonality mostly contains all the four orientations, certain features determine a 
pattern of one’s character traits embedded by a social structure by which one’s 
life has largely been affected. 
 
(d) Narcissism and the ‘having mode’ 
These discussions of the productive and nonproductive orientations, as men- 
tioned above, were succeeded, for example, by the theory of having and being 
modes in Fromm’s later work To Have or to Be?. This fact is of huge importance 
to my research particularly for seeing the close relationships between the pro- 
ductive orientation and the being mode, on the one hand, and between the 
marketing orientation as a nonproductive orientation and the having mode, on 
the other. To be sure, it is difficult to see these connections in Fromm’s works. 
Nonetheless, it is noted that the reason why I point to such relations, speci- 
fically to the latter, is because, as we saw above, the having mode characterises 
contemporary capitalist society operated by the marketing orientation in part- 
icular, and that this viewpoint is indeed appropriately explained in term of his 
concept of ‘social character’. For in Fromm’s sociopsychological theory the 
socioeconomic factor has the most powerful influence in determining social 
structures, as we have seen. This accounts for a profound effect of the mark- 
eting orientation and the having mode on his social psychology as negative 
factors for social processes. My investigation, then, focuses on the having mode 
making a negative impact on society. Having said that, I do not devote myself 
to completing this task due to the fact that, in my view, the issues concerning 
the having mode tackled by To Have or to Be? do not present new themes with 
the exceptions of the primary influence of Marx and Eckhart in respect of the 
inspiration of ‘having’ and ‘being’ and his new theory of ‘human change’ to 
establish a new society. Rather, therefore, I will concentrate my research on 
analysing the dialectical development of narcissism. 
    According to Fromm, the having mode is characteristic of ‘industrial society’, 
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namely the ‘acquisitive society’ (2011: 57), in contrast to the being mode fun- 
ctioning as ‘productive activity’ (2011: e.g. 74) – this term has almost the same 
meaning as ‘productiveness’, as we saw above, but it puts forward only a dif- 
ferent standpoint in the sense that To Have or to Be? much more strongly stresses 
the active. The present-day meaning of the having mode is that ‘to consume is 
one form of having, and perhaps the most important one for today’s affluent 
industrial societies’ (2011: 23), while the being mode is ‘the mode of existence in 
which one neither has anything nor craves to have something, but is joyous, 
employs one’s faculties productively, is oned to the world’ (2011: 16). On the 
former, in particular, Fromm emphasises that the main concern in contempo- 
rary industrial society is to increase ‘property’ by which one can gain reco- 
gnition (2011: 58); therefore, he says that, ‘[t]he nature of the having mode of 
existence follows from the nature of private property’ (2011: 63). This society, as 
mentioned above, reverses the positions of man and things, that is to say, the 
former turns into the object, on the one hand, and the latter turns into the sub- 
ject, on the other. This is understood as a paradox of capitalism illuminated by 
Marx’s theory of alienation. 
    What, however, most characteristically describes this kind of society? It is 
definitely not the marketing orientation or the having mode; in principle, these 
two concepts are regarded completely the same as each other. Needless to say, 
Fromm sees that narcissism characterises its society, that is to say, contem- 
porary society is narcissistic – in Fromm’s view, the ‘separateness and anta- 
gonism of individuals toward each other’ and the ‘worship of industrial pro- 
duction’ are the essential conditions developing narcissism (1980b: 53-4). He 
believes, however, that while it is intrinsic to human nature, we are required to 
overcome its natural human needs. We have to attain objectivity by breaking 
free from our narcissism, thereby first sublating the immanent contradiction of 
our existence. How, then, is this dialectic performed? 
 
(e) The dialectic of narcissism 
In order to consider this theme, I want to provide Fromm’s important view- 
point concerning his fundamental diagnosis of contemporary society: that is, 
‘[i]n the nineteenth century the problem was that God is dead; in the twentieth 
century the problem is that man is dead’ (1956: 360). It is important to note that 
this signifies the psychic condition that man is alienated from himself. As Koch 
puts it, ‘[i]nstead of experiencing oneness and the reality of the Sane Society, 
Fromm was confronted by estrangement and alienation everywhere’ (1990: 3). 
Fromm, through this diagnosis, takes particular notice of the spiritual crisis that 
our present-day society has suffered from alienation. In fact, he lays stress on 
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this pathological state of mind of society repeatedly, for example, in 1961 (2005: 
27): ‘alienation as a disease of modern man’ (2005: 23). This implies that he 
transferred a great emphasis on its concept primarily from his further reflec- 
tions on Marx (1961) I raised above and on Marx and Freud, Beyond the Chains of 
Illusion (1962), to his later representative works such as The Revolution of Hope 
(1968) and To have or to Be? (1976). These pieces of evidence demonstrate how 
the social phenomenon of alienation had a powerful impact on Fromm and his 
psychoanalytic therapeutic activities. From this perspective, I suggest that the 
most important signification of Fromm’s theory of narcissism can be seen only 
in terms of the socioeconomic structure of contemporary society. In these res- 
pects, the present-day implication of his conception of narcissism signifies pre- 
cisely the death of man in which he has been alienated from his ‘humanity’ (e.g. 
Fromm 1980a: chs. 3-7; 2004: chs. 4-5; and see 1964: ch. 4; 1980b: 51-4); to this 
extent, its mental condition is most dangerous to human beings. That is to say, 
the phenomenon of alienation stimulates narcissism; in this sense, they are com- 
patible with each other. 
    Despite these facts, in Fromm’s view, as we have seen, since narcissism is the 
most fundamental human intrinsic nature, it is increasingly getting harder to 
deal with its problem in contemporary society primarily as contemporary socio- 
economic structure spurs narcissism on to develop itself; in Fromm’s sense, it is 
quite difficult to cure the disease and to sublate the dialectical development 
containing the narcissistic contradictions. Notwithstanding such circumstances, 
however, he never gives up undertaking these difficult tasks. From Fromm’s 
perspective, man is by nature bound to require himself to sublate the contra- 
diction that he is each of biological and social beings. Fromm says: 
 
There is only one solution to his problem; to face the truth, to acknowledge his funda- 
mental aloneness and solitude in a universe indifferent to his fate, to recognize that there is 
no power transcending him which can solve his problem for him. Man must accept the 
responsibility for himself and the fact that only by using his own powers can he give 
meaning to his life. But meaning does not imply certainty; indeed, the quest for certainty 
blocks the search for meaning. Uncertainty is the very condition to impel man to unfold his 
powers. If he faces the truth without panic he will recognize that there is no meaning to life 
except the meaning man gives his life by the unfolding of his powers, by living productively; and 
that only constant vigilance, activity, and effort can keep us from failing in the one task that 
matters – the full development of our powers within the limitations set by the laws of our 
existence (1971: 44-5). 
 
At this point it is quite important to notice that Fromm divides the contra- 
diction, namely the ‘dichotomy’ in Fromm’s sense, up into its two kinds, with 
which we are naturally endowed: ‘existential and historical dichotomies’ (1971: 
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40-50). According to Fromm, the former is descried by the incompatibilities of 
human existence between reason and nature, between transcendence and par- 
tialness, between life and death, and so forth, whose problems cannot be solved 
in principle; other contradictions between loneliness and relatedness, and bet- 
ween solitude and solidarity, are also included in this type of dichotomy. The 
latter, says Fromm, is the contradiction between ‘individual and social life’, 
whose difficulty can be solved, as exemplified by the distinction between ‘an 
abundance of technical means for material satisfaction and the incapacity to use 
them exclusively for peace and the welfare of the people’ (1971: 43). However, it 
is interesting to note that as to the former, too, he admits that it is to a certain 
extent possible to deal with the problems, despite the fact that there is no com- 
plete solution to them (1971: 44). From this perspective, as noted above, Fromm 
asserts that only productiveness is to defeat the loneliness and meaninglessness 
of human existence. In addition, as he puts it: ‘[o]nly if he recognizes the human 
situation, the dichotomies inherent in his existence and his capacity to unfold 
his powers, will he [sic] be able to succeed in his task: to be himself and for 
himself and to achieve happiness by the full realization of those faculties which 
are peculiarly his – of reason, love, and productive work’ (1971: 45). 
    Perhaps it is possible to replace the expression of existential and historical 
contradictions by of narcissism in existence and in history. In the above context, 
although indeed Fromm does not refer to his theory of narcissism, it is no doubt 
appropriate to understand its discussion as an extension of that psychoanalytic 
theory. For in my view his word of dichotomies is merely an alternative of 
narcissism. In fact, this is elucidated by Fromm’s view of love that regards it as 
diametrically opposite to narcissism. Fromm writes: ‘[l]ove is not primarily a 
relationship to a specific person; it is an attitude, an orientation of character which 
determines the relatedness of a person to the world as a whole, not toward one 
“object” of love’ (1962: 46). It is considered that his conception of love explains 
how one relates himself to the world, that is to say, how he solves his existential 
and historical contradictions. As Fromm puts it, ‘the main condition for the 
achievement of love is the overcoming of one’s narcissism’ (1962: 118). From this 
viewpoint, man can overcome his contradictions in existence and in history by 
realising this type of love which aims at establishing relationships with others and 
the world. In other words, for Fromm loving is the most important and difficult 
productive work; love is ‘the answer to the problem of human existence’ (1962: 
7). For these reasons, in terms of Fromm’s theoretical framework narcissism ref- 
lects the bilateral character structure of the existence of human beings. 
    As regards the distinction between the two types of contradictions in exist- 
ence and in history, however, it is important to note that the core issue is simply 
to find some solutions to social problems (historical dichotomy) by overcoming 
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narcissism (existential dichotomy) with the help of love – it goes without saying 
that to perform this task is not simple.8 In this sense, most importantly, they are 
intertwined with one another. (From this perspective, our problems spring all 
from narcissism – each in historical and in existence.) In this scheme, however, 
the former narcissism is not dealt with only by the power of love, even though 
it can much help in making an effort of overcoming that. In Fromm’s view, 
historical narcissism must be tackled by another help of reason as noted above. 
The concept of reason, in Fromm’s sense, is quite different from Enlightenment 
reason and science in general. As mentioned above, it is directed towards 
‘reach[ing] to the essence of things and processes’, and, in this respect, it is 
subjective and objective. For Fromm, however, subjectivity does not simply 
denote enlightenment, and objectivity definitely does not mean empirical sci- 
ence given by the significations of ‘positivism’ and ‘behaviourism’. In some 
respects, Fromm’s ‘reason’ is rather much closer to the terminological sense of 
‘philosophy’ (philosophia), namely the love of knowledge; in this respect, in his 
view to be sure love enables man simultaneously to overcome his narcissism 
and to obtain reason. 
    Fromm, notwithstanding, is basically of the opinion that we have conside- 
rable difficulty in accomplishing both the objectives since, needless to say, con- 
temporary man and society are based on the socioeconomic structure inducing 
malignant narcissism. This is why in Fromm’s view we have been caught in and 
have not managed to get rid of a spiral of malignant narcissism, as mentioned 
in Chapter 4. The contemporary narcissistic self, who has resulted in killing 
oneself as well as others, is described in terms of Fromm’s theoretical stance as 
follows: 
 
[T]he statement ‘I (subject) have O (object)’ expresses a definition of I through my pos- 
session of O. The subject is not myself but I am what I have. My property constitutes myself 
and my identity. The underlying thought in the statement ‘I am I’ is ‘I am I because I have X’ 
– X equaling all natural objects and persons to whom I relate myself through my power to 
control them, to make them permanently mine (2011: 63). 
 
In this way, man has died. He has lost any relationships with others and the 
world. He only seeks to stick firmly to property, private things – this is our exact 
state of mind that man is deprived of reality!9 In these circumstances, obviously, 
it is not easy or even seems impossible to restore love and reason. While, there- 
fore, Fromm essentially puts his trust in human nature and some possibilities 
for restoring them (e.g. Fromm 1941, 1962, 1971), he leads us to realise ‘human 
change’ (2011: 137), namely the change of the character structure of contem- 
porary society (e.g. Fromm 1980b, 2011); this requires that we should alter our 
social character at the same time (2011: ch. 7). 
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    My fundamental question is whether it is possible to realise human change 
Fromm requires. I do not think it is possible if it means a complete change of 
man’s character structure and contemporary social structure. Although I do not 
completely reject Fromm’s suggestion, there is nevertheless little possibility of 
realising the change – to hold such a hope is always of huge significance though 
(I shall raise this theme in section 5 below). At this point it is enough to remem- 
ber that Fromm’s view on the narcissism of contemporary society in respect of 
his remedial perspective has much in common with Fujita’s in the sense that the 
latter also requires such a change, namely the ‘reform of our spiritual structure’, 
as we saw in the preceding chapter. Rather, my concern is to see Fromm’s best 
work – I think so – Escape from Freedom in terms of the development of nar- 
cissism concerning the dialectic of politics – I believe that there is a more pra- 
ctical answer to the crucial problem concerning some solution to it and some 
view of society exactly in this work. However, I will not conduct a detailed 
exploration, but simply look at the essence of the book, concentrating particu- 
larly on the political implications of narcissism. 
 
 
4.  Escape from Freedom: The Emancipation of Human Nature 
 
Fromm’s philosophical method of dialectic 
It has hardly been mentioned that Escape from Freedom basically describes the 
dialectical development of politics. Of course, ‘dialectic’ has sometimes been 
referenced, for example, in respect of Fromm’s view of politics almost to the 
extent that he points out that freedom undergoes a dialectical process (Bronner 
1992; Okazaki 2004; Xirau 1971; cf. Fromm 1941: 35, 104), and in terms of his 
view of human nature primarily concerning his discussion of the dichotomies 
(Braune 2011; Eckardt 1996; Millán 1996). Indeed, however, his philosophical 
position of dialectic concerns not simply the book and his view of politics, 
freedom and human nature but also other kinds of his tasks. In short, Fromm’s 
work itself is based on the philosophical method constituting his academic meth- 
odology and epistemology as a whole; this means that one cannot see Fromm’s 
attempts unless one knows this fact and the meaning of the philosophical met- 
hod of dialectic. Funk (1982, 1986), for instance, is one of the few persons who 
take notice of this point. Also, some other researchers clearly understand its 
crucial standpoint of Fromm’s (Klein-Landskron 1989; Le 2006). However, there 
is a common misunderstanding that the book Escape from Freedom is directed at 
a simple criticism of fascism (e.g. McLaughlin 1996). It is noted that this stems 
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primarily from the fact of being not aware that the task is performed by the 
method of dialectic. This philosophical device, most importantly, makes it pos- 
sible that democracy is compatible with fascism. Significantly, the existence of 
dialectic in Fromm elucidates the close relationship between his theory and 
Critical Theory (on this relation, see, e.g. Okazaki 2004) – since it takes a long 
space to address this topic primarily as it is generally thought of as a difficult 
and complex issue, I do not discuss its theme in my research. In this respect, 
therefore, it is plausible to believe that Fromm takes the dialectical viewpoint 
throughout his works. The following sentence, for example, characterises his 
method of dialectic. 
 
[m]an, the more he gains freedom in the sense of emerging from the original oneness with 
man and nature and the more he becomes an ‘individual’, has no choice but to unite him- 
self with the world in the spontaneity of love and productive work or else to seek a kind of 
security by such ties with the world as destroy his freedom and the integrity of his indi- 
vidual self (1941: 22-3). 
 
In my view, no one can provide such a view of things without being aware of 
the dialectical principle. It was natural, however, that Fromm should absorb 
this method, taking his academic background into account. In fact, he accepted 
its methodological device primarily from Marx (e.g. Biancoli 1989; Funk 1982, 
1986). Nonetheless, it is not right simply to think so. Funk, for example, points 
to the ‘ecstatic-cathartic conceptual model’ in relation to Fromm’s dialectic 
(1986: 1). According to Funk, this is derived from the ‘gnostic myths’, whose 
motif is depicted as the ‘pressure of reality’ in the state ‘cutting incisiveness’, 
and claims, therefore, that human beings require the salvation of the ‘human 
self’ and the ‘entire world process’. In these circumstances, they have been 
alienated from ‘their knowledge of their divine origin’, and thus, ‘they can 
either become completely estranged from that origin or recover knowledge of 
it . . . by becoming aware of their divine character’; this is the exact meaning of 
‘gnosis’ (1986: 1). This fact, then, leads Funk to see that ‘paradoxical logic’ also 
springs from the ecstatic-cathartic conceptual construct; for Fromm, this prin- 
ciple is the result of the ‘negative concept of God’ and of the view that philo- 
sophy embodies ‘the idea that god is the extreme form of ignorance’ (1986: 3). 
From this perspective, Funk says that dialectic takes a ‘three-phase rhythm of 
original state, alienation and return, of negation and negation of the negation, etc.’, 
referring to Ernst Topitsch: ‘[t]he distinctiveness of dialectics lies in its concept 
of negation, which means that dialectics proceeds by the negation of the given. It 
thus implies a particular kind of criticism’ (1986: 5; emphases added). He finally 
comes to the following conclusion: 
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[n]egation ultimately always means the negation of a negation. When a process and deve- 
lopment is understood dialectically, what exists is always and necessarily alienated and to be 
seen as the negation of an original condition. Interpreting a development dialectically as a pro- 
cess of negation means negating what existed before and exists now as a negation of an original 
state, and to abolish with this negation of the negation the negation of the original state (1986: 6; 
emphases added). 
 
Funk’s standpoint is of great value to my research, particularly to an explora- 
tion of Escape from Freedom from Fromm’s dialectical viewpoint. That is to say, 
dialectic, from this perspective, reflects the ‘negation of the given’, namely the 
return from alienation. I will look at the work employing dialectical logic below, 
focusing primarily on this crucial point. 
 
Escape from Freedom: the emancipation of constraints on human nature 
Perhaps Escape from Freedom is divided up into its three kinds of motifs concer- 
ning politics: the critique of fascism, the critique of democracy, and the critique 
of human nature. Indeed, all the statements are probably right about the concept, 
but virtually a combination of these three views is the most plausible account of 
the work. When, however, integrating the above third motif into the other 
views, shining a light on the last one, then a different motif as a whole comes 
into being as follows: the emancipation of constraints on human nature – in prin- 
ciple, this is the same as ‘positive freedom’, namely ‘freedom to’, as Fromm calls 
it (1941: 35-7). The three steps of dialectical development of ‘original state’, 
‘alienation’ and ‘return’ are a process of emancipating human nature for in this 
context sublation means the ‘negation of the given’, namely the return from 
alienation. That is to say, the negation of the present condition is exactly to 
break free from the constraints. In principle, we can release ourselves from our 
present suffering according to this framework. If we see Escape from Freedom in 
accordance with this logic, focusing on the concept of narcissism, then it comes 
out as follows. 
    Since in my research narcissism is regarded precisely as the most important 
intrinsic human nature, the primary emancipation of constraints is to overcome 
this sense of narcissism. As we saw above, however, according to Fromm, this 
fundamental need of ours (original state) has fallen into malignant type (alie- 
nation) due to the character structure of our society, or rather we are encou- 
raged to be much more narcissistic (alienation). That is to say, our social stru- 
cture has broken our mind, or, to put it another way, we have alienated ourselves 
from our original human nature. On this view, focusing on the relationship bet- 
ween ‘human existence’ and ‘freedom’, Fromm says: 
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Human existence begins when the lack of fixation of action by instincts exceeds a certain 
point; when the adaptation to nature loses its coercive character; when the way to act is no 
longer fixed by hereditarily given mechanisms. In other words, human existence and freedom 
are from the beginning inseparable (1941: 32). 
 
Fromm’s view of human existence is of huge importance to my enquiry as to 
what political implications of narcissism are included in his theory. That is to 
say, as he puts it, ‘man’s biological weakness is the condition of human culture’ (1941: 
33). Fromm illustrates the process that human beings establish their culture by 
employing the story of the Book of Genesis as follows – the illustration is cited 
below, although it requires a long space: 
 
The myth identifies the beginning of human history with an act of choice, but it puts all 
emphasis on the sinfulness of this first act of freedom and the suffering resulting from it. Man 
and woman live in the Garden of Eden in complete harmony with each other and with 
nature. There is peace and no necessity to work; there is no choice, no freedom, no thinking 
either. Man is forbidden to eat from the tree of knowledge of good and evil. He acts against 
God’s command, he breaks through the state of harmony with nature of which he is a part 
without transcending it. From the standpoint of the Church which represented authority, 
this is essentially sin. From the standpoint of man, however, this is the beginning of human 
freedom. Acting against God’s orders means freeing himself from coercion, emerging from the 
unconscious existence of prehumen life to the level of man. Acting against the command of 
authority, committing a sin, is in its positive human aspect the first act of freedom, that is, the 
first human act. In the myth the sin in its formal aspect is the acting against God’s com- 
mand; in its material aspect it is the eating of the tree of knowledge. The act of disobe- 
dience as an act of freedom is the beginning of reason. The myth speaks of other con- 
sequences of the first act of freedom. The original harmony between man and nature is 
broken. God proclaims war between man and woman, and war between nature and man. 
Man has become separate from nature, he has taken the first step toward becoming human by 
becoming an ‘individual’. He has committed the first act of freedom. The myth emphasizes 
the suffering resulting from this act. To transcend nature, to be alienated from nature and 
from another human being, finds man naked, ashamed. He is alone and free, yet powerless and 
afraid. The newly won freedom appears as a curse; he is free from the sweet bondage of paradise, 
but he is not free to govern himself, to realize his individuality (1941: 33-5; emphases 
added). 
 
Fromm’s description is thoroughly constituted by dialectical logic. Quite inter- 
estingly, first of all, while man is a human being, being himself is forbidden; 
that is, despite a human being, he is not allowed to be man. He is, however, a 
human being, so he naturally requires himself to be a human. Then, he has 
become himself by committing a sin. He has thus had his original sin by 
becoming himself. Whilst, however, he has already been a human being, he has 
not yet recognised his true self.10 Perhaps such an understanding can also be 
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illuminated by relying upon the gnostic interpretation I mentioned above. It is 
described by explaining a process of recovering one’s own knowledge. How- 
ever, here I proceed with my examination in a more appropriate way, con- 
centrating on narcissism. That is to say, while overcoming our ‘primary nar- 
cissism’ (on this, see App. 2, p. 248), we are nonetheless in danger of suffering 
from it again; we are still narcissistic. As Fromm puts it, 
 
Primary bonds once severed cannot be mended; once paradise is lost, man cannot return to 
it. There is only one possible, productive solution for the relationship of individualized man 
with the world: his active solidarity with all men and his spontaneous activity, love and 
work, which unite him again with the world, not by primary ties but as a free and in- 
dependent individual. However, if the economic, social and political conditions on which 
the whole process of human individuation depends, [sic] do not offer a basis for the rea- 
lization of individuality in the sense just mentioned, while at the same time people have lost 
those ties which gave them security, this lag makes freedom an unbearable burden. It then 
becomes identical with doubt, with a kind of life which lacks meaning and direction. 
Powerful tendencies arise to escape from this kind of freedom into submission or some 
kind of relationship to man and the world which promises relief from uncertainty, even if it 
deprives the individual of his freedom (1941: 36-7; emphases added). 
 
Here I replace the term freedom by emancipation. That is to say, primary ema- 
ncipation means ‘alienation’, and secondary emancipation is a way to ‘return’. 
Fromm depicts the former, namely ‘malignant narcissism’, as fascism (staying 
at the state of alienation), on the one hand, and the latter, namely the pro- 
ductive solution, as a way to democracy (returning), on the other. From this 
perspective, we are still under the condition that the existential contradiction 
(narcissism) has not yet been sublated. Rather, our state of mind that cannot 
bear our own existence of human beings (existential narcissism) has led us to be 
constrained by ‘“secondary bonds” as a substitute for primary bonds which 
have been lost’ (1941: 141); in Fromm’s view, this means exactly the process of 
‘escape from freedom’. From these viewpoints, our society to a greater or lesser 
degree has some fascist aspects. It is noted, however, that its degree determines 
whether or not a society is fascist, and that a pathological degree of narcissistic 
needs determines the condition of a society. To put it differently, according to 
Fromm’s sociopsychological theory, they depend upon the respective character 
structures of society. 
    Contemporary man, then, has suffered from his narcissism again. In my view, 
narcissism is our existence itself, and therefore constantly exists in our mind. As 
opposed to this intrinsic need of human beings, however, Fromm requires that 
we should always attempt to overcome our narcissism. How, then, can we do 
it? With regard to this issue, he is consistent in claiming that active love and 
reason (productive work) – spontaneity or activity – can break free from the 
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psychological condition and lead us to realise positive freedom and democracy; 
from a dialectical perspective, it is understood that they can emancipate us from 
constraints on our human nature. However, Fromm does not clarify anything 
about a possible way and process of recovering them. He simply says as fol- 
lows: ‘[t]he victory of freedom is possible only if democracy develops into a 
society in which the individual, his growth and happiness, is the aim and pur- 
pose of culture, in which life does not need any justification in success or 
anything else, and in which the individual is not subordinated to or mani- 
pulated by any power outside of himself, be it the State or the economic mac- 
hine; finally, a society in which his conscience and ideals are not the inter- 
nalization of external demands, but are really his and express the aims that 
result from the peculiarity of his self’ (1941: 270-1). 
    Surprisingly, Fromm does not change his stance at all even in his later book 
To Have or to Be?; this work is virtually regarded as his last task based on his 
social concern in his life. This writing as well as Escape from Freedom requires 
restoring democracy through ‘productive activity’ (2011: chs. 1-3, 5); in terms of 
the psychoanalytic intersubjective relationship, democracy requires the trans- 
formation from the having mode, in which there exists only the ‘pseud self’ 
(1971: 158), and in which this self is identified only by others, to the being mode, 
in which the self establishes relationships with others through creating activity, 
depending upon love and reason. However, there is only a different point bet- 
ween those works in the sense that the former aims at ‘human change’, that is at 
changing social and individual characters. Obviously, it seems quite difficult to 
realise this change primarily because it principally requires the change of the 
social structure of our society. Would it be possible? Fromm says yes, it would 
be when we meet the conditions of reforming it. Before seeing his conception of 
‘human change’, then, I will put forward three theoretical models of Escape from 
Freedom in terms of his theory of politics below, and thereby stressing some 
important political implications of narcissism in the work. 
 
Three theoretical models of Escape from Freedom: breaking free from fascism, 
realisation of democracy, emancipation of human nature 
First of all, the model of ‘emancipation of human nature’ is particularly stressed, 
comparing it with two other models as seen in Table 2. As described in ‘three 
theoretical models’, Escape from Freedom is composed of ‘overcoming fascism’, 
the ‘realisation of democracy’ and the ‘emancipation of humanity’ (realisation 
of self-love) in three theoretical levels. These three components contain three 
motifs of critiques of ‘fascism’, ‘democracy’ and ‘human nature’ respectively. 
Also, concerning these motifs of theory it is important to note that they have  
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Models 
 
Motifs of theory 
 
Basic theories 
 
Subject realms 
 
Overcoming 
fascism 
 
Criticism of 
fascism (Nazism and 
authoritarianism) 
 
Sadism-masochism 
(dependence on others) 
 
Psychoanalysis 
(social psychology), 
politics 
 
 
Realisation of democracy 
 
Criticism of 
democracy (regular life) 
 
Alienation  
(dependence on machine) 
 
Philosophy, 
sociology, politics 
 
Emancipation of humanity 
(realisation of self-love) 
 
Criticism of 
human nature (narcissism) 
 
Narcissism 
(exploitation of others) 
 
Philosophy, sociology, 
politics, psychoanalysis 
 
Table 2 Three theoretical models of politics in Escape from Freedom. 
 
their respective theoretical implications, ‘critiques of authoritarianism’, ‘regular 
life’ and ‘narcissism’. On this view, for Fromm ‘authoritarianism’ is replaced 
exactly by bureaucracy, which means that the former concept does not simply 
mean so-called violent Fascism as is well known, that ‘democracy’ means daily 
‘regular life’ repeated in the same way, and that ‘human nature’ is another 
expression of narcissism, which signifies the most fundamental human needs 
determining human nature and features. Sadistic-masochistic ‘authoritarianism’ is 
essentially based on ‘dependence on others’, on the one hand, and ‘democracy’ 
in a negative sense, which signifies contemporary disciplined, workaday daily-
life, is based on ‘dependence on machine’ as a routine life-cycle inducing 
‘alienation’, on the other. Also, while ‘humanity’ denotes both ‘self-love’ and 
‘narcissism’, love for the self in the negative sense, namely narcissism, comes 
into being in the form of ‘exploitation of others’. 
    As seen above, ‘authoritarianism’ and ‘narcissism’ are explained basically as 
pathological phenomena lying between the self and the other. On this view, as 
the Japanese sociologist Takeshi Deguchi puts it, ‘narcissists psychologically att- 
ack and distance from others, projecting their own negative personality traits 
onto the latter … thereby protecting their own pride and grandiose selves, and 
preventing their own painful negative psychology’; in this sense, authoritaria- 
nism is symbiotic, but narcissism is detached (2014: 6). To put it another way, 
while authoritarians are characterised by symbiosis, narcissists are characterised 
by segregation, namely exploitation. They are both described by the quality of 
relationships between persons, but most importantly, they have in common the 
fact that they both need others. For this reason, it is understood that those pat- 
hological phenomena are typified by the difference in distance between the self 
and others.  
    Next, it is important to note that ‘democracy’ and ‘fascism’, and ‘self-love’  
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   historical dichotomy                         democracy                     self-realisation (return) 
  
   
          
  existential dichotomy  dimension of                           human nature   
   
 
 
   historical dichotomy                               fascism                              exploitation of others 
                                                                                                                           (alienation) 
 
Figure 4 The theoretical model of ‘emancipation of human nature’ in terms of Fromm’s 
theory of narcissism in Escape from Freedom. 
 
and ‘narcissism’, are respectively in the dialectical relationships in Fromm’s 
theory of politics (democracy and fascism). Narcissism as an ‘existential dicho- 
tomy’ (see p. 163 above) is characterised as the dialectical contradiction between 
‘self-love’, which has a positive effect on humanity, and ‘narcissism’, which has 
a negative impact on human beings. Furthermore, in the human condition of 
‘existential narcissism’ (see p. 168 above) the dialectical process of history und-
ergoes in two dialectical ways of whether the self returns to ‘self-realisation’ on 
the basis of ‘productive love’ and ‘reason’, devoting himself to acquiring posi- 
tive ‘self-love’ internalised in himself (realisation of democracy), or whether he 
keeps being alienated by the ‘exploitation of others’, falling into the mechanism 
of negative narcissism existing in himself (backsliding into fascism). In Fromm’s 
social theory, this dialectical dynamics is called ‘historical dichotomies’ (pp. 
161-3 above), meaning the dialectical political law of development. 
 
 
5.  Fromm’s Theory of ‘Human Change’ 
 
According to Fromm, the change of character structures, namely ‘charactero- 
logical change’, can be done when individuals fulfil the four conditions: the 
awareness of our suffering, the acknowledgement of the cause of our ‘ill-being’, 
the recognition of some remedy for our ‘ill-being’, an understanding of the 
necessity of changing the present way of living according to norms for over- 
coming the difficulty (2011: 137). Subsequently, he suggests the conception of a 
‘new Man’, which is composed of twenty one qualities concerning character 
structures (2011: 139-40), and which brings himself to the ‘being mode’ for est- 
self-love 
dialectic
narcissism 
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ablishing the new society on the basis of ‘productive activity’. Since this is an 
important issue, I will summarise them below: 
 
1. ‘Willingness’ to transform from one’s own having mode into being mode. 
2. ‘Security’, ‘sense of identity’ and ‘confidence’ obtained by ‘relatedness’, 
‘interest’, ‘love’ and ‘solidarity’ on the basis of the being mode. 
3. The acknowledgement of the meaninglessness of one’s own life and the 
awareness of the ‘radical independence’ and ‘no-thingness’ leading one to 
‘sharing’ and ‘caring’. 
4. Self-expression. 
5. Satisfied not with ‘hoarding’ and ‘exploiting’ but with ‘giving’ and 
‘sharing’. 
6. ‘Love’ and ‘respect’ for all living creatures. 
7. Efforts to reduce ‘greed’, ‘hate’ and ‘illusion’. 
8. Having nothing about ‘worshiping idols’ and ‘illusions’. 
9. Cultivating individual ability to ‘love’ in conjunction with ‘critical’ thin- 
king. 
10.   Overcoming individual ‘narcissism’. 
11.   Strong hopes of the full development of ‘one’s fellow beings’. 
12.   The awareness of the necessity of ‘discipline’ and ‘respect for reality’ 
13. Admitting the possibility of healthily developing individuals only in the 
specific structure and the distinction between ‘structure as an attribute of 
life’ and ‘“order” as an attribute of no-life, of the dead’. 
14.   Raising individual ‘imagination’ expecting ‘real possibilities’. 
15.   Do not involve oneself and not be involved in dishonest behaviour. 
16.   Self-awareness. 
17.   An understanding of ‘nature’ and a sense of unity with it. 
18.   Freedom enabling one to become ‘oneself’. 
19.   Distrust of ‘evil’ and ‘destructiveness’. 
20.   Do not have any ‘ambition’ to a full realisation of these two qualities. 
21.   Replete with oneself ‘in the process of ever-growing aliveness’. 
 
Fromm presents not only the conception of a new Man but also of the new 
society; we should be careful about the signification of the latter concept, by 
which he intends the sole society. At this point it is important to remember that 
in his theory creating a new man precedes establishing a new society; this 
means that in his view the change of individual characters is previously com- 
pleted rather than the structural change of society. His suggestions for altering 
our society, focusing on some ways of dealing with social problems, are as 
follows. 
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1. Constructing the ‘industrial mode of production without total centra- 
lization’. 
2. The decentralisation of planning and the abolition of ‘free-market eco- 
nomy’. 
3. Aiming not at unlimited but at selective growth. 
4. Establishing working conditions stimulating one’s spiritual motivations. 
5. The development of science that avoids endangering man. 
6. The construction of social conditions giving well-being. 
7. ‘Basic security of individuals’ and the independence of bureaucracy.  
8. The realisation of ‘individual initiative in living’. 
 
From theses perspectives, one might see that there is almost no possibility of 
establishing a new Man or the new society Fromm puts forward. However, I do 
not deny his view. To be sure, virtually it would be true that either do we have 
considerable difficulty in realising them, or is there almost no hope to realise 
them – even though not entirely impossible. Much more importantly, however, 
Fromm is well aware of this fact (2011: 159); he best recognises that it is hard to 
deal with the difficulties. Most importantly, nonetheless, Fromm never throws 
away his hope for those attempts, or rather he tries to devote all his efforts to 
the task, which is given only a slight possibility. It can be argued that from his 
psychoanalytic perspective the reason why he decided to choose a more diffi- 
cult way of radically changing society by establishing his conception of the new 
society is because, unexpectedly, he arrived at the practical conclusion that soci- 
ety he saw needs a much more effective prescription which enables it to face 
exactly its own unconscious through his therapeutic practice. Perhaps this is 
why Fromm particularly stresses that, ‘[i]nsight separated from practice remains 
ineffective’ (2011: 139). In this respect, we should once listen to and accept the 
standpoint presented by a psychoanalytic practitioner. Or, more accurately, 
however, Fromm’s stance on contemporary society that quite severely sees the 
negative essence, no doubt, stems primarily from his actual experience that 
Nazi politics fell into the Weimar Republic. For instance, the dialectical view of 
politics Escape from Freedom takes cannot rigorously be understood without kno- 
wing the fact that it was first of all written on the basis of his background. In 
addition, it is pointed out that the primary reason why Fromm took part in the 
programme of ‘interdisciplinary materialism’ of the Institute for Social Research 
is because of the fact that Fromm shared with the main figures of the Frankfurt 
School not only the disciplinary concern but also a sense of crisis induced by the 
emergence of fascism apart from the failure of performing the historic task of 
the working class (cf. Whitebook 1996b: 288). His experience of facing a real 
fascism, undoubtedly, largely determined his standpoint that proposed a series 
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of concepts critical of contemporary ‘free-market society’, such as the ‘marke- 
ting orientation’ and the ‘having mode’, by laying stress on a passive and in- 
different attitude regarded as a negative aspect of contemporary people shared 
by Nazis (see, e.g. Fromm 1941, 1962, 1964, 1971, 2010, 2011).  
    These two experiences must have given rise to his position that problems 
come not from outside but from inside. According to this view, we therefore 
immanently internalise evil. As a matter of fact, Escape from Freedom begins by 
putting forward the viewpoint, raising John Dewey’s description of the political 
menace: ‘“[t]he serious threat to our democracy”, he says, “is not the existence 
of foreign totalitarian states. It is the existence within our own personal attitudes 
and within our own institutions of conditions which have given a victory to 
external authority, discipline, uniformity and dependence upon The Leader in 
foreign countries. The battlefield is also accordingly here – within ourselves and 
our institutions”.’ (1941: 5; emphases added); in this sense, Dewey is a political 
spokesman for Fromm. 
    My research, however, does not take the same stance as Fromm’s particularly 
with respect to his remedial perspective. While admitting that his prescriptive 
standpoint I noted above is to a certain extent relevant to curing individuals 
and society, I am nevertheless of the opinion that Fromm’s social theory has 
resulted simply in focusing on ethical and normative viewpoints despite his 
psychoanalytic knowledge, and therefore that it has not sublated the contra- 
diction generated by our narcissistic needs. That is to say, any suggestions are 
not useful for giving a remedy unless they identify how it is possible to realise 
them. Hence, I do not require ‘human change’, but changing our political view 
into another one that leads us, individuals and society, to be aware of the imp- 
ortance of social solidarity, and then that realises the change by ourselves. In 
this respect, my standpoint, different from Fromm’s, aims not at the complete 
reform of society but at a partial reform of society. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1 To describe the signification of its full development, Fromm stresses the importance of the 
personality of spontaneity in his following writings (e.g. 1941: ch. 7; 1962: 20-33, 128-9; 2011: 
38-9, 72-9; cf. 2005: 126) and the personality of productive love in following sources (e.g. 
1941: 114-6, 261; 1962: chs. 2, 4; 1971: 96-110, 129; 2005: 101-2; 2011: 37-9; cf. 2010: 75). In these 
works, both terms are often employed together. 
  2 I do not concern myself with the criticism of Habermas’s application of psychoanalysis to 
Critical Theory represented by Joel Whitebook (e.g. Whitebook 1996a, 2001). To be sure, it 
might seem that my research relies upon the early Habermas’s epistemology in respect of the 
self-reflective standpoint particularly through the psychoanalytic way of intersubjective 
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mutual understanding, but it is noted that such a viewpoint has already been not specific to 
Habermas. Whitebook has actually become aware of this fact and wrote, e.g. ‘Mutual 
Recognition and the Work of the Negative’ (2001), directing her critique against Honneth. He 
actually replies to Whitebook’s view that Critical Theory spoilt sociotheoretical ‘negativity’ 
through this ‘intersubjective, socialization-theoretical turn’, and argues as follows: ‘[w]hether 
the life-long influence of early expectations of security can be described as the “work of the 
negative” or merely as a largely unconscious need might be a question of scientific temp- 
erament. In any case, it does not seem to me to be wholly inappropriate to view this as an 
infinite source of antisociality, because each act of resistance to the independence and un- 
controllability of the other, who thereby embodies socially, is new. But it remains unclear to 
me why this motive should be antithetically opposed to intersubjectivism. Why should the 
idea of a life-long willingness for fusion contradict the concept of recognition? Is the fact that 
transitional objects serve to help us cope emotionally with our separation from primary 
objects, which we now recognize as being independent, not a clear indication of the inordi- 
nate significance of intersubjectivity?’ (2012: 229). Perhaps the core issue of Critical Theory’s 
theory of intersubjective recognition lies in this point. 
  3 On Fromm’s doctoral thesis, see, e.g. Sahler 1988. 
  4 Salvador Millán identifies a problem contained in this concept: ‘[h]ow shall we facilitate the 
breaking down of the rigidity of the structures without opposing it rigidly with a solution? 
And in the very terms of the social character, how shall we face the rigidity of character, if it 
is itself the result of social adaptation, a process in which class differences, exploitation on 
the job, and inequality prevail as determining elements and in which, as a dominant emo- 
tional characteristic, is apparent a vertical authoritarian type of relationship and a passive-
exploitative character?’ (1992: 57). 
  5 Okazaki’s view would be true to this extent. However, if he is of the opinion that the 
emphasis on the social needs is specific to Fromm’s psychoanalysis, then it is completely 
wrong (2004: 85-6, 134-40). Many psychoanalysts who started their academic careers from 
Freudians have laid stress on the fact that they are intrinsic to human beings (e.g. Kernberg 
1975; Kohut 1971, 1977; Sullivan 1974, 1997; Winnicott 1965). Phenomenological psycho- 
pathology, for example, extends such a simple psychoanalytic scope of individual percep- 
tion to ‘lifeworld’ (e.g. Blankenburg 1971). In my view, instead, the theoretical possibilities of 
Fromm’s psychoanalysis are illustrated precisely by ‘Analytical Social Psychology’ whether 
or not the conception of the social needs exists in the works written before the publication of 
Escape from Freedom. That is to say, Fromm is characterised particularly by his academic style 
of absorbing Marx and Freud at the same time and integrating them into a psychoanalytic 
theory by means of his sociological approach – as far as I know, there are only a few socio-
psychoanalytic approaches which related these two theorists in a theory, and which the so-
called psychoanalysts have proposed. In this sense, one cannot see Fromm’s psychoanalytic 
theory or his theory unless one knows Fromm’s fundamental philosophical method of 
dialectic, which typifies his theory in general apart from his academic background of socio- 
logy. 
  6 It would seem that this is also elucidated by Fromm’s unique conception of narcissism, 
distinguishing between individual and group (social) narcissism, the latter of which was 
invented by his later psychoanalytic theory; this means that he was consistent in his early 
methodological stance. 
  7  It would seem, however, that I should carry out a further investigation into whether 
Fromm’s social theory is self-critical and self-reflective. Having said that, since my primary 
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purpose in this exploration is not to conduct research into its theoretical aspect of Critical 
Theory, it will be done in the future. 
  8 With regard to this issue, to be sure, Fromm seems slightly confused. Although ‘existential 
dichotomy’ in Fromm’s sense is understood as narcissism that must be surmounted, he insists 
that there is no hope to settle the difficulties; however, he says that it is possible to cope with 
them by respective means (1971: 44). That is to say, my enquiry is what it means that human 
beings are all required to overcome narcissism. Indeed, it is understood that we cannot remove 
the contradiction between life and death. It is possible, however, to erase the dichotomies 
between loneliness and relatedness, and between solitude and solidarity, that is to say, the 
differences between them are given merely by the description of human emotions. Whilst the 
former contradiction is a physical problem that is definitely not soluble, the latter is a soluble 
sociopolitical problem concerning our mental condition. This is the exact dialectical matter. 
Maybe, in this respect, Fromm is not confused by the theme, but implies that narcissism as 
existential dichotomy should be overcome by means of the latter way, namely the solution of 
historical dichotomy. 
  9 As opposed to Arendt, however, Fromm definitely does not deny the social, but he rather 
supports the essence and finds some vital clues to steering contemporary society out of the 
spiritual crisis exactly in this concept. Here I do not discuss this topic since my concern in 
this research is not to tackle its issue. 
10 The concepts of ‘true self’ and ‘false self’ were presented by Winnicott (1965) (on this, see 
App. 2, pp. 247-8). 
  
 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 
 
How Is the Self Related to Politics? 
Towards the Foundations of Democracy 
 
 
 
 
 
So far I have discussed human nature in respect of some social and political 
issues with a focus on the indispensable human intrinsic feature of narcissism, 
referring to Fujita’s and Fromm’s social and political theories. The former lived 
in Japan, and the latter was born and lived in Germany and stayed in the US for 
over forty years; hence, their social and historical backgrounds are different 
from each other despite some similar aspects concerning the processes of their 
historical developments. As we have seen, nonetheless, they shared a certain 
stance on society concerning its negative aspect particularly with respect to con- 
temporary times; that is, contemporary society has killed ‘others’ and ‘man’ 
(narcissism). There is no need to explain that this view is provided simply as a 
metaphor – however, since generally it means a specific view of human exi- 
stence in the spiritual dimension, the sentence is not understood simply as a 
metaphorical expression. Rather, the two theorists’ common viewpoint shows a 
state of mind of contemporary people. It must be stressed, however, that each 
theory does not provide any effective prescription for curing society’s ill of nar- 
cissism. They both, on the whole, have failed to create practical treatment for 
social narcissism as we have seen: first, in the sense that Fujita’s theory neither 
epistemologically nor methodologically nor practically satisfies a requisite for a 
remedial standpoint despite some relevant suggestions; second, in the sense 
that Fromm’s theory has fallen into a simple moral and normative theory with 
respect to its prescriptive viewpoint of society; and third, in the sense that each 
theory ineffectively stresses only negative ingredients of narcissism specifically 
in relation to their respective perspectives of society. In these respects, it is con- 
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sidered that both theorists do not fulfil theoretical requirements of prescription. 
For these reasons, it should be noted that those theories have resulted merely in 
identifying the existence of the social unconscious particularly concerning the 
social disease of ‘social (group) narcissism’ as far as their social theories are con- 
cerned. However, it should be noted that the task of identification only conce- 
rns examination and diagnosis; thus, there remains the most important work of 
treatment. 
    How can we perform this function? Of course, it is absolutely impossible to 
complete the task only through my doctoral research. Rather, it requires a cer- 
tain period of time and several remedial steps, and here I will therefore con- 
centrate my exploration on laying the theoretical foundations of a political view 
of democracy in its epistemological dimension. To put it differently, here my att- 
empt will simply put forward a slightly provocative standpoint of politics that 
is expected to change the fundamental stance on our way of social and political 
life. For this purpose, I want once to refer to Kohut, focusing particularly on his 
conception of the ‘self’. It is hypothesised that his perspective highlighting the 
vulnerable self will help to alter a general view of democracy. That is to say, 
most importantly, the issue is how to face this weak self who is concerned only 
with oneself. From this perspective, I will first consider whether democracy is 
incompatible with narcissism, getting back to my previous discussions. I will 
then apply Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory to social and political theory, shining 
a light on the psychoanalytic meaning of self-other relations. I will finally reflect 
upon politics in terms of this psychoanalytic interpersonal relationship. These 
explorations must lead us to see our democracy from a novel and unconven- 
tional perspective. 
    The task of giving a prescription for the disease of narcissism, then, will be 
undertaken through carrying out a series of works on laying the foundations of 
society and politics. At this point, therefore, I simply attempt to prevent our nar- 
cissism from consigning its own conflicts to the unconscious. That is to say, through 
this investigation it is claimed that we can sublate our contradiction causing 
social and political problems only in so far as facing our difficulty, namely the 
psychological vulnerability of human beings. My primary concern, however, is 
not only to carry out these idealistic reflections. Most importantly, I am defini- 
tely not satisfied with a simple theoretical and speculative research. Above all, 
my theoretical endeavour will need some practical attempt in the future – this 
does not mean that empirical research fulfils its requisite, but that theory con- 
cerns and requires practice.1 
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1.  Is Narcissism Incompatible with Democracy? 
Between Fromm and Fujita 
 
Can narcissism be coexistent with democracy? Or is the former incompatible 
with the latter? If so, why? Perhaps, first of all, some might see that these enq- 
uiries are quite ridiculous primarily because there is no need to explain that 
democracy requires individual autonomy; this perspective is of the opinion that 
individuals are intrinsically independent of each other. This stance is repres- 
ented definitely by John Locke. For him, individual autonomy is a mere alter- 
native of ‘property’ defined as a right to one’s inviolable ‘own person’ (1988: pt 
II, ch. 5). In Locke’s view, everyone has a ‘property in his own person’, and so 
his person and his labour specific to him are necessarily inseparable from each 
other; hence, his property is only his own thing. Also, on the grounds that man 
was given property rights by God, says Locke, no one can infringe upon his 
property. In other words, for him the individual means simply a subject pro- 
vided with a ‘property in his own person’; in this respect, he writes that ‘all 
mankind [is] . . . equal and independent’. In Locke’s political society, the auto- 
nomous individual is a man who is related only to God; this individual the- 
refore establishes his society simply for protecting his own property. Hence, 
Locke’s political society essentially requires individual autonomy. For these rea- 
sons, Locke is not aware of the phenomenological signification of individual 
constituted by intersubjective relationships. Second, one might see that my enq- 
uiry provides an implausible standpoint of the individual in the sense that the 
concept of narcissism is invalid in the first place. Perhaps this stance is chara- 
cterised by Nietzsche’s conceptions of the subject and the self. Not only does he 
deny the idea that the subject controls its own action, that is to say, he inva- 
lidates the modern concept of subject (see Ch. 3, s. 1), but obviously he also 
refuses the notion of vulnerable self. His perspective, then, rejects the above 
issues themselves. Third, some others might claim that, since the self is cons- 
tituted by collective identity and character, and therefore since the individual 
does not directly concern politics per se, the weakness of a self should sup- 
plement its necessities with the empowerment of a group he belongs to. This 
stance may be represented by Michael Walzer. He contends that the individual 
powerlessness stems from the fact that one belongs to a group, or, to put it 
simply, its disadvantage and powerlessness are ‘the result of [one’s] collective 
identity’ itself (2004: 32): ‘the individual men and women who occupy the 
lowest ranks on the global hierarchy are there because they are poor, obviously, 
but also because they are . . . Congolese, Rwandan, or Bengali – or Kurdish or 
Palestinian’ (2004: 135). Hence, ‘meat-and-potatoes multiculturalism’, namely 
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material empowerment of groups, is necessary for them (2004: 38). To be sure, 
his argument is aware of the collective self, and seems quite relevant to political 
practice. However, it also compels me to spoil my discussion for his view dis- 
regards the psychoanalytic individual self made up of different ingredients 
from group identity. 
    It should be noted that these three standpoints do not necessarily episte- 
mologically correspond to the issues raised above. It is important to remember, 
however, that through establishing these viewpoints I definitely do not aim at 
denying the significance of their respective perspectives but at identifying the 
political implication of narcissism: the intersubjective ingredient constructing the 
individual in political life. Most importantly, this psychoanalytic standpoint cla- 
rifies what is intended by the ontological individual that has been ignored by 
many fields in the social sciences. To put it differently, so far a large number of 
issues in the social sciences have not perceived the individual intersubjectively 
constituted in the space of psychoanalytic self-other relations, in which one is not 
reduced, for example, either to an autonomous individual or to a social being or 
to a simple psychological being or to a disciplined self (see Ch. 3) – although 
phenomenological sociology, constructivism in international relations and phe- 
nomenological linguistics, for example, try to deal with their respective discip- 
linary issues by applying the concept of intersubjectivity, my approach is dis- 
tinguished from those standpoints, for neither do they present the viewpoints 
of the psychoanalytic individual and society consisting of that kind of beings, nor do 
they aim to gain an understanding of these two theoretical perspectives. Hence, 
the three issues Locke, Walzer and Nietzsche have put forward should be und- 
erstood as simple examples to demonstrate this fact. This means, therefore, that 
the three descriptions show the important evidence that the discipline of poli- 
tical theory has so far almost completely disregarded and has been unaware of 
the psychoanalytic, intersubjective individual I explained above. 
    By contrast, as we have seen, Fujita and Fromm perceived – albeit not com- 
pletely – the existence of the psychoanalytic function of intersubjectivity in the 
formation of the individual. Nonetheless, they almost entirely rejected human 
narcissism, and therefore did not manage to grasp the political signification of 
the vulnerable self. This is a crucial matter for my research. In my view, nar- 
cissism is not simply a hindrance to political and social life, but most imp- 
ortantly, the instinctual need is essential for human life. From this perspective, 
the critical problem is how to face the obstacle and indispensable human need of 
narcissism. From my research perspective, there is no person who gives a vital 
clue to seeking for some ways of tackling this problem as better as Kohut does. 
Above all, he provides us with some essential meanings of the self concerning 
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social and political life, and his viewpoint must be of great relevance for estab- 
lishing a new type of view of politics. 
 
 
2.  What Is Needed? As Seen from Kohut’s Perspective 
 
What is needed for balancing democratic life in which, while the self is abs- 
orbed in himself, he cares about and respects others? This is actually a conside- 
rably difficult matter for both individuals and politics. It would be impossible, 
however, to emancipate human nature from the constraint of narcissism, and to 
even realise democracy, by denying the need as Fromm and Fujita did. Essen- 
tially, my stance is to accept the narcissistic self. Basically, I take the view that 
there is no way of performing those crucial tasks with the exception of this 
method. In fact, my position is in favour of Kohut on the grounds that his self 
psychology stresses the raison d’être of the self, while based on the stance that 
human psychology and human beings are intersubjectively constituted. To put it 
simply, his psychoanalytic theory highlights the significance of the self. Since in 
Chapter 3 I already laid the anthropological foundations of my research thro- 
ugh applying Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory based on the relevance of the self, 
focusing particularly on his theory of narcissism, here I will therefore devote 
my attempt to integrating the Kohutian self into a theory of political life in the 
ontological dimension of the individual. My research, however, will simply 
carry out a brief exploration, referring primarily to the anthropological fou- 
ndations laid through conducting the works of Chapters 3 and 4. I will first 
raise an issue of the self presented by the discipline of political theory, parti- 
cularly taking notice of Foucault’s conception of the self, and then examine 
what meanings the Kohutian self gives to politics. 
 
The concept of self and Foucault 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the concept of self began with Descartes. This 
Descartian rational self, however, later resulted in being rejected primarily by 
relying upon the notion of ‘will to power’ and by discovering the ‘unconscious’. 
These challenges to the modern self and the subject were taken over, for exam- 
ple, by Foucault who strongly supports the former view. Famously, he has con- 
ducted a series of historical research into the connection between ‘knowledge’ 
and ‘power’, primarily raising the concepts of ‘madness’ and ‘discipline’. In his 
early work Madness and Civilization (1961), Foucault claims that since modern 
times madness has transformed itself from the embodiment of reason into 
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psychic illnesses. Through this transformation, in his view, this sense of mad- 
ness has gradually been excluded from society by institutionalising the modern 
asylum as a device of incarceration; in this context, it does not simply mean 
insane patients but excluded persons, and the completion of this mechanism is 
therefore exactly the birth of the apparatus of social exclusion as a modern tec- 
hnology. For him, thus, psychiatry merely fulfils its role as a technique for rem- 
oving madness as an object of social oppression; this knowledge is therefore 
complicit in the institutionalisation. In Discipline and Punish (1975), then, Fouca- 
ult shows that the transition from corporal punishment to imprisonment means 
the emergence of a new kind of power that the modern power of knowledge 
justifies and determines punishment (‘power/ knowledge’), and that the subject 
is disciplined by internalising the surveillance of prison as a modern technique 
(‘disciplinary power’), introducing Bentham’s idea of Panopticon prison. From 
this perspective, modern-contemporary society comes into being as a prison, 
and knowledge and technology as important means of disciplining man. Here 
knowledge and power are closely intertwined with each other – in this context, 
Foucault’s criticism is also directed against psychoanalysis as well as psychiatry 
as pseudo-sciences. He has thus led the subject to become a simple being inter- 
nalising discipline as the demands of society by adopting the systematic theo- 
retical panopticism to the theory of power. 
    Significantly, however, in his last work The History of Sexuality (1976-84) his 
concern turns into the concept of self on the whole. In this series of works, 
Foucault begins by throwing into question the ‘repressive hypothesis’ that sex- 
uality has been repressed in modern western society, arguing that, in contrast to 
the supposition, the Western world has brought man to sexual beings through 
increasing the discourse on sexuality on the basis of the ‘will to knowledge’; 
here ‘biopower’ controlling human sexual desires, namely human life itself, has 
come into being. Second, Foucault starts to draw attention to the self. In this 
attempt, focusing on ancient Greece, he contends that in Greek antiquity provo- 
catively the subject of morality obtained truth and self-mastery through sexual 
relationships, that is through the ‘use of sexuality’; in his view, sexual practice 
was directed exactly towards attaining morality in this society. Finally, Foucault 
elaborates his discussion of sexual morality, shining a light on the self. In anci- 
ent Rome, he claims, man was led to the ‘care of the self’ by the ‘culture of the 
self’. In particular, he stresses that this attitude of self-esteem enabled another 
aspect of marriage to be a contract for sexual and interpersonal relationships 
between spouses; this is the emergence of the mutually equal relationship bet- 
ween husband and wife. In sum, the care of the self captures the essence of 
Greek and Roman antiquity concerning sexuality, says Foucault. 
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    My fundamental enquiry is why Foucault later concerned himself with the 
concept of self. From the above brief survey of his works, however, my insight 
into this topic is limited to a very narrow extent. While, unfortunately, he him- 
self does not say anything about the reasons for it in his above last reflections, it 
is possible, nonetheless, to gain a clue to dealing with this issue by taking notice 
of his later series of lectures on ‘government’ given from 1977 till 1984. It is 
quite interesting to note that this work was conducted precisely during the term 
when Foucault published the series of volumes The History of Sexuality, which 
displayed his strong interest in the self, as we saw above; in this respect, it is 
evident that there are some important suggestions concerning his conception of 
the self in the lectures. Yet there does not remain any space to tackle this issue 
in great detail. Some points, however, can be observed at this stage. With 
regard to this topic, it can be argued, first of all, that Foucault became aware of 
the limitation of his systematic theoretical concept of ‘power/knowledge’ in 
terms of an aporia of his theory of power, given exactly by his conception of 
subjectivity (subject) he himself had put forward, and, second, that he recog- 
nised that there is no other way of establishing a new kind of society, in which 
the subject as well as knowledge can break free to some extent from his idea of 
power, with the exception of relying to a greater or lesser degree upon the self, 
even if succeeding in deconstructing the concept. Or, more accurately, Foucault 
at long last arrived simply at the conclusion that it is necessary to give not solely 
the subject but the self some possibilities for altering a structure that disciplines 
human body and regulates human life itself, and that absorbs knowledge – and 
his theory itself as well – into the category of power, by way of the intersub- 
jectively constituted ‘government of self and others’, whose theoretical signifi- 
cation and intention essentially cast doubt on his conception of subjectivity 
made up primarily through his early works. Here I do not afford to devote 
myself to carrying out any detailed research into these topics concerning the 
later Foucault. Instead, I will only raise some issues concerning the above views 
below. First, is Foucault’s conception of social struggle compatible with his the- 
ory of ‘government of self and others’? Second, is the latter concept based on 
and does it aim at establishing intersubjective interpersonal relationships? To 
clarify these issues, it would seem that I should refer to his concept of 
‘governmentality’, which is believed to be first put forward in his lecture 
‘Security, Territory and Population’ (1978). In short, my primary enquiry is how 
Foucault attempted to change negative systematic panopticism to positive gov- 
ernment based on the place of social struggle – the latter can be understood as 
‘agonistic democracy’. Unfortunately, here I cannot proceed with a further dis- 
cussion. Rather, my exploration suggests that, instead of the Foucauldian self 
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who is willing to be involved in social struggle, the subject regarded as the 
vulnerable self constitutes democracy. 
 
The relevance of the Kohutian self for politics 
Basically, as we have seen, my stance is that the self is made up of psycho- 
analytic interpersonal relationships with others. This self, in my view, is based 
on Kohut’s model of ‘Tragic Man’ who ‘is led by his ideals but pushed by his 
ambitions’, that is who comes into existence as the ‘bipolar self’ having ‘gradient 
of tension between two differently charged (+, -) electrical poles’ (see Ch. 3, s. 1). 
On the one hand, the ‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’ requires charging his ambi- 
tious pole up with the help of the ‘mirroring selfobject’, and, on the other hand, 
the ‘idealized parent-imago’ requires charging his ideal pole up with the help of 
the ‘idealized selfobject’. As explained in Chapter 3, this means that the existence 
of two types of others is indispensable for human beings. Admittedly, from this per- 
spective the self is an extremely vulnerable being. Again, we remind ourselves 
of this fact by referring to Eugene O’Neill’s literary depiction of human exis- 
tence Kohut emphasises: ‘Man is born broken. He lives by mending. The grace 
of God is glue’. My task is therefore to seek to glue the self onto the other. From 
this perspective, narcissism is the state of the self who has not yet glued himself to 
others. At this point we become aware that there is no need to regard narcissism 
as a hindrance to the politics of democracy, and that it is rather an absolute 
necessity in political life. 
    How do we manage to establish the above relationship? With regard to this 
issue, I am of the opinion that performing this work signifies exactly politics. 
However, it might seem necessary for us to follow some principles that regulate 
our behaviour itself. My method, nonetheless, is not simply to apply a nor- 
mative approach for addressing this theme. Rather, I take a remedial stand- 
point based on Kohut’s psychoanalytic theory. Again, let us take a look at the 
discussion in Chapter 3. Both sociological functionalism and Foucauldian pan- 
opticism have resulted in eliminating the scope for individual capacity to act 
freely from sui generis social facts and power. For them, therefore, all are redu- 
ced merely to each category, and then there is no room for individual thinking 
and determination that neither social facts nor power affect. For the purpose of 
overcoming these theoretical difficulties, I advanced my methodological tool 
called ‘psychoanalytic self-other relations’, in which it is supposed that both the 
categories do not influence individual behaviour on the grounds that the indi- 
vidual does not come into being either as a functionalist social being or as a 
disciplined subject but as a self (other) in the relationship; the self acts in his 
own ‘space of the self’, in which the self becomes the other and vice versa. In 
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this context, individuals are all recognised by others who own their respective 
masks. In addition, the fact that the self is affected and constituted by others 
gives rise to the emergence of the ‘group self’; many similar personalities of 
selves are a potential group self. In order to see this self, we actually need to go 
into ‘his inner world’ by employing Kohut’s methods of ‘introspection’ and 
‘empathy’ – as mentioned in Chapter 3, I call this ‘methodological psycho- 
analysis’ and the individual observed by this method, namely the Kohutian self, 
the ‘methodological psychoanalytic individual’. I will seek to establish a new 
aspect of the knowledge of politics in terms of this psychoanalytic anthropology 
of intersubjectivity. 
 
 
3.  The Dialectic of Narcissism: Democracy amongst Narcissists 
 
In my view, politics is always quite dialectical; it dialectically develops. My 
stance is therefore that all the kinds of existent politics can turn into either a 
healthy or unhealthy condition, and that there exist neither healthy nor un- 
healthy politics in advance. Politics, most importantly, is changeable – either 
negatively or positively – and this process is undergone on the basis of the ext- 
ent to which politics cares about the ‘injured self’ (Kohut e.g. 1985c: 78). In add- 
ition, it is hypothesised that in this context an ‘original state’ (see Ch. 6, s. 4) is 
not necessarily politics which glues the self onto the other – metaphorically, an 
expected child connected with his mother in her womb – but it might rather be 
either one which seems to link the self to the other or one which seems not to do 
so. In other words, the dialectic of narcissism does not always suggest that the 
‘original state’ means the state that one is in mother’s womb, that ‘alienation’ is 
in the state that he was born from there, that is, he has been separated from his 
mother (other), and that ‘return’ is in the state that he links himself to others. 
With regard to this issue, most importantly, the meaning of politics always is 
and seems ambiguous. In this respect, the dialectic of politics does not always 
undergo the certain process; to this extent, dialectic is not a perfect method. It is 
nonetheless still of considerable relevance for gaining understandings of poli- 
tics, particularly for illuminating its ambiguity. From this perspective, politics 
attempts to determine what is good and bad, and what is negative and positive, 
through its own political practice; that is to say, it paradoxically cannot clarify 
what is right and wrong. For dealing with this difficulty, however, I take the 
remedial standpoint that provides me with an important criterion that healthy 
politics satisfies the narcissistic need of self, that is to say, it connects the self with 
others on the basis of the intersubjective personal relationship, and that politics ful- 
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filling this requisite is right and good; needless to say, a psychoanalytic – and 
medical – treatment process is dialectical – many diseases often take the course 
of changing both good and bad conditions in turn. 
    Having said that, I do not completely deny some negative aspects of narci- 
ssism as suggested by Fromm and Fujita, while supporting some positive aspect 
of the need as seen from Kohut, as mentioned above. Rather, my position is 
between these two sides; in this respect, too, I am in favour of dialectic. Of 
course, I am really aware that, whenever narcissism is excessively strong and 
insanely requires satisfying its own needs, politics would drive the self to take 
part in itself in reasonable ways; we have already known the consequence. 
Importantly, this means not only well-known types of fascism, in which power 
violently forces one to follow its own way of controlling him, but also ‘fascism 
with a smile face’ (Fromm 2011: 141), in which the self unconsciously oppresses 
and depresses himself as well as others particularly by passively and indif- 
ferently behaving in a regular and routine life cycle – the latter is much more 
problematic, provocatively due to nonviolent politics – and the main problem in 
contemporary society is rather that problematic situations themselves are often 
not perceived; that is to say, apparently, it is difficult to see what problems are – it is 
supposed that contemporary people are most often not even aware that in their 
everyday life they are alienated from others and themselves, and that they are 
insanely much more narcissistic. One of our primary tasks is thus to prevent the 
social unconscious from eroding the space of intersubjectivity by reinforcing the 
self-other interpersonal relationships as much as possible. 
 
 
4.  Theoretical Contributions 
 
Meta-theoretical contribution: a way of seeing politics 
From the perspective of the Kohutian self, how does politics come out? It is 
expected that my explorations which have so far been conducted have con- 
tributed to the transformation of habitual views of the narcissistic self in politics 
by adopting Kohut’s self psychology; from a problem of the self that must be 
overcome to a state of the self that does not connect oneself with others, and that is in 
need of others. From this viewpoint, narcissism is regarded not as a negative state 
of mind but rather as an indispensable human need. My task, as already men- 
tioned above, is to reflect upon our politics on the basis of this standpoint. How 
does, then, it come out by applying Frommian dialectic Funk developed (as we 
saw in the preceding chapter) to this reflection? I will first of all identify what 
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political action means in terms of the Kohutian self, and then clarify the signi- 
fication of this kind of politics from a Frommian dialectical perspective. 
    First, politics is not simply a place to conflict or communicate and cooperate 
with others but also one to establish the intersubjective psychoanalytic self-other 
relationships, in which the primary aim of politics is not only to express and 
claim some value and identity of the self and to show some common good to 
public, but also to gain an intersubjective mutual understanding between the self 
and the other. Second, politics is constituted by the vulnerable self based on the 
view of ‘Tragic Man’ made up of the ‘grandiose-exhibitionistic self’ and the 
‘idealized-parent imago’, and this kind of politics therefore aims to treat the self 
by charging his two ambitious and ideal poles, that is by leading the other to 
become the mirroring and idealised selfobject, thereby curing diseased politics 
which to a greater or lesser degree breaks the intersubjective self-other rela- 
tionships. And third, this kind of self is not necessarily willing to take part in 
politics,2 but rather the self is cured by doing so. From this perspective, I see that 
politics which does not give any remedy for his injury, namely one which 
prevents the intersubjective psychoanalytic self-other relationships, and one 
which the self does not participate in, are regarded exactly as unhealthy and 
diseased.3 
 
Theoretical contribution: political practice 
Indeed, however, these three viewpoints all concern only a meta-theoretical 
framework of politics, and it might seem, therefore, that my research proposes 
nothing new concerning issues of actual politics. To be sure, apparently through 
my research I simply rejected Fromm’s and Fujita’s theoretical perspectives as a 
result of the fact that I critically reflected upon them, and that I introduced 
Kohut’s psychoanalysis for modifying their standpoints and for breaking their 
theoretical impasse. Also, I claimed that their political theories are simply nor- 
mative, and thus not of relevance for curing narcissism in contemporary society. 
However, I did not completely reject their theories by conducting an investi- 
gation into them. Rather, the intention of my research is to develop their poli- 
tical theories into a more applicable and effective knowledge. 
    Having said that, what can we actually gain through a series of examinations, 
particularly through critically analysing the two theorists from a Kohutian psy- 
choanalytic perspective of narcissism? First, from the viewpoint of the political 
practice of democracy, my theoretical attempt provides two perspectives: first, 
concerning social norms in political life; second, concerning ways of maintaining 
democracy. As regards the first point, the standpoint of the ‘vulnerable self’ puts 
forward some criteria of social norms in which both a self and a group self are 
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supported by their respective ‘selfobjects’. For example, social norms require 
reflecting some psychological condition and experience of individuals and their 
society (e.g. school authorities may not force a high school student bullied in 
school to take part in classes, and they are responsible for identifying its fact 
and problem and for improving that pathological condition). As regards the 
second point, it is stressed that politics requiring ‘selfobjects’ underpins the 
practice of democracy in a way that group and social activities (e.g. activities of 
neighbourhood community associations and PTA activity) can involve indivi- 
duals and other groups only to the extent that they respond to one’s and groups’ 
psychological needs and bring them satisfaction. 
    Second, with respect to ways of establishing a theory of politics, I claim as 
follows: first, that morality and ethics are also based on psychological harm; sec- 
ond, that for establishing social norms we need to refer to psychological grounds; 
and third, that political activities need to care about psychological condition and 
background of participants. These three standpoints explain that, for determining 
things that ‘ought to’ or ‘must’ be done, we need some reliable knowledge that 
accounts for one’s psychological experience. In other words, democratic politics 
requires its own psychological criteria for assessing itself, and political practice is 
prepared through fulfilling the above requirements. Also, these criteria can be 
an indispensable tool for examining politics. From these perspectives, an attempt 
of normative foundations is also based on psychological and psychoanalytic, 
ethical ground (e.g. Honneth 2007, 2012). 
    Furthermore, from the perspective of political system my research can affect 
some ways of performing democracy. ‘Deliberative democracy’ is required to 
take account of social conditions, for example, in which the majority of people 
in a neighbourhood association do not intend to particulate in any consultation 
process, do reject the way of deliberation, and do not have their own opinions, 
e.g. on the grounds that this group do not allow them as members to have their 
respective own opinions, and that they are all forced to share an opinion with 
other members without regard to their own wills, that is to say, in which this 
neighbourhood association cannot fulfil any requirements of participation, deli- 
beration and political equality (they are conceivable in the abstract, and it is 
supposed that they sometimes come out); how does the idea vindicate itself in 
that case? In my view, deliberative democracy needs to care for both a group 
and its group members, and their psychological conditions, in order that they 
can willingly take part in consultation in a way that their narcissistic needs are 
fulfilled by selfobjects (e.g. by other participants and groups, meanings of his 
participation, and things gained through participating); thereby, they will inc- 
line to be involved in a deliberative process. 
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Some possibilities for applying my research standpoint 
The conception of politics I established through my doctoral research can be 
applied to some concrete political problems. First, concerning social norms, for 
example, it may be suitable for tackling ‘bullying problems’. In many cases, this 
type of problem stems from the fact that it is rooted out in relation not only to 
individuals but also to groups that are supposed to be concerned (students of 
other classes, teachers, parents, local communities and so forth, and colleagues, 
managers, business partners and so forth), and that it is most often difficult to 
identify the latter; in this respect, bullying problems should be regarded not as 
a certain individual and group problem but rather as a social and political 
(public) problem (e.g. Duffy and Sperry 2014; Dupper 2013; Masiello and 
Schroeder 2014; Monks and Coyne 2011). In addition, they are most often asso- 
ciated with mental distress, and it is therefore quite difficult to deal with them 
(e.g. Masiello and Schroeder 2014; Tehrani 2012). These behaviours, needless to 
say, spoil intersubjective mutual relationships, and must therefore be cured by 
intersubjective politics itself. Second, concerning social norms I raise discrimi- 
nations, particularly ‘racial discrimination’. With regard to this issue, it seems 
unnecessary to explain why my concern is directed towards them. And third, it 
is expected to adopt the outcome of my research to some ‘Fukushima problems’. 
It is often believed that the accident at Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant was 
induced not simply by technological problems but rather by political and 
cultural problems, or, more accurately, it is understood as an ‘inevitable con- 
sequence’ (e.g. Kainuma 2011: 17, 368) – the latter is a main issue on this matter 
(e.g. Kainuma 2011; National Diet of Japan 2012; Sakai 2011). In particular, the 
Japanese sociologist Hiroshi Kainuma’s work is noteworthy in the sense of 
capturing the essence of the problems in terms of sociology and being written 
before the accident (see Kainuma 2011: 9-17); this shows a stark contrast with 
efforts of many Japanese scholars in politics which have failed to explain and 
deal with the difficulties. 
    Basically, Kainuma’s book tackles the structural problems of Japan’s nuclear 
power industry regarded as a primary contribution to the ‘economic growth of 
postwar Japan’ (sengo seichō) (2011: 52-4, 362-3), reflecting upon numerous fai- 
lures of the general approach of the social sciences in Japan. Significantly, his 
postcolonial standpoint gives us a great opportunity for the reflection, first, that 
the simple dichotomy between assailants and victims, namely the ‘assailant/ 
victim’ (kagai/higai) theoretical scheme, has solely contributed to generating the 
problematic situation that it has been completely impossible to explain that the 
former has sometimes become the latter and vice versa, and that it has thereby 
even made the distinction blur, and, second, that our insensibility of ‘position- 
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ality’ (tachiichisei) has given rise to the unconscious oppression of others (2011: 
15, 37-41, 330-50). Kainuma’s work, however, is diametrically opposite to a 
great deal of habitual research carried out by Japanese scholars in terms of some 
postmodern standpoints primarily in the sense that it succeeds in accompli- 
shing an immanent critique as opposed to their attempts. On the whole, his work 
aims to demonstrate that the symbiotic relationship between central (chūō) and 
local (chihō) governments achieved an illusory objective of impossible and im- 
probable economic growth by making the latter extremely impoverish: on the one 
hand, as drawing attention to ‘culture’ (bunka) intended by Japan’s ‘nuclear 
power village’ (genshiryoku mura) – abbreviated to mura below (2011: 36-7, 75-6, 
181); and, on the other hand, as reflecting that many structural-analytic app- 
roaches of sociology have failed to elucidate the ‘things of essence difficult to 
seek for and deep-seated in society’ (shakai no konpon ni yokotawaru mienikui 
mono), and that ‘wishful thinking’ (kibōteki kansoku) that has simply resulted in 
providing an account which seems to argue to the point has overlooked the 
‘openness’ (miketsusei), or rather it has even had harmful effects on reality (2011: 
54-69). Quite interestingly, Kainuma shows that the atomic power industry, 
while seemingly constituted by modern structure, is actually organised by ext- 
remely premodern structure unexpectedly (2011: 14). According to him, there 
remains only the survival way of being integrated into mura as a local function 
of nuclear agency (birth of another mura) for unindustrialised local commu- 
nities as represented by the periphery of Fukushima. For this reason, prob- 
lematically they drive themselves to perform this function and to undertake the task 
despite the fact that they are aware of a high risk of accepting the role, par- 
ticularly the construction of the plants as a troublesome technology in their 
local places – this behaviour that can be regarded as active obedience reminds us 
of Fromm’s ‘escape from freedom’ though local mura’s escape is different from 
the former escape in the sense that mura has no alternative. Nuclear power 
organised and maintained by the sacrifice of local communities, Kainuma beli- 
eves, is an extremely outdated and vulgar technology. In his view, both sides of 
mura must abolish the bad custom that insanely consigns their reality to the 
‘social unconscious’ (shakaiteki muishiki) on the basis of the ‘illusion’ (gensō) that 
they will both obtain the position of the forefront of the age (2011: 52-4, 293-4, 
362-3, 368). 
    Kainuma lays stress on the ‘unchangeable’ (kawaranu mono) (2011: 379). In 
particular, he thereby warns people against their insanely absent-minded and 
changeable attitude; that is to say, he believes that their repressive state of mind 
and behaviour exactly caused the accident, which means the ‘emergence of 
disturbance’ (kyōki no hyōshutsu) as an ‘inevitable consequence’ (hitsuzenteki na 
kiketsu) (2011: 17, 368). To put it differently, from the perspective integrating 
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Kohut’s self psychology and Fromm’s theory of narcissism, it may be possible 
to understand that the insane trouble was induced by the social range of psy- 
chological condition that mura as central government resonated with another 
mura as local government and vice versa, that is to say, the two group selves, 
who were injured by social and political life, and thus, who were not able to 
accept true reality, consigned this fact inconvenient to the selves to their un- 
conscious, and transferred to their respective selfobjects (selfobject transference 
or social transference); thereby, the symbiosis between them managed to con- 
struct such a diseased group self and malignant social narcissism with the help 
of the transference. It is noted that this phenomenon is not confined to mura. 
That is to say, from some psychoanalytic perspectives it is believed that the 
social dimension of transference has hitherto been and is now seen everywhere 
in Japan or rather everywhere in the world, and that social transference can 
give rise to nation-wide transference. Most importantly, here we avoid this kind 
of transference by restoring intersubjective mutual relationships; for it is consi- 
dered that problems described by the symbiotic fixation are primarily caused 
by the mental condition that intersubjectivity is broken and does not work, and 
therefore that any relationships are not based on an intersubjective mutual und- 
erstanding. Many issues represented by Fukushima problems, however, are 
quite complex, and it will supposedly take a long time to find useful solutions 
to them. Hence, many fields in the social sciences and the natural sciences must 
work together with each other for dealing with the difficulties. 
 
 
5.  Concluding Remarks 
 
Unfortunately, it must be noted that most of the existent political theories pre- 
sented by Japanese political theorists are quite helpless in tackling the above 
issues and some themes that require gaining a deep understanding of ‘culture’ 
and the ‘things of essence’ Kainuma highlights, primarily on the grounds that, 
on the whole, neither do they concern themselves with any topics and issues 
rooted in the social context of Japan, nor do they have any sociocultural stand- 
points in contrast to Kainuma’s perspective – in this sense, it is not right simply 
to believe that the problem stems from the fact that the discipline of political 
theory in Japan consists of western political theories. However, the symbiosis, 
as represented by mura, that can be regarded as the core problem concerning 
economic growth in postwar Japan and Japanese society itself is penetrated 
simply neither by the distortion of interpersonal relationships springing from 
the breakdown of intersubjectivity nor by the psychoanalytic sadomasochistic 
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relationship. In addition, obviously, it can be explained neither by the Foucau- 
ldian theory of power nor by any theories of recognition. With respect to the 
difficulty, it is rather believed that, curiously enough, on the basis of the certain 
premodern circumstances of Japan – the ‘rest of premodern Japan’ (zenkindai no 
zan’yo) – respective actors constituting politics have been led by the postmodern 
situation for aiming to achieve modernity – the ‘forefront of the modern age’ 
(kindai no sentan) (Kainuma 2011: 52-3, 361-3). This way of understanding will 
probably be slightly different from Kainuma’s original standpoint as he seems 
simply to lay stress on premodern and modern situations concerning the pro- 
blem as a whole. Rather, it appears that the primary subject of his work is to 
illustrate the fact that the desire of the ‘forefront of the modern age’, triggered 
by the circumstances that mura as local government remains persistently the 
premodern that can be described by Fujita’s society of the Tennō system, led to 
the self-destruction; the problematic factor is therefore the situation that it can- 
not obtain the modern. On this view, for example, the Japanese historian Naoki 
Sakai contends that, identifying the ‘institutional conditions’ (seidoteki jōken) 
concerning the determination and responsibility that provoked the disaster, 
Japan needs to get out of the bad habit of ‘obscuring its own responsibility’ 
from Maruyama’s perspective of the ‘system of irresponsibility’ (musekinin no 
taikei), which characterises a primary aspect of premodern Japan (2011: 33). The 
Japanese sociologist Eiji Oguma stresses that Fukushima problems are a micro- 
cosm (shukuzu) of tons of problems in Japanese society (2012: 54-9, 134). If their 
claims are true, then it is quite natural that political theory in Japan (seiji riron) 
should be useless for addressing the problems for there is no standpoint und- 
erstanding premodern Japan nor specific viewpoint seeing the social context of 
Japan in the discipline – it is not excused for its indifferent attitude by claiming 
that it is aimed at studying western political theory in so far as the field calls 
itself ‘political theory’ (seiji riron). 
    Furthermore, with regard to the present condition of the discipline of seiji 
riron, it is pointed out that its theoretical activity is confined to simple intro- 
ductory and explanatory attempts that concern themselves exclusively with 
importing theories (on this, see App. 1, s. 4) – of course, I do not deny the 
significance of these tasks. That is to say, it is not implausible to believe that 
there is no genuine action of creating a theory in the academic field of seiji riron. For 
these reasons, it must be stressed that the helplessness is a natural consequence. 
However, this is concerned not only with the discipline of seiji riron despite a 
strong tendency for it. As far as I know, this kind of indifferent and passive attitude 
to reality is also quite relevant to German scholarship; in this respect, it can be a 
contemporary tendency in the world beyond the scope of scholarship and uni- 
versity activities. With regard to this matter, I notice that Fromm and Fujita 
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warned us exactly against this problem deep-rooted in our way of life – it is 
precisely the narcissistic and fascist attitude represented by the contemporary 
self and the Nazi self respectively, as can be seen in Eichmann. We must aim to 
establish a political theory based on reality and respective social contexts, and 
must therefore be cautious about pseudo-theories indifferent to reality and 
practice, and about quasi-theories simply imported – the latter means that at the 
point of being imported a theory does not function, that is to say, it is always 
dangerous to directly apply an imported theory to some research objectives in 
some specific social context. Political theory definitely may not result in a mere 
speculative action in a seminar room by employing a theory. On this view, the 
discipline, too, is responsible for ‘distanc[ing] [itself] from perishable issues 
and . . . [for] aim[ing] to acquire a sustainable perspective that defeats unco- 
nscious perishing theories and to establish society with the help of theory’ 
(Kainuma 2011: 374). 
    Having said that, a theory is always incomplete, as mentioned above; this 
signifies that we are always required to improve and modify it. Perhaps it is 
most important for each theory to continually seek to complete a theoretical task, 
and to constructively criticise one another for enhancing their respective own 
theories, instead of satisfying their ‘grandiose selves’ (Kohut 1977). In addition, it 
is necessary that social theory and political theory should collaborate with 
psychoanalysis so as to deal with contemporary complex social issues; other- 
wise, my suggestions in this research will be spoilt exactly by contemporary 
indifference. I believe that through these efforts it would be possible to eman- 
cipate the contemporary narcissistic self from its own condition with psycho- 
logical constraint and to enable politics to play an important role in establishing 
intersubjective relationships without falling into nihilism. From this perspective, 
the issue of how the self is concerned in politics is regarded as a primary subject of 
politics. If succeeding in theoretical construction on the basis of the above 
principles, then political theory can better lead politics to fulfil the function of 
democracy without relying upon Fromm’s and Fujita’s conceptions of radical 
change. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1 On this view, most importantly, I definitely do not see my research simply as a study of some 
thoughts (see Ch. 2, s. 2). Rather, it concerns and aims at altering some views of society and 
politics and dealing with social and political problems (altering society and politics), and it is not a 
simple research but a document of discussion with friends of ours who are all the people living in 
the world. I always try to think about and deal with our problems with all the companions in 
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society and in the world – individual problems are thus always ours and social at the same 
time. That is to say, I am a ‘subject … in the resultant web of relationships with the social 
totality and with nature’ (Horkheimer 2002a: 211), and therefore think ‘with friends of ours’ 
(watashi no tomo to issho ni) (Ichinokawa 2012: 160). With respect to this issue, I will try to 
integrate the following epistemological perspective into social and political theory: ‘We beli- 
eve that it is absolutely impossible to see that human beings are independent of their sur- 
roundings, even from the human-centred viewpoint. We must prevent the harmful effects of 
radiation on animals, plants and ecosystems even if simply putting ourselves first’ (ECRR 
2010: 260) – unfortunately I was not able to obtain the English original text. I do not und- 
erstand the term ‘surroundings’ simply as nature in the sense of natural science. I count it 
exactly as society, the world and nature in Horkheimer’s sense. In my view, ‘animals’, ‘plants’ 
and ‘ecosystems’ mean individuals and society – not social system – and the ‘harmful effects 
of radiation’ signify ‘alienation’, ‘indifference’ and ‘fascism’, which have a harmful effect on 
them. From this perspective, we are required to curb such negative influences on individuals 
and society ‘even if simply putting ourselves first’. Social and political theory always ‘exists 
amongst others in society’ (Ichinokawa 2012: 160); every theory, above all, is aimed not at 
existing theorists but rather at future theorists who are facing and trying to deal with social 
problems. 
  2 Importantly, on this view, from a perspective of narcissism, although not to take part in 
politics (not to make a relationship with others) is exactly to refuse the existence of oneself 
itself, generally narcissists are not aware of this fact. 
  3 On this view, see, e.g. Kohut 1985c. 
  
 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Towards the Foundations of Political Theory and Politics 
 
 
 
 
 
Can the concept of narcissism contribute to laying the foundations of political 
theory, or more broadly, the social sciences? My answer is that it can do so to 
the extent that as many scholarly attempts as possible concern themselves with 
the issue without regard to disciplinary genres. Otherwise, my effort will be 
spoilt as mentioned in the last chapter. Most importantly, however, my primary 
concern is how theory can perform its function in our society, and how theory 
leads society to play its role and vice versa. In this respect, it appears that 
political theory based exclusively on normative theory is running into a the- 
oretical impasse – for its approach does not provide any criteria of how it can 
realise its own suggestions. It seems to me that the concept of narcissism is 
making a breakthrough in the current academic situation on the grounds that 
not only does it give a vital clue to finding solutions to society’s ills, but it also 
offers knowledge and society an opportunity for self-reflection, taking a remedial 
standpoint, as exemplified by the fact that Fromm and Fujita took notice of the 
psychoanalytically relevant notion for those purposes. The viewpoint of my 
research, therefore, applies the method not of ought to but of curing. From this 
perspective, my enquiry is not how we ought to act, but how we cure our 
disease. I am aware, however, that this standpoint as such is not different from 
the classic Durkheimian methodological position. Instead, I have taken the 
psychoanalytic standpoint that requires self-reflection, while supporting socio- 
logical approaches. Furthermore, my psychoanalytic approach concerns neither 
Freudian ego psychology nor Lacanian psychoanalysis but Kohut’s self psy- 
chology, which essentially relies upon the ‘vulnerable self’ on the basis of its 
own theoretical view of ‘Tragic Man’ who enlists the help of others. In general, 
Kohut’s society comes into being not as reasonable but rather as unreasonable in 
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the sense that, for the self in his society, it is most important to satisfy his 
narcissistic needs, and others therefore come into existence as selfobjects. 
Perhaps, from this perspective we understand why so far politics mostly has 
not managed to fulfil its main function; this is clearly explained by Churchill’s 
expression that ‘democracy is the worst form of government except all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time’. 
    My perspective, then, reflects upon our politics as follows. If there is no doubt 
that people should participate in decision-making, then how do they behave in 
their political life in a Kohutian society? (Of course, politics is not only con- 
cerned with decision-making, but is most often concerned with everything else, 
as we have seen in these discussions.) Some might take part in politics, but 
some might disregard the activity. With regard to the latter, however, it is 
absolutely meaningless to claim that they ought to take their responsibility for 
self-government because they are not concerned with what they are not inte- 
rested in. From a Kohutian perspective, there is no exception to this rule. From 
the former viewpoint, however, this Kohutian standpoint can also be applied to 
those who are willing to engage in politics. After all, human beings act so as to 
fulfil their narcissistic needs. In other words, the former behaves so on the 
grounds that their narcissism is satisfied with it, but the latter does so as they 
cannot satisfy their narcissism with politics. From these perspectives, we per- 
ceive that in this kind of society it is difficult to talk in both rational and logical 
ways. This means that political theory requires putting forward a standpoint 
which is different from both moral philosophy and analytic philosophy, and 
which is applicable to contemporary narcissistic society. 
    Essentially, my standpoint is based on the enquiry of how political theory dis- 
plays its raison d'être if many people are not willing to be involved in deliberating 
political issues concerning politics itself. The primary issues of political theory, as 
we saw in Part I, are not confined to its own disciplinary activity, but rather 
they are relevant to people’s life, and it is right, therefore, to believe that people 
should undertake the task not only of decision-making but also of studying the 
knowledge of politics. In my view, political theory as knowledge concerns not 
only political theorists but also everyone else (cf. Ch. 2, s. 2). However, most 
conventional political theories have considerable difficulty in performing their 
functions in a Kohutian narcissistic society, in which they are often not relevant 
to reality. In my view, a remedial and prescriptive perspective is most suitable 
for this society, in which first of all it is most important to fulfil the needs of the 
self. Admittedly, nonetheless, it is not right to think that there is nothing wrong 
with this type of political theory. Rather, it is noted that its approach has some 
difficulties. First of all, theory can be easily swayed by the demands of the nar- 
cissistic self. In this case, theory itself can be quite vulnerable to the fluctuating 
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mental condition of the self. Second, theory requires itself to rely more exten- 
sively upon empirical evidence. On this view, for example, depending heavily 
upon some psychological and psychoanalytic theories is always in danger of 
leading one’s theory to ‘psychologization’, as Fraser calls it (e.g. Fraser and 
Honneth 2003: 31). Referring to the injustice of ‘misrecognition’, she claims that 
it can be reduced to the mere individual attitudes when a theory lays stress on 
the individual phenomenon of psychological harm; for avoiding psycholo- 
gisation, she advances the ‘status model of recognition’ (2003: 28-33).1 In addition, 
Fraser contends that psychologisation is based on some psychological theory, 
and therefore that it can spoil the normative values of theory. She says: ‘When 
claims for recognition are premised on a psychological theory of “the inter- 
subjective conditions for undistorted identity-formation” . . . they are made 
vulnerable to the vicissitudes of that theory’ (2003: 32).2 Why, however, does 
applying a psychological theory to normative theory directly mean under- 
mining the latter significance and theory? As Simon Thompson stresses, since it 
is unavoidable for a theory of recognition to rely upon and require the support 
of empirical theory, ‘it is not a criticism to point out such dependence’ (2006: 38). 
With regard to Fraser’s view, her stance on normative theory is diametrically 
opposite to Fromm’s and Fujita’s, both of which are in favour of psychological 
approach, or, more precisely, psychoanalytic theory, as we have seen. Having 
said that, we should once accept her criticism of psychologisation. 
    The facts mentioned above do not allow narcissists to disregard democratic 
life and to assume an indifferent attitude towards politics – here normative and 
moral theories are expected to appropriately function as democratic theory. 
Rather, we can no longer deny and cast doubt on the raison d'être of democracy 
as the best political form at the present stage – we have not yet found any form 
of government as better as democracy. This means that it is better and imp- 
ortant that as many people as possible should take part in political decision-
making in our democracy; for, otherwise, it does not function, needless to say. If 
the many avoid considering their political matters, then their unconscious vio- 
lence is to lead their politics to repress and depress selves and others and to 
occasionally emerge as an extreme form of government. What can we do for 
dealing with this troublesome problem? If we can do anything about it, how 
can we realise it? Seeking for answers to these enquiries is exactly the task of 
political theory. 
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Notes 
 
  1 With regard to this concept, compared to Honneth’s psychological model of recognition, 
Fraser supports its validity as follows: ‘When claims for recognition are premised on a 
psychological theory of “the intersubjective conditions for undistorted identity-formation”, 
as in Honneth’s model, they are made vulnerable to the vicissitudes of that theory; their 
moral bindingness evaporates in case the theory turns out to be false. By treating recognition 
as a matter of status, in contrast, the model I am proposing avoids mortgaging normative 
claims to matters of psychological fact. One can show that a society whose institutionalized 
norms impede parity of participation is morally indefensible whether or not they distort the 
subjectivity of the oppressed’ (2003: 32). 
  2 With reference to Fraser’s psychologisation, Simon Thompson divides her critique up into 
the following three types: ‘reduction to individual attitude’, ‘dependence on empirical 
theory’ and ‘sectarianism of self-realization’ (2006: 31-9). 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 1 
 
Political Theory as an Academic Discipline 
 
 
 
 
 
This appendix is aimed at gaining a better understanding of the disciplinary 
characteristics of political theory.1 Regarding this issue, I take the view that it is 
most reasonable to begin my exploration by conducting a survey of the origins 
of politics because a description of the derivation provides us with a lucid 
account of the characteristics of the discipline in the sense that the origins of 
politics are undoubtedly identical to those of political theory.2 Next, I will make 
a possible distinction between political theory, political philosophy, the history 
of political thought and social theory. Finally, I will raise some methodological 
issues of political theory in Japan, the discipline of which is called seiji riron in 
Japanese. 
 
 
1.  The Nature of Politics 
 
The origins of politics 
It has sometimes been said that ‘politics is as old as humankind’. To be sure, it is 
correct in Aristotle’s sense: ‘man is by nature a political animal’ (zōon politikon) 
(e.g. Aristotle 1988: 1253a2, 1278b19).3 If this is true, then it is quite natural that 
politics should be intrinsic to us. A possible tip for considering this issue is to 
know the origins of the concept of ‘politics’ itself. The German term Politik, equ- 
ivalent to the English politics, etymologically has its origins in the Greek ta 
politika, signifying the ‘political (public) matters relevant to the polis’, and in 
politikē technē, meaning the ‘art of control and administration of the political 
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(public) duties concerning the community of citizens and the common (public) 
goods of the polis’ (Schultze 2010: 746).4 Not surprisingly, the derivation of the 
German term corresponds precisely to the English one in respect of the word of 
polis; needless to say, the English politics is also derived from polis (e.g. Heyking 
2008: 319; Vincent 1997: 6). This denotes that the term politics originates in 
Greek and ancient Greece. 
  The term politikē technē, meaning a political expertise in governing the polis, is 
expressed by Socrates’s political philosophy.5 According to him, the words sig- 
nify the ‘political art’ (special knowledge of politics), which was aimed at 
‘excellent political leadership’ – famously, this is told by Plato’s Gorgias. The art 
is composed of two basic components: legislation and corrective justice. Soc- 
rates defined the concept as ‘an analogy between health as the good condition 
of the body . . . and virtue as the good condition of the soul’ (Devereux 2011: 
99).6 However, it is noted that the notion was originally developed by Plato. 
After in his famous work Republic Plato had inherited the term from Socrates, 
he gradually gave new meanings to the concept. According to Daniel Devereux, 
Plato required ‘legal checks on the power of rulers’ so long as there was some 
possibility that they would be driven by their greed (pleonexia) whether or not 
they possessed the political art – obviously, Plato’s stance on it is closely asso- 
ciated with his pessimistic view on the possibility of gaining the expertise, and 
the reason why he took such a negative stance on the acquisition of the political 
skill is because indeed he declared a more negative position on the concept in 
his later work Statesman (2011: 106, 109). As a matter of fact, Plato revised the 
concept of political art, which ideal rulers possess, in his works Statesman and 
Laws, in which he gave some different implications, laying great stress on the 
‘knowledge of particulars’ – this was later called by Plato’s successor Aristotle – 
which could be obtained through political experience; Plato’s change is eluci- 
dated by the fact that he modified the concept of political art in order that the 
‘citizenry’ may legislate (Devereux 2011: 107-8). As a result of his dynamic 
change, Plato opened up a way of democracy not as the ideal state but as the 
second-best state of a polis governed in accordance with law. For these reasons, 
the Laws and the Statesman give the impression that Plato became an ‘enlight- 
ened democrat’ in comparison with the Republic (Devereux 2011: 107-11). In 
sum, the life of the ancient Greek polis at Plato’s time, on the whole, was closely 
connected with politikē technē and vice versa, and this fact, as we shall see below, 
is undoubtedly of huge importance for recognising an aspect of politics and its 
origins. Plato’s view, however, is still not associated with ‘polis life’ later defined 
by Aristotle, and Plato’s polis, in this respect, does not have any implication of 
‘political life’ in Aristotle’s sense. At this point it is important to look at Aristotle’s 
political philosophy by focusing on the characteristics of his polis. 
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  Aristotle’s best-known work Politics provides us with a great illustration of 
what polis life meant. As we have seen, while in the Republic Plato had parti- 
cularly emphasised the ‘political art’ aimed for good political rules through 
Socrates, in his later years he gradually changed his view to a more accessible 
one available to democracy. As opposed to Socrates and Plato, Aristotle put 
particular emphasis on ‘practical wisdom’ (phronēsis) about ‘a broad under- 
standing of ethics and politics’, after having rejected the political art, proposed 
by Plato’s Republic (Devereux 2011: 117). Here it would seem that the best way 
to gain an understanding of what polis meant is to shine a light on what 
Aristotle intended by the concept of polis, that is to know its features. 
First, according to the Politics, the human life of the polis depended upon the 
‘good life’; that is to say, life in a polis was based on ‘living well’, and basic 
necessities were aimed at its purpose (Aristotle 1988: 1252b29-30).7 Here my 
question is what the good life signified for Aristotle. It is presumed that the 
concept is closely related to his specific ethics, which was oriented overall tow- 
ards seeking for good actions and good things. In this respect, his ethics was 
directed to the good – Aristotle’s view of ethic, famously, is presented primarily 
in his Nicomachean Ethics. For him, in other words, the good existed for the polis 
because polis life was the end (telos) and the good end, and the good life was 
therefore to live in a polis; hence, polis life was the good thing. Second, as 
regards the constitution, Aristotle’s polis consists primarily of two basic com- 
ponents: first, a politēs, meaning a citizen who has a right to participate in 
decision-making based on his deliberation; and second, a politeia, meaning a 
constitution which organises a polis (Aristotle 1988: book III).8 The former den- 
otes the person who is eligible to run a city state (polis). The latter is defined as 
institutional arrangements aimed at deliberating and judicial decision-making; 
in this respect, it is also called ‘polity’ today. In short, a polis (city state) is org- 
anised by politai (the plural of politēs meaning citizens) on the basis of a politeia 
(constitution), a politēs denotes a person living in a polis based on a politeia, and 
a politeia is the constitution of a polis organised by politai.9 
These two perspectives, then, lead me to the next discussion as to what polis is. 
In Aristotle’s view, lives in a polis are all closely connected with polis life. Also, 
things in a polis are all related to the life. The life of the polis must therefore be 
the good life, and things of the polis must also be the good thing. In this respect, 
Aristotle does not concern himself with lives and things in the outside of the 
polis. The citizens, in his view, have a great deal of interest in the matters of the 
polis (ta politika), which are called ‘politics’ today.10 From these viewpoints, my 
discussion in this section takes an explicit view of the polis as follows: Aristotle 
believed that politics is the matters of the polis, and therefore that political life is 
polis life and vice versa. 
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Aristotle, obviously, gives us a clear description of the characteristics of the 
polis. In Plato’s time, the polis had to be closely associated with the ‘political art’ 
for ruling the polis. However, it varied its own form through Aristotle. In con- 
trast to Plato, as we have seen, Aristotle laid great stress on ‘practical wisdom’. 
As a matter of fact, this paradigm shift gave rise to a new way of ruling that 
citizens took part in running the constitution of the polis, namely democracy. 
Despite these facts, however, it is noted that Plato and Aristotle had a common 
view of politics in the sense that both their perspectives sought to connect pol- 
itics with ethics. In short, it is appropriate to understand that politics is derived 
from polis not only in the terminological sense but also in the actual sense, as 
exemplified by the fact that polis is primarily made up of politēs and politeia, 
regarded as the primary components of the politics of the polis; in Aristotle’s 
view, these three Greek concepts are intertwined with each other. For these 
reasons, ‘politics’ characterises the polis and polis life in terms of the political art 
(politikē technē) and the matters of the polis (ta politika), both of which are 
considered as the derivations of the term Politik (politics), on the one hand, and 
as the essential conditions and ingredients for achieving the end of the polis, on 
the other. 
 
The political and polis 
The above investigation into the origins of the term politics has aimed at pre- 
paring to grasp its nature, namely what politics can be viewed. In my view, 
every attempt at seeking for the nature of a thing necessarily involves exploring 
its origins. However, then, what does it mean to concern politics? This pers- 
pective leads me to carry out an enquiry into what the political signifies in its 
original sense.11 In order to see it, I want to focus on Aristotle’s concept of pol- 
itical. 
What Aristotle intends by his words that ‘man is by nature a political animal’ 
is obviously not that all men are political, but that they are all born in the polis.12 
As Humphrey D. F. Kitto clearly explains, all men are above all intended to live 
in the polis in Aristotle’s view (Kitto 1957). It is evident that his provocative 
words suggest that the matters of the polis should be regarded as politics and 
the political, and vice versa. Aristotle’s words, however, do not necessarily 
imply that we are by nature political animals, but rather that we are concerned 
in the polis. Quite interestingly, as is well known, the politics of the polis vir- 
tually depended heavily upon slavery, by which women were almost comp- 
letely excluded from both the politics and the political life of the polis, and the 
citizens having political rights were restricted to a minority of adult males (e.g. 
Brunt 1991: 98; Minogue 1995: ch. 2). In fact, there is the concept of slavery in 
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Aristotle, for example, as seen from his Politics – here he supports slavery (e.g. 
Aristotle 1988: 1253b4-1255b39). This political life, needless to say, is not equ- 
ivalent to ours, and the political in Aristotle’s sense is therefore definitely not 
the same as ours. What does, then, Aristotle mean by the word of politics? 
Again, here I refer to his words that ‘man is by nature a political animal’. This 
expression should be understood as follows: man is an animal born in the polis. 
  It is important to remember that the English adjective political is derived 
from the Greek term politikos (e.g. Allen 2011: 75), the adjective of polis (e.g. 
Druwe 1987: 393), and it means ‘belonging or pertaining to the polis’ (Allen 
2011: 75). In this sense, the political might indeed seem peculiar to the polis. This 
simply denotes, however, that the specific feature of the political has one of its 
origins in the polis, and it does not mean, therefore, that the polis is and the 
matters of the polis are the sole political. From these perspectives, we can clearly 
see that the polis and the matters of the polis have their own specific chara- 
cteristics of politics and the political respectively. In short, a polis must have 
been a city based on a specific politics. In this respect, politics and the political 
are not specific characteristics of the polis. In other words, a polis is a peculiar 
city and state having the specific political style from the outside perspective.  
 
The political 
Taking account of a large number of discussions of the view of what politics 
and the political signify, it is not easy to gain a deep understanding of the 
nature of politics and the political. Needless to say, this means that the task has 
continually been carried out up until now. Interestingly, however, there are 
some common features in approaches to understanding politics and the poli- 
tical. A typical way of understanding the specific characteristics of politics is to 
divide the political from everything else. It is not simple, however, to identify 
this considerably complex and abstract thing. Nonetheless, it is noted that there 
is a tip for a clear understanding of the intricate concept. Elizabeth Frazer’s 
‘Political Theory and the Boundaries of Politics’ (2008), for example, carries out 
a great survey of the theme. It seems that her work gives us a clue to dealing 
with the issue. So let us look briefly at it below. 
First, Frazer begins by exploring the complexity of the concept of politics in the 
work, in which she stresses the huge importance of the problems of the 
‘boundaries of political theory’s subject matter’ and of the implications of the 
adjective political meant by the discipline’s name (2008: 171-4). By highlighting 
the complexity of the concept of politics, she draws attention to two basic ele- 
ments of politics: first, ‘policy’ and ‘the competition for the power to govern’; 
and second, the fact that a person who is not a professional politician can act 
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politically. According to Frazer, these facts have caused the problems of distin- 
guishing between political and social actions and setting them in the ‘public’ and 
‘private’, and they have made the meaning of ‘political’ much more complex. In 
her view, despite the complexity, politics has so far been understood in the fol- 
lowing three ways: first, in the way of confining politics to the role of ‘internal 
relations between a state and its citizen’; second, in the way of relating it to 
‘power’; and third, in the way of accepting the method of associating politics 
with power to some extent, on the one hand, and the method of connecting it 
with any other things, on the other. 
Second, Frazer highlights two kinds of controversy over the view of what is 
regarded as politics: ‘academic disciplines’ and ‘methodologies’ (2008: 174-80). 
The former has primarily been caused by the disciplinary differences between 
political science, sociology and economics, involving normative theorists, amo- 
ngst them philosophers and political theorists; the primary issue has been to 
separate politics from any other kinds of human life. The latter is divided up 
into three types of approaches: positivism, rational action theory and structu- 
ralism. Here Frazer shines a light on the possibility that these perspectives will 
present the view that state and political institutions are separated from society. 
In addition, while to some extent accepting the view of ‘political action’ concer- 
ning and involving all the people, she casts doubt on this view. According to 
Frazer, nevertheless, approaches to politics by means of distinguishing between 
politics and any other human activities have been rejected by most academic 
researches. 
  Third, despite the aforementioned facts, Frazer attempts to define the specific 
characteristics of ‘doing politics’ and ‘being political’ (2008: 180). She presents a 
theory concerning the features of ‘politics’ and ‘political’ in terms of ‘politics’ 
ends and means’, as seen from Table 3. The first viewpoint lays stress on 
politics’ means; this belongs to cells 1 and 2. The former highlights ‘any ends’ 
and ‘any means’, which lead to the standpoint that we consider politics either as 
all the things of a state or as all the things within a state; according to Frazer, 
Max Weber is a representative who takes this sort of view of politics. Although 
emphasising any ends of politics, the latter stresses the importance of some 
‘particular means’ of achieving ends; this is characterised, e.g. by Machiavelli- 
anism. In contrast to these perspectives, the second viewpoint focuses on the 
ends of politics; this belongs to cells 3 and 4. The former regards politics as 
things concerning ‘particular ends’, but this does not restrict it to particular 
means. In this view, the end of politics is to gain the ‘power to govern’; Frazer 
might call this kind of view politics’ semantic Platonism. The latter denotes that 
some particular means play a role in reaching ends; this view is characterised, 
e.g. by Aristotle and Hannah Arendt. Despite these distinctions, the border bet- 
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 Any ends Particular ends 
Any 
means 
1. 
For example, ‘everything is 
political’ or ‘everything to do 
with the state is political’ 
3. 
For example, 
politics is securing the power to 
govern by any means 
Particular 
means 
2. 
For example, 
‘Machiavellianism’ or 
‘Ciceronianism’ 
4. 
For example, 
ends and means are 
mutually conditioning 
 
Table 3 Frazer’s classification of the meanings of politics in terms of its ends and means 
(cited from Frazer 2008: 181). 
 
ween cells 3 and 4 is not stable. For instance, Frazer points out that Arendt’s 
perspective does not necessarily belong to cell 4 in the sense that it separates 
politics’ ends from politics’ means of achieving its ends. For Arendt, as Frazer 
puts it, politics signifies ‘a public encounter between individuals’ (2008: 189). 
  Finally, Frazer sums up her article in terms of the following three issues (2008: 
190-4): first, there is no specific political action, while to some extent it is pos- 
sible to demarcate the border between political life, namely the institutions and 
process of states, and any other kinds of life; second, with respect to the view of 
the nature of political action, while it is possible to confine its signification to 
politicians, it is nevertheless also possible to think that everyone can act pol- 
itically; and third, many scholars seek to distance social and individual lives 
from political life, but virtually, the border between them are unclear and 
variable. From these perspectives, Frazer clarifies the four kinds of ways of 
understanding political borders: ‘state-society-individual’, ‘publicity-secrecy’, 
‘deliberation’ and ‘openness-closure’. 
How, then, should we consider the meaning of politics from these points of 
view? Can we find anything helpful in gaining a clear understanding of the 
political from Frazer’s perspective? Not surprisingly, she does not make any 
lucid and rigid distinction between politics and everything else. For this reason, 
her discussion might seem helpless in finding some clue to a better under- 
standing of the political. Nonetheless, it is noted that her work is relevant for 
identifying both politics and the political in the following two respects. First, 
Frazer agrees to some extent with an attempt at distinguishing between the 
political and everything else, on the one hand, but she does not completely 
agree with the standpoint, on the other. Indeed, in this respect, her stance seems 
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ambiguous. For instance, she flatly refuses to categorise politics on the basis of 
the view of confining politics to the functions of the state by entirely relating it 
to power and by simply connecting politics with power. In my view, however, 
the significance of her stance is rather to lay great stress on the ambiguity and 
variability of politics. In other words, Frazer poses a challenge to an approach to 
simply classifying its meanings by emphasising the ambiguous feature of politics. 
In short, as the adverb ‘simply’ clearly shows, she requires avoiding an under- 
standing of politics by way of the sole simplification of its significations, even 
though categorisation is helpful in gaining an easy understanding of the con- 
cept. 
  Second, Frazer’s work implies that issues concerning the meaning of politics 
have so far been addressed in a variety of ways; this solid evidence means that 
politics has multiple characteristics. As far as her discussion is concerned, the 
meaning of politics is divided up into its four kinds of views with a focus on the 
five types of approaches; Machiavellian, Weberian, Platonic, Aristotelian and 
Arendtian approaches. Of course, in so far as the way she proposes is a division 
of politics from the viewpoint of ‘ends and means’, her description is merely 
one of the ways of understanding politics. Indeed, political studies and political 
science have also provided other types of viewpoints of politics in order to 
establish better disciplinary understandings: e.g. politics as ‘conflict’. To be sure, 
as we shall see in more detail below, this typical perspective of politics provides 
a different viewpoint from Frazer’s in the sense that it is primarily characterised 
by ‘power’. Adam Swift, for instance, clearly explains that, ‘[p]erhaps politics 
happens wherever there is power’ (Swift 2001: 5).13 
  Third, Frazer has shown that what politics means has been much more com- 
plex by demonstrating that essentially everyone can act politically, and that poli- 
tics requires considering all the persons concerned. This clearly explains that we 
have considerable difficulty in defining the specific characteristics of politics 
even though many political scientists and political theorists have regarded what 
concerns state as a typical meaning of politics.14 To be sure, not only what pol- 
itics means but also what research objects of politics are elucidated by the fact 
that many scholars have so far illuminated their understandings of politics by 
focusing particularly on state. Nonetheless, they both do not necessarily confine 
themselves to state and the matters of state. Rather, it would seem that, as Swift 
says, politics exists wherever there is power, and that, as Jean Blondel stresses, 
it exists when more than two persons are involved in decision-making.15 In 
short, Frazer implies that politics is associated with the matters of state, but 
nonetheless that its scope is not entirely restricted to them. In this sense, trea- 
ting the concept of politics and the political is a laborious task. 
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The features of politics 
Frazer has indeed proposed a very useful idea of understanding politics by 
highlighting its ambiguity. At the same time, however, it means that politics is a 
sort of vague. It might seem that there is no method of coping with this problem. 
Is there no approach to gaining a more lucid understanding of politics in a dif- 
ferent way? Perhaps the best way to see politics is to focus on state and power, 
regarded as describing its specific features. However, it should be emphasised 
that politics is not specific to them while the latter can be specific to the former. 
Here I will devote myself to finding out some reasons for difficulty in defining 
politics. Ulrich Druwe, for example, establishes a practical way of understand- 
ing it by setting out the following three levels of the concept of politics (Druwe 
1987: 395-6):16 
 
1. Politics contains goals (Ziele), aims (Zwecke) and norms (Normen). 
2. Politics concerns state (Staat). 
3. Politics means social action (soziales Handeln). 
 
Regardless of whether or not Frazer’s approach takes account of these com- 
ponents of politics, her description evidently contains most of those ingredients 
Druwe identifies. In this respect, it can be argued that these three political dim- 
ensions overlap with one another in accordance with necessity, and that each 
ingredient might sometimes be included in some action regarded as political. 
As far as Druwe’s perspective is concerned, politics primarily involves action. 
He then describes the above respective concrete features as follows (1987: 395- 
6): 
 
1. Good (das Gute), peace (Frieden), emancipation (Emanzipation), etc. 
2. Power (Macht), rule (Herrschaft), class conflict (Klassenkampf) or parti- 
cipation (Partizipation). 
3. Decisions (Entscheidungen), consensus building (Konsensfindung) and 
rulemaking on social dimensions (Regelformulierung von gesellschaft- 
licher Tragweite). 
 
This classification contributes to our understanding of politics. On the basis of 
his above specification, then, I will first give a description of the main points of 
the conceptual history of politics in terms of three kinds of perspectives, namely 
three dimensions of politics as art, conflict and cooperation – it seems to me that 
the primary issues concerning the signification of politics have been tackled 
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from these three perspectives. I will next describe the features of politics so as to 
clearly understand the multiplicity of the concept. 
 
(a) Politics as art 
Politics as art has a long history, and it has been typically depicted by the 
Platonic ‘political art’ (politikē technē), as we saw above. As the Greek term technē 
shows, in this context, the role of politics is defined as either art or technique; as 
we have seen, this is another origin of the term politics denoting a ‘political 
expertise in governing the polis’ aimed at ‘excellent political leadership’. For 
Plato, governing the state (polis) is aimed at producing ‘harmony’. For this 
purpose, he requires that rulers should possess the political art – his aim is to 
establish his ideal state. From this perspective, politics is viewed as a specific 
expertise only a few can gain. Here we become aware that keeping a political 
order characterises this type of politics. Modern and contemporary politics, 
however, is not unrelated to this politics, for example, in so far as Bismarck’s 
view that ‘politics is the art of the possible’ has in common to some extent with 
Plato’s. Rather, it is noted that the view that essentially politics involves main- 
taining order even captures an aspect of politics. 
 
(b) Politics as conflict 
The second perspective defines politics as conflict. This is closely linked to power, 
rule and dominance; in this sense, we are familiar with this kind of politics. 
Thomas Hobbes is a representative who takes this view of politics. Famously, 
shining a light on power, he said as follows: ‘in the first place, I put for a general 
inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless desire of power after power 
that ceaseth only in death’ (Hobbes 2007: 70). The reason why Hobbes high- 
lighted the importance of the existence of an absolute power is obviously beca- 
use it would offer security and achieve peace; in his sense, the establishment of a 
state aims at accomplishing them. His famous words of ‘war of all against all’, 
in which all are coloured by conflict and violence, describe this type of politics. 
As far as his claim is concerned, politics is associated with the process of laying 
the foundations of order. For this reason, this kind of politics is not immune 
from the first type, as we have seen above. 
  Weber’s conception of politics may be much more applicable to this kind of 
politics in relation to power. He clearly defines power as ‘the probability that 
one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his own 
will despite resistance’ (Weber 1978: 53). From this perspective, power seems to 
aim at arbitrarily ruling over and dominating people, and therefore seems to be 
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violent. For Weber, the aim of politics is to govern by means of power and vio- 
lence. In this respect, it can be argued that basically his politics stems from con- 
flicts. On the other hand, however, famously he lays great stresses on the spe- 
cific ability of politicians to govern; in this sense, Weber’s conception of politics 
bears a close resemblance to the Platonic political art. 
In so far as politics points up conflict, I also need to refer to Carl Schmitt’s 
political theory. In his masterpiece, The Concept of the Political (1927), Schmitt 
points out that distinguishing between ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’ is the essence of 
politics, which means that he regards conflict as the core of politics. For him, it 
is inevitable that one comes into conflict with others, and it is most important, 
therefore, that politics should reach a decision. In this respect, it is possible to 
consider that his politics is associated with power and politics as art to make 
decisions. 
 
(c) Politics as cooperation 
On the one hand, as we have seen, some theorists count the essence of politics 
as conflict, but, on the other hand, some others highlight a political aspect of 
cooperation. For example, Arendt stresses the concept of ‘action’ to cooperate 
with somebody and to establish a mutual action amongst individuals by means 
of power – essentially, her conception of action is based on ‘plurality’ directed 
towards ‘public encounter between individuals’ in the ‘space of appearance’. 
For Arendt, in other words, action means politics. Her following sentence clea- 
rly expresses her view of power, which stresses the importance of cooperation: 
‘Only where men live so close together that the potentialities of action are 
always present can power remain with them, and the foundation of cities . . . is 
therefore indeed the most important material prerequisite for power’ (Arendt 
1998: 201). Arendt’s stance on power might seem peculiar and provocative from 
the above two other standpoints. From Weber’s perspective, for example, it 
might be difficult to understand her position. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that, despite many differences, there is some common ground between these 
two theorists, in the sense that the two kinds of power they put forward are two 
sides of the same coin. 
 
(d) Politics as social action 
The aforementioned facts, after all, might still remain in the dark about what 
politics is. Indeed, however, it might be expressed either as some art or as some 
conflict or as some cooperation or as a combination of them. In this respect, it 
must be stressed that we have considerable difficulty in defining and identi- 
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fying politics. As far as my research is concerned, however, it is most plausible 
to believe that politics denotes social action (soziales Handeln); many political sci- 
entists are of the same opinion that politics means some kind of action (Handeln) 
(e.g. Druwe 1987: 395-6; Patzelt 2007: 22-8) or activity (Handlung) (e.g. Blondel 
1991: 482-4; Heyking 2008: 319).17 For this reason, it can be validly argued that, 
in so far as politics is some action, that is to say, in so far as it is a political action, 
it might sometimes aim at achieving something, i.e. peace and good, and it 
might sometimes be a state’s action, such as rule and domination, and other 
types of action, such as decision and consensus building. In this respect, it is not 
plausible to think that a certain action is the sole political action. Rather, it is 
most reasonable to think that in reality politics comes into being as a combi- 
nation of the three essential ingredients I identified above. In other words, the 
three components of politics are intertwined with each other, and politics the- 
refore does not come to existence only as a certain action. In short, the meaning 
of politics constantly varies in respect of social action, and what it signifies 
depends heavily upon what kind of social action one regards as political. For this 
reason, it should be noted that the diversity of political theorists’ ways of und- 
erstanding politics elucidates the complexity of the concept of politics. In this 
respect, Frazer’s account helps us to know how difficult it is to grasp the nature 
of politics. Andrew Vincent, for example, precisely tells us the characteristics of 
politics: 
 
politics is not an independent ‘thing’ which we theorize about. . . . politics is not one sim- 
ple thing to which we refer. It is the site of a multiplicity of vocabularies (Vincent 2004: 9). 
 
Does this mean, however, that it is not plausible to think that there is no specific 
feature of politics? As we have seen, it is certain that politics characteristically 
concerns state and power. Having said that, it is also true that, with reference to 
the diversity of the meaning of politics, even an attempt at seeking for politics 
can be a political action.18 
 
 
2.  Political Theory, Political Philosophy 
   and the History of Political Thought 
 
Political philosophy 
With regard to the discipline of politics, it is believed that, particularly since 
David Easton had issued ‘The New Revolution in Political Science’ (1969), 
contemporary politics dramatically changed its disciplinary characteristics. A 
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representative work characteristically describing this fact is regarded as John 
Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1971). In the sense that his work thoroughly tackled 
value issues, it was completely different from any studies that were carried out 
from the ‘value-neutral’ standpoint, although it was believed that issues of 
normative political theory were no longer meaningful particularly since Peter 
Laslett had declared the ‘death of political philosophy’ in 1956 (1956: vii).19 For 
this reason, it is completely understandable that Will Kymlicka claims as fol- 
lows: ‘It is generally admitted that the recent rebirth of normative political 
philosophy began with the publication of John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice in 
1971’ (2002: 10).20 In addition, as Swift puts it, ‘Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is the 
most influential book of contemporary political philosophy’ (2001: 51). Admit- 
tedly, in these respects, ‘contemporary political philosophy’ Swift intends began 
with Rawls. In other words, the provocative work has largely determined the 
direction of the discipline since then, and it might be argued, in this sense, that 
political philosophy commonly denotes its own field in post-A Theory of Justice 
particularly in the English-speaking world.21 
  How is political philosophy in this sense related to political theory? For con- 
sidering this issue, for example, Vincent clearly mentions: first, ‘I do not draw 
any rigid distinction between political theory and political philosophy. They are 
considered, on most occasions, as synonymous’ (2004: 7); second, ‘political the- 
ory is not clearly distinguishable from political philosophy in all circumstances’ 
(2004: 9).22 Despite his view, however, the methodological matter of the con- 
nection and distinction between these two disciplines is not quite as simple as 
we might expect particularly with respect to the terms theory and philosophy 
included in the two fields’ names. At this point, then, for the purpose of gra- 
sping the disciplinary relationship and methodological distinction between 
political theory and political philosophy, I will first address the issue of what 
theory means by comparing its implications with those of the term philosophy, 
and will next identify the possible differences between the two disciplines.23 
 
Political theory and political philosophy 
As some political theorists mention, the term theory etymologically has its roots 
in Greek (e.g. Vincent 2004: 8; Wolin 1968a: 319). For example, Vincent provides 
an account of this word in terms of three kinds of Greek words, thea, theoros and 
theoria: ‘A thea was a spectacle’, ‘the one who observed the spectacle was a 
theoros’ and ‘theoria meant beholding a spectacle’ (2004: 8). First, Vincent begins 
his explanation of the term theory with other two kinds of terms, ‘event’ and 
‘practice’, which are closely connected with the above three Greek words. 
According to him, theory has a role in mediating between events and observers. 
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In other words, theory can explain and is interconnected with events (practice). 
Next, Vincent shines a light on the three terms, ‘theory’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘phi- 
losophy’. As mentioned above, theory is connected with events, but knowledge, 
by contrast, is an ‘unmediated event’ (2004: 8). He stresses that theory is gene- 
rally associated with philosophy and knowledge, and he puts emphasis on the 
relation between theory and philosophy. Vincent says: ‘The friend or lover 
(philia) of wisdom (sophia) had the ability to see or behold (theoria) through the 
eye of the mind. Theoria therefore virtually became the act of knowing itself’ 
(2004: 8; emphases added). That is to say, theoria (theory) means beholding, 
namely knowing, and is the ability of the philia (lover) of sophia (wisdom). As 
Vincent puts it, theory is also the ‘best walk of life’ (2004: 8). Finally, he emp- 
hasises that the term theory in its modern usage has been transformed into a 
concept in the narrow sense within the natural sciences which consists of hyp- 
othesis and experiment for the purpose of controlling the world. 
  Admittedly, theory and philosophy are profoundly associated with one ano- 
ther in their Greek contexts, and we thereby perceive that essentially they can- 
not be separated from each other. In fact, Vincent describes that theory is ‘a 
specific wisdom of philosopher’ (2004: 10; emphasis added). However, the dis- 
tinction between theory and philosophy is not yet clear, and I must therefore 
tackle this issue, focusing on the terms theory and philosophy in more detail so 
as to let us fully understand the disciplinary connection and distinction bet- 
ween political theory and political philosophy. 
  Sheldon Wolin’s discussion makes the distinction much more clear. Again, it 
begins with ancient Greece. Wolin explains that classical political theory had 
been developed by Socrates and his colleagues in ancient Athens in the fifth 
century BC, and that it was enhanced by Plato and Aristotle. In this context, 
Wolin aims at integrating the three essential ingredients, ‘politics’, ‘theory’ and 
‘philosophy’ (1968a: 319). According to him, they were constituted respectively 
as follows: by ‘the political’, meaning the matters of the polis (so-called ta 
politika); by the ‘observation of practice’, the ‘collection of experience’ and the 
‘process of appraising the importance of what has been observed’; and by 
‘philosophia’, meaning the love of wisdom (1968a: 319). 
  Here I should shine a light on the two terms philosophy and theory. First, 
with regard to the former, Wolin’s view is that it meant a ‘knowledge which 
would enable men to become wiser’ in the context of classical political theory 
(1968a: 319). Second, he sums up the latter term, focusing on its revolutionary 
role that a ‘new theory’ aimed to pose a challenge to traditional ways, conven- 
tions and customs and to displace them by new ways (1968a: 319). Here Wolin 
takes the view that terminologically both words had been formulated by Plato 
and Aristotle, and stresses that this fact gave a crucial meaning to the later 
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evolution of the two concepts. In my view, there is an appropriate answer to my 
enquiry in the above two points. That is to say, a rigid distinction between phi- 
losophy and theory is drawn by their respective functions which can be seen in 
a clear difference between knowledge as wisdom and knowledge as reformation. In 
short, Wolin’s accent in the article is not on philosophy but on theory in relation 
to a disciplinary character. In other words, he lays stress not on political 
philosophy but on political theory in favour of its revolutionary function. For 
instance, using the term political theory, his following description shows it: ‘The 
aim of many political theorists has been to change society itself: not simply to 
alter the way men look at the world, but to alter the world’ (Wolin 1968b: 144; 
emphases added). In addition, it might be argued that his methodological pos- 
ition on the discipline of political theory is also elucidated by the fact that he 
employs ‘political theory’ as some titles of his works such as ‘Political Theory as 
a Vocation’ (1969).24 In sum, political theory with a particular emphasis on its 
revolutionary function is separated to some extent from political philosophy. 
 
Political theory and the history of political thought 
Next, I will draw a rigid distinction between political theory and the history of 
political thought.25 The discipline of political theory, as mentioned above, has 
been considered to be almost identical to political philosophy. Similarly, it is 
noted that the name of political theory has sometimes been replaced by the 
history of political thought without any distinction. However, it is observed that, 
as far as the functions of these two disciplines are concerned, the usages of their 
names are not correct. The best possible way to make a clear distinction bet- 
ween them is to compare the methodology of political theory with Quentin 
Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas, a representative approach of the 
so-called Cambridge School regarded as one of the predominant styles of the 
history of political thought.26 So let us first find out the disciplinary meanings 
of his method of the history of political thought, and second describe a possible 
distinction between them. 
 
(a) Quentin Skinner’s approach to the history of ideas 
Meaning and Context: Quentin Skinner and his Critics (1988), edited by James Tully, 
clearly describes Skinner’s methodological position on the history of political 
thought. His famous article ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of 
Ideas’ – abbreviated to ‘MUHI’ below – printed in Tully’s above work suggests 
his general methodology.27 So I will begin by summarising the main points the 
essay puts forward: 
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1. It is risky to focus ‘simply on what each classic writer says’ as this app- 
roach necessarily leads readers not to history but to the following myth- 
ologies (1988a: 30-49): 
(a) Mythology of doctrines 
(b) Mythology of coherence 
(c) Mythology of prolepsis 
(d) Mythology of parochialism 
2. The approach dealing with texts and their doctrines has considerable dif- 
ficulty in recognising the problems of the relation and difference between 
‘what a given writer may have said’ and ‘what he may be said to have 
meant by saying what he said’ (1988a: 50-6): 
(a) Intellectual biographies run into confusion about a possibly huge differ- 
ence between what a given writer says, what it means to readers and 
what they understand concerning sense and reference the writer intends 
due to the fact that the literal meanings of terms can alter. 
(b) The study of histories of ideas results in some confusion which can be 
caused by an essential difference between meaning and use because there 
is the possibility that words meaning a given idea can be employed in 
different intentions. 
3. It is necessary to understand how a statement intended and to grasp the 
relation between a variety of statements with respect to whether ‘to be 
said to have understood’ statements given in the past (1988a: 62). 
4. A full understanding of a text denotes the awareness of two kinds of int- 
entions: first, an intention ‘which should be understood’; and second, an 
intention which must describe the ‘text itself as an intended act of com- 
munication’ (1988a: 63-4): 
(a) Every understanding of statements requires that we should replicate (or 
restore) ‘the complex intention on the part of the author’. 
(b) It is most important that the approach to the history of ideas should 
describe the ‘whole range of communications which could have been con- 
ventionally performed on the given occasion by the utterance of the given 
utterance’ in detail. 
(c) An understanding of a given author’s real intention requires tracing the 
‘relations between the given utterance and the linguistic context’. 
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5. There is not any continual problem as such, but simple ‘individual ans- 
wers to individual questions’, and it is absolutely impossible, therefore, to 
obtain the timeless answers or solutions to actual themes by reading cla- 
ssic texts in studying the history of ideas (1988a: 65). 
 
With regard to the first point, Skinner first of all stresses the ‘mythology of 
doctrines’, which is diametrically opposed to history in his view. He highlights 
the possibility that some statements made by a classic theorist can turn into a 
‘doctrine’ of readers; this generates two kinds of ridiculous things, intellectual 
biographies and histories of ideas. In addition, Skinner’s emphasis is on eternal 
and traditional ‘true standards’, with which some readers connect ethical and 
political theory – here his criticism is directed against Leo Strauss. Skinner, next, 
comments that readers sometimes give great consistency to a classic writer’s 
idea – he calls this the ‘mythology of coherence’. In addition to the above two 
mythologies, he finally proposes two types of mythology: the mythology of 
prolepsis and parochialism. The former stresses the significance of classic works 
to us, and the latter has a tendency to be biased in favour of one’s standpoint 
when describing contents of classic texts. These four methods, in Skinner’s view, 
are unconsciously applied by readers, and these problems are thus deep-rooted 
in their approaches. 
  The second point suggests some problems concerning the difference between 
‘what a given writer may have said’ and ‘what he may be said to have meant by 
saying what he said’. According to Skinner, the following two types of appro- 
aches are contained in a study which does not care about the distinction: first, 
works of ‘intellectual biography’, which tackle issues of the doctrines of a given 
classic writer; and second, the study of ‘histories of ideas’, which aims at tracing 
the form of a doctrine. He is of the opinion that these two approaches provoke 
unavoidable confusion about the difference between meaning and use – his 
emphasis on the latter approach is based primarily on Wittgenstein. The third 
point highlights Skinner’s essential view that the awareness of the ‘intention of 
what was said’ and of the relation between a variety of types of statements con- 
cerned with one another in the same context is a crucial matter for his approach 
to the history of ideas. He asserts that, simply by means of an understanding of 
what was said in terms of meaning, we cannot fully see any statements of classic 
writers. The fourth point focuses on the view that recovering the total aim of 
writers is an essential task of the history of idea. As regards the fifth point, 
Skinner concludes that any classic texts do not answer any actual questions 
from our standpoint, but do simply answer questions of individuals.28 
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(b) History and political theory 
What impression do we get of his approach? It might seem peculiar particularly 
from some familiar approaches to the history of ideas, which stress the ‘validity 
or present significance of past ideas’ (Femia 1988: 157). Joseph V. Femia claims: 
‘Skinner writes of the history of political thought as if it were merely a series of 
disconnected intellectual events, historical inquiry itself becomes impossible. . . . 
If all historical events are sui generis, then we cannot write history; we can only 
pile up documents’ (1988: 168). It is admitted that, from Skinner’s perspective, 
as Femia emphasises, everything is counted as something different from one we 
know, and very often seems to be weird. As a result, it appears that every past 
event is completely separated from our familiar phenomena, and therefore that 
it is absolutely impossible to explore historical events, regarding them as peren- 
nial issues. With regard to this vital point, Femia, referring to Antonio Gramsci, 
puts forward the following four essential components of the study of the his- 
tory of thought (1988: 158): 
 
1. Historical ideas contain ‘permanent value’. 
2. All the tasks of thinkers deal with transcendental issues of history. 
3. Issues of past events can help us to solve problems nowadays. 
4. Historical issues are all aimed at ‘contemporary history’. 
 
In his article ‘Historicist Critique of “revisionist” Methods’, Femia depends 
basically upon Gramsci, and occasionally refers to Dilthey and Croce, in order 
to highlight the significance of studying history from the present perspective. In 
addition, stressing ‘a present interest’, Femia refers to Croce as follows: ‘“only 
an interest in the life of the present can move one to investigate past fact”. 
Therefore, “this past fact does not answer to a past interest, but to a present 
interest”’ (1988: 169). In other words, he requires that we should situate past 
events in a contemporary context, which sees the past not as the world of aliens 
but as a kind of human phenomenon connected with the present. After all, his 
above four standpoints account precisely for the necessity of a contemporary 
interest to history. Femia, then, comes to the conclusion that, ‘[i]f we follow 
Skinner’s instructions, we can never produce “contemporary history” – histo- 
rical knowledge that has as its sounding-board and measuring rod contem- 
porary preoccupations and concerns. The methods and practices denounced by 
Skinner are precisely the methods and practices which enable us to separate 
what is valuable from what is erroneous or transient (tied to a determinate 
social form) in the philosophical works of the past’ (1988: 174). 
  Does his criticism, however, get right to the point of the issue? Indeed, it 
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seems that Skinner almost completely rejects today’s meaning of history when 
contending that what we can learn from Plato is only that slaves such as cooks 
might not have participated in politics; in this sense, Femia’s demands seems 
relevant. His critique, however, is not appropriate to Skinner’s above discussion 
as he rather misses the mark. In short, Skinner does not deny any present 
significance of studying the history of ideas, or rather he even supports its 
perspective. Above all, Skinner seeks for a historical importance not in the past 
connected with the present but in the world of aliens disconnected with it. He 
claims: ‘it is the very fact that the classic texts are concerned with their own 
quite alien problems, and not the presumption that they are somehow con- 
cerned with our own problems as well, which seems to me to give not the lie 
but the key to the indispensable value of studying the history of ideas. The 
classic texts, especially in social, ethical, and political thought, help to reveal – if 
we let them – not the essential sameness, but rather the essential variety of viable 
moral assumptions and political commitments. It is in this, moreover, that their 
essential philosophical, even moral, value can be seen to lie’ (Skinner 1988a: 67; 
emphases added). 
  It is not correct, then, to believe that Skinner does not concern himself with 
the present – we are driven by the hope to label him as a ‘revisionist’. For him, 
the importance of studying the history of ideas is rather shown by recognising 
something unfamiliar to us from an objective perspective which is not biased in 
favour of our standpoint – of course, he is aware that it is impossible to see it 
from the complete objective standpoint. Perhaps the reason why Skinner lays 
great stress not on meaning but on use is primarily because its approach breaks 
free from our biased view. According to him, as we have seen, if we see a past 
idea only in terms of its meaning, then it is impossible to fully understand its 
thought; we can grasp it only by considering the ‘intention of what was said’, 
thereby correctly recognising the idea in an unfamiliar world. I believe that 
Skinner’s above demands are all aimed at presenting a possible neutral view in 
order that he can look at past events without any biased viewpoint; otherwise, 
he cannot grasp anything about the history of ideas from his perspective. 
Skinner arrives at a more general conclusion as follows: 
 
The investigation of alien systems of belief provides us with an irreplaceable means of 
standing back from our own prevailing assumptions and structures of thought, and of 
situating ourselves in relation to other and very different forms of life . . . such investiga- 
tions enable us to question the appropriateness of any strong distinction between matters 
of ‘merely historical’ and ‘genuinely philosophical’ interest, since they enable us to reco- 
gnize that our own descriptions and conceptualizations are in no way uniquely privileged 
(1988b: 286). 
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Here we can clearly see an academic orientation towards his own times in his 
approach. Skinner calls the above viewpoint the ‘anthropological justification 
for studying intellectual history’ (1988b: 286). In addition, emphasising this 
anthropological justification, he adds: 
 
We can hope to attain a certain kind of objectivity in appraising rival systems of thought. 
We can hope to attain a greater degree of understanding, and thereby a larger tolerance, for 
various elements of cultural diversity. And above all, we can hope to acquire a perspective 
from which to view our own form of life in a more self-critical way, enlarging our present 
horizons instead of fortifying local prejudices (1988b: 287; emphases added). 
 
Obviously, Skinner is in favour of the present-oriented study of the history of 
ideas, and implies that intellectual history is even aimed at us. He simply req- 
uires that we should present an impartial view through highlighting certain 
objectivity for only thereby we can place ourselves at a ‘self-critical’ position in 
his view. At this point it is interesting to note that Skinner’s viewpoint has a lot 
in common with Wolin’s in the sense that they both point up an understanding 
of the alien character of studying the history of ideas.29 According to them, in 
other words, since past views are not understandable, it is relevant to seek to 
understand them. Is it right, however, to believe that only a ‘purely historical’ 
approach is of ‘further relevance’ for the study of the history of ideas? (1988b: 
287).30 It is stressed that Skinner’s method is definitely not the sole way of 
studying the history of ideas, and is not given any further relevance only by the 
fact that it is ‘purely historical’. To be sure, it is admitted that pure and objective 
historical research is highly relevant to academic studies. Nonetheless, it is 
impossible to deny other kinds of methods such as one which Femia presents, 
and to claim that only Skinner’s approach has the highest validity, even though 
one can occasionally show a higher relevance than others. Rather, it is impor- 
tant to note that to stress that one’s own approach is much more relevant than 
others – in Skinner’s case, only in terms of the genuine historical – is exactly to 
push one’s own standard on them. In short, Skinner’s perspective seems to 
simply insist that his method with an accent on the ‘purely historical’ is the sole 
certain knowledge. 
  There, then, may and should exist other types of approaches to the history of 
ideas and social and political thought as well. In this respect, I must admit that 
there is some possibility that one’s approach can have a higher validity than 
others. However, Skinner stresses that ‘the “pure historical” study of social and 
political thought may prove to have a further relevance’ (1988b: 287). As men- 
tioned above, it is absolutely impossible for me to agree with the stance that the 
pure historical method for studying political thought has a higher relevance 
than others only in the sense of the purity of a historical study. Rather, it appears 
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that Skinner simply wants to assert that his approach is most suitable to aca- 
demic studies. If this is true, then it must be stressed that he has a fatal mis- 
understanding of knowledge itself. 
  With regard to this issue, Mark Philp, while acknowledging the significance 
of the historical perspective (e.g. 2008: 130-1, 136, 146-8), highlights his stance 
that the historical approach itself is merely a method that does not have any 
advantage – of course, even if it is highly objective (Philp does not refer to 
Skinner’s method in this context) – and that other approaches are also relevant 
and significant, focusing on the meaning of the past. He says: 
 
The past is one field on which people can draw for insights and evidence, and the methods 
of the professional historian provide a set of tools to work that field, but it is certainly not 
the only field or discipline in which political theorists should be interested – philosophy, 
sociology, psychology, anthropology, law, and economics are also often equally relevant. . . . 
Politics may look to history, but it does so because it is concerned to understand events, to 
construct explanations and models of political order, and to develop a sense of what is 
politically possible and desirable. It comes to history with specific purposes that derive 
from the nature of its own discipline and its object – the understanding of politics – and it 
addresses historical material with greater or lesser degrees of attention according to its 
purposes (and it is as possible to over-invest as it is to underinvest). But its object is not 
identical with history, and its aim is not merely historical (2008: 130-1). 
 
Regardless of whether or not Skinner’s way of studying the history of ideas is 
relevant, I comment that his approach is a method for studying the history of 
political thought, which should be rigidly distinguished from political theory. 
Philp puts forward his methodological viewpoint of political theory, highlight- 
ing the disciplinary difference between these two academic fields as follows: 
 
Political theory, much like political science, need not be historical. There are many other 
disciplines to draw on for insights into the nature of politics and the challenges it faces at 
any one point of time. And yet the language of politics and vocabularies and lexicons we 
draw on in reflecting on its character and demands is profoundly shaped by the events and 
the writing of the past . . . We are more in control of what we say the more we understand 
the tools and materials with which we work, and a historical understanding of those tools 
and materials can be a powerful source of illumination and can contribute dramatically to 
the self-awareness with which we engage with difficult conceptual and theoretical pro- 
blems. To that extent there is a clear case for ensuring that political theorists understand 
something of the history of their discipline. Developing that understanding does not entail 
becoming a historian (2008: 148). 
 
Philp’s account sheds much light on a sharp difference between political theory 
and the history of political thought. Quite significantly, he makes it clear that 
the former has not only a historical character but also a non-historical character 
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as opposed to the latter typically seen as Skinner’s approach. Needless to say, 
this means that we can draw an important disciplinary difference between them 
in this point, regardless of whether or not the history of political thought should 
aim to be purely historical. It should be noted, however, that this particularly 
important distinction between the two rigidly distinct disciplines is very often 
obscure. On this view, I draw particular attention to Philp’s following lucid exp- 
lanation as to why we are required to distinguish between them: 
 
political theory has a concern with the past that serves its disciplinary interests in under- 
standing the character of political rule, the conditions for social and political order, the 
parameters of political possibility, and the values we should pursue within that set of pos- 
sibilities. But those interests also demand contributions from other disciplines. Moreover . . . 
while the standards by which we judge the truth and falsity of claims are similarly inhe- 
rited, they too are open to interrogation and question. In that possibility lies the distinctive 
philosophical moment for those who argue about politics, and in that moment is embedded 
an essential distance for political theory from history (2008: 148-9). 
 
I strongly agree with his way of drawing a disciplinary distinction between pol- 
itical theory and the history of political thought through focusing on a meth- 
odological function of the former discipline, which presents a historical pers- 
pective on the basis of a direct interest in politics in contrast to the latter, which 
identifies itself as history. In fact, Philp’s account clearly illustrates that, while 
the history of political thought can be history, political theory is not history, even 
though the latter often refers to the past. Furthermore, the method of gaining a 
genuine understanding of history is occasionally to be an effective means, but it is 
by no means the ends of political theory. For these reasons, it is reasonable to 
recognise a rigorous distinction between these two disciplines in terms of the 
respective research objectives. 
Some possible characteristics of political theory, however, are elucidated not 
only by the above difference but also by some features common to other related 
fields. A good example of this is provided by the disciplinary characteristics of 
social theory, whose research field is generally considered either to be different 
from political theory or to embrace it, as we shall see below. Presumably this is 
primarily the result of the respective disciplinary developments. Nonetheless, it 
is emphasised that, in social theory’s perspective, no doubt, there are some 
important field characteristics which can disciplinarily help political theory to 
tackle its own issues, to illuminate an understanding of politics and to prac- 
tically contribute to dealing with some political problems, that is to say, which 
can give rise to the significant development of the discipline through absorbing 
them. So let us see their relevant standpoints which can provide some provo- 
cative ideas for political theory. 
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3.  Political Theory and Social Theory 
 
Normative political theory and social theory 
It is important to note that the task of providing some detailed account of the 
connection between political theory and social theory involves us dealing with 
exceedingly troublesome issues, and thereby that my discussion inevitably 
becomes complex. Social theory, as opposed to political theory, consists of a 
wide range of theoretical ingredients of the social sciences, including empirical 
science, with a particular focus on sociology and anthropology. From this per- 
spective, complicated issues in this section stem from a profound epistemo- 
logical difference between these two research fields. This elucidates the fact that 
they have been largely determined by respectively different disciplinary influ- 
ences apart from some similar effects; this leads us to have further difficulty in 
tackling the theme. On this view, for example, Lois McNay points out that, in 
general, Anglo-American world supports the view that social theory and poli- 
tical theory are independent of one another (2008b: 85). 
  According to Christine Helliwell and Barry Hindess, social theory has pri- 
marily addressed issues concerning the nature of society and human sociality, 
which have not been provided as purely explanatory descriptions but as 
normative descriptions by which the discipline is related to political theory 
(2006: 811). First, they observe that the normative character of social theory was 
profoundly affected by the two major founders of positive social theory, August 
Comte, who took the view that social theory primarily attempts to accomplish 
‘social reform’, and Émile Durkheim, who enhanced sociology as a ‘diagnostic 
discipline’ by which this study learnt to appropriately shine a light on and 
explain ‘society’s ills’ so as to offer effective ‘remedies’ for them; in Durkheim’s 
view, social theory is viewed as an analogy between medicine and sociology, 
and the aim of the knowledge is to identify and tackle ‘social problems’ (2006: 
811). Second, Helliwell and Hindess highlight the functionalist view of the 
individual that, as opposed to traditional political theory, which counts one as 
an ‘autonomous individual’, man is primarily made up by a society in which he 
is born and brought up, that is to say, he is a ‘product of society’ and a ‘social 
artifact’; this view, they writes, is shared to some extent with poststructuralists, 
amongst them Michel Foucault and Nikolas Rose, despite many differences 
(2006: 814-5). Third, Helliwell and Hindess claims, referring to Foucault, that 
the concept of the ‘figure of man’ elucidates the relationship between political 
theory and social theory in the sense that we are not only epistemic and cultural 
constructs but ‘political’ constructs (2006: 816). Finally, they describe that, whilst 
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political theory generally raises only normative issues, social theory addresses 
both normative and descriptive themes, and therefore that the latter field takes 
the view that these two research fields are interconnected with one another; this 
is why the former is thought of merely as a branch of the latter (2006: 821). 
  All the above four points with respect to the foundations of social theory are 
closely associated with its epistemological position generated by the sociolo- 
gical diagnostic standpoint conventional non-empirical political theory lacks. 
From this perspective, it is natural that social theory should generally be consi- 
dered to be separated from the realm of political theory and vice versa. How- 
ever, it is not right to distance the former from the latter, taking account of the 
following statement: ‘Normative theory can only develop in tandem with a con- 
tinuous sociological self-critique that . . . is oriented to uncovering the exc- 
lusions that it makes’ (McNay 2008b: 105). In other words, it is impossible to 
separate their disciplinary attempts for undertaking their respective tasks. Thus, 
if McNay’s words of ‘sociological self-critique’ denote the approach of ‘critical 
social theory’, then I will next explore the relation between the two academic 
realms from a slightly different angle in relation to their epistemological stand- 
points, namely the relation between normative political theory and critical soc- 
ial theory. 
 
Political theory and critical social theory 
The topic of ‘recognition’ is an attempt to epistemologically interconnect poli- 
tical theory with critical social theory. This task has been performed by some 
famous social theorists, amongst them Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth. How- 
ever, here I do not aim to address the issue of recognition. My primary concern 
in this section is rather to carry out a detailed investigation into the epistemo- 
logical difference and connection between those two academic realms. This exp- 
loration is expected to illustrate that the critical, dialectical, reflective, diagnostic 
and remedial standpoints, which critical social theory is based on, are of high 
relevance for the disciplinary efforts of political theory. In short, this task has a 
great deal of interest not in Honneth’s political theory but in his epistemology. 
So let us raise this significant theme serving as a bridge between political theory 
and critical social theory. 
 
(a) Critical social theory 
According to Honneth, the concepts of ‘diagnosis’ and ‘pathology’ in social 
theory are derived from the field of medicine – here the discipline’s name of 
‘social philosophy’ is replaced by social theory (1996: 387). I am aware that this 
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fact is completely identical to Durkheim’s view that the diagnostic discipline of 
sociology describes society’s ills, and that it gives appropriate remedies for social 
problems regarded as either ills or diseases; his methodological and episte- 
mological views are affected by the approach of medical science in particular. 
This raises the important issue of how to count the individual, who can be, as 
we saw above, recognised by the sociological standpoint of a ‘product of 
society’, on the one hand, and by the ‘figure of man’, on the other. From these 
perspectives, social theory generally does not approach its own topics in exactly 
the same way as medicine’s despite the fact that the medical model of epis- 
temology has had a profound effect on the former discipline’s epistemological 
understanding. 
  Not surprisingly, the epistemology of critical social theory is most character- 
istically presented by Max Horkheimer. For instance, he highlights the role of 
his theory as follows: ‘Critical thinking is the function neither of the isolated 
individual nor of a sum-total of individuals. Its subject is rather a definite 
individual in his real relation to other individuals and groups, in his conflict 
with a particular class, and, finally, in the resultant web of relationships with 
the social totality and with nature. The subject is no mathematical point like the 
ego of bourgeois philosophy; his activity is the construction of the social pre- 
sent. . . . the social structure as a whole and the relation of the theoretician to 
society are altered, that is both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ 
(2002b: 210-1). In these sentences, we can identify his stance of the individual, 
which is constituted by and embedded in both society and history in which 
man including Horkheimer himself is contextualised, on the one hand, and 
which has certain consciousness that reforms society, on the other (‘immanent 
critique’); in this respect, his view is dialectical. It should be noted, therefore, that 
I perceive that in Horkheimer’s words there are both the frameworks of 
Comtean and Durkheimian social theories, which aim to diagnose for the pur- 
pose of accomplishing ‘social reform’ and offering Cartesian and Marxist ‘social 
criticism’ – this critique, most importantly, is aimed at achieving reformation. In 
other words, Horkheimer consciously intends that, while to a certain extent rej- 
ecting ‘traditional theory’, which contains not simply empirical and positive 
theory including natural science but also other kinds of academic theories such 
as normative theory (in this sense, his critique is directed against all the acade- 
mic disciplines and styles), Critical Theory consists of its traditional-theoretical 
ingredients; in this respect, too, the latter theory is dialectical. What precisely 
distinguishes the latter from the former, then, is that Critical Theory is based on 
the theoretical function of reflection in addition to certain self-awareness. When 
Horkheimer says, therefore, ‘for all the agreement of its elements with the most 
advanced traditional theories, the critical theory has no specific influence on its 
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side’ (2002b: 242), his theory requires distancing itself from traditional theory, 
even though it somewhat accepts its traditional view – indeed, Critical Theory 
is made up of the components of traditional theory. This is precisely described 
by his following sentence, emphasising the dialectical evolution of ideas: ‘truth 
is forged in an evolution of changing and conflicting ideas’ (1947: 63). In sum, as 
a result of self-reflection and self-awareness, Critical Theory has displayed its 
own epistemological characteristics, such as dialectic, diagnosis and critique, all of 
which are regarded as its own crucial theoretical standpoints. Next, let us see 
these several essential theoretical features of Critical Theory in more detail 
below. 
In his early writing, Horkheimer writes: ‘The real social function of philo- 
sophy lies in its criticism of what is prevalent’ (2002c: 264; emphasis added). 
Indeed, this sentence tells the derivation of the name of critical social theory, and 
he in fact draws his attention to the function of critique. However, it is noted that 
the meaning of his criticism is not simply to criticise in its literal sense – of 
course, its role is also included in his intention. Rather, it should be considered 
that his conception of critique signifies that ‘the task of theory was practical, not 
just theoretical’, and that ‘it should aim not just to bring about correct und- 
erstanding, but to create social and practical conditions more conductive to 
human flourishing than the present ones’ (Finlayson 2005: 4; emphases added). 
In addition, James G. Finlayson stresses that Critical Theory intends to be dia- 
gnostic and remedial, which means, as he says, ‘[t]he goal of the theory was not 
just to determine what was wrong with contemporary society at present, but, by 
identifying progressive aspects and tendencies within it, to help transform 
society for the better’ (2005: 4) – these two important ingredients have already 
been noted above. Horkheimer, above all, is willing to undertake the difficult 
task of practice. He says: ‘By criticism, we mean that intellectual, and eventually 
practical, effort which is not satisfied to accept the prevailing ideas, actions, and 
social conditions unthinkingly and from mere habit; effort which aims to coor- 
dinate the individual sides of social life with each other and with the general 
ideas and aims of the epoch, to deduce them genetically, to distinguish the app- 
earance from the essence, to examine the foundations of things, in short, really 
to know them’ (2002c: 270). In this sense, I believe that he is a direct heir of 
Durkheim.31 
  In addition to the above critical character, as noted earlier, there are some 
other important theoretical features in Critical Theory: reflective and dialectical. It 
is presumed that they both have their primary roots in G. W. Friedrich Hegel. 
As has often been mentioned, Critical Theory draws its inspiration primarily 
from Immanuel Kant, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud and Max Weber apart from 
Hegel. Also, it must be noted that the main figures of the Frankfurt School (e.g. 
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Horkheimer, Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm and Jürgen Habermas) have more 
or less absorbed – whether critically or uncritically – almost all the theories of 
modern philosophy and the social sciences. In these respects, it can be argued 
that they have captured the essence of approximately almost all the modern 
philosophical theories on which many branches of the social sciences are based. 
In fact, in his article ‘The Social Function of Philosophy’ (1939) Horkheimer 
refers to an extremely wide range of scholars and thinkers, amongst them 
Thomas Hobbes, Rene Descartes, Baruch Spinoza, David Hume, Gottfried W. 
Leibniz, Kant, Hegel, Friedrich W. J. Schelling, J. C. Friedrich Schiller, some 
Neo-Kantians, Max Scheler, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Karl 
Mannheim, Ernst Mach, Rudolf Carnap, Paul Valery, Henri Bergson, Comte, 
Herbert Spencer, Bertrand Russell, Alfred N. Whitehead and some American 
pragmatists.32 
  However, it must also be pointed out that Critical Theorists were definitely 
not affected by the above theories without any reflection. Rather, it must be 
emphasised that Critical Theory reflects on all the things concerning its own 
theoretical and practical efforts, that is on knowledge, society, human beings 
and interests, and so on, all of which contribute to its own theory. As Finlayson 
says, most importantly, ‘critical theory reflected on the social context that gave 
rise to it, on its own function within that society, and on the purposes and 
interest of its practitioners, and so forth, and such reflections were built into the 
theory’ (2005: 3; emphases added). In addition, it is important to remember that 
this fact is profoundly associated with the reason why Critical Theory has 
applied the Hegelian dialectic to its own theoretical framework. Furthermore, 
this clearly explains another reason why the theory takes the fundamental 
standpoint that knowledge and society reciprocally determine one another. In fact, 
as Horkheimer writes: ‘Mind . . . is not cut loose from the life of society; it does 
not hang suspended over it. In so far as mind seeks autonomy or man’s control 
over his own life no less than over nature, it is able to recognize this same 
tendency as a force operative in history’ (2002b: 223; emphases added). From this 
perspective, he stresses, ‘in genuinely critical thought explanation signifies not 
only a logical process but a concrete historical one as well. In the course of it both 
the social structure as a whole and the relation of the theoretician to society are 
altered, that is both the subject and the role of thought are changed’ (2002b: 211; 
emphases added). To put it another way, Horkheimer takes the view that 
‘society’ and ‘theory’ progress and develop dialectically, and that both their fun- 
ctions and the relation between them change in the historical process, at the 
same time. This standpoint enables Critical Theory to concern itself not only 
with theoretical activity but also with practical activity – from the dialectical 
viewpoint, theory necessarily involves itself in practice and vice versa – that is 
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to say, it requires that Critical Theorists should change not only theory but also 
reality (society) as a process of historical progress from their reflective pers- 
pective; this is also why Critical Theory applies the style of critique. In Critical 
Theory, for these reasons, the above theoretical components of reflection, dialectic 
and critique are inseparable from each other. 
  Through the above discussion, I arrive at the following conclusion. Social the- 
ory can and ought to be not simply descriptive and explanatory but normative, 
diagnostic and remedial. In addition, from the epistemological perspective the 
discipline can also be critical, reflective and dialectical. There is thus no reason 
why political theory cannot absorb these methodological and epistemological 
frameworks. In this respect, it is noted that the disciplinary style of critical 
social theory must be profoundly relevant to some disciplinary efforts of poli- 
tical theory. However, there is a troublesome problem with respect to the above 
diagnostic viewpoint, which presents the pathological view of what is normal 
and abnormal. In other words, provided that social theory takes a methodo- 
logical position which regards a problem as a society’s ill, what is identified as 
an illness or a pathology is a crucial matter for the task of diagnosis. With respect 
to this issue, Honneth gives his opinion as follows: ‘the application of both 
concepts [diagnosis and pathology] to the realm of psychic disturbances pre- 
sents major difficulties, since clear standards of what is normal for the psychic 
life of a person until now were barely establishes in clinical research’ (1996: 387). 
Here he takes the view that there is no certain criterion for the determination as 
to what is normal and not, with regard to our psychological condition, obvio- 
usly because of a great deal of difficulty in defining it. Also, there is another 
serious problem of applying the medical, pathological standpoint to the social 
sciences in the sense that a research object transfers from a simple individual to 
a society or a group by introducing it to a study of society, and issues tackled 
thereby become much more complex, says Honneth. As a matter of fact, he is of 
the opinion that what counts as normal is determined entirely by cultural 
contexts, so criteria for what should be considered as normal and abnormal 
(pathological) always exist within respective societies (1996: 387-8). Despite 
these pieces of evidence, nonetheless, Honneth draws attention to the following 
fact: ‘the determination of social pathologies in social philosophy always pro- 
ceeds with a view to the social conditions that can promote the individual’s 
self-realization’ (1996: 390). In other words, in his view normality, proposed as 
‘an ethical representation of social normality’, ‘is derived from the conditions of 
possibility of self-realization’, which is of particular importance in order that 
society may be normal (1996: 388). 
  Needless to say, Honneth concerns himself primarily not with social psycho- 
logy but with the specific ethics for laying the ethical foundations of society, by 
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which he can give appropriate diagnoses and remedies – according to Honneth, 
this is the primary task of social philosophy. With regard to the approach of 
presenting a social underpinning, my enquiry is whether the psychological 
ground is based on ethical grounds or vice versa. Fromm, for example, stresses 
that first of all it is necessary to lay the sociopsychological foundations so as to 
provide an appropriate diagnosis of a society’s ill, and we can thereby adequ- 
ately create the ethical ground of society. He claims: 
 
It may be surprising to many readers to find a psychoanalyst dealing with problems of 
ethics and, particularly, taking the position that psychology must not only debunk false 
ethical judgements but can, beyond that, be the basis for building objective and valid norms 
of conduct (Fromm 1971: vii). 
 
Fromm believes that psychological perception, no doubt, gives rise to our eth- 
ical and normative basis – as argued in Chapter 6, his word of ‘psychology’ is 
replaced by ‘social psychology’ in the sense that for him the former must always 
be the latter, and, in this respect, in Fromm’s view an individual denotes a 
‘socialized individual’ (e.g. Fromm 1991: 142). As a matter of fact, his great 
contribution to the early Frankfurt School elucidates the special need of social 
psychology as a primarily requisite ingredient of the project of Critical Theory, 
called ‘interdisciplinary materialism’. Fromm emphasises that psychoanalytic 
knowledge provides us with social norms based on its solid ethical ground.33 
For these reasons, it must be stressed that Fromm’s social and psychoanalytic 
theory is still of vital importance to the task of reflecting on Critical Theory. 
 
(b) Social and political theory 
Again, how does the above epistemological ways of understanding theory and 
society affect political theory? As far as normative political theory is concerned, 
it seems that many works of political theory have concentrated all their efforts 
on topics concerning social justice in post-A Theory of Justice, as if the primary 
task of the discipline was to deal with those issues. However, it is important to 
remember that Rawls’s task and approach are concerned only with the estab- 
lishment of distributive justice. In general, therefore, it is interested neither in 
any sociological diagnoses nor in Marxist social criticism and reform. However, 
there is no reason why political theory may not be critical, reflective, diagnostic 
and remedial. If this is true, then the disciplinary style of normative theory is not 
the sole political theory. On this view, I want to refer to McNay. She writes: 
 
To criticize normative political theory in terms of its sociological pre-understandings is not 
necessarily to forestall it. It is rather to continue the dialectical engagement between the 
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two areas of thought and, in using each to expose the limits of the other, to provide ren- 
ewed grounds for critical debate (McNay 2008b: 105). 
 
It is possible to believe that, as McNay says, political theory and critical social 
theory are already dialectically interwoven; in this sense, there is no need for 
them to exclude each other. Rather, it can be validly argued that social theory is 
indispensable for laying the theoretical foundations of political theory, and that 
the latter discipline can thereby even deal with unfamiliar issues contributing to 
new theoretical attempts of its own field. 
 
 
4.  Seiji riron: Political Theory in Japan 
 
In this section, I will carry out an exploration of the discipline of seiji riron in 
Japan, which is regarded as equivalent to political theory, focusing on its met- 
hodological issues.34 No one can avoid addressing one’s own problems. It goes 
without saying that this task forms a link in the chain of self-reflection; thus, 
this is a crucial matter. 
 
The discipline of seijigaku and Masao Maruyama 
In the aftermath of World War II, the best-known Japanese scholar of politics 
(seiji gakusha) and political theorist (seiji rironka) Masao Maruyama35 (1914-96) 
wrote in his famous article ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku: Sono kaiko to tenbō’ 
(Politics as a Science in Japan: Retrospect and Prospects) (1947) as follows:36 
 
Instead of drawing its problems from its own native soil, Japanese scholarship has tended to 
chase persistently after the passing themes and methods developed in the European aca- 
demic world. To this may be traced the divorce of our scholarship from reality. Politics 
(seijigaku) in Japan manifests this fatal weakness (shukumeiteki na yowasa) in an extreme form. 
Here the dissociation of scholarship from the reality it purports to study is so deep that the 
gap seems to be almost insurmountable (Maruyama 1969c: 227; emphases added, and tran- 
slation modified; [1995c: 136]). 
 
In this article, Maruyama highlights the following two crucial matters with res- 
pect to the disciplinary conditions of politics in Japan (seijigaku): first, the dis- 
sociation of theory and practice; and second, escape from actual political issues 
(1969c: 225-32; [1995c: 133-42]). As regards the first problem, he clearly says that 
‘for in its development it [seijigaku] almost never had the corrective experience 
of shaping and being shaped by political realities’ (1969c: 227; [1995c: 136]); this 
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best explains the ‘fatal weakness’ (shukumeiteki na yowasa) he stresses above.37 In 
other words, the reason why the academic discipline of seijigaku caused such a 
weakness, according to Maruyama, is due to the fact that it had not tried to 
connect itself with political realities; this is directly associated with the second 
problem he raises. In short, in Maruyama’s view these faults are the result of the 
historical process the field of seijigaku underwent, and it implies that his cri- 
ticism was directed not only against seijigaku but also against a wide range of 
fields in the social sciences in Japan. On this view, Maruyama claims as follows: 
‘The sterility (funinsei) of Japanese political science is not to be blamed on either 
the laziness or the incompetence of individual scholars of politics. It is essenti- 
ally an outcome of the political structure established after the Meiji Restoration’ 
(1969c: 227; emphasis added, and translation modified; [1995c: 136]). Most imp- 
ortantly, however, his primary aim is to criticise not social science as a whole 
but seijigaku: ‘It is unreasonable to expect any genuine social science to thrive 
where there is no undergirding of civil society. It is particularly unreasonable to 
expect it in the case of political science’ (1969c: 227-8; [1995c: 136-7]). 
  How should we accept Maruyama’s criticism of the ‘sterility’ of seijigaku? In 
order to consider this issue, I want to refer to the Japanese scholar of politics 
and the history of ideas Noriaki Ono’s stance on the knowledge of politics. In 
the afterword to his book Seiji riron no genzai (Present-Day Issues of Political 
Theory) (2005), Ono says as follows: 
 
In my lecture ‘Public Philosophy and Contemporary Politics’ (Kōkyō Tetsugaku to Gendai 
Tōchi) (Summer Semester 2004), I necessarily hesitated to decide my attitude towards actual 
political issues and to express it to students, although I was able to explain what and where 
their problems are from the perspective of normative theory (Ono 2005: 232). 
 
Ono gives three reasons for his silent attitude towards his own lecture: first, he 
is unwilling to express his opinion about politics in his lectures; second, he is in 
favour of the ‘bottom-up approach’ (genba-shugi); and third, his manner is based 
on his way of thinking as a specialist in the history of ideas (2005: 232). In 
addition, it is noted that he declares that his work holds onto a ‘value-neutral’ 
stance (kachi chūritsu) for making his explanatory attempt (2005: 3).38 How, then, 
should we see Ono’s position on the knowledge of politics? In conclusion, in my 
view, his attitude towards politics as a reality denotes exactly the abandonment 
of the role of politics as a discipline. With regard to this issue, however, there is 
a troublesome problem concerning whether the accent of his study is on pol- 
itical theory (politics) or the history of ideas (history). Basically, as we saw in 
section 2 above, I am of the opinion that these two disciplines should be dis- 
tinguished from each other due to their different disciplinary characteristics; 
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and therefore its issue is a crucial matter. With respect to this vital point, 
however, it is observed that Ono himself has begun to occur to him that a 
value-neutral position that consistently stands to objectivity is no longer rele- 
vant to Japanese scholarship (2005: 232). Here I reference Easton’s later position 
on his study of political science. Why did he later abandon his early metho- 
dological stance of ‘pure science’?39 From Easton’s later perspective, knowledge 
that is driven by its desire to adhere firmly to objectivity is a pseudo-theory 
regardless of disciplinary genres. Here I am not intrigued by justifying Easton’s 
view. Rather, my concern is why Ono tries to stick strongly to the ‘value-neutral’ 
position. At this point I want to return to Maruyama’s discussion. He claims: 
 
A scholar of politics must start by frankly recognizing the existence in his own field of this 
kind of close interrelation between the process of knowing and the object known, In other 
words, he must recognize that all political speculation, including his own, is existentially 
bound. In the political world there can be no observer who is not also an actor. ‘Strict 
neutrality’ (gensei chūritsu) is also a political position. In this sense, when a scholar con- 
structs a theory of political situation, he is ipso facto committing himself to a specific 
political course of action (1969c: 238; translation modified; [1995c: 149]). 
 
From Maruyama’s perspective, Ono’s academic position is an invalid and imp- 
ossible methodological choice. According to Maruyama, ‘[i]f a person professes 
to be a mere spectator of the all-out political struggle among the various types 
of Weltanschauungen, he shows himself by that very fact to be unqualified as a 
political scientist’ (1969c: 238-9; [1995c: 150]). How, then, did Maruyama cope 
with the problem that every task of political science necessarily bases itself on 
one’s subjectivity, while the discipline requires certain objectivity? Significantly, 
he answers this enquiry as follows: 
 
Political investigation both regulates and is regulated by its object of study. Therefore it is 
the ‘original sin’ (shukugō) of political theory (seiji riron) to be markedly subjective and to 
take on an ideological cast. . . . a person who is deeply concerned with actual political 
trends and who sincerely desires to affect them will probably realize through self- 
examination that any speculation is existentially bound. In his perception of political reality 
he will be particularly conscious of the need to guard against any clouding of the cognitive 
process that arises from his own hopes and aspirations. Thus he is likely to attain a higher 
level of objectivity than the self-styled ‘value-free’ observer (1969c: 239-40; [1995c: 150-1]). 
 
Maruyama attempts to support political theory partaking of subjectivity, pro- 
ducing a paradoxical effect on his logic. To be sure, it seems that, while admi- 
tting that his political theory can take on a dogmatic character, he tries to take 
his responsibility. Rather, he even lays stress on the necessity of subjectivity, and 
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requires us to face political realities, by emphasising ‘our politics’ (wareware no 
seiji): 
 
it is characteristic of speculation about politics that problems of methodology are insepa- 
rably intertwined with its subject matter. A pure methodology that transcends its subject 
matter has no meaning in this world. Another important activity for political science is 
comparative government. But I suspect that Japanese studies of foreign political systems, 
unless they are ultimately related to the problem of what to do about Japan’s [our] politics 
[wareware no seiji], are rather in the nature of old man’s hobbies (1969c: 234; [1995c: 144]). 
 
Quite interestingly, Maruyama warns particularly against the personalisation of 
knowledge that is caused paradoxically by highlighting purity. From this per- 
spective, he comes to the conclusion that, ‘[n]owadays political science must, 
above all, be a science oriented to actualities (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft)’ (1969c: 
234; emphasis added; [1995c: 144]). Is there, then, any problem in the way that 
politics aims exclusively to pursue ‘actualities’? In any case, from Maruyama’s 
standpoint, too, political theory is definitely regarded as a sub-discipline of pol- 
iitics. I therefore want to seek a possible answer to the question by observing 
the present state of the discipline of seiji riron. 
 
Seiji riron 
(a) Imported studies (yu’nyū-gaku) 
With regard to a major methodological issue of political theory in Japan, the 
Japanese political theorist Seiki Okazaki raises a significant topic associated 
with Maruyama’s view of ‘sterility’ in his short article ‘Seiji riron hōhōron ni 
tsuite’ (On the Methodology of Political Theory) (2008). Basically, Okazaki 
admits Maruyama’s view. His stance is that the primary reason for the ‘im- 
maturity’ (mihattatsu) of seiji riron is because most Japanese political theorists 
have ignored methodological issues in the discipline (2008: 3). In addition to 
this evidence, it is noted that the ‘sterility’ of seijigaku can be explained by the 
fact that the Japanese term shakai kagaku is the translation of the ‘social sciences’ 
and ‘social science’. In other words, it can be argued that the problem is pro- 
foundly associated with the historical circumstances to which Japan has been 
adopted – this is exactly ‘an outcome of the political structure’ Maruyama 
stresses. According to Okazaki, however, the main factor in immaturity is not 
the above second reason. On this view, as Okazaki puts it, I am convinced that 
Japanese political theorists have been merely ‘importers of Western political 
theory’ (seiji riron no yu’nyū gyōsha) (2008: 5) – similarly, the political theorist 
Keiichi Matsushita describes shakai kagaku as ‘studies based on imported the- 
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ories’ (yu’nyū-gaku) (1991: 14).40 From this perspective, Okazaki requires the 
shift away from importers to ’producers of political theory’ (seiji riron no seizō 
gyōsha) (2008: 5). In addition, referring to William Galston, he reflects on a 
harmful tendency of seiji riron as follows: ‘Unless political theory presents a 
new theory which creates “difference”, it results either in a mere “political 
criticism” (seiji hihyō), which simply expresses one’s attitude towards actual 
politics, or in mere “studies of political theory” (seiji riron-gaku), which solely 
import foreign political theories, even if regarded as “political theory”.’ (2008: 5). 
Taking account of this condition of the scholarship of political theory, it is not 
surprising that Gendai seiji riron (Contemporary Political Theory) (2006), edited 
by the best-known Japanese political theorists Osamu Kawasaki and Atsushi 
Sugita, which is counted as a major text of seiji riron, refers only to five Japanese 
scholars, despite the fact that the book contains one hundred-four foreign scho- 
lars’ theories (Kawasaki and Sugita 2006) – these solid pieces of evidence have 
been offered by Okazaki’s article (2008: 3). 
 
(b) Two types of seiji riron: Western political thought and Japanese political thought 
Next, I will point out that there is a weird segregation in the discipline of seiji 
riron: Western and European political theory (Seiō or Seiyō seiji shisō) and 
Japanese political theory (Nihon seiji shisō). In Japan, scholars of the former 
theory, on the whole, have so far performed the task of ‘political theory’ in the 
literal sense – the primary reason is obviously because political theory is derived 
from the West. The latter, which has largely been determined by ‘Maruyama’s 
approach of the history of ideas’ (Maruyama shisōshi-gaku), is characterised by a 
profoundly historical feature, and has primarily been provided by Maruyama’s 
disciples who have formed the ‘Maruyama School’ (Maruyama gakuha). In other 
words, there is a rigid distinction between European political theory, which is 
regarded as political theory in Japan (seiji riron), and Japanese political theory, 
which is generally called Japanese political thought (Nihon seiji shisō) or the history 
of Japanese political thought (Nihon seiji shisōshi). How is, then, seiji riron related to 
social and historical issues of Japan? If not, then it means exactly that the 
discipline cannot tackle political issues associated with sociohistorical themes – 
moreover, if seiji riron is not interested in politics concerning the Japanese, then it 
does not and cannot precisely deal with Japanese political themes ironically 
despite the discipline’s name. How is seiji riron connected to Japanese political 
thought? Does the former make such an effort? If not, then the present-day 
scholarship of seiji riron is definitely not a ‘science oriented to actualities’ 
(genjitsu kagaku), which the young Maruyama demanded, on the grounds that, if 
it is constituted exclusively by imported theories – this is not the core problem, 
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and is not too problematic – and if it does not concern its own methodology and 
methodological issues so as to adapt them for its own sociocultural ground, 
they cannot function in its own context. In this respect, to be sure there may be 
no problem with it, and seiji riron does not necessarily fulfil the requisite of a 
science oriented to actualities. However, then, doesn’t seiji riron tackle actual 
political issues? And doesn’t it concern itself with its own sociocultural themes? 
In my view, the primary problematic and troublesome point of the discipline of 
seiji riron lies exactly in these issues. In this sense, Maruyama’s suggestion is still 
of great value for considering those problems. For these reasons, there is no 
reason why the two studies may not be integrated into seiji riron. With regard to 
this vital point, I will summarise primary issues concerning the integration of 
the two types of seiji riron below. 
  Seiji riron, as mentioned note 34, is the translation of political theory. Here my 
primary concern is whether Japanese political theory exists or not. As we saw 
above, (the history of) Japanese political thought consists of historical contents, and 
most often does not tackle actual themes. Can we, then, call it Nihon seiji riron 
(Japanese or Japan-based political theory)? If Maruyama’s canonical works are not 
categorised as seiji riron, then does there exist seiji riron in Japan? If not, it is 
undoubtedly mere import-based studies in view of the current disciplinary 
condition. So what is political theory translated as seiji riron for? Why don’t we 
employ the expression of poritikaru seorī (ポリティカル・セオリー)? Most importantly, 
how and what should we do for overcoming these troublesome problems con- 
cerning methodology? At this point I arrive at the conclusion that we cannot 
find any reason why seiji riron does not concern itself with political actualities. 
From this perspective, I will suggest a possible clue to surmounting the present 
condition of seiji riron beset with methodological difficulties which stem from 
its import-oriented character and the segregation noted above. 
 
(c) Political theorist as a political practitioner 
Consider some academic fields such as medicine and law, which characteris- 
tically involve themselves in the actual application of their own theories beyond 
the scope of the engagement with theorisation. This means that medical and 
judicial practitioners actually become decision-makers who are required not only 
to suitably apply their respective own theories but also to decide what theory, to 
whom, when, where and how to adopt it. This is well explained by the fact that in 
general a medical scientist is a doctor at the same time – it is, of course, profoundly 
associated with the discipline’s characteristics and objects. From this perspective, 
however, there is no reason why political theory cannot actually engage, for 
example, in policy-making and political decision-making – of course, these act- 
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ions are dangerous in the sense that theory is used to one’s and a certain group’s 
advantage. Having said that, the standpoint of a practitioner suggests that 
political theory should be satisfied neither simply by a philosophically abstract 
thinking nor by a conceptual analysis nor by the destruction of the dominant 
discourse nor by a simple criticism. It should intervene in actual politics from 
the perspective of a political practitioner different from a politician in accordance 
with disciplinary necessity. On this view, Maruyama’s following words might 
demonstrate the validity of my view: 
 
We must now make every effort to use the vast amount of living research material spread 
before our eyes. We must do as Aristotle did with the ancient polis, as Machiavelli did with 
Renaissance Italy, as Hobbes and Locke did with seventeenth-century England, as Marx did 
with the Revolution of 1848 and the Paris Commune, as Bryce did with the democracies, as 
Beard, Merriam, Laski, and Siegfried did in the twenties and thirties. By analysing the com- 
plicated trends that underlie Japanese politics, we must elicit the laws of political process 
and behaviour, constantly trying to verify in the actual political situation the propositions 
and categories thus acquired (Maruyama 1969c: 233-4; emphases added; [1995c: 143-4]). 
 
Perhaps Maruyama did not intend that politics (political theory) should rely 
upon natural science’s behaviourist and positivist approaches depending hea- 
vily upon the verification of hypotheses, nor should it be political science. On this 
view, for Maruyama the term seijigaku does not necessarily signify natural 
science-based political science but rather politics, as exemplified by the fact that 
in the essay he fully intends ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ not to avoid falling 
into ideology and to achieve certain objectivity – his term of seijigaku denotes 
them to a certain extent, but they are not most important for him – but to be a 
genjitsu kagaku (Wirklichkeitswissenschaft) by applying the term ‘science’ (kagaku) 
– in this respect, in Maruyama’s view, seijigaku is not necessarily scientific as his 
article ‘Kagaku to shite no seijigaku’ is precisely translated as ‘Politics as a 
Science’.41 
 
The arrogant “positivist” dislikes to pass value judgements and professes to stand for 
“objectivity”. Though he makes a great show of his freedom from values, in the midst of 
his “positivist” cognition value judgements are likely to creep inadvertently into his 
“objective observations”. On the other hand, a person who is deeply concerned with actual 
political trends and who sincerely desires to affect them will probably realize through self- 
examination that any speculation is existentially bound. In his perception of political reality 
he will be particularly conscious of the need to guard against any clouding of the cognitive 
process that arises from his own hopes and aspirations. Thus he is likely to attain a higher 
level of objectivity than the self-styled “value-free” observer’ (1969c: 239-40; emphases 
added; [1995c: 150-1]). 
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Paradoxically speaking, Maruyama explicitly avoids implying ‘science’ in the 
positivist sense with the effective use of the term kagaku; this is why ‘Kagaku to 
shite no seijigaku’ does not mean seiji kagaku but genjitsu kagaku which is reg- 
arded as seijigaku. Most importantly, however, my other enquiry is whether his 
politics and political theory actually contributed to establishing a genjitsu kagaku, 
and whether he actively participated in politics as a political actor or a political 
practitioner. If not, then it is possible to presume that Maruyama was also 
driven by his impulse to stay in the outside of political realities. If this is true, 
then his discussion turns into a political doctrine. In that case, it is not impla- 
usible to believe that Ono’s academic position is rather more valuable to scho- 
larship.42 
 
 
Notes 
 
 1 John von Heyking, for example, calls attention to ‘political activity’ for scientific enquiry into 
the meaning of politics. He thereby distinguishes between the two basic components of 
political studies, the ‘character’ and the ‘scope’ of political activity (2008: 319). 
 2 With regard to this issue, for example, Dustin Ells Howes clearly explains as follows: ‘a great 
deal of political theory involves thinking about the nature of politics itself’ (2008: 318). 
 3 Interestingly, Richard Kraut has provided the statistical data that Aristotle uses the phrase in 
his works ‘seven times’ (2002: 95). 
 4 The originals of these expressions are provided in German: the former is given as ‘Tà politikà, 
bezeichnet die auf die Polis bezogenen öffentlichen Angelegenheiten’; the latter is given as 
‘die Kunst der Führung und Verwaltung der öffentlichen Aufgaben im Interesse der 
Gemeinschaft der Bürger/des Gemeinwohls der Polis’. As regards the terminology of Politik, 
Werner J. Patzelt, for example, has also offered a good illustration of it. He has translated ta 
politika as ‘die einem Freien wohlanstehenden Diskussionen über die Angelegenheiten der 
Polis (citizens’ pending discussions about the matters of the polis)’ (2007: 20). 
 5 With regard to Socrates and Plato, my discussion depends upon Daniel Devereux’s work 
(Devereux 2011). 
 6 According to Devereux, the political art does not have its origins in Socrates. Devereux has 
presented the important historical fact that Protagoras and other sophists ‘set themselves up 
as teachers of the “political art”’ (2011: 99). 
 7 For example, Cambridge’s English translation of the Politics edited by Stephen Everson 
(1988) has translated polis as ‘state’ – this is the revised version of Jonathan Barnes’s tran- 
slation (1984). With respect to this point, after explaining that in today’s meaning Aristotle’s 
polis is not state but ‘city’, and that what he actually described in the Politics is the ‘city-state’, 
Everson says as follows: ‘Aristotle’s subject in the Politics is neither the nature of the “city- 
state” nor of the ‘city’ but of the society unified by constitutional government – and the clo- 
sest notion we have to capture this is that of the state’ (Aristotle 1988: XV). 
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 8 The polis, needless to say, was made up of the ‘two kinds of spheres’, oikos (economic and 
familial sphere) and polis (‘sphere of general binding regulation of the public matters’) 
(Rieger 2010: 744). Hence, the polis denotes the politics of the polis. 
 9 With respect to Aristotle’s conceptions of polis, politēs and politeia, see Devereux’s work (2011: 
112). 
10 See the following account of politics (Politik): ‘er [Politik (begriff)] bedeutet soviel wie “von 
öffentlichem Interesse, dem Gemeinwohl gemäß” (The concept of politics signifies the same 
thing ‘as the public interest in accordance with the common good’)’ (Druwe 1987: 393). 
11 With respect to the meaning of the political in classical political theory, Sheldon Wolin’s 
following description is quite relevant to my enquiry: ‘Classical theory identified the poli- 
tical with the common involvements which men shared by virtue of membership in the 
same polis. Romans of the republican period called their political order a res publica, literally, 
“a public thing”; the same idea was reflected in the sixteenth-century English usage of 
“commonweal”. The core meaning of “political” – a sharing of what is common – was elo- 
quently expressed by Cicero: “Further, those who share Law must also share Justice; and 
those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth” (De 
legibus I, 7.23).’ (1968a: 319-20). My survey focuses on the context of ancient Greece. 
12 This view has been put forward, for example, by Humphrey D. F. Kitto. He says: ‘Man is an 
animal whose characteristic it is to live in a city-state’ (1957: 11). 
13 Frazer also takes a similar standpoint to Swift’s (2008: 179). 
14 For example, Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes and Weber are categorised as theorists taking this type 
of view. 
15 Blondel sets out the appearance of politics with reference to ‘decision’ as follows: ‘There are 
no politics unless at least two individuals have to take a decision together ’ (1991: 483). 
16 Druwe’s conception of politics closely resembles the following two conceptions: first, 
Wilhelm Hofmann’s, Nicolai Dose’s and Dieter Wolf’s ‘three classic concepts of politics’ (die 
drei klassichen Politikbegriffe), ‘normative-ontological’ (normativ-ontologisch), ‘critical-dialecti- 
cal’ (kritisch-dialektisch) and ‘empirical-analytical’ (empirisch-analytisch) concepts of politics 
(2007: 16); and second, Werner J. Patzelt’s conception of politics, ‘technical’ (technische), ‘state’ 
(staatliche) and ‘practical’ (praktische) concepts of politics (2007: 21) – cf. Dirk Berg- Schlosser’s 
and Theo Stammen’s conception of politics (2003: 22-33). 
17 To the extent that Druwe employs the term ‘social activities’ (soziale Handlungen), corres- 
ponding to ‘social actions’ (soziale Handeln), and that Patzelt occasionally uses the word of 
‘activity’ (Handlung) instead of ‘action’ (Handeln), ‘activity’ is identical to the term ‘action’ in 
this context. In addition, Blondel defines politics as ‘activity by which decisions are arrived 
at and implemented in and for a community’. According to him, politics is characterised by 
the three features, activity, decisions, ‘arrived at and implemented’ by activity, and community, 
in which activity takes place (1991: 482-4). 
18 With respect to this view, see the Japanese political theorist Masao Maruyama’s following 
description (on him, see s. 4 below): ‘In the political world there can be no observer who is not 
also an actor. “Strict neutrality” is also a political position. In this sense, when a scholar con- 
structs a theory of political situation, he is ipso facto committing himself to a specific political 
course of action’ (1969c: 238; emphases added [1995c: 149]). 
19 See, for instance, the following description: ‘When John Rawls wrote A Theory of Justice in 
1971, which I take as ground zero for our debates, there was only one journal (Ethics) devo- 
ted to the field of political philosophy, and it was more or less moribund’ (Kymlicka 2002: x). 
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20 On this, three political theorists take the same view as Kymlicka’s: ‘For many years before 
Rawls, academic political philosophy was either the history of political thought or quasi- 
technical linguistic analysis of the meaning of political concepts. Since Rawls there has been 
systematic and substantive argument about what the societies we live in should actually be 
like . . . Much of what has been written since then can helpfully be understood as engaging 
with Rawls’s theory – like it or not, those writing in his wake have to think about how their 
arguments relates to his’ (Swift 2001: 10); ‘In the mid-twentieth century John Rawls single- 
handedly revived Anglo-American political philosophy, which had not been significant 
progress since the development and elaboration of utilitarianism in the nineteenth century’ 
(Arneson 2006: 45); ‘Much academic work in political theory – including much that disputes 
his substantive positions – operates in a Rawlsian paradigm’ (Swift and White 2008: 59). 
21 See, for instance, the following account: ‘With the advent of Rawls’s work, normative pol- 
itical theory began to form the dominant motif from the later 1970s up to the late 1980s’ 
(Vincent 1997: 2; emphases added). 
22 On this view, it appears that these two fields’ names are nowadays employed without any 
different implications in their English contexts. 
23 Despite the fact that some theorists, including Vincent, notice that there is no clear difference 
between these two disciplines, some others make a distinction between them. One of them, 
Mark Philp, claims as follows: ‘If we think of political philosophy as involving this focus on 
values, and political theory as including concerns about the conditions under which these 
values can be realized, or the extent to which they can be realized under current conditions – 
with the latter shading at times into political science – then, even if we recognize the dis- 
tinctive character and independence of the different activities, we can see that having an 
understanding of a body of past thinking about politics and a grasp of the context and the 
imperatives and constraints facing earlier thinkers is likely to be a considerable asset to any 
political theorist even if it has no direct impact on the work of the philosopher ’ (2008: 147). It 
seems that Philp’s explanation highlights the historical perspective of political theory. How- 
ever, we cannot find a clear difference between them only in terms of his account. In any 
case, here I simply stress that the task of political theory is not confined to the discussion of 
the historical conditions that realise values; in this respect, I am not in favour of his view. As 
we shall see later, however, he draws a significant distinction between political theory and 
the history of political thought. 
24 In his Politics and Vision (2004 [1960]), for example, Wolin employs the term political theory 
in almost the same sense as political philosophy, but this fact does not affect my under- 
standing of his stance on the distinction between them on the grounds that there is enough 
evidence that he gives a special meaning to the term political theory in his primary three 
methodological essays. 
25 For example, the Japanese political theorist Seiki Okazaki’s article, ‘Seiji riron no hōhōron ni 
tsuite’ (On the Methodology of Political Theory) (2008), makes some clear distinctions bet- 
ween these two fields by focusing on their respective disciplines’ roles. This is particularly 
useful for rigorously distinguishing between them not only in Japan but also in Europe. 
26 With regard to this topic, it is particularly important to note that in the UK the study of the 
academic discipline of the history of political thought is generally conducted by the dep- 
artment of history. It seems that this is closely associated with the fact that Skinner’s app- 
roach is recognised predominantly by many British universities. 
27 Skinner published Visions of Politics, vol. 1: Regarding Method (2002), which contains the sum- 
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mary and revised version of ‘Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas’, and 
which includes his other methodological articles. 
28 I have roughly summarised the primary issues of Skinner ’s approach to the history of ideas 
by focusing on his ‘MUHI’. His other essays, however, also provide its essence; while his 
methodology is suggested primarily in his methodological article printed in Meaning and 
Context, his stance on the discipline is put forward even by his primary works which do not 
focus on methodological issues, such as The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (1978), as 
Tully says (1988b: 19). Having said that, Skinner often refers to his article ‘MUHI’ when pre- 
senting his view on approaches to the history of ideas, and the work should therefore be 
regarded as his primary essay on his methodology. 
29 Wolin says: ‘one reads past theories, not because they are familiar and therefore confirm- 
ative, but because they are strange and therefore provocative’ (Wolin 1969: 1077). 
30 I do not think that there exist pure things in human activity even though we can try to create 
such a thing. In this respect, there is no such thing as a purely historical standpoint, and the 
pure can be seen as a kind of ‘ideal type’. Of course, nonetheless, Skinner intends a complete 
historical approach by the expression. The reason why I highlight this point is because the 
word of pure seems to suggest at least two meanings in his context: first, being unmixed for 
arriving at complete objectivity (literal meaning); second, having only a historical perspe- 
ctive. It seems to me that his methodological aim is to achieve both objectives. 
31 In these respects, it must be stressed that, despite his ‘pessimism’, Horkheimer’s critique was 
aimed at offering constructive criticism. 
32 Perhaps the interdisciplinarity of Critical Theory may be derived from these intellectual 
backgrounds – even though most of those scholars are generally regarded simply as philo- 
sophers. In other words, Critical Theory has aimed to be methodologically interdisciplinary 
by absorbing and reflecting on ‘traditional theory’, which captures the essence of all the social- 
science theories which were predominant particularly in the twentieth century, and which 
does not include self-reflection and self-criticism such as pragmatism, positivism and beha- 
viourism. In this respect, Critical Theory reflects on all the existing theories, while containing 
them all. 
33 In Fromm’s view, the insane condition is characterised by a lack of ‘productivity’ and 
‘objectivity’ – this does not mean what is value-neutral – in society and human beings. By 
contrast, when they fully develop these two essential characteristics, they can first exhibit 
their complete humanity as opposed to insanity (see Ch. 6). 
34 The term seiji riron is derived from ‘political theory’, and is regarded as the translation of the 
discipline (e.g. Kawasaki and Sugita 2006: i). To avoid confusing the former with the latter, 
therefore, I will basically employ the term seiji riron in my exploration. 
35 He can be regarded as the ‘father of modern politics in Japan’. On the discipline’s name of 
‘political science’, it is generally translated as either seijigaku or seiji kagaku in Japanese. The 
latter is used in the literal sense of ‘science’ meaning the Japanese kagaku. The former is most 
often employed for the latter is an unnatural literal translation of the English political sci- 
ence. Despite these facts, there is nowadays a remarkable tendency for Japanese academic 
community – especially for the discipline of politics – to intend seijigaku as the English poli- 
tics and seiji kagaku as political science. 
36 I am aware that there is the important fact that Maruyama wrote this article with a strong 
awareness of Weber’s methodology of social science (e.g. Takabatake 1997: 59). This eluci- 
dates another fact that some kind of Weberian ‘academic asceticism’ lies in this essay, and 
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therefore that Maruyama simply required the revival of the discipline of seijigaku, and con- 
fined his intention of the writing to the improvement of the field. To be sure, this way of 
understanding the article is appropriate to this issue here, but his aim should be viewed as a 
more radical demand for the awakening to reality in the sense that he actually refers to 
Weber in the work as follows: ‘Max Weber’s demand for value-free judgement is apt in 
Japan to become a disguise for the positivist “onlooker”. But Weber himself thought that the 
separation of theoretical value relations from practical value judgements was an “investi- 
gator’s ideal”, and that its perfect realization was even incompatible with the unity of the 
personality. . . . In his Die Objektivität der Sozialwissenschaflichen Erkenntnissen and his Die 
Wissenschaft als Beruf Weber sharply rejects any confusion of his theory with the attitude of 
the ‘purely impartial observer’ regarding value judgements on different Weltanschauungen, 
or with a neutral position vis-à-vis both the right and the left wings in politics. He claims that 
it is a scholar’s duty as a citizen to state clearly his Weltanschauung and his political position’ 
(Maruyama 1969c: 239; [1995c: 152]). 
37 It is noted that such a fact has been observed by many Japanese social scientists particularly 
in the postwar period. A representative of those who stress the separation between the social 
sciences and reality in Japan is the Japanese political theorist Keiichi Matsushita (e.g. 1971: 
163). In addition, the Japanese political scientist Michitoshi Takabatake expresses the tende- 
ncy as ‘perverse (ashiki) Japanese scholarship’ based on ‘imported theories’ (yu’nyū gakumon) 
and ‘idealistic discourse’ (kan’nen rongi) (1997: 59). 
38 Philp, for example, describes an aspect of the task of an explanation as follows: ‘attempting 
to do so [to offer a complete overview of . . . challenges concerning the methods for the study 
of political thought and political theory] would at best replicate work that others have done 
in recent years’ (2008: 128; emphases added). With respect to the deep-rooted ‘explanatory 
character’ (kaisetsu-teki seikaku) of Japanese scholarship, Hisaki Matsuura’s and Tadashi 
Karube’s ‘Shintaika sareta chi no fukken wo’ (Towards the Restoration of Physicalised 
Knowledge) (2011) is valuable to my discussion, despite the fact that it rather refers to the 
‘obstacle of the academic culture of explanation’ in Japan (kaisetsu bunka no kōzai), meaning 
an ‘additional explanation by some specialist with a series of small format paperback books 
of Japan’ (bunko kaisetsu); in this respect, it is directed towards a slightly different context 
from my intention. Nonetheless, their work elucidates the existence of an abundance of 
‘explanatory books’ (kaisetsu-sho) in Japan. Of course, I do not deny the necessity for them, but 
here it is emphasised that the ‘explanation of a political theory’ is not the primary role of the 
field of political theory. 
39 Ono actually raises Easton’s declaration of 1969 at the beginning of the book (2005: 7-8). In 
addition to Easton’s statement, it is noted that the following illustration concerning the 
meaning of the historical approach of political theory presents the complete opposite view 
from Ono’s: ‘We should not underestimate either the difficulty of attaining that depth of 
understanding [a precise understanding of the past thought in its historical context (here it 
denotes Thomas Paine’s political thought)] or the contribution that historical evidence and 
argument can make to its formation. But, in so far as we gain a sense of those core values 
and commitments, we may have a distinct set of questions of a less historical character to 
ask about how far those commitments map onto our own political values and practices, how 
far they raise issues that are critical of our contemporary institutions, and how far they pro- 
vides insights and distinctions that can modify or enhance the way in which we understand 
and defend our own practices and values’ (Philp 2008: 144; emphases added). Philp’s des- 
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cription provides us with a significant criterion that the study of political thought even 
entails us making a value judgement which is closely associated with our political life. 
40 The Japanese-Australian sociologist Yoshio Sugimoto, for example, explains that a problem- 
atic tendency to rely exclusively upon Western theories on a nationwide scale concerns not 
only Japan but also a wide range of countries in the Asia-Pacific region (2000: 179-80). 
41 I must point out, nonetheless, that Arthur Tiedemann’s translation published by Oxford has 
a problem with his overall translation of seijigaku into ‘political science’ despite his correct 
translation of the title of ‘politics’, in the sense that in the article, as can be seen above, 
Maruyama does not imply political science, which explicitly contains a greater orientation 
towards the natural science-based value neutral position – though this fact does not denote 
that he does not intend that meaning by it. On this view, first, it can be argued that 
Maruyama wittingly distinguishes politics (seijigaku) from political science (seiji kagaku) – 
indeed, the expression of political science is nowadays regarded as the most general usage 
of it, but, strictly speaking, it is inappropriate to Maruyama’s view in the context, taking 
account of the academic situation of Japan in 1947 when he published the article. Second, 
although Tiedemann has translated ‘seiji no kagaku’ as ‘political science’ (1969c: 234; [1995c: 
144]), it is a definite mistranslation, provided that for Maruyama it does not signify seiji 
kagaku, namely political science, but simply intends to distinguish ‘his seijigaku’, which 
Japanese scholarship in the field of politics should aim at, from seijigaku as an academic 
realm – it is oriented not to seiji kagaku but to genjitsu kagaku. Indeed, we run into great 
difficulties with the task of translating ‘seiji no kagaku’. For example, whether to translate 
‘seiji no’ as ‘political’ – in this case, seiji no kagaku must be translated as ‘political science’ – or 
whether to employ ‘of’ – in this case, it is translated as ‘the science of politics’. Most 
problematically, in this sense, there is no English word that is the exact equivalent of the 
Japanese ‘no’, which is grammatically entitled as ‘joshi’ (rigorously speaking, ‘kaku joshi’) in 
Japanese – the English ‘of’ is not identical to the Japanese ‘no’. As a matter of fact, this 
evidence is quite important to the issue here, due to the fact that Maruyama in fact lays 
stress on the ‘seiji no’ of seiji no kagaku – this cannot be identified in the English translation 
(1969c: 234; [1995c: 144]). In short, it is definitely impossible to rigidly express the Japanese 
no in English – nor in German – especially in the above case, even though the English ‘of’ 
and the German ‘von’ – and der and des as well – can occasionally contribute to an und- 
erstanding of the meaning of the Japanese word. 
     Apart from this issue, there exist other kinds of terms equivalent to the Japanese seijigaku 
in both English and German, the English discipline of ‘political studies’, which is generally 
distinguished from political science, the German politische Wissenschaft, Politologie and 
Politikwissenschaft, all of which are very often used in the German context (Berg-Schlosser 
and Stammen 2003: 1-2; cf. Patzelt 2007: 19). To be sure, it is true that the English term 
political studies is handy for avoiding implying the US-based political science, but it is 
equally true that it seems to intend the British discipline of politics. Also, the above German 
terms might be helpful in drawing some kind of distinction – there is nonetheless no clear 
distinction between them in the sense of some special implications (Berg-Schlosser and 
Stammen 2003: 1-2). 
42 In spite of my negative view on value neutrality, as far as Ono is concerned, I am wholly 
respectful of his reflective attitude towards his lectures and studies (2005: 231-3). Rather, he 
should be regarded as a historian in the sense that he recognises himself as a scholar of the 
‘history of political thought’ (seiji shisōshi) (2005: 232). 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 2 
 
Psychoanalytic Meanings of Narcissism 
 
 
 
 
 
1.  The Derivation of Narcissism 
 
The term narcissism is derived from psychiatry in the broad sense. According to 
Kenneth N. Levy et al., this term, originating in the German form, was first used 
by the German sexologist Paul Näcke in 1899 (2011: 4).1 Thereafter, it was deve- 
loped into a psychiatric theory – rigorously speaking, into a psychoanalytic 
theory – by Otto Rank, Sigmund Freud, Heinz Kohut, and so on. However, the 
word, which gives us a mythical impression, requires that I should provide a 
detailed explanation of the derivation of the term on the grounds that the evo- 
lutional process of the term is extremely complicated. 
 
The myth of Narcissus 
The concept of narcissism has its roots in the ‘Narcissus story’, the classical 
mythology by the Roman poet Ovid’s Metamorphoses (e.g. Levy et al. 2011: 3-4; 
Jacoby 2010: 9-12). Narcissus was a young man at the centre of attention, whose 
beauty attracted people. The nymph Echo, one of those who fell in love with 
him, was a victim of Narcissus’ cruelty, which resulted in him being punished 
by the goddess of revenge Nemesis. This led Narcissus to ‘vainly reach out to 
embrace his own reflection’ (Holmes 2001: 3; emphasis added) mirrored in ‘a 
pool of water’ (Levy et al. 2011: 3); this triggered his abnormal narcissistic 
behaviour that he gazed away at his figure reflected on the surface of the water 
until his death. 
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  This version of the tale, according to Levy et al., is the best-known story of 
narcissism, which best explains the essence of the evolution of the psychoana- 
lytic concept. Interestingly, Ovid’s text contains three motifs: first, the prophecy 
of the blind seer Tiresias that ‘si se non noverit’, meaning that Narcissus will 
enjoy a long life so long as ‘he does not come to know himself’; second, the rel- 
ationship between the myth of Narcissus and the fate of Echo; and third, the 
discrepancy between the descriptions of error and illusion and of recognition 
and acknowledgement, which depicts Narcissus’s reflection episode (Jacoby 
2010: 9-12). One might be intrigued by the first motif, which elucidates the rea- 
son for the appearance of the arguments about a ‘modified treatment for path- 
ological narcissism’ raised by important psychoanalysts nowadays, as Levy et al. 
put it (2011: 3-4). In addition, it is noted that there are other types of myth of 
Narcissus apart from Ovid’s version. My survey, however, does not conduct any 
further investigation into some other versions of the myth. My aim is not to 
describe a historical evolution of the mythology.2 I must proceed to tackle the 
next issue of the derivation of narcissism as a psychoanalytic term. 
 
Narcissism as a term 
As mentioned above, Näcke first used the term narcissism (the German 
‘Narcismus’). According to Levy et al., the British sexologist-physician Havelock 
Ellis first employed the myth of Narcissus to describe an ‘autoerotic sexual 
condition’ explaining ‘human sexuality’ (2011: 4). Here I draw attention to Ellis’s 
expression of ‘Narcissus-like’ provided in his ‘Auto-Eroticism: A Psychological 
Study’ (1898), which denotes the ‘sexual emotions to be absorbed, and often ent- 
irely lost, in self-admiration’ (2011: 4). After Ellis had introduced the myth to his 
psychiatric enquiry in his work ‘Die Sexuellen Perversitäten in der Irrenanstalt’ 
(1899), Näcke developed Ellis’s idea into a more accessible style by applying the 
term ‘Narcismus’, meaning that ‘the self is treated as a sexual object’; this word 
contributed to his study of autoeroticism (2011: 4). Likewise, in his famous work 
Zur Einführung des Narzißmus (On Narcissism: An Introduction) (1914),3 Freud 
gave a slightly different account of the terminological development of narci- 
ssism. So let us look at his work by focusing on some different points of it 
below. 
  In his ‘On Narcissism’, Freud also explained that the name of narcissism was 
provided by Näcke in 1899. In 1920, however, Freud added a footnote in his 
paper, ‘Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality’ (1905), in order to modify his 
previous view of the terminological derivation of narcissism. In this new foot- 
note revising the preceding view, he commented that the term was devised not 
by Näcke but by Ellis, and his previous account thereby resulted in being 
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rejected (Freud 2001b: 218, n. 3).4 I am intrigued and also irritated by this point 
because, if his account was true, then mine would have to be revised. However, 
we do not have to be annoyed by his modification, taking account of the fol- 
lowing evidence presented by the editor of the writings of Freud The Standard 
Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud – abbreviated to SE 
below – which completely supports my view: 
 
Ellis himself . . . subsequently (1928) wrote a short paper in which he corrected Freud’s 
correction and argued that the priority should in fact be divided between himself and 
Näcke, explaining that the term ‘narcissus-like’ had been used by him in 1898 as a descrip- 
tion of a psychological attitude, and that Näcke in 1899 had introduced the term ‘Narcismus’ 
to describe a sexual perversion (Freud 2001c: 73, n. 1). 
 
The validity of Freud’s correction to his preceding view in 1920 is called into 
question by this description identical to my view. In other words, Freud’s view 
is rejected by the crucial evidence that Ellis himself claimed that Näcke first 
applied the term. Despite his wrong way of understanding, however, it is pos- 
sible to think that, if Freud’s intention had been to explain not the term but the 
concept of narcissism, namely the ‘introduction of the Narcissus myth’, then his 
view would have undoubtedly been acceptable. 
  Let us get back on track. Narcismus put forward by Näcke, as we have seen, 
was further developed by psychoanalysts. Between 1908 and 1910, a colleague 
of Freud’s, the Austrian psychoanalyst Isidor Sadger, divided the concept up 
into two types; first, the normal forms of ‘egoism’ and ‘self-love’; second, the 
pathological forms based on ‘overvaluation’ and ‘overinvestment’ (Levy et al. 
2011: 4). In addition, one of the most famous colleagues of Freud’s, the Austrian 
psychoanalyst Otto Rank, defined narcissism as a ‘vanity’ and ‘self-admiration’, 
which do not necessarily sexually but defensively fulfils their functions in the 
work Der Doppelgänger: Eine psychoanalytische Studie (The Double: A Psycho- 
analytic Study) (1914), after having written the first psychoanalytic essay on 
narcissism ‘Ein Beitrag zum Narzissismus’ (A Contribution to Narcissism) 
(1911). In the same year, in ‘On Narcissism’ Freud pointed out that, ‘[n]arci- 
ssism . . . would not be a perversion, but the libidinal complement to the egoism 
of the instinct of self-preservation, a measure of which may justifiably be att- 
ributed to every living creature’ (2001c: 73-4). Freud’s account of narcissism, as 
Levy et al. put it, varied between ‘sexual perversion and quality of primitive 
thinking’ and ‘self-esteem’ (2011: 4). I shall later conduct a survey of the psy- 
choanalytic concept of narcissism. 
  Let us focus on the appearance of the term narcissism. In 1898 Ellis had first 
adopted the Narcissus myth to psychiatric studies in the form of ‘Narcissus- 
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like’, and in 1899 Näcke transformed it into the German Narcismus. However, 
the later direction of the evolution of the term has remained unclear in my 
discussion. Indeed, it is made clear that Freud employed the term ‘Narzißmus’ 
(Narzissmus)5 in his ‘On Narcissism’ – the German title is ‘Zur Einführung des 
Narzißmus’ – but it is not yet clear who finally transformed it into the present 
forms, the English ‘narcissism’ and the German ‘Narzissmus’. 
  The complexity of my enquiry is obviously triggered by the two derivations of 
the terms in English and German, as exemplified by the fact that Ellis was a 
British psychiatrist, and that Näcke was a German one. For this reason, they car- 
ried out their studies in their respective languages, English and German, and it can 
be argued that this fact leads us to have difficulty in explaining the termino- 
logical enquiry. In addition, it is noted that the following interesting piece of 
data regarding its theme might seem to spoil my view: 
 
Actually, the term narcissism was introduced into psychoanalysis in 1908 by Sadger, for 
which Freud gave him due credit. Rank, too, wrote on the subject (Rank, 1911, vol. 3: 401- 
26)’ (Jacoby 2010: 249, n. 2). 
 
If this was true, then my discussion would go to waste. However, I do not think 
so because, as noted above, there are two language contexts in the terms nar- 
cissism and Narzissmus. In short, with regard to Mario Jacoby’s view neither 
Sadger nor Freud nor Rank, all of whom worked in Austria, generally conducted 
their research in English. In relation to their works my discussion raised, their 
important writings were all written and published in German. How, then, sho- 
uld we consider the above evidence? Perhaps it is better to divide the issue up 
into two language contexts, English and German, so that I can validly identify 
their respective derivations. As far as the German context is concerned, however, 
the editor of SE makes the issue more complex: 
 
In his paper on Schreber (1911c), near the beginning of Section III, he [Freud] defends this 
form of the word on the ground of euphony against the possibly more correct 
‘Narzissismus’ (2001c: 73, n. 1). 
 
This solid evidence means that in the above essay Freud had already referred to 
Narzissmus before publishing his significant paper on narcissism; to be sure, this 
is an interesting fact amazing us.6 However, I am much more intrigued by the 
expression of ‘Narzissismus’. Nonetheless, we are not surprised at the word if 
we are aware that, in 1911 when Freud pointed out the above fact, Rank 
employed the unfamiliar form in his commemorative essay on narcissism, ‘Ein 
Beitrag zum Narzissismus’ (A Contribution to Narcissism). 
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  However, I do not go on to carry out any further investigation which will be 
an extremely historical enquiry, for example, as to whether Rank actually ref- 
erred to Freud in the above essay and vice versa, in relation to Narzissismus. In 
addition, I do not have any further exploration of the issue due to the following 
two reasons: first, it is meaningless unless the issue is divided up into two 
language contexts, German and English; and second, in so far as narcissism is a 
translation of the German term (or terms), the enquiry as to who introduced the 
term depends heavily upon which German term is regarded as the general form of 
narcissism. Indeed, it might be argued that, as Jacoby says, Sadger introduced 
the term, considering that Narzissmus is generally viewed as the general form 
equivalent to the English narcissism. How, then, should we count Näcke’s 
Narcismus? Is it impossible to regard it as one type of narcissism as a word 
regardless of some possible grammatical problem? It is undoubtedly counted as 
the original version of narcissism. If so, why can’t we think of it as general? My 
answer is that there is not enough reason why we cannot think so, and that 
there is only the fact that in general a term gradually changes into a suitable form 
in accordance with necessity. 
 
 
2.  Narcissism as a psychoanalytic concept 
 
Here I want to simply give a précis of the development of the concept of 
narcissism presented above. It can be validly argued that its summary is suf- 
ficient to gain an appropriate understanding of some reasons for the appea- 
rance of the term primarily in the field of psychoanalysis. 
 
The early development 
 
The first stage of the early development of narcissism, put forward by Ellis, 
meant an ‘autocratic sexual condition’ which was presented by the expression of 
‘Narcissus-like’, whose sexual emotion is aimed only at ‘self-admiration’. Näcke, 
as noted above, inherited and elaborated Ellis’s idea by applying the term 
Narcismus, which describes such an abnormal sexual condition as something that 
‘the self is treated as a sexual object’. The second stage of the definitions of the 
concept, presented by Sadger and Rank, was what distinguished between 
normal and pathological narcissism, and what signified that narcissism is not 
necessarily a sexual emotion. The former scholar defined it as normal ‘egoism’ 
and ‘self-love’ and pathological ‘overvaluation of and overinvestment in ones’ 
own body’. The latter presented the view that narcissism means ‘vanity’ and 
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‘self-admiration’, which do not necessarily function sexually. Next, Freud also 
participated in the argument of narcissism, publishing his famous article ‘On 
Narcissism’, which regarded narcissism as something that ‘consistently keep[s] 
out of awareness any information or feelings that would diminish one’s sense of 
self’ (Levy et al. 2011: 4). Freud’s view of narcissism, as noted earlier, consists of 
a variety of understandings, the ‘sexual perversion and quality of primitive 
thinking’, ‘a mode of object relationship’ and ‘self-esteem’. Although a variety 
of his views consistently defined narcissism not as a personality type or a per- 
sonality disorder – which later came to existence – but as a process or a state, 
his complex understanding of narcissism caused significant confusion about 
what narcissism signifies. The third stage of the early evolution we have not yet 
seen is characterised by ‘pathological narcissism’ connected with the concept of 
‘envy’. In 1913, the British psychoanalyst Ernest Jones defined narcissism as a 
mentality described as ‘aloof’, ‘inaccessible’, ‘self-admiring’, ‘self-important’ 
and ‘over-confident’, and as ‘omnipotence and ‘omniscience’ (Levy et al. 2011: 
5). In addition, in 1919 the German psychoanalyst Karl Abraham presented his 
theory of narcissism from the viewpoint of envy, which signifies a ‘contemp- 
tuous or hostile attitude toward love objects’ induced by the past disappointed 
experience (Levy et al. 2011: 5). 
  In sum, with the exception of the confusion caused by Freud the early stage 
of the evolution of narcissism is generally characterised by the distinction bet- 
ween normal and pathological narcissism and the difference between narcissism 
as a sexual emotion in the first stage and one as a variety of views. However, the 
concept did not consist of a sexual element since the second stage. 
 
The stage of an individual personality or a character type and disorder 
The first account of narcissism as a personality or a character trait, according to 
Levy et al., was provided by the Austrian psychoanalyst Robert Wälder in his 
article ‘The Psychoses: Their Mechanisms and Accessibility to Influence’ (1925), 
in which narcissism was defined as a ‘condescending’ attitude that is ‘pre- 
occupied with themselves and with admiration’, and that lacks empathy – 
interestingly, they point out that in 1931 Freud referred to Wälder and con- 
nected narcissism with ‘aggression’ in his ‘Libidinal Types’, focusing on the 
feature of ‘self-preservation’ (2011: 5). In addition, the famous Marxist psycho- 
analyst Wilhelm Reich, who was largely affected by Freud’s work presenting 
the above connection, proposed the ‘phallic-narcissist character’, which is cha- 
racterised as the ‘phallus’ that is based on masculinity, and which is generally 
described as ‘self-confidence’, ‘arrogance’, ‘coldness’ and ‘aggressiveness’, in 
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Character Analysis (1933). Since then, narcissism as a character trait has been 
explained by a number of well-known psychoanalysts. 
  The German-American psychoanalyst Karen Horney, for example, divided 
narcissism up into two types, ‘healthy self-esteem’ and ‘pathological narcissism’, 
in her work New Ways in Psychoanalysis (1939), defining narcissism as ‘agg- 
ressive-expansive’, ‘perfectionist’ and ‘arrogant vindictive types’ (Levy et al. 
2011: 5). Not only did Horney contribute these distinctions to the theory of 
narcissism, but she also took the view that ‘narcissism should be restricted to 
unrealistic self-inflation’, and that narcissists are actually ‘unable to love any- 
one’ including themselves, as opposed to ‘self-love’, which had generally been 
considered as a narcissistic character trait (Levy et al. 2011: 5-6). With regard to 
the narcissistic self, the British psychoanalyst Donald W. Winnicott pointed out 
that a narcissist induces a ‘grandiose false self’; here he laid stress on his 
famous distinction between the ‘true and false self’ (1960) (Levy et al. 2011: 6). 
Annie Reich observed that narcissists are suffering from an ‘inability to regulate 
their self-esteem’ caused by ‘early traumatic experiences’ in ‘Pathologic Forms 
of Self-Esteem Regulation’ (1960), which highlighted the narcissistic character of 
the ‘repetitive and violent oscillations of self-esteem’ (Levy et al. 2011: 6). 
  According to Levy et al., in around the early 1960s narcissism appeared as a 
disorder. They observe that, in his Foundations of Psychopathology (1961), for 
example, the American psychiatrist John Case Nemiah put forward the term 
‘narcissistic character disorder’, which shows narcissism to be a disorder (2011: 
6). They also point out that, in his work ‘Borderline Personality Organization’ 
(1967), the Austrian-American psychoanalyst Otto F. Kernberg had employed 
the concept of ‘narcissistic personality structure’, which later the Austrian- 
American psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut called ‘narcissistic personality disorder’ 
on the one hand, and which contributed to the later distinction between normal 
and pathological narcissism on the other (2011: 6). 
  The above summary of narcissism as an individual personality type and dis- 
order obviously complicates our understanding of the concept, and it therefore 
seems solely to contribute to increasing the complexity of the term. Indeed, 
there is no simple way of understanding the complex psychoanalytic term, but 
it is nonetheless possible to identify some characteristics of the complicated 
word. I will next summarise the primary points of issues of the concept of 
narcissism below, and my account can thereby make sense to readers who do 
not specialise in psychoanalysis – this is also much applicable to me. 
  Narcissism as a personality trait, as we have seen, was first defined as a 
‘condescending attitude’ satisfying self-admiration without sufficient empathy 
(Wälder). Later, Freud also took part in this argument, connecting narcissism 
with aggression; narcissism, in his view, is based on ‘self-preservation’. Freud’s 
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view of narcissism motivated W. Reich to describe the ‘phallic-narcissist char- 
acter’. Thereafter, many theories of narcissism came out: for example, the distin- 
ction between ‘healthy self-esteem’ and ‘pathological narcissism’ (Horney), the 
‘grandiose false self’ (Winnicott) and the ‘repetitive and violent oscillations of 
self-esteem’ (A. Reich). Next, narcissism as a disorder came out: ‘narcissistic 
character disorder’ (Nemiah), ‘narcissistic personality structure’ (Kernberg) and 
‘narcissistic personality disorder’ (Kohut). 
In short, we are aware that the above views of narcissism are all concerned 
with the distinction between normal and pathological. As we have seen, the way 
of understanding narcissism by distinguishing between these two meanings 
had already been seen in the early evolution; in this sense, it was not a new 
view of narcissism in particular. Nonetheless, it is noted that the above the- 
orists’ views are undoubtedly more sophisticated than before. In addition, the 
fact that many theorists participated in the establishment of the theory of nar- 
cissism obviously contributed not only to the formulation of a variety of ways 
of understanding it but also to the identification of its primary issue. As far as 
my discussion is concerned, the primary point of the issue in this stage is obv- 
iously whether narcissism is counted as either a character trait or normal or 
pathological; that is whether it is considered as personality traits such as a con- 
descending attitude and a phallic-narcissist character, or whether it is distin- 
guished between healthy self-esteem and pathological narcissism and is the- 
refore intrinsically pathological, or whether it is divided up into two types, 
namely healthy and pathological narcissism. Indeed, these issues are quite com- 
plicated, but main issues are confined to the above three points. On this view, it 
is noted that primarily these issues are concerned with and have been tackled as 
the distinction between ‘primary narcissism’ and ‘secondary narcissism’; that is 
to say, the former is normal and healthy, and the latter is unhealthy and pat- 
hological. Furthermore, as Levy et al. put it, although Kernberg and Kohut, 
both of whom have intrigued many scholars who are interested in narcissism, 
to some extent take different views of narcissism concerning what is counted as 
normal and pathological – for instance, while Kernberg regards ‘narcissist’s 
grandiose self-representation’ as pathological, Kohut thinks of it as normal – it 
is obvious that both their ways of understanding narcissism are profoundly 
associated with the problem of the self: ‘Others are taken as extensions of the 
self’ (selfobject) (2011: 6-7). In this respect, the difference between their views of 
narcissism is not particularly important for me. Rather, I concern myself with 
the enquiry as to how the narcissistic self is related to others. 
However, I will next see narcissism as a social phenomenon. Not only does 
this exploration contribute to a good understanding of the close relation bet- 
ween society and the individual from some psychoanalytic perspectives, but 
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much more importantly, it also provides a relevant illustration of how it is 
appropriate to apply the term narcissism to an analysis of society. I discuss the 
fundamental issue of how the narcissistic self is linked to others from Chapter 3 
onwards. 
 
The stage of a social phenomenon 
Levy et al. point out that a great deal of interest in narcissism emerged in 
personality psychology and social theory at the same time. They first put emp- 
hasis on the name of Theodor W. Adorno, who introduced the term narcissism 
to an analysis of society to explain both individual and social phenomena. 
According to them, in the work ‘Sociology and Psychology’ (1968) Adorno 
employed the word for describing the ‘defensive management of weakness in 
the modern collective ego in the face of changing economic factors and ind- 
ustrialized structures’ (2011: 7). In addition, they point up Lasch’s ground- 
breaking work, The Culture of Narcissism, which observed a ‘compensatory 
self-preoccupation’ of American society as a whole (2011: 7). Their account, 
however, misses some important names in the field of the social sciences who 
contributed to describing narcissism as a social phenomenon, such as Erich 
Fromm and Charles Taylor, but they instead simply refer to an empirical rese- 
arch which proposed the diagnosis of a ‘societal epidemic narcissism’ (2011: 7). 
To be sure, the above studies which concern themselves with narcissism pro- 
vide a good explanation of the rise of interest in narcissism in the social sciences. 
It must be noted, however, that Levy et al.’s attention to the issue obviously 
lacks their account of the topic as a whole, even though they explain enough for 
their primary concern of individual psychology. In addition, it must be stressed 
that, in order to precisely know the meanings of narcissism at a social level, it is 
necessary to give a more detailed description from some different perspectives. 
In any case, most importantly, the primary object of my research is not indi- 
vidual psychology but social psychology in so far as my primary interest is not 
in individuals but rather in society in general. What is most important, none- 
theless, is that the key concept connecting an individual to others and society is 
the self, which is profoundly associated with both the psychological studies 
noted above. For this reason, the concept of self carries its significance both to 
individual and social psychology. 
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Notes 
 
 1 As far as Levy et al.’s work is concerned, it could be argued that Havelock Ellis gave the 
name of narcissism in his ‘The Conception of Narcissism’ (1927). In this sense, I notice that it 
had taken quite a long time until the present English form of narcissism appeared since 
Näcke had first employed ‘Narcismus’ (on this German version of narcissism, I shall raise it 
later). However, there is some doubt about this view in the sense that, for example, the 
English term narcissism had already come into existence in the English version of Freud’s 
essay ‘On Narcissism’ published in 1925. The view that narcissism was introduced by Ellis, 
therefore, is not correct in the sense that, as we will see in more detail, Ellis’s ‘Narcissus-like’ 
was transformed into Narcismus by Näcke. On this view, the following sentence vouches for 
the validity of my view: ‘Ellis gives Näcke credit for appending the “-ism” that led to the 
eventual term narcissism (1927)’ (Levy et al. 2011: 4, n. 2). In this respect, it is plausible to 
think that the English term narcissism appeared in 1927. 
 2 I highly recommend Mario Jacoby’s work for a further enquiry into this theme (Jacoby 2010: 
12-4). 
 3 This work was first translated into English by Cecil M. Baines in 1925 (Freud 2001c: 69, 
Editor’s note). 
 4 Freud says: ‘The term “narcissism” was not introduced, as I erroneously stated in that paper 
[‘On Narcissism’], by Näcke, but by Havelock Ellis’ (2001b: 218, n. 3). 
 5 In German context, Narzißmus has been old-fashioned, and Narzissmus is nowadays com- 
monly used. 
 6 Freud first referred to narcissism in a footnote added to his ‘Three Essays on the Theory of 
Sexuality’ (1905) in 1910 (Levy et al. 2011: 4). 
  
 
 
 
 
APPENDIX 3 
 
The Political Theorist Shōzō Fujita: 
From the Critique of the Tennō System 
to the Critique of the Kōdo Seichō 
 
 
 
 
 
This appendix aims to write a biography of the Japanese political theorist Shōzō 
Fujita (1927-2003) through focusing on his political activities and his struggle 
with reality. With respect to the person of Fujita, there are already some great 
works that precisely depict both the man and his intellectual activities (e.g. Iida 
2006a, 2006b; Miyamura 2009 – in particular, Iida’s works describe Fujita’s 
theoretical activities including his bibliography in great detail).1 Unfortunately, 
however, there is no translation of Fujita’s writings, nor any work focusing on 
Fujita in English.2 This explains the need for a biography of him in English. 
 
 
1.  The early Fujita (zenki Fujita) 
 
Shōzō Fujita was born in Ehime in Shikoku, ‘the fourth largest island in Japan’ 
(Iida 2006a: 252), on 17 September 1927. It is believed that, in the educational 
stage of the lower sixth form (kōkō ni-nen), Fujita already decided to go to the 
University of Tokyo (Tōkyō Daigaku) – often abbreviated to Tōdai – in order to 
study the ‘spiritual structure’ (seishin kōzō) of the Tennō system under 
Maruyama, on the grounds that he was particularly impressed by Maruyama’s 
essay ‘Gunkoku shihaisha no seishin keitai’ (Thought and Behaviour Patterns of 
Japan’s Wartime Leaders) (1949), which critically analysed the psychic disease 
of wartime Japan noted above (Iida 2006a: 253; Iida 2006b: 346). It is possible to 
anticipate the later birth of the political theorist (seiji rironka) Shōzō Fujita by 
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stressing this strong passion for studying politics on the basis of Maruyama’s 
research method.3 
    In 1950, Fujita actually started to study in the Faculty of Law at the University 
of Tokyo – in July of this year, the Korean War began. In 1952, as per his wishes, 
he was allowed to participate in Maruyama’s seminar, and studied the method 
of the history of political thought with the use of the English text Ideology and 
Utopia (1936 [1929]) by Karl Mannheim. In 1953, Fujita graduated from the 
university and started to work in the Faculty of Law at Hosei University (Hōsei 
Daigaku Hōgakubu), where he lectured on the history of Japanese politics (Nihon 
seijishi). In the same year, as noted above, he wrote his first article ‘Tennōsei’ 
printed in The Lexicon of Politics (Seijigaku jiten) (1954) on behalf of Maruyama 
due to a relapse of his tuberculosis. Iida precisely depicts Fujita’s research aim 
at this time – here Iida’s sentences are cited again although they were already 
partly quoted above: ‘Fujita’s subject of research in the postwar period desig- 
nated as his starting point of forming his thought was . . . to construct the 
adequate logic that blows a hole in the “state of the Tennō system” in prewar 
and wartime Japan (and the society of the Tennō system), which led this 
country to destructive militarism and fascism on the grounds that the people 
got carried away (yarikirenai) with the specific mood of the whole nation, by 
finding out the logical essence of the system and by objectifying the whole 
structure’ (2006a: 255). It is presumed that this theme became the fundamental 
basis of his study thereafter. In fact, the subject of his early masterwork, 
‘Tennōsei kokka no shihai genri’ (The Principles of Rule of the State of the 
Tennō System) (1956), captures the essence of the Tennō system. It claims, 
 
The absolutist Tennō system (Tennōsei zettaishugi) enabled the arbitrary and absolute man- 
ner of action to permeate every aspect of society, paradoxically, not by carrying absolutist 
power (kenryoku zettaishugi) throughout society; it thereby succeeded in laying the incom- 
parable and solid foundations of an absolutist system (zettaishugi taikei) (Fujita 1998a: 48). 
 
The 1956 declaration that ‘it is no longer “postwar”’ (mohaya sengo de wa nai) by 
Keizai Hakusho (Economic White Paper of Japan), which aimed at ‘Japan’s eco- 
nomic growth and modernisation’ (Nihon keizai no seichō to kindaika), and which 
meant the transition from the postwar period to the ‘high growth’ (Kōdo Seichō) 
period,4 signified the ‘departure from the “postwar”’ (sengo e no ketsubetsu) and 
the experience of ‘intellectual conversion (tenkō) stemming from the despair of 
radicalism in the postwar era’;5 this denoted the necessity of reflecting upon 
‘postwar’ (sengo) and ‘prewar’ (senzen) Japan, which gave rise to another ess- 
ential reflection of ‘modern Japan’ (kindai Nihon) (Iida 2006a: 256-7). As Iida 
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puts it, ‘the period from 1956 to 1959 marked a huge turning point for inte- 
llectuals in postwar Japan (sengo chishikijin)’ (2006a: 256). 
    In 1960, Fujita, in conjunction with Maruyama and other Japanese intel- 
lectuals, was actively involved in the ‘the Anti-Security Treaty Struggle of 1960’ 
(Anpo Tōsō) – the latter Japanese term will primarily be used below – which was 
organised on the grounds that Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi at the time 
concluded the ‘US-Japan Security Treaty’ (the 1960 Anpo)6 on 19 January, which 
was finally approved by the House of Representatives on 20 May of the same 
year. Through taking part in this political activity, Fujita contributed several 
writings on those political events such as: ‘Tokkenteki chishikijin e no yōsei: 
Arata na kōdō no jihatsuteki soshiki wo’ (An Appeal to Privileged Intellectuals: 
Towards Establishing Voluntary Associations Aiming for New Politics) (1960) 
printed in The University of Tokyo Newspaper (Tōkyō Daigaku Shimbun), which 
encouraged students at the University of Tokyo to try to get rid of ‘Tōdai’ as a 
‘school for bureaucrats’ (kanryō yōseijo) that cultivated a sense of perquisite and 
to transform the university into a ‘place of genuine and authentic scholarship’ 
(junsui na gakumon no fu) (Fujita 1998b: 183); ‘6/15 jiken, ryūketsu no kachū kara: 
Kono me de mita keisatsu kenryoku no bōryoku’ (The Front Line of Defence 
Against Violence and Bloodshed in the 6/15 Incident: The Truth of the Violence 
of Police Authority) (1960), which, as an actual document of the 6/15 Incident,7 
was contributed to Asahi Journal; and ‘Shaku-shaku daiji wo eien ni hakaran: 
Kikyō gakusei S-kun e no tegami’ (On the Basis of Common Sense: A Letter to 
Mr S, Students in Favour of Their Home Villages) (1960) – abbreviated to 
‘Shaku-shaku’ below – printed in the monthly journal Sekai, a speculative article 
that imitated a letter for ‘students in favour of their home villages’ (kikyō 
gakusei), and that aimed at discussing ‘jinmin-shugi’ – although this can be 
translated as ‘people-ism’ in which politics is based on the principles of Fujita’s 
theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’ (jinmin shuken),8 the Japanese term will 
primarily be used below – with the students (Fujita 1998b: 220). These facts 
elucidate the person of Fujita who did not always closet himself in his study but 
sometimes actually took part in political activity. In fact, he formulated his 
theory through these political practices. As Iida puts it, ‘Fujita’s basic position at 
the time was to seek to find out the conditions (possibilities) for establishing the 
principles of “sovereignty of the people” – the conditions of “democratisation” 
(minshuka) – through reflecting upon and identifying a new political situation 
brought about on “19 May 1960”9 – abbreviated to the ‘5/19’ below – with the 
past situation, in which the original individual freedom and the sense of 
“natural rights” (shizenken) came into existence from the “state of nature” 
(shizen jyōtai) without a state (kokka izen) – a “tabula rasa” (hakushi) – under the 
conditions that the people had to live in the “burnt-out ruins and the black 
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market” (yakeato yamiichi) since “V-J Day” in 1945 (the ‘postwar’ in the narrow 
sense)’ (2006a: 259). 
    The above description clearly explains that Fujita was not a scholar who was 
simply satisfied with speculative, empirical and positive theories. Rather, his 
stance was characterised as the complete opposite of the habitual scholarly 
styles, and required observing practice, collecting experience, achieving ‘pers- 
pective upon [his] own society’ and ‘appraising the importance of what had been 
observed in the light of what was known’ (Wolin 1968a: 319; emphases added). 
In this respect, he is regarded exactly as a theorist in the original Greek sense. In 
fact, his theory of ‘primordial man’ (Urmensch, genjin),10 whose standpoint was 
first provided in his interview ‘Zero kara no shuppatsu’ (Start from Scratch) 
(1960), was advanced through actually observing, experiencing and appraising 
the political movement, the Anpo Tōsō, particularly through focusing on the 5/19. 
Fujita says: 
 
I believe that in the spiritual dimension the Anpo Tōsō was constituted by the social con- 
ditions of the black market, that is by the characteristics of primordial man (genjin-sei) in 
postwar Japan. Almost all the people in Japan have been living through the market. This 
way of life has given them the prototype of the character features. There is the living spirit 
claiming the right to live outside the law represented as the natural rights in them (Fujita, 
Tanikawa, Tsurumi and Yoshimoto 2006: 132). 
 
As Iida clearly mentions, ‘after the Anpo Tōsō, Fujita fell into “despair” (zetsubō) 
particularly after the 1960s, during the age of “high economic growth” (kōdo 
keizai seichō)’ (2006a: 260). However, it is possible to believe that, in the early 
1960s, he still retained his strong interest in actual politics. In fact, Fujita acti- 
vely contributed some politically-charged works which show that he was a poli- 
tical activist and theorist: for example, ‘Nihon ni okeru futatsu no kaigi’ (The 
Two Kinds of Discussions of Japan) (1960) – abbreviated to ‘Futatsu no kaigi’ 
below – which warned against the Japanese ‘gossip session model of existing 
primarily to meet and talk’ (hanashiai-shugi),11 and, at the same time, which tried 
to design the ‘principles of genuine and authentic discussion’ (ikita kaigi); 
‘Tōjisha yūi no genri: Terorizumu to shihaisha e no kōgi’ (Towards the 
Principles Based on Persons Concerned: A Protest Against an Act of Terrorism 
and Rulers’ Attitude) (1961) – abbreviated to ‘Tōjisha’ below – which was 
‘aimed at protesting against an act of terrorism, the “Shimanaka Incident” 
(Shimanaka jiken), and against Japan’s rulers’ and conservative thinkers’ attitude 
towards it’ (1998b: 267), and at applying the ‘principles based on “persons 
concerned” (tōjisha)’; ‘Jiyū kara no tōbō hihan’ (The Criticism of Behaviour of 
Escape from Freedom) (1962) – abbreviated to ‘Tōbō hihan’ below – which cri- 
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ticised a compromise solution adopted by Shisō no Kagaku Kenkyūkai (Research 
Association for the Science of Thought) towards ‘Shisō no Kagaku Incident’ 
(Shisō no Kagaku jiken) provoked by Chūōkōron-sha (Chūōkōron Publishing 
Company), and which called for ‘civil liberties’ (shimin-teki jiyū). 
    At this point it is interesting to note that all the above three works published 
after the Anpo Tōsō are more theoretical than his other writings previously pub- 
lished while taking a more strong position of ‘protest’ and ‘criticism’. Perhaps 
this is profoundly associated with Fujita’s more sophisticated theoretical view 
of politics which was taken particularly since ‘Shaku-shaku’, in which, as noted 
above, Fujita provided the essential framework of his theory of ‘sovereignty of 
the people’. In fact, his article ‘“5/19” zenshi’ (The History of the Preceding 
Period of the 5/19) (1960) published just after ‘Shaku-shaku’ presented a more 
precise view of his conception of the people. As Fujita writes, ‘nations (kokumin) 
mean the people (jinmin) who are willing to be nations (kokumin) and those who 
formulate a theory for their nation (kuni)’ (Fujita 1998b: 245). Significantly, this 
implies that Fujita recognised that the ‘autonomous subjects’ (jiritsuteki shutai) 
came into being in the 5/19. 
    For these reasons, it should be considered that all of the above three works, 
‘Futatsu no kaigi’, ‘Tōjisha’ and ‘Tōbō hihan’, as well as the above two works, 
‘Shaku-shaku’ and ‘“5/19” zenshi’, were intended particularly as a theoretical 
process of establishing his theory of sovereignty of the people. For instance, 
‘Tōjisha’ suggested the direction that postwar Japan should have taken in the 
light of the experience of Shimanaka Incident, entertaining Fujita’s hopes of 
laying the foundations of the principles of sovereignty of the people: 
 
There is still no sovereign spirit (shukensha no seishin) in most of the people (kokumin) of this 
county. In principle, however, it must be built, and they would be the people (Nihon 
kokumin) who accomplish this objective in the future, when necessary. It is believed that the 
Constitution requires that they should do so, and I hope that they will complete the task 
(1998b: 285-6). 
 
Here it is possible to see an adequate image of a political theorist who sought to 
find out what politics ought to be through political practice. In this period, in 
addition, he published some significant writings such as ‘Atarashii seijiteki 
shutai no shutsugen’ (The Emergence of New Political Subjects) (1962), which 
also constructed his theory of sovereignty of the people, and ‘Gendai ni okeru 
“risei” no kaifuku’ (The Restoration of Reason in Contemporary Times) (1962) – 
abbreviated to ‘“Risei” no kaifuku’ below – which provided his essential theo- 
retical stance on the political situation in terms of philosophical thought. 
    It is noted, however, that there was a gradual change in Fujita’s state of mind 
 256 Appendix 3 
 
at this time. An opportunity of changing his mind was provided, as Iida says, 
by ‘the fact that Fujita’s “disappointment at defeat in the Anpo Tōsō” (anpo 
zukare) had a lasting effect on him’, that is to say, ‘the experience of the “defeat 
in the Anpo” (haiboku) and “high growth” (Kōdo Seichō), while society gradually 
underwent a radical transformation of culture and spirit . . . , crushed his 
“hopes” (kibō) based on the sole possibility of restoring society in postwar Japan, 
and it rather led him to start to seek a way of more radical “restoration” (saisei) 
by keeping himself within the “disappointment” (shitsubō)’ (2006a: 263). From 
this perspective, Fujita’s masterworks, ‘Puroretaria minshushugi no genkei: 
Rēnin no shisō kōzō’ (The Principles of Proletarian Democracy: Lenin’s 
Spiritual Structure) (1964), ‘Gensho-teki jōken’ (The Primordial Conditions) 
(1964) and ‘Jinmin shuken no seishinteki ichi jyōken’ (A Spiritual Condition of 
the Sovereignty of the People) (1964) – abbreviated to ‘Jinmin shuken’ below – 
all of which were published after his silence for one and a half years, are rega- 
rded precisely as ‘the declaration of his new start’ (Iida 2006b: 364). 
    In the middle 1960s, just when Japan was in the midst of strong economic 
growth and the Vietnam War was heating up, Fujita’s series of works ‘Ishin no 
seishin’ (The Spirit of the Meiji Restoration) (1965) began to be published. As 
Iida puts it, the work ‘aimed to see the driving force of reform by shining a light 
on the fact that the “unbiased and impartial style of argument, behaviour and 
solidarity” (ōgi, ōkō, ōketsu), signifying the new “spirit of the Meiji Restoration” 
(Ishin no seishin), came into existence from the old regime’ (Iida 2006a: 263; cf. 
Fujita 1997c: 1-43). However, here I am intrigued primarily by Fujita’s ’15 
August statement’, which was issued in 1965, while he was writing the article 
‘Rondan ni okeru chiteki taihai’ (Intellectual Decay in Discourse) and the int- 
erview conducted by Sekai ‘Betonamu shinryaku hantai undō no hitotsu no jiko 
ninshiki’ (A View on the Anti-Vietnam War Movement), both of which raised 
the politically-charged topic of US military intervention in Vietnam. I will first 
quote the statement, and then consider it briefly below – although it consists of 
relatively long sentences, its entirety is cited, so we can be aware that he con- 
sistently concerned himself with the same issue after his first work. 
 
Declaration: 
On 15 August 1945, the whole world brought an end to World War II, which produced tens 
of millions of casualties, and which left the basis for human life in ruins, defeating fascism 
and militarism. It was an epoch-making day in world history. For us, the people of Japan 
(Nihon kokumin), in particular, that revolutionary day, bringing about a considerable change 
in social values, marked a starting point for nationwide reflection (kokuminteki hansei). 
    Today, going back to our first objective twenty years ago, we who are gathering together 
at Kudan Kaikan hall (Kudan Kaikan) appeal vigorously to the people (kokumin): first, that 
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we resolve on making utmost efforts to realise the principles of fundamental human rights 
(kihonteki jinken) and unarmed neutrality (hibusō) under the Constitution; second, that in the 
global community we assign maximum value to equal rights for and independence of 
people in the world, and oppose all uses of military force endangering the dignity based on 
this first principle. On the basis of these principles, then, we appeal for the following nec- 
essity for the US and Japan concerning the present political situation: first, to leave the fate 
of resolving the political conflict over Vietnam in the hands of the Vietnamese people on 
the grounds that we protest against the US military intervention in the country; second, to 
resume diplomatic relations with China, and to bring it into the fold of the international 
community; and third, to put an end to all of Japan’s policies harmful to the unification of 
Korea. 
    It goes without saying that for twenty years the people of Japan have made a tireless 
effort to realise democracy (minshushugi) and to achieve lasting peace (heiwa) up until now. 
To be sure, therefore, we have yielded valuable results. At the same time, however, it is 
observed that we have constantly experienced political resistance to this attempt. We have 
a challenging task ahead of us. V-J Day is not yet over; it has been twenty years. We the 
People hereby pledge to continue unremittingly with our efforts to realise the universal 
value shared by all humanity (jinrui kyōtsū no mokuteki), represented by fundamental 
human rights and freedom of all the people in the world, together with them. 
Tokyo, 15 August 1965 
(1998c: 714-5) 
 
We are well aware that this description captures the essence of the early Fujita. 
First of all, the above statement overlaps with the essential standpoint of the 
early Fujita: first, that it ‘construct[s] the adequate logic that blows a hole in the 
“state of the Tennō system” in prewar and wartime Japan (and the society of 
the Tennō system), which led this country to destructive militarism and fas- 
cism . . . by finding out the logical essence of the system and by objectifying the 
whole structure’ (Iida 2006a: 255); and second, that it ‘seek[s] to find out the 
conditions (possibilities) for establishing the principles of “sovereignty of the 
people” – the conditions of “democratisation” (minshuka) – through reflecting 
upon and identifying a new political situation brought about on the “5/19” in 
1960 with the past situation, in which the original individual freedom and the 
sense of the “natural rights” came into existence from the “state of nature” 
without a state – a “tabula rasa” – under the conditions that the people had to 
live in the “burnt-out ruins and the black market” since “V-J Day” in 1945’ (Iida 
2006a: 259). In addition, it is understood that his ‘tireless effort(s)’ (fudan no 
doryoku) regarded as the process of advancing his theory of ‘sovereignty of the 
people’ faced ‘political resistance to [his] attempt’ (doryoku wo habami samatageru 
seijiteki dōkō), which presumably signifies, for example, the direction of the Anpo 
and the Kōdo Seichō determined exactly by politics. For Fujita, perhaps, the ‘first 
objective’ (shoshin) must also have meant his decision to study the ‘spiritual 
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structure’. In sum, it can be argued that these attitudes to the ‘postwar’, namely 
his fundamental principles that had been consistently retained since his first 
objective, were methodologically applied to his position on actual politics rep- 
resented by the Vietnam War. In particular, the three principles of ‘sovereignty 
of the people’ (kokumin shuken), ‘fundamental human rights’ (kihonteki jinken) 
and ‘pacifism’ (heiwa-shugi), which the ‘Constitution of Japan (Nihonkoku kenpō) 
requires, must have reminded him of his theory of ‘sovereignty of the people’ 
based on the autonomy of the people and the ‘principles of universal value of 
human beings’ (fuhen ningenteki kihan-shugi) 12  on the basis of ‘fundamental 
rights’ (kihonken) guaranteed by ‘common sense’ (komon sensu).13 For these rea- 
sons, it must be stressed that Fujita’s 8/15 declaration is of huge significance for 
his early work. 
    Since the statement, Fujita went into his silence again after having issued 
‘“Shingi” ni tsuite’ (On Decision-Making) (1965). As Iida puts it, ‘it is believed 
that at the time Fujita internally philosophised in a deep trough, as seeking for a 
new direction of his study as later suggested by “Itanron danshō” (The Writings, 
vol. 10: Political Fragments of Unorthodoxy) which was to be written next spring 
(1967)’ (2006a: 266). Under this state of mind, he left for the UK for his study in 
1967. 
 
 
2.  The later Fujita (kōki Fujita) 
 
Fujita, after having returned to Japan from the UK, showed a significant change 
in his work in the sense that it is believed that in those days there was a 
perceptible change in his sense of ‘despair’ of theory and practice (Iida 2006a: 
346-7; cf. Iida, Miyamura and So 1998: 446-7). In this respect, it is possible to 
assume that the two years’ duration between 1967 and 1969 when he studied in 
Sheffield and Oxford marked his huge turning point in his career, as a result of 
his new experience and encounter with new things subsequent to the above 
crucial event. 14  This is largely explained by the fact that this new attitude 
towards reality brought about new methods of exposing his state of despair as 
the ‘criticism of contemporary times’ (jidai hihan) and analysing the ‘spiritual 
structure’ of society that prevents the people seeing politics as the basis of the 
principle of sovereignty of the people. In fact, after having returned from the 
UK, Fujita first published an interview entitled ‘“Kōdo Seichō” hantai’ (A 
Protest Against ‘High Growth’) (1969) – abbreviated to ‘Kōdo Seichō’ below – in 
which ‘he first bitterly opposed “society nudging itself towards ‘high growth’”.’ 
(Iida 2006a: 266). His stance on reality in this work is clearly described by his 
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words: ‘only those who learn the lessons of history can make progress (shinpo)’ 
(1998c: 8; emphasis added). 
    This evidence, then, accounts to a certain extent for his significant change. 
Iida clearly describes Fujita’s state of mind at this time, broaching the subject of 
the work ‘Jiyū kō’ (On Liberty) published in the following year (1970) after 
publishing ‘Kōdo Seichō’: ‘“Jiyū kō” shows that “high growth” was produced 
by the full of energy of free competition edging out one’s rivals under the 
conditions of being jostled by the crowds, and that it was leading society to be 
on “the cutting edge” (saisentan) of Joan Robinson’s “new mercantilism” . . . on 
the basis of the historical conditions of the country of “the absence of the 
constitution (kōkyō seido) guaranteeing human rights” and “the lack of capacity 
for autonomously establishing a social order based on freedom by way of 
bottom-up decision making (shita kara)”. High growth in its developmental 
process dashed Fujita’s “hopes” of laying the foundations of the principles of 
“sovereignty of the people” brought about by the “state of nature” coming into 
being soon after WWII’ (2006a: 267). Obviously, this description shows a 
marked change in his position on and understanding of reality. As we shall see, 
in this respect, it is evident that the above fact, that his ‘hopes’ gradually faded, 
had a profound effect on his later works. For this reason, it appears that, from 
then on, Fujita did not tackle any topics of actual politics. As noted above, 
however, it must be stressed that he consistently retained his essential stand- 
point of analysing a spiritual structure in his later works. Rather, it seems to me 
that the indispensable device for him was more sophisticated, particularly as a 
result of a ‘methodological change’ (hōhōteki sai-shuppatsu) (Miyamura 2009: 
194-9). 
    Fujita left his academic job in 1971 on the grounds that ‘he was no longer able 
to stand the situation of holding his privileged position of “professor” (kyōju) 
constituting the fabricated university system under the conditions of “intelle- 
ctual decay” (chiteki taihai) based on “high growth”’ (Iida 2006a: 269). This gives 
a clear indication of his outlook on reality at the time. During 1968 and 1969, 
‘university troubles’ (daigaku funsō) burgeoned in many universities in Japan. 
Perhaps this extremely violent behaviour in the place of the university must also 
have constituted a major factor in leading Fujita to take the decision to hand in 
his resignation as a professor in addition to the ‘intellectual decay’ induced by 
the Kōdo Seichō, whose act contributed to spoiling his aim of realising ‘demo- 
cracy in postwar Japan’ (sengo minshushugi), namely Fujita’s jinmin-shugi. From 
this perspective, it is not surprising that he did not return to his old place of 
work for nine years. 
    In 1980, Fujita returned to his work. It is noteworthy, however, that he con- 
tinued to publish his articles during these nine years. His activities during that 
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time give the impression of being more active in writing than before, as far as 
the number of essays issued during the period is concerned.15 It is presumed 
that during this time Fujita had already restored his energy by repairing the 
damage done to his intellect by his sense of despair, which was replaced with 
his ‘new intellectual movement’ (atarashii seishin no undō) (Iida 2006a: 270). 
Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu (Reflections on Intellectual History) (1982) – abbreviated to 
Kōsatsu below – is undoubtedly one of the works illustrating this restoration. In 
fact, all the writings printed in this book were written between 1975 and 1981, 
when he did not officially belong to any university, with the exception of 1980 
and 1981. This demonstrates why the work is described as the ‘memorial work’ 
created as a result of reaching a peak of his spiritual movement, ‘signifying the 
birth of “the world of Shōzō Fujita”’ (Iida 2006a: 330). In addition, Iida clearly 
describes Fujita’s intention of this significant work as follows: ‘Perhaps Fujita 
intended not only Burckhardt’s Reflections on World History (Sekaishi-teki 
kōsatsu) but also Dilthey’s and Simmel’s ‘intellectual history’ (Geistesgeschichte) 
by the title of “Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu” (Reflections on Intellectual History). It is 
most likely, however, that the title, aimed at putting forward his position and 
method, represented a radical departure from a passing fad for the “history of 
ideas” (shisōshi būmu) that existed in the publishing industry of the country 
from the late 1960s to the early 1970s. In other words, he definitely avoided 
having some kind of sale of thoughts (shisō) for a liberal arts education 
(kyōyōshugiteki shisō asari) in a department store providing history (rekishi) as 
commercial products (shōhin) in which ready-made thoughts (sho-shisō) are dis- 
played, and in which readers, as customers, find a favourite. In short, it can be 
argued that Fujita sought to discover the method of illuminating the essence of 
history by shining a light on the transformation of the living spirit (ikita seishin), 
creating himself and things – particularly on the historical significance of dec- 
line (hōkai) and fall (botsuraku) – through encountering many different kinds of 
facets and through responding to and communicating with the world’ (2006a: 
331). The ‘living spirit’ (Dem lebendigen Geist), on which Fujita laid great stress, 
probably best explains his fundamental position articulated particularly after 
his ‘pause’ (rōnin) (Iida 2006a: 270), that is since his ‘methodological change’. In 
other words, this concept elucidating the transformation of the living spirit sheds 
light on the reason why the spirit regarded as the subject of history changed itself 
by itself. In addition, Fujita’s emphasis on the essence of the notion accounts for 
the reason why, exactly from then on, he focused all his attention on another 
concept of ‘experience’. That is to say, the ‘transformation of the living spirit … 
creating himself and things’ captures the essence of experience in this sense, 
which requires ‘encountering many different kinds of facets and . . . responding 
to and communicating with the world’. Here we perceive that his attention to 
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the concept of experience, meaning the ‘communication between the world and 
a spirit’ (sekai to seishin to no ōtō) (Iida 2006a: 332), became his new method 
based on analysing a ‘spiritual structure’. 
    It is also important to note that Fujita’s style of criticising contemporary times 
noted above represents another important aspect of the above significant book. 
The primary subject of the work, showing the new phenomenon of the ‘loss of 
experience’ (keiken no sōshitsu), was undoubtedly also aimed at criticising the 
Kōdo Seichō that prevented people encountering the ‘substance of things’ 
(honrai-teki na mono), and, at the same time, that spoilt his hopes of establishing 
jinmin-shugi based on his theory of sovereignty of the people. In the chapter 
‘Aru sōshitsu no keiken: Kakurenbō no seishinshi’ (The Experience of 
Deprivation: An Intellectual History of Hide-and-Seek) (1981), Fujita claims: 
 
It is quite natural that the ‘new mercantilism’ (shin jyūshōshugi), which requires making 
money hand over fist, should take a heavy toll on society, and that ‘high-growth economy’ 
(seichō keizai) should come at the cost of social foundations, as explained by the law of costs, 
that profit comes at the expense of something – we cannot have it all. This results in our 
forgetting what economic activity is for when distracted by increases in wages, unless well 
aware of what has been lost; due to moneymaking, in that case, we are bound to lose a set 
of values and the criteria of our way of life. This is the exact nihilism of the new mer- 
cantilism (Fujita 1997d: 11-2). 
 
Significantly, these words elucidate Fujita’s fundamental stance on the Kōdo 
Seichō. According to him, contemporary times characterised as the ‘world surr- 
ounded by finished products’ (seihin bunka no sekai) (1997d: 7), above all, have 
brought about the ‘loss of experience’ (keiken no shōmetsu) (e.g. 1997d: 17; 1997e: 
15) by way of ‘rationalising without reason’ (risei naki gōrika), 16  which was 
particularly highlighted in an introduction to Chosakushū 5: Seishinshi-teki 
Kōsatsu, ‘Shinpin bunka: Jōshō ni kaete’ (The World Surrounded by Finished 
Products: As an Introduction to the Writings vol. 5, Seishinshi-teki kōsatsu) (1981). 
For Fujita, in other words, the Kōdo Seichō was the world in which everything 
was bound to be rationalised by ‘given alternatives to experience’ (sekkeisareta 
keiken no daiyōhin) instead of by reason (1997e: 10): 
 
today’s finished products (kanseihin) and completed devices, which have transformed the 
human capacity for imagination (sōzōryoku), are all produced in accordance with the 
‘deductive-nomological model’ (gōhōsokuteki na kata) . . . Products (seihin), in this way, 
embody rationality (gōrisei). The embodiment of rationality means, therefore, exactly that 
finished goods (seihin) completely rob the human mind of reason. Commodities produced 
(seihin) come into existence from the absorption of things (mono) into reason, and 
‘rationalisation’ (gōrika) as the finished reification (busshōka) of reason is completed when 
products (buppin) completely deprive man of reason (1997d: 3; emphasis added). 
 262 Appendix 3 
 
In his view, as shown above, the direction of the Kōdo Seichō exactly meant the 
last process of decline, and resulted in fall. That is to say, in his later work 
‘Kon’nichi no keiken: Habamu chikara no naka ni atte’ (Experience in These 
Days: What Prevents Us Experiencing?) (1982), as Fujita put it, ‘we are living 
through the last experience (saigo no keiken), meaning the loss of experience 
(keiken no shōmetu)’ (1997e: 15). This is why he took the methodological style of 
the ‘chronological history of decline’ (hōkaishi) in Kōsatsu (1997d: iii). In these 
respects, the ‘world surrounded by finished products’ (shinpin bunka) denotes 
the last phase of history. 
    Not only did Fujita advance a new method and criticise the contemporary 
way of life in his ‘memorial work’, but he also tried to give society some pos- 
sible remedies for ‘rationalising without reason’ through reflecting upon the 
history of decline. He suggested some of them by applying several important 
concepts of intersubjectivity (sōgo shutaisei), a ‘sense of minority spirit’ (seishin 
no yatōsei) and Walter Benjamin’s ‘Untergang zum Grund’ (kiso ni made tassuru 
botsuraku, to perish)17 – the German original will be used below – in conjunction 
with his essential conception of ‘experience’. According to him, 
 
combining some possibilities for our capacity for imagination, plenty of scope for reason 
and the intersubjectivity of experience, all of which have nowadays shrunk to insigni- 
ficance, we should devote ourselves to completing this task so as to direct the fragmentary 
combination amongst them against ‘rationalising without reason’. . . . only . . . a sense of 
minority spirit, keeping a sceptical attitude, has potential for designing the originality of 
experience (seisei keiken), revival (saisei) and restoration (fukkatsu) (1997d: 8). 
 
For Fujita, as Iida puts it, ‘death (shi) and revival (saisei) were exactly the fund- 
amental experience (kongenteki keiken)’ (2006a: 334). In this respect, it was quite 
natural that Fujita has required us to perish (zugrunde gehen, monogoto no kiso ni 
tassuru), and that he has claimed that we can thereby revive our society, which 
has become a ‘dead body with ruddy cheeks’ (kesshoku yoku shindeiru jyōtai) 
(1997e: 10). Here we are aware that his long-lasting standpoint of exploring the 
‘conditions (possibilities) for establishing the principles of “sovereignty of the 
people” – the conditions of “democratisation”’ was replaced with the ‘philo- 
sophy of “experience”’ (keiken no tetsugaku) for exploring the ‘fundamental 
conditions of contemporary times’ (gendaiteki jyōken) by way of finding out the 
‘primordial conditions’ (genshoteki jōken) (e.g. Iida 2006a: 311, 334, 336, 350, 354). 
    Fujita’s philosophy of experience seems to have come to a climax with his 
writing ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’. His view of society in this work was presented 
precisely by the words that ‘Japanese society is nowadays being confronted 
with the crucial problem that experience has gradually ceased to exist’ (Katō 
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1997: 234). In other words, it is the world subject to the contemporary attitude 
of ‘apriorism’ (senken-shugi) – the Japanese original will be used below – that 
‘requires complete knowledge of others and things before encountering them’ 
(Fujita 1997e: 9). In such a society, there is no opportunity of experiencing 
anything or encountering things (monogoto) and the other (tasha) (Fujita 1997e: 
8-13). Everything requires living in a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ (hoikuki) in this 
world (1997e: 7). For these reasons, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ introduced the term 
‘totalitarianism’ (zentaishugi) containing the weird attitude of senken-shugi tow- 
ards all the things (1997e: 9). 
    As an editor’s note puts it, however, ‘Fujita’s concern, instead of raising the 
theme of “experience”, turned to analysing psychology (shinsei) avoiding 
(kaihisuru) experience’ after the main work focusing on establishing his theory 
of experience (Fujita 1997e: 234). Thereafter, he devoted himself to writing a 
series of quasi-psychoanalytic works, ‘Kon’nichi no keiken’, ‘Narushizumu kara 
no dakkyaku: Mono ni iku michi’ (To Break Free from Narcissism: A Way of 
Finding out the Essence of Things) (1983) – abbreviated to ‘Narushizumu’ 
below – and ‘“Anraku” e no zentaishugi: Jyūjitsu wo torimodosu beku’ (Total- 
itarianism to Unruffled Ease: Towards the Restoration of Intersubjectivity) 
(1985). The reason why I employ the term ‘series’ above is, first, because 
‘Kon’nichi no keiken’ already put forward his psychological view primarily by 
using the terms such as ‘anxiety’ (fuan), ‘avoidance’ (kaihi) and ‘pain’ (kutsū) 
(Fujita 1997e: 10-15), all of which explained aspects of our psychology invisible 
to our eyes, and second, because these three articles were published conse- 
cutively. Obviously, this means the transformation of his academic style from 
the philosophy of experience to the ‘analysis of the psychology of human beings 
and society’. In particular, it is noted that, in ‘Narushizumu’, Fujita drew parti- 
cular attention to the term ‘self’ (jiko), which captures the essence of narcissism. 
He says: 
 
Nowadays . . . the ‘ego’ (jiga) concentrating its concern on itself acts in a dominant fas- 
hion. . . . The contemporary state of mind, in this way, characterises the age of the ego on a 
mass scale (taishūteki kibo ni okeru jiga no jidai) (1997e: 19-20). 
 
These sentences clearly describe why Fujita applied the term ‘narcissism’ 
(narushizumu). In his view, in other words, this psychoanalytic word illuminates 
products of the Kōdo Seichō. Perhaps his emphasis on the psychology of self 
avoiding anxiety and pain led him to introduce Richard Sennett’s term ‘a 
voluntary servitude to unruffled ease’ to his work. The common subject of his 
three quasi-psychoanalytic works is undoubtedly described by the concept; in 
this sense, it is emphasised that Fujita must have found some relevance of the 
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notion of narcissism for the social sciences through reading Sennett’s book. For 
him, however, it was provided not just as a metaphorical term that illuminates 
the social sciences and contemporary problems in the sense that he actually had 
a great deal of interest in psychiatry in the broad sense, which means that he 
highlighted the significance of the medical and psychiatric meanings intended by 
the term. As mentioned earlier, rather, it is much more plausible to think that 
Fujita was intrigued primarily by the mythical and medical implications, as 
exemplified by the fact that he first of all became interested in analysing the 
‘spiritual structure’ (of the Tennō system), the method of which examines and 
diagnoses inner problems of the human mind. For this reason, it is presumed 
that for Fujita the encounter with the term narcissism was exactly the discovery 
of another type of his methodological device that had been retained since his 
most significant encounter with Maruyama. 
    As noted above, Fujita primarily considered the ‘psychological basis’ (seishin-
teki kiban) (1997e: 29) of people’s attitude that ‘requires complete knowledge of 
others and things before encountering them’ (1997e: 9) as ‘totalitarianism’. In 
other words, it is ‘the psychology that has a strong impulse to sweep out 
everything (mono) inducing discomfort (fuyukai na kanjō) and pain (kutsū no 
kankaku)’ (Fujita 1997e: 29-30); in his view, this is based on and described by the 
political concept that depicts the age of the twentieth century. This is why Fujita 
called contemporary ‘high tech society’ (kōdo gijutsu shakai) ‘totalitarianism 
towards unruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi) (1997e: 29). 
    In this way, the concept of ‘totalitarianism’ became one of his most important 
analytical devices since Fujita had seen the psychology of contemporary people 
that avoids experience as senken-shugi, which has a lot in common with the 
implications of the political term. This analysis with a focus on the concept 
reached a climax with his article ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken (jyō)’ (The 
Experience of the Twentieth Century of Totalitarianism, Original Edition) (1986) 
– abbreviated to ‘Zentaishugi (jyō)’ below. Roughly speaking, the subject of this 
work was to grasp the characteristics of the age of the twentieth century by 
focusing on the concept of totalitarianism. In this writing, Fujita first of all 
described ‘totalitarianism as a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi or 
sensō no zentaishugi) – abbreviated to ‘totalitarianism as war’ below – which is, 
according to him, typical of World War I, regarded as a ‘commercial war’ 
(senden-sen) and a ‘war of attrition’ (shōmō-sen). Referring primarily to Hannah 
Arendt, then, Fujita explained ‘totalitarianism as a way of political rule’ (seiji 
shihai no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi, seiji shihai no zentaishugi or seiji no 
zentaishugi) – abbreviated to ‘political totalitarianism’ below – which is cha- 
racterised particularly by the use of ‘ideology’ (ideorogī) and ‘terror’ (teroru), and 
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by the appearance of ‘mass’ (taishū). Through shining a light on the connection 
between the former and latter concepts, Fujita contended, 
 
not only does political totalitarianism (seiji no zentaishugi) denote the secondary stage (dai-niki 
or dai-nidankai) of the history of the formation of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, 
but the violent extension movement (bōryokuteki bōchō undō), namely war (sensō) meant by 
the concept, also notably and intentionally contains totalitarianism as war (sensō no 
zentaishugi) that emerged in the first stage (dai-ikki). In this respect, the latter totalitarianism 
was integrated into the former (1998c: 524). 
 
Subsequently, ‘totalitarianism as a contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni 
okeru zentaishugi, seikatsu yōshiki no zentaishugi or gendai zentaishugi) – abb- 
reviated to ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ below – which was first provided in 
the revised edition of ‘Zentaishugi no jidai keiken’ (1995) – abbreviated to 
‘Zentaishugi’ below – was raised fundamentally on the extension of the above 
two types of totalitarianism. In this kind of society, says Fujita, ‘fictitious 
commodities’ (gisei shōhin) put forward by Karl Polanyi, namely ‘land’ (tochi), 
‘labour’ (rōdō) and ‘money’ (kahei), and Marx’s ‘labour power’ play a major role 
(1997e: 77-81). In particular, money is bound to acquire all those things. Fujita 
writes: 
 
Currency (kahei) essentially based on the principle of currency (ryūdō, ryūtsū) represents all 
wealth (tomi) – what a paradox! Doesn’t currency (ryūdō) representing all kinds of values 
and wealth precisely characterise totalitarianism per se? . . . Isn’t it a new totalitarianism in 
a different dimension and form from the original and classical one (sōzōtekina kotenteki 
zentaishugi) which emerged in the catastrophic 1930s in so far as fierce and ceaseless 
mobilisation (ryūdō and ryūtsū) sucks everything – figurations (keitai), objects (taishō) and 
things (mono) – out of society, and in so far as this world typifies this feature, regardless of 
the banner? (1997e: 82-3) 
 
The above sentences explain why Fujita claims that ‘contemporary totalita- 
rianism’ is ‘not the opposite of totalitarianism but rather captures the essence in 
peaceful appearance’ (1997e: 77). Admittedly, from this perspective, he rather 
stresses the problematic situation that it is quite hard for contemporary people to 
be aware of the existence of the problem per se exactly in the sense that apparently it 
looks nonviolent. 
    Another important viewpoint ‘Zentaishugi’ presents, quite interestingly, is to 
identify the totalitarianism of Japan as a representative ‘contemporary total- 
itarianism’; in my view, this is of vital importance to Fujita. Previously, he 
already pointed out that Japan was characteristic of ‘political totalitarianism’ in 
‘Zentaishugi (jyō)’, in which, similarly, he said that it was established sub- 
sequent to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (1998c: 526). In this work, however, cont- 
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emporary totalitarianism was neither clarified nor even described; instead, he 
simply observed that a strong need for ‘newness’ (atarashisa, shinpin) is an 
essential feature of totalitarianism in contemporary Japan. In ‘Zentaishugi’, later 
published, by contrast Fujita provided a more precise account. Indeed, focusing 
on this new edition, it is very easy to understand what the article intends by 
introducing the concept of totalitarianism. In short, his intention of advancing 
the concept of contemporary totalitarianism following two kinds of totalitarian- 
ism noted above is oriented exactly towards criticising ‘contemporary Japanese 
society’. As he puts it, 
 
The characteristics of the totalitarianisation (zentaishugika) of Japan are described simply by 
the fact that the attitude that ‘New is beautiful!’18 (sōdai na atarashii mono wa yoi mono da) 
established totalitarianism based on the whole society by exploring (tsuikyū) or copying 
(mohō) or modifying (kakō) or highly streamlining (kō-nōritsuka) it, regarding even the 
newest evil (shijyō saishin no aku) as good (zen). This resulted in Japan becoming a leading 
and typical contemporary totalitarianism (gendai zentaishugi) as the third type of totalita- 
rianism (1997e: 86). 
 
According to Fujita, Japan’s proposition that ‘New is beautiful!’ is derived from 
the ancient ‘ritsuryō kokka’ (code-based state) (1997e: 86). He claims that the 
Meiji Restoration also inherited its spirit from the ancient state. In this respect, it 
is stressed that Japan has so far valued its conventional spirit for long periods of 
time. For instance, referring to the thinker of Meiji era, Yukichi Fukuzawa, who 
is often regarded as a founder of modern Japan, Fujita points out that most of 
the Japanese ‘Europeanists in the nineteenth century’ (jyūkyū seiki seiō bunmei 
shugisha) including Fukuzawa were absorbed in the act of ‘imitating the ori- 
ginal’ (mohō) (1997e: 87). In addition, focusing on the 1930s, Fujita emphasises 
that their strong praise for newness and magnificence clearly explains that 
Japan was intrigued by totalitarianism such as Fascism and Stalinism chara- 
cterised as new and magnificent – he provides an interesting piece of data that 
the book entitled Zentaishugi sōsho (A Series of Totalitarianism), which seems to 
‘put a high value on the total (zentai) and totality (zentaisei)’, was published in 
Japan in the 1930s (1997e: 88-9). Needless to say, here he recognises one of the 
significant characteristics of Japan that even puts a high value on ‘the newest 
evil’. Through these analyses, Fujita puts forward his remedial perspective on 
totalitarianism as follows: ‘every part (bubun) is described by them as such, and 
possible comparative differences between them are therefore represented sim- 
ply either as a more important part (yori taisetsu na bubun) or as a part previously 
existing (yori saki ni atta bubun); there is no privileged part representing exactly the 
total as such (sonomono)’ (1997e: 89). 
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    From these perspectives, we can precisely acknowledge that Japan has consi- 
stently sought to obtain newness by means of an act of imitation. It is understood 
that the efficiency of this Japanese fundamental style has been greatly improved, 
for example, through experiencing fascism in wartime Japan and the Kōdo Seichō. 
Presumably this is why Fujita had particularly to highlight Japanese totalita- 
rianism. In other words, he believed that Japan has been totalitarian continu- 
ously for long periods, particularly through laying stress on the essence of 
newness and magnificence, and that, after WWII, it has made more sophi- 
sticated the problematic feature by way of ‘rationalising without reason’. Most 
importantly, in this respect, we should consider that, above all, his object of 
study was always the ‘present age’, and therefore that he criticised ‘contem- 
porary totalitarianism’ in our time. (In many respects, Fujita’s stance particularly 
on contemporary society has much in common with Critical Theory’s, regard- 
less of the roughly 30-year generation gap between them.19) 
    It is recognised that in the interview ‘Gendai nihon no seishin’ (The Spirit of 
Contemporary Japan) (1990) – abbreviated to ‘Gendai seishin’ below – Fujita’s 
interest somewhat changed. As the editor’s note for Chosakushū 6 puts it, Fujita 
concerned himself ‘neither with the theory of “experience” nor with the psy- 
chology of society but with ethics’ (1997e: 240). Briefly speaking, Fujita sum- 
marised the essence of his knowledge cultivated since ‘Kōdo Seichō’, and add- 
ressed issues of contemporary Japan from his new ethical perspective in the 
work. First, depending on the ‘ability of self-criticism’ (jiko hihan nōryoku), 
namely ‘ethics’ (rinriteki burēki), he primarily criticised the Kōdo Seichō and 
‘companyism’ (kaisha-shugi),20 which were, according to him, based on ‘narci- 
ssism’, ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’, the ‘spirit of the imitation of the 
original’, the ‘impulse of extension’ (bōchō-shugi) and ‘exclusionary collectivism’ 
(haigaiteki shūdanshugi), all of which are induced by Japanese uncontrollable 
instincts without self-criticism (1997e: 92-110). Referring primarily to Konrad 
Lorenz’s perspective of the ‘point of no return’ and Edward M. Forster’s per- 
spective that ‘man can’t touch’, Fujita presented the provocative view that 
‘ethics (rinri) is aimed at learning our own personal boundaries’ (1997e: 112; cf. 
110-26). Significantly, ‘Gendai seishin’ introduced his new perspective of ethics 
with a particular focus on several scholars, including natural scientists such as 
zoologists and biologists, and, in this respect, it is noted that there was no cha- 
nge in his primary aim of criticising contemporary society. 
    In the interview ‘Marukusushugi no baransu shīto’ (The Balance Sheet of 
Marxism) (1991), Fujita suggested his significant proposition that ‘democracy is 
the minimum purpose’, referring to Russell and Laski (1997e: 168). In addition, 
he highlighted the importance of ‘personal relationships’ in the work (1997e: 
185-90). Most importantly, however, as he says, ‘I, as a Japanese, cast doubt on 
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the raison d’être of pure science (junsui gakumon) that is not motivated to deal with 
unhappy conditions about which the well-organised society, Japan, has brought, 
and from which one has suffered enough’ (1997e: 141; emphases added). Per- 
haps this motivation accounts for Fujita’s most fundamental academic position 
throughout his works, that academic knowledge ought to contribute to creating 
solutions to our actual problems.21 This is another reason why I am intrigued by 
Fujita’s political theory. 
    It is important to remember that, after his rectal cancer had been diagnosed in 
1993, Fujita published ‘Zentaishugi’ mentioned above. Taking account of the 
fact that he wrote the volume of forty nine pages during that serious illness, we 
can easily recognise how seriously he devoted himself to the work. In this res- 
pect, it can be regarded as the best work of his later years, in which, as we have 
seen, he tried to settle the primary issue of his later work, the Kōdo Seichō. 
However, Fujita had already provided its brief summary in the preceding work 
‘Mittsuno zentaishugi’ (Three Types of Totalitarianism) (1994) as an interview, 
in which he began by explaining his state of mind of ‘discontinuity’ (danzetsu). 
As Fujita puts it: 
 
Since the extension of the Japanese economy had been completed at the stage of the end of 
so-called industrial capitalism and national economy, there remained only the possibility of 
some economic bubbles (baburu); recently, in fact, there were such opportunities . . . in the 
1960s and 1980s. These experiences described by high growth, regarded either as capitalism 
or as market society, demonstrate how society is to renounce all connections (danzetsu) to 
cultural history. We were given the last experience through the events. This led me to 
conclude that all my tasks were completed (owatta na), and I gave up (owatta na); I got rectal 
cancer at precisely the same time (1997e: 192-3). 
 
Needless to say, this is a crucial matter for Fujita. For this statement clearly 
denotes that Fujita abandoned political practice; it therefore gives a vital meaning 
to his life’s work, namely the task of establishing jinmin-shugi that was un- 
alterably of huge importance to him. In this interview, then, Fujita put forward 
three kinds of totalitarianism noted above, and claimed that ‘Japan has led itself 
to a leading totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’ (1997e: 207). From this per- 
spective, he concludes that ‘the twentieth century is the age of totalitarianism’ 
(1997e: 197). At this point it is important to note that Fujita’s diagnoses of con- 
temporary society are based on his following another fundamental diagnosis. 
He says, 
 
High growth gave society the specific discontinuity (tokubetsu no danzetsu). . . . around the 
middle of the 1960s . . . . The high economic growth, market society or, say, perpetuating or 
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revitalising bubble society . . . brought about the transmutation of and discontinuity in 
cultural history concerning individuals (1997e: 191). 
 
This statement attaches special importance to both Fujita’s early and later works, 
for it profoundly affected his final examination and diagnosis, as noted pre- 
viously. We remind ourselves that his ‘8/15 declaration’ was issued in the mid-
1960s. In this period, on the other hand, as Iida puts it, ‘“High growth” . . . 
while society gradually underwent a radical transformation of culture and 
spirit . . . crushed his “hopes” based on the sole possibility for restoring society 
in postwar Japan’ (2006a: 263). In other words, it is presumed that it was during 
the time Fujita underwent his inner conflict between ‘hope’ of realising jinmin-
shugi and ‘despair’, stemming from the spiritual change of Japanese society 
aiming at the Kōdo Seichō, that gave him a considerably negative perspective. It 
is noted, however, that although the conflict had given rise to his pessimistic 
view of the Kōdo Seichō, he managed to overcome it. Perhaps he repeatedly 
experienced such a psychological conflict. After all, it led Fujita to arrive at the 
above final conclusion that brought about his abandonment of hopes for politics. 
Thus, Fujita must have fallen into ‘despair’ again after overcoming it through 
regarding ‘the place severing ties with society’ (danzetsu no basho) as his home 
(1997e: 205). It must be emphasised that coming to such a conclusion means that 
he also abandoned being a political theorist, for his words that ‘all my tasks were 
completed’ questions the value of a theorist. 
 
 
Notes 
 
  1 Unfortunately, as far as I know, there is still no translation of his works into English, German 
or any European language. But there exists a translation of Zentaishugi no jidai keiken into 
Korean (1998d), the contents of which are slightly different from the original. Also, there is a 
great work on Fujita in German that focuses on his early contributions (Seifert 2010). 
  2 There are, however, some works referring to Fujita, e.g. Miriam Silverberg’s Erotic Grotesque 
Nonsense (2007: 265-6). 
  3 So far, no one has viewed Fujita as a political theorist. Most researchers on Fujita’s work have 
believed him to be either a ‘thinker’ (shisōka) (e.g. Cho 2012; Ichimura 2010; Iida 2006a) or a 
‘scholar of the history of ideas’ (shisōshi-ka) (e.g. Ichimura 2003, 2010; Miyamura 2009). How- 
ever, it seems that these ways of understanding Fujita have been largely determined by some 
partial views of the persons carrying out research on his work, that is by their research fields. 
In other words, they simply reflect their fixed views, as exemplified by the fact that, mostly, 
those who have studied Fujita’s theory have regarded themselves and have also been 
regarded as neither political theorists nor scholars of political theory primarily due to their 
research areas. In Japan, two disciplines of political theory and Japanese political theory, which 
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have close links with one another – generally, the latter is called ‘(the history of) Japanese 
political thought’ (Nihon seiji shisōshi or Nihon seiji shishō), and is also sometimes called the 
‘history of Japanese ideas’ (Nihon shisōshi) – have been separated, and it is sometimes bel- 
ieved that they are different fields (on the segregation between these two branches, see pp. 
232-3). It is generally considered, on the one hand, that the former studies Western political 
theory including its history with a focus on studying its ideas, exploring political principles 
and laying the foundations of political norms, and, on the other hand, that the latter studies 
Japanese political thought with a particular focus on understandings of its historical deve- 
lopment and its ideas. Admittedly, the latter discipline very often does not consider and reflect 
upon political principles and norms, as does the former. In other words, there is a distinct dif- 
ference in disciplinary characteristics between them. Although researchers on Fujita’s work 
are not confined to these two disciplines, these facts to a certain extent explain what concern 
their works have been based on, and why the above views have primarily been provided. In 
short, most persons who have tackled topics of Fujita’s writings have unconsciously disrega- 
rded his aspect of a political theorist. 
  4 This term has specific meaning to Fujita, and it is therefore much better to use the Japanese 
expression of Kōdo Seichō than the English words equivalent to the term such as ‘high growth’ 
and ‘high economic growth’. Hence, my research prefers the Japanese original. 
  5 On the meanings of tenkō, see, e.g. Tsurumi 1991, 2011. 
  6 This is usually abbreviated to the ‘Rokujū-nen Anpo’ or the ‘Anpo’ in Japanese. 
  7 This is the incident that, on 15 June 1960, an anti-Security Treaty demonstration organised by 
several groups such as Anpo Kaitei Soshi Kokumin Kaigi (The People’s Council to Prevent the 
Revision of the Security Treaty) and Zengakuren (The All-Japan Federation of Student 
Associations) had fought with the police, who had injured many demonstrators, and this 
violent behaviour led a student at the University of Tokyo, Michiko Kanba, to her death. 
  8 For example, Fujita’s sovereignty of the people is defined by Fujita himself as follows: ‘We, as 
the people (jinmin) engaging in certain occupations respectively, aim to establish relation- 
ships with others (kojin). Ways of communicating with them are bound to depend upon res- 
pective interpersonal relationships between the people. I believe that communication inde- 
pendent of the state system will come into existence, and that we will gradually be able to 
create the people (jinmin) as subjects who check and control political power on the basis of 
these principles. This is the exact sovereignty of the people’ (Fujita 1998b: 220). 
  9 It is said that, on this day, the Anti-Security Treaty movement supporting parliamentary 
democracy had begun to gain strength before the Security Treaty bill was railroaded through 
the Lower House late at night (e.g. Iida 2006a: 258). 
10 Fujita provides a brief account of this concept: ‘The term bourgeois is often translated as 
citizen (shimin, citoyen) [he most often intends the French term citoyen by the Japanese shimin]. 
Although Japanese language has a lack of the terminological tradition, I do not mean bour- 
geois or the middle class by citizen particularly when referring to citizenism (shiminshugi). 
All the classes and workers, that is ‘primordial men’ (Urmensch, genjin), are meant by the 
word. In short, it denotes citoyen’ (Fujita, Tanikawa, Tsurumi and Yoshimoto 2006: 131-2). For 
Fujita, therefore, the German Urmensch and the Japanese genjin mean the French citoyen 
equivalent to the English ‘citizen’. In this respect, it can be argued that, in his sense, the 
former two terms imply the German Bürger. 
11 This is Wesley Makoto Sasaki-Uemura’s translation (2001: 138). 
12 ‘“Risei” no kaifuku’ (1962) primarily presents this theoretical standpoint (see p. 255). 
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13  For example, Fujita has stressed the importance of ‘common sense’ in relation to the 
Constitution of Japan (Fujita, Ishida, Hidaka and Fukuda 2006: 337-8); he called for an act of 
‘filibuster’ (giji bōgai), ‘a right based on the spirit of parliamentarism (gikaishugi no seishin ni 
nezashita kenri)’, as the common sense of the Constitution. Needless to say, he intended parti- 
cular emphasis on the role of common sense in every constitution. Also, it is noted that Fujita 
employs the term kyōtsūkō as a translation of the English common sense, e.g. in his work 
‘Jinmin shuken’ (Fujita 1998b: 383), and the term kyōtsū no shiki, a translation of common 
sense, in ‘Shaku-shaku’ (Fujita 1998b: 223). 
14 My own experience to some extent supports the idea that living in a foreign country whose 
culture and lifestyle are considerably different from one’s own over several years signifi- 
cantly affects one’s mind. In this respect, it can be argued that there was a marked change in 
Fujita’s mind through his first study abroad even if he hesitated to discuss his experience – 
e.g. in ‘Kōdo Seichō’, which, as noted above, was first published shortly after his return to 
Japan (Fujita 1998c: 1). Indeed, it was the first time the Japanese Fujita had ever lived in Europe. 
15 According to ‘Fujita Shōzō chosaku mokuroku’ (A List of the Writings of Shōzō Fujita) edited 
by Iida, Miyamura and Hondō, Fujita published over ninety writings – albeit mostly short 
essays – between April 1971 and March 1980, that is during the period from when he left his 
job at the university to his return. 
16 This is a Japanese translation of Ernst Bloch’s term Rationalisierung ohne Ratio. 
17 It is noted that Fujita himself does not give the German original. This is Iida’s suggestion (e.g. 
2006a: 358). 
18 This is Erich Fromm’s expression (2011: 62), which seems to capture the essence of what 
Fujita intended by the words. 
19 On this, see Ch. 7. 
20 On this term, Fujita writes: ‘The Japanese company self is always driven by the desire to exp- 
and its territory on the basis of Mitsubishi-ism, Itōchū-ism and Marubeni-ism’; this is exactly 
the economic imperialism of Japan (keizai teikokushugi)’ (1997e: 94-5). 
21 In addition, Fujita stresses the importance of the contribution of ‘knowledge’ (gakumon) tow- 
ards establishing the sovereignty of the people (jinmin shuken). He says, ‘[k]nowledge is 
merely a means of achieving it [sovereignty of the people]’ (1998a: 231). 
  
 
 
 
APPENDIX 4 
 
On Fujita’s Terminology of Totalitarianism (Zentaishugi) 
 
 
 
 
 
In this appendix, I want to clarify Fujita’s terminology of ‘totalitarianism’ 
(zentaishugi) on the grounds that we can presume that it can often serve to con- 
fuse one particularly in terms of his specific usage of the concept. As is well 
known, the term has its origins in early Fascist Italy (Bracher 1973; Gleason 
1995). Later, however, it has not only meant Fascist politics but also been appl- 
ied specifically to extreme forms of Communist politics, especially to Stalinism. 
Furthermore, the concept has been widely applied to the most advanced cap- 
italist societies such as the US and Western Europe. In fact, it is important to 
note that it has often been used particularly for Nazism and Stalinism and also 
for Communist countries in the context of the Cold War, on the one hand, and 
for some democratic countries based on mass production and consumption, on 
the other. For these reasons, totalitarianism is regarded as a typical complex 
word which is the result of its own way of developing as a concept. I will first 
give a brief account of the emergence and development of the concept, next, see 
Fujita’s usage of the notion, and finally, seek for some problems of and consider 
the relevance of his conception of totalitarianism below. 
 
 
1.  The Origins and Expansion of the Concept of Totalitarianism 
 
The emergence and early development of the term 
As has been mentioned above, the term of totalitarianism (Totalitarismus) is 
derived originally from Fascist Italy. On this view, there is some evidence that 
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the adjective ‘total’ was terminologically developed into the Italian terms 
totalitario and totalitarietà in the context of Italian Fascism (Bracher 1973: 408). It 
is assumed, however, that the word was first used for criticising Fascism in Italy 
in 1923 (Gleason 1995: 13). Despite this fact, the philosopher of Italian Fascism 
Giovanni Gentile introduced the term, and Mussolini regarded the political sys- 
tem as totalitarian. 
    Later, the concept of totalitarianism was applied to the intensification of 
Nazism and Stalinism (Bracher 1973: 406). We can clearly see the idea of trying 
to understand both the two right- and left-wing extreme forms of political 
system by applying the notion typically in Hannah Arendt’s The Origins of 
Totalitarianism (1951), which argues that totalitarianism is characteristically seen 
in those new types of despotism with a wide range of uses of ideology and 
terror. Particularly in the late 1940s, meanwhile, it started to be applied for cri- 
ticising the Communist side of politics from the perspective of the Western side, 
in conjunction with the concept to a ‘war of ideas’. George Orwell’s Nineteen 
Eighty-Four (1949), for example, intends to offer a criticism of Communism by 
using the concept. Through these processes, the word of totalitarianism has 
been a rigorous political term. 
    With regard to the terminological signification of the concept, it is important 
to note that we generally use the term in an Arendtian or Orwellian sense for 
describing a political world. For this reason, we often misunderstand one’s int- 
ention of criticising Western society by the idea, for instance, primarily due to 
the above fact – we will see its signification below. In fact, this is primarily why 
Fujita’s usage of totalitarianism confuses us. 
 
The application of the concept to the criticism of the West 
The term totalitarianism has also been adopted to the critique of Western, 
capitalist, democratic countries particularly since the 1950s. Jacob L. Talmon’s 
The Origins of Totalitarian Democracy (1952) contends that a democratic system of 
government most often does not represent the people. Herbert Marcuse’s One-
Dimensional Man (1964) describes and criticises ‘advanced industrial society’, in 
which individuals are integrated into an existent controlling system based on 
mass production and consumption by effectively utilising advertising media; 
this world, he stresses, is not different from a totalitarian oppressive society 
even though raising the banner of democracy and freedom, in the sense that it 
propagates ‘false needs’, thereby enforcing conformity (2002: 3-8). With respect 
to the latter issue, however, it is possible to think that, for example, Adorno’s 
and Horkheimer’s The Dialectic of Enlightenment (1944) precedes Marcuse’s work 
on the grounds that, highlighting the ‘culture industry’, which even makes art 
 274 Appendix 4 
 
or culture a product, the former work stresses that the primary function of 
contemporary industrial society controls individual desires and enables them to 
conform, similarly to authoritarianism or totalitarianism. 1  Interestingly, their 
common intention of introducing the concept for describing those problems of 
Western society is to criticise capitalist, liberal democracy in parallel with com- 
munist or totalitarian politics. 
 
 
2.  Fujita’s Usage of the Term Totalitarianism 
 
Three types of totalitarianism2 
Basically, Fujita’s conception of totalitarianism proposes three types of totali- 
tarianism: ‘totalitarianism as a way of war’ (sensō no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) 
– often abbreviated to ‘totalitarianism as war’ (sensō no zentaishugi) – ‘totalitari- 
anism as a way of political rule’ (seiji shihai no arikata ni okeru zentaishugi) – often 
abbreviated to ‘political totalitarianism’ (seijiteki zentaishugi) – and ‘totalitaria- 
nism as contemporary way of life’ (seikatsu yōshiki ni okeru zentaishugi) – often 
abbreviated to ‘contemporary totalitarianism’ (gendai zentaishugi). 
    Fujita explains them as follows. With regard to the first one, a ‘commercial 
war’ (senden-sen) and a ‘war of attrition’ (shōmō-sen) characterise it, which is rep- 
resented by WWI (Fujita 1997e: 49-56). The second one is typified by ‘ideology’ 
(ideorogī) and ‘terror’ (teroru), and given its own energy by the mass (taishū), 
exactly as Arendt clearly describes (1997e: 45-9, 61-76). From these two perspe- 
ctives, he says: 
 
not only does political totalitarianism denote the secondary stage (dai-niki or dai-nidankai) of 
the history of the formation of totalitarianism in the twentieth century, but the violent 
extension movement (bōryokuteki bōchō undō), namely war (sensō) meant by the concept, also 
notably and intentionally contains totalitarianism as war that emerged in the first stage (dai-
ikki). In this respect, the latter totalitarianism was integrated into the former (1998c: 524). 
 
In Fujita’s view, ‘totalitarianism as war’ is intrinsically interwoven with ‘poli- 
tical totalitarianism’. The third one describes some negative aspects of con- 
temporary society and its social functions, in which, on the one hand, Karl 
Polanyi’s ‘fictitious commodities’ (gisei shōhin) – ‘land’ (tochi), ‘labour’ (rōdō) and 
‘money’ (kahei) – and Marx’s ‘labour power’ perform a major role (1997e: 77-81), 
and on the other hand, man’s need for ‘unruffled ease’ (anraku) requires him 
and his society to eliminate ‘anxiety’ (fuan), ‘pain’ (kutsū) and ‘discomfort’ 
(fukai) (1997e: 30). In particular, Fujita calls the former ‘totalitarianism as market 
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economy’ (shijō keizai zentaishugi), and the latter ‘totalitarianism towards un- 
ruffled ease’ (anraku e no zentaishugi). That is to say, there are two types in 
contemporary totalitarianism. On the former totalitarianism, he says as follows: 
 
Currency (kahei) essentially based on the principle of currency (ryūdō, ryūtsū) represents all 
wealth (tomi) – what a paradox! Doesn’t currency (ryūdō) representing all kinds of values 
and wealth precisely characterise totalitarianism per se? . . . Isn’t it a new totalitarianism in 
a different dimension and form from the original and classical one (sōzōtekina kotenteki 
zentaishugi) which emerged in the catastrophic 1930s in so far as fierce and ceaseless mob- 
ilisation (ryūdō and ryūtsū) sucks everything – figurations (keitai), objects (taishō) and things 
(mono) – out of society, and in so far as this world typifies this feature, regardless of the 
banner? (1997e: 82-3). 
 
As Fujita stresses, in the world of ‘totalitarianism as market economy’ currency 
represents ‘all kinds of values and wealth’ and absorbs all the other things. In 
this world, market mechanism even requires human beings to be means of cur- 
rency. With respect to ‘totalitarianism towards unruffled ease’, Fujita draws his 
inspiration from Richard Sennett’s concept of ‘a voluntary servitude to unru- 
ffled ease’ (Sennett 1974: 8). In this society, as can be seen in Sennett’s term, 
everyone desires a life of comfort exactly as if living in a ‘cocoon-like chamber’ 
(hoikuki), while, as can be seen in Ernst Bloch’s ‘rationalisation without reason’, 
they are deprived of humanity by the rationalisation of society, and need to 
exist in the harsh environment of exact rationalised market economy, at the 
same time (1997e: 7). 
    For Fujita, these two types of totalitarianism are regarded as more trouble- 
some existences because generally people are not even aware of the problem per se 
exactly as they look nonviolent. In his view, however, they are definitely ‘not the 
opposite of totalitarianism but rather capture the essence in peaceful appea- 
rance’ (1997e: 77; emphasis added). In other words, for Fujita, living especially 
after the war, peaceful totalitarianism is much more problematic than any 
others previously existing. In these respects, both totalitarianism as market eco- 
nomy and totalitarianism towards unruffled ease are regarded as contemporary 
totalitarianism exactly as our problem. 
 
Problems 
From the above perspective, how can we see Fujita’s conception of totalitari- 
anism? To be sure, it stresses and is in favour of the above critique of cont- 
emporary capitalist society. However, it does not intend primarily to criticise 
capitalism or western society. He rather aims to enable people to reflect upon 
their way of life and society by considering that totalitarianism has been the 
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world order since the twentieth century, and by warning them about their 
weird behaviour that they devote their attention to consuming things satisfying 
their needs in dialectical social conditions between market economy and their 
desire for unruffled ease. From this perspective, it can be well understood why 
he writes, ‘[t]he twentieth century is the age of totalitarianism’ (1997e: 197). 
    Is there, however, noting wrong with Fujita’s way of understanding both 
contemporary aspects of capitalism (consumption) and democratic life (privacy) 
simply as totalitarianism even though the negative factors he provided perform 
a function in centralised control over people, thereby repressing them, as it 
does? In my view, there are at least three problems with his conception of tot- 
alitarianism. First, it does not have any positive sense from a democratic per- 
spective, and it can therefore shed light only on negative aspects of contem- 
porary society. Second, it rather serves to blur the borders between traditional 
and contemporary problems. And third, it ironically ignores any differences 
between contemporary totalitarianism and the other two types. With regard to 
the first problem, the conception does not enable us to find any positive aspects 
of society – this is also applicable to his many other concepts provided in his 
later years – or, more accurately, it serves to hide what social aspects are not 
categorised as totalitarianism. With regard to the second problem, the conception 
cannot describe what problems are specific to contemporary society. With regard to 
the third problem, his way of using the term contributes solely to finding common 
aspects between past and present societies, and the concept in his usage thereby 
loses its general meanings. These three problems can be explained by the meta- 
phor that the taste of a soup including some vegetables can be masked in acc- 
ordance with the amount and quality of pepper. Concretely speaking, both 
problems and benefits in contemporary society are masked by a strong flavour 
of totalitarianism. 
 
Relevance 
Despite the above difficulties, his conception of totalitarianism is of great rel- 
evance for critically understanding contemporary social and political pheno- 
mena. As mentioned above, it is greatly helpful particularly in elucidating our 
problems common to the past – in this respect, it seems that the conception has 
developed Arendt’s, Adorno’s and Horkheimer’s, and Marcuse’s issues. To put 
it another way, it helps to reflect upon what we generally do not regard as 
problematic. Most importantly, he tells us that a past problem is directed not 
only at the past but also at the present by conceptualising some contemporary 
phenomena as totalitarianism.  
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Notes
 
  1 On this issue, for example, Horkheimer, Adorno and Fromm rarely use the term totalita- 
rianism, rather it seems to me that they prefer the terms authoritarianism and fascism. 
  2 On this issue, see Chapter 5, sections 2 and 4, and also Appendix 3, section 2. 
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